Lafayette McLaws

JEB

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McLaw's graduated from West Point with James Longstreet in 1842 . He was promoted to division command under Jackson and served under Longstreet in the Antietam and Fredricksburg campaigns. He particulary distinguished himself in the defense of Marye's Heights when his division held back an entire corps . It seems that he was a great divisional commander thus far .

At Gettysburg he locked horns with Longstreet . I'm surprised to learn McLaws defended Longstreet against the attempts of Early and Pendleton to smear Old Pete's reputation after the war . McLaw's support of Longstreet seems all the more curious considering Longstreet relieved him of command during operations in the west in late 1863 .

I've also learned that General Lee had little faith in his abilities and refused his promotions . Lee issued McLaws orders personally on July 2nd rather than have Longstreet direct him . Was that because of Longstreet's " mood " or McLaw's questionable understanding of the situation ? Or Both ?


Why did Lee have a problem with McLaw's leadership ?

Could anyone elaborate on McLaw's performance at Gettysburg and his relationship with Longstreet and Lee ?

Thanks in advance .
 
I don't have the answer, just happy to see the question, thank you!( disclaimer first, beginner here ) I like McLaws but he gets written about sometimes like he was Gomer Pyle's second, favorite cousin so I'm generally intimidated to ask about the guy.

I could make a guess on why a man like McLaws would defend Longstreet postwar. He seems to have been awfully deliberate and honest- maybe he liked that about Longstreet and respected it in him. If he saw events at Gettysburg the same way Longstreet did, and felt Early and Pendleton's versions were colored on a way which misrepresented what he experienced himself, maybe he smelled a rat.

I have a question to add, if JEB doesn't mind, was Jackson happy with his performance? You'd think if Jackson approved of McLaws then Lee would too?
 
I've also learned that General Lee had little faith in his abilities and refused his promotions . Lee issued McLaws orders personally on July 2nd rather than have Longstreet direct him . Was that because of Longstreet's " mood " or McLaw's questionable understanding of the situation ? Or Both ?


Why did Lee have a problem with McLaw's leadership ?

Could anyone elaborate on McLaw's performance at Gettysburg and his relationship with Longstreet and Lee ?

Thanks in advance .
I first remember reading of Lee's problems with McLaws' leadership in Lee's Lieutenants, Volume 2. I've seen other accounts since then, but all pretty much agree. They seem stem from two instances when he was given more or less independent commands at Sharpsburg and Chancellorsville.

During the Maryland Campaign McLaws commanded his and Anderson's divisions with instructions to seize Maryland Heights in conjunction with Jackson's attack on Harper's Ferry. He performed this assignment quite well - taking the Heights while holding off Franklin's VI Corps after it seized Crampton's Gap on September 14. Unfortunately Franklin's Corps blocked McLaws' most direct route to Sharpsburg. He was forced to cross the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, wend his way through the town in the aftermath of that battle and follow Jackson's command. Rather than push thru with the urgency Lee expected McLaws stopped his command near Shepherdstown for the night until prompted by another order from Lee. When McLaws' and Anderson's Divisions finally did arrive on the morning of September 17 the battle had already begun and both divisions were somewhat bedraggled and disorganized.

At Chancellorsville on the afternoon of May 3, 1863, McLaws and his division were sent by Lee to block the advance of Sedgwick's VI Corps which had seized Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg and was advancing toward the rear of Lee's lines at Chancellorsville. McLaws and the Wilcox's Alabama Brigade (previously detached from Anderson) set up a line at Salem Church. Lee, ever aggressive, sent new orders to coordinate an attack on Sedgwick with his command with Early's Division which had regrouped after being pushed back from Fredericksburg. At McLaws' request Lee sent Anderson's Division as reinforcements. When Lee arrived at the scene in late morning he found that McLaws had done nothing while awaiting Anderson's arrival. In the meantime Early had arrived and launched some uncoordinated attacks that had not been supported by McLaws. In addition McLaws seemed to have little awareness of the Federal dispositions and the ground in front of him.
 
Thanks everybody .
Great article Rebforever .

I suppose Jackson's leadership style brought out the best in McLaws . Jackson had the will and energy to micro manage . Thats gotta be one of the key elements of Jackson's success .

Lee's " discretionary "orders created controversy after controversy in the Gettysburg Campaign . It became a perfect breeding ground for scapegoats .

Had Jackson survived maybe McLaws potential as a commander would have been fully realized ? Its another factor that supports the notion that the loss of Jackson signaled the decline of the ANV .
 
Thanks everybody .
Great article Rebforever .

I suppose Jackson's leadership style brought out the best in McLaws . Jackson had the will and energy to micro manage . Thats gotta be one of the key elements of Jackson's success .

Lee's " discretionary "orders created controversy after controversy in the Gettysburg Campaign . It became a perfect breeding ground for scapegoats .

Had Jackson survived maybe McLaws potential as a commander would have been fully realized ? Its another factor that supports the notion that the loss of Jackson signaled the decline of the ANV .

Don't forget that Jackson 'a leadership style and inflexibility hampered his relationship with many of his subordinates. Direct and immediate supervision at times may have at times worked for McLaws, but his obtainment of his full potential is questionable. Leaders who have to be repeatedly told what to do often do not blossom. At Gettysburg, Lee's discretionary orders certainly created controversy in the Gettysburg campaign. There was certainly enough blame to go around within the Confederate General staff, including Lee himself. The AOP certainly had a key role in their defeat. As far as Jackson's death signaling a decline in the ANV, I believe that was more of an effect rather than the cause. Jackson's "what if" role at Gettysburg is always a debate. In the end, however, I believe Grant's transfer East would have resulted in the same eventual outcome.
 
Here's a rabbit trail. In the Sid Myers computer game ( which won't work on new computers) I remember McLaws had a very small division. So I never gave them much of a task other than to guard the camp, so to speak. I'm thinking of the Anteitam/South Mountain versions.
 
McLaw's graduated from West Point with James Longstreet in 1842 . He was promoted to division command under Jackson and served under Longstreet in the Antietam and Fredricksburg campaigns. He particulary distinguished himself in the defense of Marye's Heights when his division held back an entire corps . It seems that he was a great divisional commander thus far .

At Gettysburg he locked horns with Longstreet . I'm surprised to learn McLaws defended Longstreet against the attempts of Early and Pendleton to smear Old Pete's reputation after the war . McLaw's support of Longstreet seems all the more curious considering Longstreet relieved him of command during operations in the west in late 1863 .

I've also learned that General Lee had little faith in his abilities and refused his promotions . Lee issued McLaws orders personally on July 2nd rather than have Longstreet direct him . Was that because of Longstreet's " mood " or McLaw's questionable understanding of the situation ? Or Both ?


Why did Lee have a problem with McLaw's leadership ?

Could anyone elaborate on McLaw's performance at Gettysburg and his relationship with Longstreet and Lee ?

Thanks in advance .
Great post.
 
Yes. In his meeting with Lee and Longstreet,McLaws insisted on scouting his front before he launched his attack. They,then,discovered Sickles advanced position.

Except that Longstreet forbade him to leave his division in the morning. Had he ridden forward at 8 in the morning it wouldn't have helped him anyway, Sickles didnt move his line forward until after 1pm. After which it was apparent to anybody anywhere on Seminary Ridge where Sickles was, the Peach Orchard is an open piece of high ground visible from all over the area. It did speak well of McLaws that he wanted to scout the position himself of course. Why Longstreet prevented him is an interesting piece of this puzzle.

Not only did Lee reject McLaws promotion, he may have intended to transfer him out of ANV and Longstreet may have interceded to prevent it. What is certain is that Lee ordered Longstreet to keep McLaws directly under his eye, and held Longstreet accountable for the conduct of his division. McLaws didnt know this at the time, and became bitter that Longstreet interfered with his division on the 2nd. This also explains why Longstreet didnt take a firm grasp of Hood's division once Hood went down- he had been ordered to remain with McLaws.

My take on all of this is that there is a missing aspect of the Longstreet/Lee disagreement that morning, and I suspect the McLaws situation was fuel to that fire for Longstreet. I think that it was no one thing setting Longstreet off that day it was a series of things- first Lee insists on taking the tactical offensive against whatever agreement Longstreet thought they had, then Lee pushes Longstreet to attack short one of his divisions on uncertain ground, then he badmouths one of his division commanders and forces him to babysit, then Lee proposes an attack up Emmitsburg Road that (had it been carried out) would expose Longstreets flank to the actual enemy position on Cemetery Ridge (see the Longstreet thread for my take on that), the Lee rather condescendingly goes over the plan directly with McLaws while Longstreet stalked around in irritation. Longstreet points out the position parallel Emmistburg road he wants McLaws to assume (wisely, as the enemy would be to his front, Lee overrules him and points Mclaws to a line perpendicular. I suspect there was more to that disagreement between the two that never made it into anybody's memoirs for some reason.

It seems likely Lee either directed Longstreet to keep McLaws with his division, or Longstreet knew Lee would disapprove of allowing McLaws to leave his division on the march. It probably didnt help that McLaws didnt seem to understand that Johnston had already been on his scout and returned (McLaws volunteered to go with him), making him look like he wasnt paying attention. So twice Longstreet aggressively refused, probably for the unlooking Lee's benefit.

Once McLaws and Hood were in position (and Sickles new forward position was revealed) BOTH commanders requested their orders to be changed from attacking 'up the emmitsburg road'. Considering there were heavy infantry and artillery positions in their front and right, this was a pretty obvious request. Both commanders were denied, and both with the telling and repetitive note that Lee's orders were to attack up the Emmitsburg Road. Longstreet seemed peevish on the point. Of course with Sickles new position it was physically impossible to do so without removing Sickles from their front, and so opened the 2nd Day. Sickles may have saved the Longstreets command by moving forward. Had he remained on Cemetery Ridge with V Corp in close support, it would seem Longstreet had been summarily ordered to turn his divisions to face north and expose their flank and rear, with utterly no support in reach, and march towards Cemetery Hill, up Emmitsburg Road. In my opinion this dangerous and doomed order (on top of the other issues above) was what threw Longstreet into near mutiny that afternoon.
 
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"Not paying attention"? No,McLaws was not present when Johnston reported to Lee. That's not McLaws fault or "Not paying attention". McLaws was correct to request to ride forward with Johnston "to see for himself",as Johnston's report turned out to be inaccurate. McLaws and Kershaw discover Sickles advance as they are moving their men into position about 3 pm.

No- McLaws was told that Johnston had made the recon earlier and he mistook it for Johnston was about to make the recon.

This is from Mclaws own recollections of the battle in his own words:
"He said "Major Johnston, of my staff, has been ordered to reconnoitre the ground, and I expect he is about ready." I then remarked, "I will go with him." Just then General Longstreet, who, when I came up, was walking back and forth some little distance from General Lee, and hearing my proposition or request to reconnoitre, spoke quickly and said: "No, sir, I do not wish you to leave your division,"
http://www.gdg.org/Research/OOB/Confederate/July1-3/shmclaws.html

By the time Lee, McLaws, and Longstreet were having this discussion, Johnston and his party had been and returned.
 
Except that Longstreet forbade him to leave his division in the morning. Had he ridden forward at 8 in the morning it wouldn't have helped him anyway, Sickles didnt move his line forward until after 1pm. After which it was apparent to anybody anywhere on Seminary Ridge where Sickles was, the Peach Orchard is an open piece of high ground visible from all over the area. It did speak well of McLaws that he wanted to scout the position himself of course. Why Longstreet prevented him is an interesting piece of this puzzle.

Not only did Lee reject McLaws promotion, he may have intended to transfer him out of ANV and Longstreet may have interceded to prevent it. What is certain is that Lee ordered Longstreet to keep McLaws directly under his eye, and held Longstreet accountable for the conduct of his division. McLaws didnt know this at the time, and became bitter that Longstreet interfered with his division on the 2nd. This also explains why Longstreet didnt take a firm grasp of Hood's division once Hood went down- he had been ordered to remain with McLaws.

My take on all of this is that there is a missing aspect of the Longstreet/Lee disagreement that morning, and I suspect the McLaws situation was fuel to that fire for Longstreet. I think that it was no one thing setting Longstreet off that day it was a series of things- first Lee insists on taking the tactical offensive against whatever agreement Longstreet thought they had, then Lee pushes Longstreet to attack short one of his divisions on uncertain ground, then he badmouths one of his division commanders and forces him to babysit, then Lee proposes an attack up Emmitsburg Road that (had it been carried out) would expose Longstreets flank to the actual enemy position on Cemetery Ridge (see the Longstreet thread for my take on that), the Lee rather condescendingly goes over the plan directly with McLaws while Longstreet stalked around in irritation. Longstreet points out the position parallel Emmistburg road he wants McLaws to assume (wisely, as the enemy would be to his front, Lee overrules him and points Mclaws to a line perpendicular. I suspect there was more to that disagreement between the two that never made it into anybody's memoirs for some reason.

It seems likely Lee either directed Longstreet to keep McLaws with his division, or Longstreet knew Lee would disapprove of allowing McLaws to leave his division on the march. It probably didnt help that McLaws didnt seem to understand that Johnston had already been on his scout and returned (McLaws volunteered to go with him), making him look like he wasnt paying attention. So twice Longstreet aggressively refused, probably for the unlooking Lee's benefit.

Once McLaws and Hood were in position (and Sickles new forward position was revealed) BOTH commanders requested their orders to be changed from attacking 'up the emmitsburg road'. Considering there were heavy infantry and artillery positions in their front and right, this was a pretty obvious request. Both commanders were denied, and both with the telling and repetitive note that Lee's orders were to attack up the Emmitsburg Road. Longstreet seemed peevish on the point. Of course with Sickles new position it was physically impossible to do so without removing Sickles from their front, and so opened the 2nd Day. Sickles may have saved the Longstreets command by moving forward. Had he remained on Cemetery Ridge with V Corp in close support, it would seem Longstreet had been summarily ordered to turn his divisions to face north and expose their flank and rear, with utterly no support in reach, and march towards Cemetery Hill, up Emmitsburg Road. In my opinion this dangerous and doomed order (on top of the other issues above) was what threw Longstreet into near mutiny that afternoon.
"Not paying attention"? McLaws was not present when Johnson reported to Lee. McLaws was certainly correct to wish to "see for himself",as,Johnson's report was inaccurate. McLaws/Kershaw discover Sickles at about 3 pm as they are moving their men into postion.
 
"Not paying attention"? McLaws was not present when Johnson reported to Lee. McLaws was certainly correct to wish to "see for himself",as,Johnson's report was inaccurate. McLaws/Kershaw discover Sickles at about 3 pm as they are moving their men into postion.

See my McLaws quote above. McLaws was (even after the battle in his memoirs) confused about the time of Johnstons recon. He claims Lee said Johnston was just about to depart at around the 8am time of the meeting. Johnston had already returned by then. There was no second reconnaissance by Johnston, with or without McLaws- Johnston was guiding Longstreets march down Seminary Ridge.
 
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