Hindsight being 20/20 was John Reagan right?

I can't speak for@OpnCaronet but it appears that in a sense Lee did see the future and the fuure was Lee need a quicj and decisive victory in Pa.
Leftyhunter

I partially agree. Lee wanted a victory in an important Northern state. Because of the political ramifications for the Republicans.
 
I partially agree. Lee wanted a victory in an important Northern state. Because of the political ramifications for the Republicans.
True .Also of course Vicksburg is simply to far away to reinforce in time. Lee could certainly see that the near term future for the Confederacy was grim.
Leftyhunter
 
Lee may also have considered that his northern raid into Pennsylvania might conceivably draw Union forces away from the Vicksburg seat of war, thus relieving pressure there. Of course, this didn't happen, but that idea may have offered as much hope of saving Vicksburg as sending units of the ANV westward.
 
So Lee is at fault because he couldn't see the future?



No, but, his plan for the Invasion of Pa. was a waste of precious resources and time for the confederacy, at the very time both were most needed in the West. In that respect, I believe he hindered the csa's chances of revitalizing the war in the West, rather than furthering them.
 
No, but, his plan for the Invasion of Pa. was a waste of precious resources and time for the confederacy, at the very time both were most needed in the West. In that respect, I believe he hindered the csa's chances of revitalizing the war in the West, rather than furthering them.

It seems to me the potential benefit of a victory in Pennsylvania just before Pennsylvanians and Ohioans voted for governors and a year before the Presidential election was worth the risk.

It was only a waste because Lee lost. If he could have foreseen a defeat he probably would have done things differently. So it does seem he is being criticized because he couldn't see the future.
 
@cash, we would appreciate you posting in English.
Makes it easier to determine your meaning.
Thanks in advance for your cooperation.

Respectfully,
Chellers
 
No, but, his plan for the Invasion of Pa. was a waste of precious resources and time for the confederacy, at the very time both were most needed in the West. In that respect, I believe he hindered the csa's chances of revitalizing the war in the West, rather than furthering them.

Hi,

In answer to the thread's question, Reagan was wrong at the time and 20/20 hindsight still proves him wrong.

Even though I have written about this in detail and at length within the pages of Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign and elsewhere, a very brief summary may be appropriate on this thread.

First, while Lee was having his meeting with Davis and the other cabinet members in mid-May, 1863, word came in from "Retreatin' Joe" Johnston that he had abandoned Jackson and with it, the vital rail hub of the region. That single act alone sealed Vicksburg fate and Lee and most of the others then meeting in Richmond knew it. Why? Logistics, to start with. The Confederates in the Jackson region did not have the logistical lift capacity (the sufficient number of wagons and mules/horses) to move off a rail line by more than two days and, if stretching it to the max, three days. Whereas Lee had a substantially larger logistical lift capacity with his army, those Confederates near Jackson, Mississippi, did not. So even if troops from anywhere are railed in to northern Mississippi, they would arrive absent the logistical capability to move off the rails and mount a relief attempt because of Jackson's rail hub having been removed from the equation.

Second, and this is a military truism as old as the ages...you simply do not reinforce failure when you have the option to reinforce success. Sending Southern troops to northern Mississippi at this time in light of the logistical restraints and continued defeat and retreat (failure) would have been foolish. Alternatively, Lee's proposal to move north with all the veteran brigades of the army returned to him (remember that five veteran brigades totaling more than 11,000 combatants had been detached from the mobile army) was the correct move to reinforce Confederate success in the East, the result of which further continued Confederate success would be simply incalculable. When in late June, Davis finally refused to fully commit to reinforcing Lee as the army commander had ask for and deserved to be reinforced did it become fully evident to Lee (a growing frustration that had begun a long time before) that Davis had failed to grasp the essence of the lessons of the Great Captains and what Dennis Hart Mahan had tried to teach at West Point. In other words, there was only one successful Confederate army commander and he and his army demanded support and reinforcements to the hilt.

While there's many more points, perhaps the two above will help.

regards,
 
No, but, his plan for the Invasion of Pa. was a waste of precious resources and time for the confederacy, at the very time both were most needed in the West. In that respect, I believe he hindered the csa's chances of revitalizing the war in the West, rather than furthering them.
I suppose we have two schools of thought on this thread. One is " invading Pennsylvania is the least bad option" vs "hunker down in Northern Virginia snd send Longstreet west with as many troops as possible without leaving the AnV to short to protect Virginia".
We do know how Longstreet fared in the Fall of 1863. We of course will never know how Longstreet eould of fared in the summer of 1863.
Leftyhunter
 
Lee could have limited his operations to Virginia while sending a portion of his mounted forces to carry out a scorched earth policy between Jackson and Vicksburg. If Grant was going to live off the land then leave him nothing but ashes to eat.
 
Lee could have limited his operations to Virginia while sending a portion of his mounted forces to carry out a scorched earth policy between Jackson and Vicksburg. If Grant was going to live off the land then leave him nothing but ashes to eat.

During the siege of Vicksburg the Army of the Tennessee didn't live off the land but was supplied by means of the Mississippi River.
 
Lee could have limited his operations to Virginia while sending a portion of his mounted forces to carry out a scorched earth policy between Jackson and Vicksburg. If Grant was going to live off the land then leave him nothing but ashes to eat.

Resources in Virginia were used up. Foraging from both armies had left the land barren. Part of the trip up north was to fatten up the army and the stock.
 
Paging @Eric Wittenberg on a feasibility study:grant::lee:
Leftyhunter

Wow. I've seen some really bizarre theories before, but that has to take the cake.

Let's see: let's do significant damage to our own people in the hope that it might prevent the inevitable from happening. Yeah, that's politically expedient and feasible. Not.
 
No, but, his plan for the Invasion of Pa. was a waste of precious resources and time for the confederacy, at the very time both were most needed in the West. In that respect, I believe he hindered the csa's chances of revitalizing the war in the West, rather than furthering them.

I am both reading the Pfanz Gettysburg Triology & Re-familiarizing the basics with Sears Gettysburg. It catches me by surprise that some folks view the foray of the ANV into Penn. and the battle of Gettysburg a waste. Some brief points (leaving out a lot).

1. Virginia was greatly depleted of both natural resources and food for the army, after so much battle time being spent there. Lee realized that the greener pastures and full larders were North.

2. The political implications of a loss in the North were dire : Lincoln was uncertain of his future, the popularity of the war was lagging after losses both in Fredericksburg & Chancellorsville.

3. Concentrating the whole CSA in one area far from Virginia could leave it vulnerable as Lee said: it was a choice between Virginia or Mississippi, but both could not be covered by the ANV.

4. Gettysburg Day One was a full retreat for the AoP. Day 2 could have been lost at Culp's Hill, which conceivably could have collapsed the whole Union line

5. The resources were only a waste after the fact. Based on the Day One and Day Two results, it was conceivable at the time that Gettysburg victory could have gone to the ANV. The loss was not a rout. The final losses for both armies, IIR was only about a 9-10% difference based on equal percentages by army size.

6. I would add that one aspect of the Gettysburg battle that I consider a waste is the Kilpatrick ordered "Farnsworth's Charge". It was known at the time to be a failure in the making and sadly, it was when attempted.
 
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I am both reading the Pfanz Gettysburg Triology & Re-familiarizing the basics with Sears Gettysburg. It catches me by surprise that some folks view the foray of the ANV into Penn. and the battle of Gettysburg a waste. Some brief points (leaving out a lot).




Yes, all very good points. But, in relation to the 30/20 hindsight of later generations, what does it say about Regan's views, on the importance of the war in the West compared with that in the East, i.e., Was he Right ?

Relatively speaking the war in Northern Va. was well in hand, Lee still retained the Valley, from which he drew much of his supplies, until Sheridan, in the Fall of 1864. Whereas, the Mississippi was in the process of being lost(and the Trans-Mississippi with it).
Regan could look at the map and see, the course of the War in the West. Taking Vicksburg, freed up a powerful Union Army, to deal with Bragg(the last confederate Army(or any consequence) in the West , take Chattanooga, the gateway to the confederate heartland....with 20/20 hindsight, was he wrong?
 
I suppose we have two schools of thought on this thread. One is " invading Pennsylvania is the least bad option" vs "hunker down in Northern Virginia snd send Longstreet west with as many troops as possible without leaving the AnV to short to protect Virginia".
We do know how Longstreet fared in the Fall of 1863. We of course will never know how Longstreet eould of fared in the summer of 1863.
Leftyhunter


In fact though, what is the evidence that 'hunkering' down in Va.(did it have to be Northern Va.?) was not viable. Lee defeated Hooker, with Longstreet and his men in Southern Va. foraging.

To me, the idea that Lee would be helpless against a the AoP and the current crop of commanders, available, at the time, is hardly credible.
 
Regarding Regan's points as addressed in the OP. I agree that the premise of viewing Gettysburg as a distraction from Vicksburg as a reason to venture North was the least valid reason to do so. I do not believe that this particular point was universally accepted even at the time (I am separate from my files at the moment) However, if successful, there was much to gain from a victory say Gettysburg, and at the time and circumstances, victory was conceivable. It is too easy to look at the Battle of Gettysburg through the lenses of present knowledge, but that would not be an accurate method of evaluation.
 
In fact though, what is the evidence that 'hunkering' down in Va.(did it have to be Northern Va.?) was not viable. Lee defeated Hooker, with Longstreet and his men in Southern Va. foraging.

To me, the idea that Lee would be helpless against a the AoP and the current crop of commanders, available, at the time, is hardly credible.
Wasn't the battle of Chancellorsville in Northern Virginia? What Union Army troops foraged in Southern Virginia prior to General Shemans troops very late in the war?
Has @Scott Bowden points out how exactly does a Corps from the AnV reach Mississippi in time to do any good?
Leftyhunter
 
Hi,
In answer to the thread's question, Reagan was wrong at the time and 20/20 hindsight still proves him wrong.

While there's many more points, perhaps the two above will help.
regards,




Again, good points, that do not precisely answer the question of Regan's view of the strategic importance of the War in the West.

In point of fact, you do reinforce those points(especially those points where failure cannot be an option) where, not only is success lacing, but, also, are, in fact, in the process of collapse.

Logistically, well after Gettysburg, a rail line existed from Richmond to Chattanooga, through the Cumberland Valley.

With 20/20 hindsight you agree that Lee's Invasion was the correct decision, in the light that it sealed the fate of Vicksburg and Chattanooga?

Could the confederacy survive losing the West? Where was the
 
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