Iuka - Victory as Failure

Introduction
In a recent thread another poster posed the question of why the battle of Iuka was considered a Union victory. Before responding I decided to review the battle in an effort to justify or dispel the outcome as a Union victory. What I discovered was actually a surprising mix of triumph and failure. Rather than hijack the thread with multiple posts I decided to start this thread in way of explanation.

It is traditional to judge the outcome of battles by standards that may ignore the original intent of the commanders involved. While territorial gain, dominance on the field, or inflicting greater casualties are noteworthy accomplishments in themselves they do not always satisfy a claim to success. These can often be an unintended result used to disguise the failure of the true purpose of an operation. The retreat of MG Sterling Price’s Confederate forces from the northern Mississippi town of Iuka in the early fall of 1862 is an example of an apparent victory that actually represented a miserable failure with dire consequences.

Only by judging the end result against the intended objective can the true depth of the failure be determined. This series of posts will examine the Battle of Iuka and attempt to explain this “victory” as just such a failure.

Same here. I'm really lookin' forward to this.

Good to see you back at it.

IMHO the only way to judge victory/defeat; success/failure of combat operations is through the lens of the pre-operation commanders intent.

Post battle spin, excuses and tale telling should not be allowed to alter the fact that someplace was to be defended or attacked. Post battle it is easy to determine who succeeded and who failed based upon their own pre-battle intentions.

Difficulty comes when using the same formula for non-combat operations.

I've often been entertained by the numerous reports issued by various commanders, especially when they have to explain a defeat. To hear Napoleon Banks tell it, his flight down the Shenandoah Valley to Harper's Ferry & beyond, seeking safety from Stonewall Jackson's attack, was an incredible victory over the Confederate general! Banks was always a great writer of fiction, he missed his calling as a novelist.

The Command Shuffle
The post Shiloh command situation in Northern Mississippi was undergoing significant changes for both sides. The Confederates had lost Albert S. Johnston to his wounds and P.G.T. Beauregard led the retreat to Corinth. The position there proved untenable in the face of the combined Union armies that took up a glacial but steady pursuit. A completely disheartened and ill Beauregard took his forces south to Tupelo and then without authorization handed command to Braxton Bragg and departed. Beauregard’s departure probably saved Jefferson Davis the unsavory task of relieving him. Other command placements were more on his mind. The newly formed Trans-Mississippi Department needed a commander. MG Sterling Price was actively campaigning for the position when he traveled to Richmond for a meeting with the Confederate President in June. Davis was unconvinced of Price’s loyalty to the Confederate cause and preferred West Point educated officers. The position was granted to MG John Magruder. The slight caused Price to offer his resignation. It was a bold reaction but Davis simply refused to accept it or allow Price to return to Missouri with his troops. Disgruntled Price returned to Mississippi to serve under Bragg with a vague promise to be returned to Missouri as soon as the situation allowed. Davis had also placed another West Pointer, MG Earl Van Dorn, in charge of the Trans-Mississippi District Two, to mediate the disputes between the two major leaders of state forces in Missouri, Price and BG Benjamin McCullough. Those issues became secondary as Van Dorn and his forces occupied the Confederate fortress at Vicksburg. When the early threat to that city passed they were called to Mississippi to join Beauregard. The situation became even more muddled when Bragg departed with the Army of Mississippi (later the Army of Tennessee) for a joint venture in Kentucky with MG Edmund Kirby Smith. Bragg failed to clearly designate an overall commander in his absence and left only instructions to cooperate to prevent the Union forces in the area from reinforcing his intended target. It was not a promising situation. Conflicting goals, personal enmity, and different interpretations of Bragg’s order offered little hope of cooperation between Van Dorn and Price.

The Union forces also experienced changes at the top. MG Henry Halleck was called to Washington to act as General in Chief of all US forces. The departure of Halleck allowed Ulysses S. Grant to re-emerge in the command spotlight. The distrust and jealousy of Halleck and the near disastrous surprise at Shiloh had stolen much of the star power he had gained at Fort Donelson. But Grant had survived the innuendo and meaningless assignments to gain command of the District of West Tennessee. William S. Rosecrans also found himself in a new command position as John Pope was called to Washington. He assumed command of the Army of the Mississippi. The two men and Don Carlos Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, formed the triumvirate of Federal commanders in the west. Like their Confederate counterparts they suffered from opposing viewpoints and unclear lines of authority. In this atmosphere of uncertainty the two sides began the movements leading up to the battle of Iuka.

What to do?
Braxton Bragg’s ambiguous orders to occupy the Federal forces in Northern Mississippi and the poorly defined command structure there led to immediate problems between Price and Van Dorn. They could not agree on an operational concept to satisfy Bragg’s directive. Van Dorn was inclined to more grandiose schemes while Price favored a more localized approach. Indeed Van Dorn had already embarked on a scheme to liberate Baton Rouge from Yankee control. The move had significantly weakened his available force and he replied to Price’s suggestion for an offensive in western Tennessee by requesting reinforcements from Price. Bragg had rationalized that a move in that direction would draw the Union forces from Corinth into middle Tennessee and away from any possibility of reinforcing Buell. Price refused Van Dorn’s request for reinforcement because it was contrary to what he understood of Bragg’s desire to occupy the Federal forces. His proposal was a combined effort in support of Bragg’s upcoming campaign in Kentucky. If they could not maneuver Grant and Rosecrans away from Buell then Price felt they must occupy them directly by an attack on Corinth. Van Dorn simply would not budge. In the first week of August he telegraphed Van Dorn that his army was in no condition to enter into offensive operations outside of Mississippi and also demurred on attacking Corinth. Price appealed to Bragg to intervene but Bragg only sent a weakly worded suggestion to Van Dorn that he cooperate with Price. The stubborn Mississippian chose to ignore the suggestion and the impasse continued. Price was left to operate alone.

Lacking the strength to threaten Corinth alone Price began a series of harassing operations using BG Frank Armstrong’s cavalry brigade. The Confederate troopers conducted raids against Holly Springs, Chewalla, and Bolivar. The moves kept the Union commanders guessing and caused Grant to request that all forces in northern Mississippi be consolidated to face the possibility of an attack on Corinth. Newly named General in Chief Halleck had other ideas however. Instead of a reduction he ordered the line expanded to cover the railroad as far east as Decatur, Alabama. The move would stretch the available forces extreme thin.

As the campaign into Kentucky ramped up Bragg’s call for support became more urgent. A September 1st message from Bragg implored the two men to prevent a junction of Rosecrans army and Buell. Again Van Dorn disregarded the message and informed Price that he would be unavailable for operations until September 12th. Price was incensed but determined to obey the order even if he had to act independently. Another message from Bragg on the 6th left Price no choice but to act against Rosecrans, whom Bragg believed (incorrectly) was moving toward a junction with Buell. Price’s problem was that without Van Dorn he lacked the necessary strength to make much of an impact against the Union forces at Corinth. He needed an opportunity where he had a chance at success. Union reactions to the Confederate moves presented just such an opportunity at Iuka.

Price takes Iuka
At Corinth the seemingly disconnected Confederate moves left the Union leadership thoroughly baffled. Trying to assemble an accurate intelligence picture of the situation Grant and Rosecrans began to search out clues to the enemy intent. Reports from scouts, cavalry patrols, deserters, and even an escaped prisoner were gathered and evaluated to make an estimate of the next move. More and more Grant became convinced that Corinth was the target. He was determined to fortify the Federal position there by calling in his scattered forces. Included in the outposts to be abandoned was Iuka. The town of Iuka was an important part of his logistical support network. Materials intended for the Union forces were unloaded at Eastport on the Tennessee River and brought into town on the Eastport Stage Road to be transferred to the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and then on to Corinth. The process meant that large quantities of stores were stockpiled in town awaiting movement. By September 12th Colonel Robert Murphy’s brigade was alone in Iuka. Murphy was ordered to guard the town until all the stores could be removed. Murphy’s exposed situation proved to be the opportunity that Price was looking for.

Price expected battle at Iuka but he also expected a much larger force to oppose his effort. Unaware of Grant’s consolidation order Price was working under the assumption that Rosecrans was at Iuka with the bulk of his forces in a prelude to a move toward Buell. He began his march with an order for haste before Rosecrans could complete the expected crossing of the Tennessee and move off . The march was preceded by Armstrong’s cavalry who entered Iuka on the morning of the 13th. The Confederate troopers quickly rounded up thirty Union pickets as prisoners before they were driven off by a counter-attack by Murphy. Armstrong misinterpreted this aggressiveness as validation of the expected strength and called for infantry support. The exhausted 3rd Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) and 3rd Louisiana Infantry were roused to make a mad dash to Armstrong’s aid.

In Iuka Colonel Murphy faced a dilemma of his own. His orders were to defend the stores until the arrival of a train to move them off to Corinth. When the train did not arrive and he faced the possibility of being assaulted by Price he ordered the provisions burned. The destructive mission proved a failure as the officers and men assigned the duty departed town at the first sign of the enemy approach. As Armstrong’s men rode into town they found no enemy and massive quantities of stores ripe for the picking. The infantry arrived, led by the 3rd Louisiana, and the feasting began. Order was not restored until the main body arrived and orders were sent out to place the stores under guard. Iuka was won and a large booty of stores secured without significant loss. Price’s bloodless victory, however, was not without its negatives. He had declared his intentions, separated himself from any timely support from Van Dorn, and done so by isolating himself in an area with few movement options. To the north the way was blocked by the Tennessee River, to the west were the Union armies, to the east was just the narrow line of the railroad through poor country, and finally the south offered only two escape routes: the Fulton and Jacinto Roads. Now it was the Union commanders turn to take advantage of an opportunity.

Nathan B
Van Dorn was a Mississipian that had gained the attention of Jefferson Davis during the Mexican War. Davis had recommended a brevet promotion to captain for Van Dorn. Later as Sectretary of War Davis helped Van Dorn get a choice assignment in Texas. Unfortunately as President of the Confederacy he allowed his personal feelings towards someone to dictate his actions. Like Bragg, Van Dorn proved a great disappointment. He certainly added nothing of value to this scenario.
Dan

It seems that the seed of a lot of Confederate command mistakes originated in Mexico with Davis' experiences there. His impressions formed there as the young commander of a small unit deceived him later. He didn't realize that a good small-unit commander wouldn't necessarily translate into the skills required of a commander of a division, corps, or an army.

Mower’s Reconnaissance
Grant was also under pressure to confront the enemy. A message from Halleck exhorted him to “attack the enemy” if he could find a situation that offered advantage. Price’s force at Iuka appeared to offer just such an opportunity. Before rushing off Grant wanted a more complete picture of the enemy’s strength at Iuka. He ordered a reconnaissance in force by Marcellus Crocker’s brigade. Crocker was to move east along the railroad until they struck the Confederates. Rosecrans had other ideas, however. Crocker’s men had been subjected to three days of hard marching and were played out. Rosecrans shifted the burden of the mission to Col. Joseph Mower, now in command of Murphy’s brigade.*The men who had given up the town would have a chance to return and gain a measure of redemption.

The column advanced to within six miles of the Iuka on the Burnsville road when they encountered the first Confederate pickets. The pickets were driven in and the march continued forward. The Confederates responded to the threat by deploying two squadrons of Wirt Adams cavalry and sharpshooters to slow the advance while the rest of BG Dabney Maury’s division formed a line of battle about a mile outside of town.

Mower aggressively brought up his artillery and shelled the enemy for a short time before attempting an advance. He discovered that his line was overlapped by the arriving reinforcements and began a retreat. The movement along the narrow road was covered by a single artillery piece loaded with canister and dragged back by a fixed prolonge. When they reached high ground Mower stopped and assembled a line of battle and deployed his guns again. Two pieces shelled the advancing enemy at a distance of about a mile and the pursuit stalled as the two sides faced each other across the intervening low ground. Pickets exchanged shots until nightfall but no serious confrontation played out and the sides fell on their weapons and went to sleep in place.

The reconnaissance had thus far established that the Confederates were indeed in possession of Iuka in strength but the exact nature of the force there was still a mystery. During the night a deserter from the 2nd Texas came into the Union camp and informed Mower that Price was in town with about 12,000 men. With the number established and the threat of that force overwhelming them Mower wisely ordered a return to Burnsville. Mower’s information was confirmed when BG Charles Hamilton captured a small Confederate supply train south of Iuka and got the same story. Grant had the information he needed to plan an attack.

*Murphy had been arrested for failure at Iuka and replaced by Mower.

Davis had an extreme bias toward West Point educated officers. Van Dorn was that although he graduated near the bottom of his class (1842) and had come very close to being tossed out on behavorial issues.

Dr. Peters did the Confederacy a favor when he put a bullet in the back of Van Dorn's head.

Van Dorn was known as a womanizer and apparently Mrs Peters needed her morals adjusted as well.

Remember that this is the same woman that was implicated in the Spring Hill fiasco. She did her fair share of getting around as well.