Lee operational incompetence at Gettysburg?

His division attacked; he displayed no control over his command.

True enough. If I recall correctly, Mahone refused to move his brigade at all, which I've always thought odd considering his otherwise solid combat record. Neither Anderson nor Hill nor Lee seems to have noticed that he was just sitting there, even though all of them were in close proximity. What on Earth went wrong there?
 
True enough. If I recall correctly, Mahone refused to move his brigade at all, which I've always thought odd considering his otherwise solid combat record. Neither Anderson nor Hill nor Lee seems to have noticed that he was just sitting there, even though all of them were in close proximity. What on Earth went wrong there?

Mahone doesn't move forward, Posey gets sidetracked by the skirmish around the Bliss Farm, and there's no coordination with Rodes' Division.

The Confederate command made a bunch of mistakes (as is normal in combat) but was unable to capitalize on the Federal errors, as they had done in the past.

R
 
OK, I know Hollywood isn't known for its accuracy and a movie is poor substitute for hard research, so all you learned experts and authors spare me the flames, OK? I think these quotes from Lee in the movie "Gettysburg" says it all about why he acted the way he did:

General Robert E. Lee:"If we stay we fight. If we retreat now we would have fought here for two days and will leave knowing we could not drive them off , and I have never left the enemy in command of the field. No sir retreat is no longer a option."

General Robert E. Lee:" But this war goes on and on and the men die and the price gets even higher. We are prepared to lose some of us, but we are never prepared to lose all of us. We are adrift here in a sea of blood and I want it to end. I want this to be the final battle."

"Lieutenant General James Longstreet: Yes sir, they have always done that. But in the morning we may be outnumbered, and they'll be entrenched on the high ground.
General Robert E. Lee: General, you know as well as I, we have never concerned ourselves with being outnumbered."

Until this time, Lee had been brilliant at doing the unexpected and persevering when outnumbered and a history of winning. All of which - I think - would make it harder for him to back off when things started going bad.
 
Actually, champ--show a little respect. When you've devoted 20+ years to researching this, have written 18 books and won awards, then you can speak to me with that level of disrespect. Otherwise, you are dismissed.

To answer your question: Heth knew that there were Union troops in Gettysburg. He incorrectly assumed that they were militia.
I addressed you,exactly,as you addressed me. The correct answer is No. Heth did not know Buford was in front of him and Heth is marching in column. Heth is shelling in advance of his troops to attempt to determine if there are troops to his front. Thank you.
 
Imagine that. As if Lee never heard of such a thing and FZ would know something Lee didn't know.

That's the whole reason for having an en echelon attack, but some folks prefer to wallow in self-imposed ignorance rather than learn something and not simply be a knee-jerk critic of a professional soldier who well deserves his place as the second best general of the war.
Excuse,me. I'm not explaining Interior Lines to Gen. Lee:I'm explaining them to You! I have to point this out to You to illustrate your error in claiming Lee performed well at Gettysburg.I'm happy to explain this one point at a time. Thank you.
 
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Excuse,me. I'm not explaining Interior Lines to Gen. Lee:I'm explaining them to You! I have to point this out to You to illustrate the Military Folly of Lee's attack on 7/2 and,particularly,Lee's attack on 7/3. Again,Lee's performed poorly at Gettysburg. I'm happy to discuss it with you,one point at a time. Thank you.

Cash is correct. Attacking en echelon was an attempt to negate the strength of the interior lines. The problem wasn't the plan, it was the execution (it started late, Anderson's Division gets bogged down, Rides makes no move to attack, Ewell doesn't attack on time, etc.).

R
 
Cash is correct. Attacking en echelon was an attempt to negate the strength of the interior lines. The problem wasn't the plan, it was the execution (it started late, Anderson's Division gets bogged down, Rides makes no move to attack, Ewell doesn't attack on time, etc.).

R
No. The problem is the Plan. The Fact is: Meade can shift troops to Lee's point of attack before Lee can overwhelm the point of attack. Meade can do this all day long. On 7/3 Lee exaggerates this error by attacking Meade's center. A center attack shortens the distance Meade has to move troops to counter Lee's attack and results in Lee's attack being attacked on 3 sides. That how it is ....and that's what happened.
 
No. The problem is the Plan. The Fact is: Meade can shift troops to Lee's point of attack before Lee can overwhelm the point of attack.

Sort of, but don't get carried away. As it was, Longstreet's attack on the Union left drew so many Union troops away from Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill that Ewell's attack on them near dusk very nearly succeeded. Had Rodes attacked the west side of Cemetery Hill at the same time that Early attacked the east side, we'd be talking about how Lee's en echelon tactics defeated Meade's use of interior lines.
 
No. The problem is the Plan. The Fact is: Meade can shift troops to Lee's point of attack before Lee can overwhelm the point of attack. Meade can do this all day long. On 7/3 Lee exaggerates this error by attacking Meade's center. A center attack shortens the distance Meade has to move troops to counter Lee's attack and results in Lee's attack being attacked on 3 sides. That how it is ....and that's what happened.

No, Meade can't. Until the Sixth Corps arrives, Meade has a limited number of reserves to draw upon in case of emergency. If Lee were given more time for the attack on July 2 and some of the commanders had played a more active role, Meade would've been in serious trouble. For example, if Wilcox and Posey had followed up on Wright's attack, there were very few troops that could've been thrown into the breach. And that doesn't include the potential if Rodes moves as well.

Unfortunately for Lee, the Union troops fought incredibly stubbornly and were led ably while many of his commanders had rather lackluster days.

R
 
No, Meade can't. Until the Sixth Corps arrives, Meade has a limited number of reserves to draw upon in case of emergency. If Lee were given more time for the attack on July 2 and some of the commanders had played a more active role, Meade would've been in serious trouble. For example, if Wilcox and Posey had followed up on Wright's attack, there were very few troops that could've been thrown into the breach. And that doesn't include the potential if Rodes moves as well.

Unfortunately for Lee, the Union troops fought incredibly stubbornly and were led ably while many of his commanders had rather lackluster days.

R
Well,excuse me...but Meade did just that! It's real simple. Meade has more men than Lee! Further,most Federal casualties are attributable to Sickles advanced position. As the terrain steepens,the Confederates start to take,relatively,more casualties and their advance is stopped. The Confederates have gained nothing but the ground over which Sickles advanced his line. Forget your Ifs and Buts. "If, ifs and buts were candy and nuts,we'd all have a merry Christmas." (Don Meredith) mnf,rip.
 
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Sort of, but don't get carried away. As it was, Longstreet's attack on the Union left drew so many Union troops away from Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill that Ewell's attack on them near dusk very nearly succeeded. Had Rodes attacked the west side of Cemetery Hill at the same time that Early attacked the east side, we'd be talking about how Lee's en echelon tactics defeated Meade's use of interior lines.
Can't agree. Meade shifts troops to meet any attack. Interior Lines!
 
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