Longstreet's Evil Twin?

To my mind, Lee was a far superior general to Hood. Pickett's Charge was a mistake, but Lee had consistently won victories since taking command before the Seven Days. He won victories because he was an excellent general. As a corps commander and army commander, Hood was out of his depth. Any battles he presided over were ghastly defeats. Certainly his Tennessee foray which laid Georgia open to Sherman's march was a massive strategic miscalculation.
Lee can be faulted for his mistakes at Gettysburg. But he kept the war out of Virginia for a year, and even after July 3rd, the Union failed to attack him, and he was able to detach Longstreet's corps to help win the only real Confederate victory in the West, Chickamanga.
 
If I remember correctly, someone once aske Lee who was responsible at Gettysburg and he replied "I beleive the Yankees had somthing to do with it." At least that is how the story goes.
Your memory is not faulty, but I think it was Pickett that said that.
Ole
 
Lee's Failures and Success at Gettysburg

I doubt any good analysis of the Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg can be laid at Lee's foot, without blaming Lee for their predicament.
However, we must remember that Lee no longer had the advantage of operating in Virginia, but was in enemy territory with the spies, that could place his armies at York and Wrightsville, at Carlisle and at Chambersburg.

Lee had taken two corps through the slow narrow gap that ran from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, perhaps the great mistake of the campaign.

We all accept that Pickett's Charge was an offensive action. Perhaps not, in all its aspects. Since few ever faulted Lee, many may not judge accurately that Lee might of realized his mistake in not keeping Hill and Longstreet at Chambersburg or west of South Mountain. By July 2nd, Lee only had one sure egress from Gettysburg and that was through the Chambersburg-Gettysburg gap. How would he move three corps through that one gap. Impossible, I would think, efficiently.

If Lee couldn't drive the Union army off of Cemetery Ridge, it had to secure the Fairfield road for a second egress back to Virginia. That was essential.

I think Lee's retreat, back to Virginia is one of the great retreats in military history. Perhaps Pickett's Charge was at a minimum made to ensure that Lee had two routes home; one over the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike and the over over the Fairfield Road. It did do that. Those are the routes Lee took his army. The Army of Northern Virginia survived, even with the delay caused by high waters on the Potomac River.

Lee might have hoped that Pickett would break through, but perhaps Lee feared an AoP countermove to take Fairfield Road. Striking forceably with a huge artillery barrage and with Pickett's Charge, Lee maintained the second egress over Fairfield Road.

Lee lost at Gettysburg, but he kept an army for nearly two more years. Perhaps looking at Lee's errors in moving into Gettysburg, we can find how he succeeded.
 
I agree. An excellent analysis. I have always thought that Lee was one of the best generals this country ever produced. My quibble has always been with those who would prevent any criticism. Something I think Lee himself woud be uncomfortable with.
 
ole said:
Your memory is not faulty, but I think it was Pickett that said that.
Ole

Don't think it was Pickett. He was quoted as saying about Lee after the war. "That old man destroyed my division."
 
matthew mckeon said:
To my mind, Lee was a far superior general to Hood. Pickett's Charge was a mistake, but Lee had consistently won victories since taking command before the Seven Days. He won victories because he was an excellent general. As a corps commander and army commander, Hood was out of his depth. Any battles he presided over were ghastly defeats. Certainly his Tennessee foray which laid Georgia open to Sherman's march was a massive strategic miscalculation.
Lee can be faulted for his mistakes at Gettysburg. But he kept the war out of Virginia for a year, and even after July 3rd, the Union failed to attack him, and he was able to detach Longstreet's corps to help win the only real Confederate victory in the West, Chickamanga.

I had a Great Great Uncle with the 35th Ill. who was killed when Longstreet's troops came off that train and right through their line on the first day.
 
whitworth said:
Lee might have hoped that Pickett would break through, but perhaps Lee feared an AoP countermove to take Fairfield Road. Striking forceably with a huge artillery barrage and with Pickett's Charge, Lee maintained the second egress over Fairfield Road.


Ordering an large assault to open an additional line of retreat, with a hope for a breakthrough?

I can't buy it.
 
Someone advanced a theory a while back that was new to me, but did make some sense. The speculation was that Lee might have launched the attack so as to beat up on Meade enough that he wouldn't follow closely. Just a touch fanciful, but interesting to contemplate.
Ole
 
ole said:
Someone advanced a theory a while back that was new to me, but did make some sense. The speculation was that Lee might have launched the attack so as to beat up on Meade enough that he wouldn't follow closely. Just a touch fanciful, but interesting to contemplate.
Ole

Well if that were true, or that he ordered the PPT assault as a ruse to open an additional avenue of escape, the the entire character of Robert E. Lee would have to be re-evaluated.

He was sometimes called the "Gray Fox", but I think one would be going a bit far to say that he attempted to 'outfox' his adversary by sacrificing a third of his army.

Likewise that attribute of "honor" generally attributed to General Lee, would be seriously tarnished by such a calculated sacrifice.

Pickett might well have said "That old man sacrificed my division, in order to escape".

As I said, I can't buy it.
 
Seems that the entire campaign was whys, ifs, and maybes. Could be a lot like Franklin -- doomed if you don't; doomed if you do.
Ole
 
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