General Dan Sickles, Revisited

Sickles' advance had a significant advantage in providing a good platform for artillery batteries posted along the Wheatfield Road, especially since Longstreet's brigades marched off from right to left. As a result, these batteries were able to damage Anderson's Brigade, smashed much of Semmes' Brigade, as well as roughly half of Kershaw's Brigade.

In my opinion, had Longstreet attacked from left to right, Union forces would have continually been drawn toward the right, clearing the front of Longstreet's far right brigades and allowing him to take Little Round Top - but that is another subject.

I am of the opinion that Sickles helped win the battle because his move forward formed an advance barrier that Longstreet and Anderson had to break first before moving on to Cemetery Ridge. The delay also allowed time for the Union Fifth and Sixth Corps to arrive and bolster the line. Not that Sickles planned it that way and should get credit for it, but it is how the battle actually played out. The one great Confederate advantage was the shock caused by the charge of their veterans - it is precisely this advantage that was effectively negated when Sickles blunted the impact of their attack early on.
No. Had Sickles remained in his assigned position and had Longstreet attacked "up the Emmitsburg Road",as ordered, Sickles could have attacked Longstreet's right flank and rear. Further,the entire Federal artillery would have heavily damaged Longstreet. The Federal artillery could not fully engage Longstreet on July 2 because Federals were in the line of fire from Cemetery Hill.
 
Sickles was correct about his originally assigned position being weak, certainly it was weaker than the higher ground along the Emmitsburg Road. If he stayed put and Longstreet had launched his attack as he did, there would have been no need to divert troops along the path, which means, for one thing, Law's brigade would have remained together and swept over Big Round Top, well beyond the Federal left. Artillery at longer ranges was ineffective, and in addition there were ample woods to protect most of Longstreet's force from all the guns the Federals could muster on Cemetery Ridge, and good positions for Sickles' artillery were lacking at his originally assigned position. The Fifth Corps, presumably thrown in then to bolster the Federal left, would have engaged Longstreet's men as they held the summit and open ground east of Little Round Top, which was somewhat in rear of the main Federal line on Cemetery Ridge - not good for Federal morale, especially as Anderson would be attacking them in front. The Confederates would also control the Taneytown Road, leaving only the Baltimore Pike open as a potential escape route, and that would tend to make all of the Federals nervous. In fact the Sixth Corps might have been held in place on the Baltimore Pike as a precaution, especially since Johnson's Division would soon threaten the opposite end of the line. At that point Federal troops in the center of the line would hear heavy firing both in their left rear and their right fear - that would get the attention of even stalwart veterans. We know what happened when Barksdale's brigade slammed into the stronger Third Corps position at the Peach Orchard; if they and their companions had done the same thing north of Little Round Top, the bulk of the Union army would be threatened with panic and subsequent annihilation.
 
Sickles was correct about his originally assigned position being weak, certainly it was weaker than the higher ground along the Emmitsburg Road. If he stayed put and Longstreet had launched his attack as he did, there would have been no need to divert troops along the path, which means, for one thing, Law's brigade would have remained together and swept over Big Round Top, well beyond the Federal left. Artillery at longer ranges was ineffective, and in addition there were ample woods to protect most of Longstreet's force from all the guns the Federals could muster on Cemetery Ridge, and good positions for Sickles' artillery were lacking at his originally assigned position. The Fifth Corps, presumably thrown in then to bolster the Federal left, would have engaged Longstreet's men as they held the summit and open ground east of Little Round Top, which was somewhat in rear of the main Federal line on Cemetery Ridge - not good for Federal morale, especially as Anderson would be attacking them in front. The Confederates would also control the Taneytown Road, leaving only the Baltimore Pike open as a potential escape route, and that would tend to make all of the Federals nervous. In fact the Sixth Corps might have been held in place on the Baltimore Pike as a precaution, especially since Johnson's Division would soon threaten the opposite end of the line. At that point Federal troops in the center of the line would hear heavy firing both in their left rear and their right fear - that would get the attention of even stalwart veterans. We know what happened when Barksdale's brigade slammed into the stronger Third Corps position at the Peach Orchard; if they and their companions had done the same thing north of Little Round Top, the bulk of the Union army would be threatened with panic and subsequent annihilation.

The major issue with your scenario is we don't know how the attack would have proceeded if Sickles had not advanced. The only reason Longstreet changed the direction of attack from northeast to east was because of Sickles' move to the Emmittsburg Road line.

It's reasonable to believe that Longstreet would have started his attack moving along the Emmitsburg Road as he was ordered and have to change on the fly as he came under fire from troops along lower Cemetery Ridge and the Third Corps' line. Since it was already so late, it's hard to see how the Confederates could have succeeded as well as they did if they had to change the entire movement while it was going on rather than from the start.

R
 
True we don't know all the what ifs had Sickles not advanced. But Tom's scenario would, in my opinion, been nice for the AOP had it happened.

Lee knew the key was Cemetery Hill. Anything the AOP got from Lee's subordinates not following orders and trying to move farther away and farther to the flank to attack would have been, to me, groovy...

Imagine Law is trying to get around BRT and LRT, and who knows, drags more of Hoods division that way. Lee's lines string out longer and he is now thinner and in danger of breaking away from his supports (Andersons div).

It is ' what if ' but the longer Lee's lines get, the thinner. Caldwell not moving to the Wheatfield but instead going on the offensive from Cemetery Ridge in Lee's thinner lines? 6th Corps arriving in the rear of Longstreets right? 5th
Corps facing a less concentrated attack. All what ifs, but they may have been what ifs that made Meade happy.

I would have been interested to see it. I spent a few hours there today. Could see it happening (in my head).
 
Multiple possibilities, to be sure. The idea that 3rd Corps will just be swept aside is still unconvincing - okay, sure, Law is coming over BRT. That doesn't mean he can just ignore Ward's brigade (presumably Ward's) and whatever else is securing the left - putting Barnes's whole division instead of just Vincent's brigade means another three thousand infantry there (not counting the 9th Massachusetts, as it being detached may happen anyway). Ward's brigade not counting Berdan's sharpshooters makes around sixteen hundred. And this will just be rolled up because why?

I am not sure what suggests that there were better positions for artillery in Sickles's new position. Some places, perhaps, but the line on the whole is not exactly in the best artillery ground to defend from.
 
If Sickles stayed put, Longstreet would either have to delay the already well delayed attack even further to go around Round Top, attack northeast up the Emmitsburg Road according to the plan, or shift his attack to hit Cemetery Ridge directly which would require him to redeploy his forces directly in the face of the enemy. None of those are attractive prospects for Confederate success.
 
If Sickles stayed put, Longstreet would either have to delay the already well delayed attack even further to go around Round Top, attack northeast up the Emmitsburg Road according to the plan, or shift his attack to hit Cemetery Ridge directly which would require him to redeploy his forces directly in the face of the enemy. None of those are attractive prospects for Confederate success.

Yeah. Climbing over Big Round Top and assembling an organized assault or having any basis to make people (in the ranks, not Meade as someone who has to take the big picture in mind) jumpy about the threat to the Tanneytown Road would take time and effort - which would mean a race between 5th Corps's response if any was needed and concentrating enough of Hood's division here to do any good. It's not that long a period of time, but it isn't exactly going to be brief or, assuming proper precautions about the flanks by Sickles, impossible to detect.

Could it work? It's not impossible. But it seems like it's being assumed that "holding his original line"means a static, unobservant defense - which is the last thing that would make sense.
 
Yeah. Climbing over Big Round Top and assembling an organized assault or having any basis to make people (in the ranks, not Meade as someone who has to take the big picture in mind) jumpy about the threat to the Tanneytown Road would take time and effort - which would mean a race between 5th Corps's response if any was needed and concentrating enough of Hood's division here to do any good. It's not that long a period of time, but it isn't exactly going to be brief or, assuming proper precautions about the flanks by Sickles, impossible to detect.

Could it work? It's not impossible. But it seems like it's being assumed that "holding his original line"means a static, unobservant defense - which is the last thing that would make sense.

It also presupposes Longstreet could make such a movement unobserved, which was unlikely. One of the other problems Longstreet would face in any sort of flanking movement is that it would open a gap between him and Hill. That gap would be dangerous not only because Hill would be unable to directly support Longstreet, but also because it would leave the Confederate right flank rather exposed in the event that Longstreet failed.
 
Sickles was correct about his originally assigned position being weak, certainly it was weaker than the higher ground along the Emmitsburg Road. If he stayed put and Longstreet had launched his attack as he did, there would have been no need to divert troops along the path, which means, for one thing, Law's brigade would have remained together and swept over Big Round Top, well beyond the Federal left. Artillery at longer ranges was ineffective, and in addition there were ample woods to protect most of Longstreet's force from all the guns the Federals could muster on Cemetery Ridge, and good positions for Sickles' artillery were lacking at his originally assigned position. The Fifth Corps, presumably thrown in then to bolster the Federal left, would have engaged Longstreet's men as they held the summit and open ground east of Little Round Top, which was somewhat in rear of the main Federal line on Cemetery Ridge - not good for Federal morale, especially as Anderson would be attacking them in front. The Confederates would also control the Taneytown Road, leaving only the Baltimore Pike open as a potential escape route, and that would tend to make all of the Federals nervous. In fact the Sixth Corps might have been held in place on the Baltimore Pike as a precaution, especially since Johnson's Division would soon threaten the opposite end of the line. At that point Federal troops in the center of the line would hear heavy firing both in their left rear and their right fear - that would get the attention of even stalwart veterans. We know what happened when Barksdale's brigade slammed into the stronger Third Corps position at the Peach Orchard; if they and their companions had done the same thing north of Little Round Top, the bulk of the Union army would be threatened with panic and subsequent annihilation.
You've got the cart before the horse. Longstreet is setting up to attack up the Emmitsburg Road when he discovers Sickles advanced position. Longstreet attacks Sickles simply because Sickles is there.
 
It also presupposes Longstreet could make such a movement unobserved, which was unlikely. One of the other problems Longstreet would face in any sort of flanking movement is that it would open a gap between him and Hill. That gap would be dangerous not only because Hill would be unable to directly support Longstreet, but also because it would leave the Confederate right flank rather exposed in the event that Longstreet failed.

Yeah. If Hill was a better corps commander I'd be far less worried about this, from the POV of weighing how that would go, but the leadership that made the Light Division fearsome is lacking.

Hell, even just plain more aggressive would do. Keep the Army of the Potomac reacting and the Confederate right isn't exactly an open target, but if things fall to pieces for 1st Corps and 3rd isn't doing much . . .
 
What would Longstreet have done if Sickles stayed on the Ridge, still one of my favorite what if's.

I think the actions of Confederate and Union skirmishers, that were very active the morning of July 2nd, have not been given its due importance relative to this "what if". Colonel, than a Lt Frank Haskell, was at Gettysburg and was in the thick of the fighting July 2nd and 3rd. In his account of the battle he makes mention of the persistence and aggressiveness of the Confederate skirmishers north and west of town. This action was particularly heavy on the morning of the 2nd starting at around 9 AM, such much so that Union artillery batteries opened on them. Haskell states that:

"These skirmishers soon engaged those at the right of the Second Corps, who stood their ground and were reinforced to make the line entirely secure. The Rebel skirmish line kept extending further and further to their right—toward our left. They would dash up close upon ours and sometimes drive them back a short distance, in turn to be repulsed themselves—and so they continued to do until their right was opposite the extreme left of the Third Corps. By these means they had ascertained the position and extent of our lines-"

Much has been made about Longstreet's insistence to follow Lee's orders as to how he was to attack "up and astride" the Emmitsburg Road. We know that General Hood dispatched skirmishers to scout the Union line and whom reported back that the RT's were not occupied. Also During the march to get into position, July 2nd, Longstreet is reported to have had this conversation with McLaws: LaFantasie in Twilight at Little Round Top, "On the countermarch, Longstreet informed McLaws that his division would end up being deployed with no Federals in his front and entirely on the flank of the enemy. In that case, McLaws said, he would continue marching in columns of companies and, after getting into position on the Federal flank, he would face to the left and march on the enemy. Longstreet replied "that suites me."

The Confederates, by early afternoon, knew that the Federal line was on Cemetery Ridge and that it ended in the vicinity of the RT's. Longstreet had plenty of time to adjust the deployment of his divisions so as to make a concentrated, direct attack on Sickles' end of the line. I do not think it conjecture to state that at a minimum the Confederates would have gained controlled of both RT's by the end of fighting that day. I also think many on the board underestimate the ability of General E.P. Alexander to get artillery up into any position on any terrain. Come the next morning there would have been artillery on those hills pointing north and east. With the their left, severely threatened by Confederate infantry and artillery occupying the RT's, The Federal Army would be forced into another humiliating withdraw from the battlefield.

Sickles advanced to the Peach Orchard, just as Longstreet was deploying his Corps, "may" have prevented that from happening.
 
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Any attempt to gain the Round Tops would have been opposed not only by elements of the Third Corps but also the fully concentrated Fifth Corps. The more troops Longstreet commits to assaulting the Round Tops, the fewer he has to hit Cemetary Ridge. A direct assault on the Round Tops also presents serious difficulties in coordinating with Hill. A direct frontal assault on Sickles will expose Longstreet and Hill to the same artillery barrage that Pickett faced.

What Sickles movement forward prevented was all of the above.
 
The Confederates, by early afternoon, knew that the Federal line was on Cemetery Ridge and that it ended in the vicinity of the RT's. Longstreet had plenty of time to adjust the deployment of his divisions so as to make a concentrated, direct attack on Sickles' end of the line. I do not think it conjecture to state that at a minimum the Confederates would have gained controlled of both RT's by the end of fighting that day.
It is conjecture by definition, but my English pendant leanings aside: And the basis for this is what? Again, why is 3rd Corps going to fight worse here? Why will 5th Corps not be moved to support areas that would be too thinly held?

Why?
I also think many on the board underestimate the ability of General E.P. Alexander to get artillery up into any position on any terrain. Come the next morning there would have been artillery on those hills pointing north and east. With the their left, severely threatened by Confederate infantry and artillery occupying the RT's, The Federal Army would be forced into another humiliating withdraw from the battlefield.

Sickles advanced to the Peach Orchard, just as Longstreet was deploying his Corps, "may" have prevented that from happening.

I admire the hell out of Alexander, but that's neither here nor there until 3rd and 5th Corps are driven from LRT.
 
...The Confederates, by early afternoon, knew that the Federal line was on Cemetery Ridge and that it ended in the vicinity of the RT's. Longstreet had plenty of time to adjust the deployment of his divisions so as to make a concentrated, direct attack on Sickles' end of the line. I do not think it conjecture to state that at a minimum the Confederates would have gained controlled of both RT's by the end of fighting that day. I also think many on the board underestimate the ability of General E.P. Alexander to get artillery up into any position on any terrain. Come the next morning there would have been artillery on those hills pointing north and east. With the their left, severely threatened by Confederate infantry and artillery occupying the RT's, The Federal Army would be forced into another humiliating withdraw from the battlefield.

Sickles advanced to the Peach Orchard, just as Longstreet was deploying his Corps, "may" have prevented that from happening.


I think that is the very definition of conjecture.
"the formation or expression of an opinion or theory without sufficient evidence for proof. 2. an opinion or theory so formed or expressed; guess; speculation."


I have heard a lot of what ifs over the years. But Alexander converting LRT and BRT overnight into North and East facing artillery platforms is one of the longest I have ever heard of.

I mean... the troops that did attempt to climb BRT, like Oates, literally passed out from heat stroke. So after a long exhausting march, these troops were going to clear two mountains of forest and then build two roads overnight.

LOL.

I would go on... but it hardly seems worth it. At times I think some of these ideas that are floated are not serious attempts.
 
If the goal was to command the Taneytown Road, I suspect there are scenarios it could happen in, but they would require a wretchedly inadequate Union response - and Gettysburg is not a battlefield where that's a safe assumption, based on the historical actions of the actors.

It gets far into what if land to change that.
 
A direct assault on the Round Tops also presents serious difficulties in coordinating with Hill. A direct frontal assault on Sickles will expose Longstreet and Hill to the same artillery barrage that Pickett faced.

And yet Pickett's soldiers, with everything the Union Army had to throw at his troops, reached the ridge.
 
It is conjecture by definition, but my English pendant leanings aside: And the basis for this is what? Again, why is 3rd Corps going to fight worse here? Why will 5th Corps not be moved to support areas that would be too thinly held?

Why?


I admire the hell out of Alexander, but that's neither here nor there until 3rd and 5th Corps are driven from LRT.

5th Corps arrived up the Baltimore pike and where ordered over to the left late in the afternoon "sometime" between 4-5PM. If Sickles was on the Ridge there is a "what if" scenario as to who would have gotten to the hills first. The key here is that Sickles advanced position gave Meade, and subsequently 5th corps, the advantage in the race.

Just so I know were you are coming from, have you read Alexander Memoirs, Fighting For the Confederacy?
 
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And yet Pickett's soldiers, with everything the Union Army had to throw at his troops, reached the ridge.

A scant few hundred reached it, and had no chance of moving past it. How is Longsteet supposed to do better facing an even stronger defense? He would be facing the entirety of the unbloodied Second and Third Corps, and Meade would be able to commit the mass of the entire Fifth Corps plus the whole of the Artillery Reserve to support his line. And somehow you think Longstreet and Hill will just sweep all that aside with 3 or 4 divisions?
 
I think that is the very definition of conjecture.
"the formation or expression of an opinion or theory without sufficient evidence for proof. 2. an opinion or theory so formed or expressed; guess; speculation."


I have heard a lot of what ifs over the years. But Alexander converting LRT and BRT overnight into North and East facing artillery platforms is one of the longest I have ever heard of.

I mean... the troops that did attempt to climb BRT, like Oates, literally passed out from heat stroke. So after a long exhausting march, these troops were going to clear two mountains of forest and then build two roads overnight.

LOL.

I would go on... but it hardly seems worth it. At times I think some of these ideas that are floated are not serious attempts.

As I asked Elenssar, have you read Alexander's memoirs? On several occasion they broke down the guns, carried them piece be piece to a position and reassembled them. Roads were not always required. The man would have artillery on this hills. Even of he didn't, the simple threat of having his flanked exposed to infantry would have induced Meade to abandon Cemetery Ridge and retreat South.

You are right about Oates and his troops, his official report reads: "Having become exhausted from fatigue and the excessive heat of the day, I turned the command of the regiment over to Captain B. A. Hill, and instructed him to take the men off the field, and reform the regiment and report to the brigade." This statement is common throughout many of the reports given by many Confederate regimental and brigade commanders for that day. It also supports that assertion that Sickles advanced position served to wear down the attack before it got to the ridge.
 
A scant few hundred reached it, and had no chance of moving past it. How is Longsteet supposed to do better facing an even stronger defense? He would be facing the entirety of the unbloodied Second and Third Corps, and Meade would be able to commit the mass of the entire Fifth Corps plus the whole of the Artillery Reserve to support his line. And somehow you think Longstreet and Hill will just sweep all that aside with 3 or 4 divisions?

McLaws division would have been supported on his left by Anderson who would have drawn most of the attention of 2nd Corps. Hoods entire division, covered on his left by McLaws, would have descended on the Hill's practically untouched. I am not asserting that they would have "swept aside all Federal opposition ... However, Where you are right is the wild card ... 5th Corps ... how quickly could they have responded, and how well would they have fought, having marched all night with little rest, to cover the RT's ...
 
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