Internal strife centers around Confederate Gen. Bragg

CMWinkler

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Internal strife centers around Confederate Gen. Bragg

Published: January 19, 2013
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESSBraxton Bragg was disliked and distrusted by many of his subordinate generals.


By TIM ISBELL — [email protected]
The new year of 1863 had barely started and President Jefferson Davis already had a brewing crisis in Tennessee. Gen. Braxton Bragg was seemingly at war with his subordinates more than with the Union army. This internal war had gone so far that Davis ordered Gen. Joseph E. Johnston to inspect the Confederate Army of Tennessee and see if Bragg should remain in command.
Davis had given Bragg command of the Army of Tennessee after Albert Sidney Johnston's death at Shiloh and P.G.T. Beauregard's removal due to health reasons. Bragg was known as a strict adherer to rules and regulations.
Ulysses S. Grant told a story of Bragg during the Mexican War. Bragg was serving as company commander and company quartermaster. As company commander, Bragg made a request upon the company quartermaster for an item.
As company quartermaster, Bragg turned down the company commander's request. This continued with written requests and denials sent. Finally, Bragg asked the post commander to settle Bragg's dispute with himself. The commander was incredulous, saying, "My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarreled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarreling with yourself."
After Shiloh, Bragg had fought battles at Perryville, Ky., and Stones River, Tenn. At each battle, Bragg chose to retreat even when some of his subordinates thought victory was at hand.
After Perryville, Dr. D.W. Yandell wrote, "General Bragg is either stark mad or utterly incompetent. He's ignorant of both the fundamental principles and details of his noble profession, and he has lost the confidence of both his men and his officers."
At Stones River, Bragg had won a tactical victory which turned into defeat when the Army of Tennessee retreated, ceding central Tennessee to the Union. Although some of his subordinates initially suggested this move, these and other generals now blamed Bragg for defeat at Stones River.
Bragg actually polled his generals for their opinions, offering to resign if they believed him wanting. Despite their lack of support, Bragg did not resign.
Maj. Gen. William Hardee expressed a lack of confidence, and Leonidas Polk wrote Davis, asking him to put Johnston in command.
Brig. Gen. Franklin Cheatham vowed never to serve under Bragg. Brig. Gen. John C. Breckinridge considered challenging Bragg to a duel. Bragg responded, court-martialing one general for disobeying orders, accusing Cheatham of drunkenness during Stones River and calling Breckinridge an inept leader. Bragg confided to a friend that it might "be better for the President to send someone to relieve me."
Davis hoped Johnston would arrive in Tennessee and take command. Johnston hoped to return to command of the Army of Northern Virginia. The odds of that happening were small, as Robert E. Lee was firmly entrenched there.
After talking to Bragg's subordinates, Johnston surmised that discipline and morale in the army were high. Johnston refused any suggestion that he take command from Bragg. In March 1863, Davis ordered Johnston to take command. Johnston refused, stating Bragg's wife was ill and Johnston thought to remove him during her illness was inhumane. Later Johnston was ill and could not assume command.
Meanwhile Bragg's feud with his subordinates continued throughout the Tullahoma campaign, when he was outmaneuvered from Chattanooga, victorious at Chickamauga and suffered disastrous defeat at Missionary Ridge.
It would not be until Dec. 27, 1863, that Johnston would assume command. By then, the state of Tennessee would be lost to the Confederacy.

Read more here: http://www.sunherald.com/2013/01/19/4416330/internal-strife-centers-around.html#storylink=cpy
 
In fact though, Davis made the arduous trip West to confer personally with Bragg(whom, I believe, offered to resign the command, if Davis wished) and his disaffected officers (who voiced their general lack of confidence in Bragg) and in the end made only minor changes in the command and left Bragg in command.
 
General Braxton Bragg.
bragg1.jpg
 
It is truly unfortunate that Bragg was not replaced, or maybe not even chosen to lead an army. He was a competent tactician it seems, but right in the middle of a good thing, he would invariably pull back. No knockout punch. That and his inability to get along with his subordinates.

Cheatham probably was drunk at Murfreesbourough, but then drunken Tennesseans make hellacious fighters.
 
One commentator mentioned that in any history of the AoT, the index lists "Bagg, Gen. Braxton ... Disputes with....", and then goes on to list multiple entries of just about every senior officer of the AoT.

As for the winter 1863 conflict, petitions were circulated and made their way to Richmond asking for Bragg's removal. As CM Winkler said, Johnston was sent out to survey the situation, but he was also directed to take command of the AoT if he decided that Bragg should be removed. Johnston felt strongly against this, as he thought it improper to serve the rolls of prosecutor, judge, jury, executioner, and chief beneficiary of the removal of Bragg. He asked Davis to modify his orders, but Davis refused, as he had no one else available to perform the tasks, much less two seperate men to conduct both elements of the task. Johnston's sickness was severe and lasted for weeks, delaying any action or decision until it was clear that Rosecrans was taking the offensive at Tullahoma - hardly the time to be changing commanders (the Hooker/Meade example notwithstanding).

It should be noted that at the same time (Dec. 1862/ Jan. 1863) pretty much the same situation was bieng duplicated within the AoP, as a handful of senior officers attempted to have Burnside removed from command before another attack in the nature of the Fredericksburg disaster could be repeated. The "mud march" did more to stop Burnside's planned offensive than these political efforts. But Washington D.C. didn't take to such mutiny very well, and the senior officers who plotted against Burnside were punished through various means. But Burnside was removed, and Hooker named in his place.
 
One commentator mentioned that in any history of the AoT, the index lists "Bagg, Gen. Braxton ... Disputes with....", and then goes on to list multiple entries of just about every senior officer of the AoT.

As for the winter 1863 conflict, petitions were circulated and made their way to Richmond asking for Bragg's removal. As CM Winkler said, Johnston was sent out to survey the situation, but he was also directed to take command of the AoT if he decided that Bragg should be removed. Johnston felt strongly against this, as he thought it improper to serve the rolls of prosecutor, judge, jury, executioner, and chief beneficiary of the removal of Bragg. He asked Davis to modify his orders, but Davis refused, as he had no one else available to perform the tasks, much less two seperate men to conduct both elements of the task. Johnston's sickness was severe and lasted for weeks, delaying any action or decision until it was clear that Rosecrans was taking the offensive at Tullahoma - hardly the time to be changing commanders (the Hooker/Meade example notwithstanding).

It should be noted that at the same time (Dec. 1862/ Jan. 1863) pretty much the same situation was bieng duplicated within the AoP, as a handful of senior officers attempted to have Burnside removed from command before another attack in the nature of the Fredericksburg disaster could be repeated. The "mud march" did more to stop Burnside's planned offensive than these political efforts. But Washington D.C. didn't take to such mutiny very well, and the senior officers who plotted against Burnside were punished through various means. But Burnside was removed, and Hooker named in his place.
It is truly unfortunate that Bragg was not replaced, or maybe not even chosen to lead an army. He was a competent tactician it seems, but right in the middle of a good thing, he would invariably pull back. No knockout punch. That and his inability to get along with his subordinates.

Cheatham probably was drunk at Murfreesbourough, but then drunken Tennesseans make hellacious fighters.

One of Bragg's problems is that he would come up with a plan, and then refuse to modify it as conditions changed. Thus as the AoT's left flanking attack lost momentum at Stones River (as all such successful attacks are likely to do), he couldn't adjust to take advantage of his success - the next day's attack against Union artillary on the Confederate right was a predictably a disaster.

Again, at Chickamauga, his plan was for a "left wheel", where the right would open the attack and each brigagde in turn would attack and rive the Union forces, turning them away from their source of supply at Chattanooga. But that assumes that each regiment, brigade, and division would succeeed in driving the enemey - something which hardly ever occured. When the right flank's attacks petered out in the face of an entrenched and stubborn resistence, it was Longstreet in the center & left who broke theUnion lines by lining up his forces with multiple brigades into an armored "fist", breaking the center and causing a route among the center and many of the southern portions of the Union line. But Bragg refused to acknowledge that a victory had been won, since the enemy was fleeing back to Chattanooga instead of being blocked from it, as was his plan.

During the "seige" of Chattanooga, Bragg refused to accept that his plan to starve the union forces there would compel them to retreat, even though the arrival of Grant, Hooker, and Sherman made it clear that Chattanooga could no longer be held for longer than the time it took tfor the Union forces to be positioned for an attack.
 
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