Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

Dan Sickles; Union Savior?

Assuming the two Corps are in position to reinforce immediately. Was the Cemetary Ridge Line reconstituted before the battle ended because of darkness? Another hour of daylight and would there have been anything to reinforce?
Again, if past events are prologue, then the history of the Civil War was that a Full Blooded assault on an army's flanks were seldom withstood.
Given the experiences of the AoP and it's officer corps and the ANV and its officer corps, especially their respective commanders, would probably, lead to the same result; what happened to Sickles forward position would have happened (more or less) in his original position, except, it would have occurred 'In' the Union MLR rather than in 'Front' of it.


P.S. as an example of theory vs reality, LRT was a prime tactical and strategic position, yet it was mostly ignored by most of the higher ups in both armies.
 
J_Man0507 said:
I still say that had Sickles stayed, with artillery in place and the Fifth Corps coming up to reinforce the flank, it would have been Pickett's Charge a day early.

Foote tends to agree with you, "Whatever else it was o wasn't [Sickles' movement] - and entirely aside from the fact that it helped to discourage Longstreet's men from attacking as Lee had ordered, straight up the Emmitsburg Road, which probably would have meant utter destruction for them if Sickles had stayed back on the ridge to tear their flank as they went by...."
 
I meant to post something yesterday, but didn't get a chance. I was gone for the weekend and didn't have access to a computer. I will post more this evening, but I will say that the Fifth Corps was in immediate reserve of the left flank, hence the reason that it was brought up as quickly as it was. Warren told Meade that LRT should be defended, and when he saw Confederate troops moving in its direction, because of Sickles rash maneuver, he brought them up. I will post more later, though. Work calls.
 
There is general agreement among students of the Second Day; i.e., Lee's plan was aimed to roll up the 5th Corps. Had Sickles been where he ought to have been, Longstreet's attack would have, at most, brushed Sickles' Corps at a steep angle--for the most part, they would have been marching almost parallel in front of Sickles' guns.

One might speculate that, when the when the planned attack reached the 5th Corps (and one might assume that Longstreet would have held things together at least that long), it would have already been considerably bloodied and disorganized. Hitting the 5th in that condition would be predictably disastrous--not to mention that Sickles would be in a position to swing in behind the attacking force.

Great posts, gentlemen.

ole
 
I really don't have much more to say. Through my research of this battle, I have come to the conclusion that if Sickles had stayed in position, he could have held. He had good ground. He had good fields of fire. Sykes corps was in immediate support, within a mile or so of the battlefield. If a threat to the flank had been detected, it would have been taken care of. The key is LRT. Warren recognized it as the key to the line. He most likely would have been sent down to check it out. He would have realized the importance and called for men to hold the position. Thats my position, and I'm stickin' to it. Both theories have merit. I don't deny that there was some good that came out of the foolhardy move, but I still don't think it was a good one tactically. Now, I'm going to get something for this headache....stupid coffee.:noway:
 
I have come to the conclusion that if Sickles had stayed in position, he could have held. He had good ground. He had good fields of fire.
Most I know of hold the same conclusion. Sickles-apologists will recall for you his state of mind re having enemy artillery on higher ground at Chancellorsville.

It remains, for me, that his movement forward was not in keeping with allowable discretion. That it inadvertently turned Day Two into a bloodbath that ended with a Confederate withdrawal means no nevermind. If, and this is what the whole thing boils down to, Sickles had placed his troops where instructed, the battle may well have ended that day.

But these are things that were, and we can't change them much. But it does make for a good conversation. Does anyone have a spare cold one? I ran out.

ole
 
Flip Sides

And this I think is where we should 'flip sides' and look at the Confederate side of things. Specifically, Hood, and ultimately his decision to go around Sickles who is now of course in the Peach Orchard.

It seems to me that Lee's plan is a little bit too ridgid, he wants to hit the Union flank but it doesn't seem that he is willing to concede any tactical flexibility to his commanders to find the flank. Is Lee ultimately ridgid because of the differences of opinion that he has had with Longstreet about slipping around the Federal left and awaiting an assault? ie. does he interpret the desire to go around Sickles a 'subversive' way for Longstreet to get his way?
 
Dan Sickles; Union Savior?

Wasn't it Longstreet who was being too rigid? Hood requested permission to move to his left, several times to Longstreet and was refused each time. Unlike Longstreet, Hood used his initiative to sidle to his Left anyway, otherwise the battle would not have reached LRT.
Lee had been acquiescing to his Corps commanders indecisions and reluctance all through the battle and Longstreet now decides to follow the letter of his instructions.
IMO Lee was impatient with Longstreets obvious attempts to redirect the offensive and based on faulty intelligence, thought he knew where the Union Left was located. Lee was probably anxious to end the campaign as soon as possible (day 2) and get back to Va. befsore his ammo and supplies completely failed.
Lee was trying to get the battle over as fast as possible and as a result made mistakes that, ultimately, reinforced the mistakes of his corps commanders.


P.S. The terrain between Seminary Ridge and Cemetary Ridge was undulating, from Sickles original position( lower than Hancock's position and lower than the Peach Orchard where Lee planned to site his supporting artillery) how good a field of fire 3d Corps would have had on Longstreet's Corps as it passed on its way to Hancock, is problematice. even If that was really their target)
 
Opn:

Will assume you meant Hood's right.

In the situation you've presented so ably is Longstreet's infamous snit. He knew that Lee's orders no longer applied, as the situation had changed so drastically. But, for whatever reason one might imagine, he insisted in following them. All of which adds to the never ending discussion about Gettysburg, Day 2.

ole
 
What an absolutely fantastic question! Does he become aware before Longstreet commits his forces? When, exactly, did he learn that his orders were fubar? And what did he do? Goshamighty. Willl be waiting for the learned to pitch in on that one. Many thanks for the question.

ole
 
Dan Sickles; Union Savior?

Apparently, there is no official record of Lee's whereabouts at the time of Sickles' forward movement (or indeed, during the battle itself). Although, it is unlikely that the advance of 10,00 men, in formal array, with flags waving, towards the confederate lines could have escaped Lee's notice.
Sickles sent Col. Berdan with two Reg'ts to the Peach Orchard to make a reconnaisance in force to locate and determine the strength of the opposition there, a little after 12:00 Noon. Then 3d Corps makes it forward movement a little after 1:00 o'clock, finishining it movment around 3:00. Longstreet's formal attack did not commence until around a little after 4:00.
Like Gen. Hill, just before and during the battle, Lee apparently, disappeared.
If Lee had always assumed the Peach Orchard was the Left anchor of the AoP. What would he have made of a whole Union corps moving up to occupy that position at 1 - 3:00 in the afternoon and what did he think when Longstreed did not attack until an hour later?
 
Exactly

OpnDownfall said:
Although, it is unlikely that the advance of 10,00 men, in formal array, with flags waving, towards the confederate lines could have escaped Lee's notice.

Exactly, if he didn't know, he didn't know, but HE SHOULD'VE KNOWN, he's the commander! The old maxim that a plan will not survive first contact with the enemy applies. No matter what we think of Sickles' actions, from the Confederate point of view, it is irrelevant, Sickles is, in fact, there, and the plan needs to accomodate the movement.

Hood is desperately trying to get Longstreet to recognize the tactical situation has changed and to permit the swing around Sickles (which he does anyway).
 
Looks like Hood was trying to adapt, improvise, and overcome. Lee and Longstreet should have known, is this something that not having calavery for eyes can be blamed on. There are times when you should just pick up your trash and look for another opportunity. Maybe Gettysburg was one of those times.
 
There are times when you should just pick up your trash and look for another opportunity.
Perzackle. Amen. If one were to make a list of all the bone-headed actions on Day 2, on both sides, one would need an entire notebook (narrow ruled) and an extra-fine pen so as to write tiny.
 
Dan Sickles: Union Savior?

From a southern view, it can be argued that in retrospect, it might have been better if Hood had followed Longstreet's orders and attacked the area around Devil's Den and the western foot of LRT. The added weight of the brigade(s) sent further East to envelope LRT, might have broken through earlier and could have completely surrounded the remnants of 3d Corps or even occupied Seminary Ridge on it's south end and with Hills last minute success at the center of the Union Line, might easily have convinced Meade to implement the retreat plans he had ordered to be prepared earlier.
A Maximum effort North, along the base of LRT (instead of losing extra force attempting to occupy the whole hill) might have yielded a southern victory at the end of Day 2.
 
Dear List Members:

By chance have any looked at the web inquiry called "Sickle's Hole." I did a web browser inquiry on General Daniel E. Sickles and looked at "Sickle's Hole." Very interesting and -- It has some interesting comments.

I will also mention, that when General Sickles was wounded, after his leg amputated he 'insisted' on being returned to Washington. He then started weaving his web of stories being the first back in Washington with the reports about Gettysburg.

He was later associated with some embezzlement of money for the memorial projects concerning Gettysburg. However, he did save Gettysburg by getting the Government to save the Battlefield of Gettysburg and preserve it for future generations.

I do agree with President Lincoln that General Meade was not going to be successful in a war in the press type of situation. Smear campaigns then are no different now. However; these things come to my summary of General Sickles. Sickles had been given an order. He was insubordinate.
Yes, he might have been in a hole but--the tactics General Meade might have been to bait the Confederates and as they committed--to pop up Sickles' Corps and fight a surprised Confederate Corps. By being insubordinate, he distracted General Hancock and perhaps other commanding officers. Distracting fellow Generals about ready to fight an enemy would not hold me 'endearing' to the man.

There are indeed many 'what ifs'--well, the fact remains we're dealing with what was and based on may different stories and accounts. It wasn't recorded by movie cameras so it could be replaying for review.

What I do come away with, given positions by everybody--the line of sight is different for everybody, as well as judgment of ground. Battle lines are 'fluid.' It has to be. However, it was unfortunate that General Meade had to be distracted by General Sickles as to get him back in line with the rest. It was too late for Meade to get him back in place and Sickles in need of rescue, pulled valuable resources and troops to save as much of Third Corps as possible. IF Sickles was indeed 'in a hole' he could have been on the back rim of the hill --not the frontal part of the rim--In my opinion.

I will also add, battlefield pictures look more sharply defined in vintage Civil War photographs compared to the present. Age has rounded those edges and has changed the ground. I have found this to be the case, especially true at Bull Run/Manassas Battlefield and believe such to be the same for Gettysburg. Also, it was over many years after the battle was over at Gettysburg, before it was made into a National Battlefield to be protected.

Just some thoughts.

Sincerely,
M. E. Weyraugh
 
Dear OpnDownfall and List Members;

I also find it interesting, that there is no 'official' record as to General Lee's whereabouts during the area of General Sickles' movements and the like. Surely, wouldn't one of his aide-de-camps, staff members be with him always, a courier and or someone--just to handle messages/reports?
Could it be General was indeed 'sick' and was taking a rest? Putting in motion and having Generals taking that battle plan--I can assume he has some moments to take a dump, a 10 minute nap.

Reference to the movie Gettysburg, I do recall General Longstreet telling General "Sam" Hood that he had argued constantly with General Lee, about taking the course of assault on Little Round Top. General Longstreet told General Hood--"I cannot change the commanding general's order." I have to agree--that you can only do so much and passionately present cause for one's case in front of the Commanding General but--it still is General Lee who commands and makes the final battlefield orders. I think from that point--regardless of sides; everybody prays and hopes they see the end of the battle alive.

I also will mention that this site's "Letters" titled Gettysburg Report by General Longstreet dated 7-27-1863 and General Lee's reports--to include General Lee's "Official" report dated 1/1864; is full of information.

In another direction please--In regard to General Longstreet; I do believe the South and former veterans, et.al.; were not seeing the 'man' post Civil War--who saw the need for the country/South to get on and get healthy as to be part of the Union and equal in power with the other sister states. I don't see it 'bashing' the South, holding ill will towards General Lee and the like. I believe General Lee was still hurting from having to surrender and was just upset about it all. I'm sure there were a lot of 'what ifs' then too. I further feel, the Southern people put General Lee on such a high throne that his defeat was everybody's fault but the facts and not so much the people surrounding him. Everybody has flaws in war. The real flaw was the lack of supply to match the demands of the troops and when troops are not whole and supplied--Generals have to work with what they have. The trickle down through the chain of command also can affect General's plans--especially if orders are vague. The game of 'telephone' as kids prove that saying one thing, many times it changes by time it gets to the last person and entirely different from the original message.

Could there have been spying from the Union in Confederate ranks? Could there have been internal sabatoge? Could have messages been intercepted? Lot of things could have taken place. Could there have been a change of signal officers flag codes as to throw things off--so many questions. Pity we have no Sylvia Browne to talk to these long dead participants.

Just some thoughts.

Sincerely,
M. E. Wolf
 
How about some maths to anser this question?

L-Street 11/37 is using 29% of the Anv Brig, against 25/50 or 50% of the AoP. L-street losses are 6k spread out over 30% of the ANV, Sickles etc is 10k spread out over 50% of the AoP Brigades.

We can fiddle with the losses brigades used if you like, but what will the numbers tell us is what we are after.
 
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