TDMD
First Sergeant
- Joined
- Nov 11, 2010
- Location
- Norridge, IL
Lee tried them two, too many times and with the same reluctant leader both times.
And other than Gettysburg, these times would be...?
Lee tried them two, too many times and with the same reluctant leader both times.
Bumping your question up 30K feet, imagine how the "war" would have been different had Longstreet, the most brilliant mind on either side, been in command from the start. A military victory was not possible for the South. Lee never understood that. Longstreet did. Had the South waged a battle of recognition, and not warfare, the land you and I know today would look far different.
:laugh2:You've been reading too much of Longstreet's book.
The point is(once again) is why was Longstreet to Attack at 1100 or even1200 or 1600 hrs etc, instead of the early morning hrs as originally planned by Lee, on Day 2? Did Longstreet await laws brigade while on the march or did he wait for its arrival before starting the planned movement to the Union Left flank?
It can only be noted, again, that most of those 'circumstances' mentioned et. al., that most directly led to Lee's defeat at Gettysburg, had their source in Lee and Longstreet's Disagreement, both, on Day 2 And Day 3.
P.S. ref Post #221: Obviously the main attacks on Day 2 And Day 3; both imperfectly planned by Lee and imperfectly executed by Longstreet.(the importance of this, as to this particular thread, is that both failed for the same reasons and both happended within 24 hrs of each other)
Surely, Lee or Longstreet are not depending on a recon report many hrs. old, even at 1100 hrs? Which both Lee and Longstreet is totally outof date, when they both learn of the occupation of the Peach Orchard by Sickles a little after1200 hrs. Is it not more accurate to point to the historical evidence of the words and actions of Lee and Longstreet, as explaining the slowness of the confederate attack to develop and assume that it was the direct result of Lee's and Longstreet's fundamental disagreement over strategy and tactics, rather than an out of date recon report, no matter how accurate, or not, it actually was?
No,it's not more accurate,etc. This is 1863,they don't have Twitter or Cell Phones with which to communicate. Communication up and down the lines takes hours;not seconds.Surely, Lee or Longstreet are not depending on a recon report many hrs. old, even at 1100 hrs? Which both Lee and Longstreet is totally outof date, when they both learn of the occupation of the Peach Orchard by Sickles a little after1200 hrs. Is it not more accurate to point to the historical evidence of the words and actions of Lee and Longstreet, as explaining the slowness of the confederate attack to develop and assume that it was the direct result of Lee's and Longstreet's fundamental disagreement over strategy and tactics, rather than an out of date recon report, no matter how accurate, or not, it actually was?
No,it's not more accurate,etc. This is 1863,they don't have Twitter or Cell Phones with which to communicate. Communication up and down the lines takes hours;not seconds.
No commander worth his salt, wiould build his main assault on an out of date recon report. Surely such, if true, reflects badly on both Longstreet's and Lee's professional abilities as soldiers. The recon report was out of date, at least, as soon as Sickles sent his reconnaisance in force to the Peach Orchard a little after 1200 hrs. From that time until the attack at approx. 1700 hrs. Lee is predicating his main assault on a recon report made long before daylight that morning with no thought of changing it according to new evidence? Longstreet certainly did as did Hood later.
If we did not have the evidence of Day 3, supreme belief in Lee's and Longstreet's differing strategy and tactics having no decisive effect on the success of the ANV's attacks on Day 2, might have some logical or reasonable basis in fact.
But, by 1500 hrs, it was too late, as the results show. Does the historical record of the failure of two major confederate assaults indicate that Lee's strategy and tactics were defective, as implied by Lonstreet's heartfelt criticisms of them, or, because they were both delivered in the afternoon rather than in the morning, as Lee had wanted, both commanded by the same officer who voiced his lack of confidence in the first attack and predicted utter failure for the other?
There is a pattern of events, leading from the very planning stages of the Pa. Invasion in Richmond, through three days of battle, that can best be logically explained by the effects of a fundamental difference of opinion between Lee and his chief Lt., Longstreet.
The battles themselves have little or no relevance to the question of the effect of Lee's and Longstreet's disagreement over the best tactics and strategy to be followed, for the invasion of Pa. The question is, did that disagreement produce the 'circumstances' that resulted in Lee's plans for Day 2 inoperative or moot, directly leading to the failure of those plans on both days?
Were the 'circumstances' for the results of Day 3 a difference of degree and not substance, compared to the same failure of Lee's plans as that of Day 2?
Look,OC. Lee's attacks on days 2 and 3 were a "Bad Idea". It's,really,that simple.The battles themselves have little or no relevance to the question of the effect of Lee's and Longstreet's disagreement over the best tactics and strategy to be followed, for the invasion of Pa. The question is, did that disagreement produce the 'circumstances' that resulted in Lee's plans for Day 2 inoperative or moot, directly leading to the failure of those plans on both days?
Were the 'circumstances' for the results of Day 3 a difference of degree and not substance, compared to the same failure of Lee's plans as that of Day 2?