Longstreet Circumstances of Longstreet's Death

I agree to a point here, Diane, but he could never uphold his greatness with being on his own. General Lee took the blame
for his mistakes. Longstreet placed the blame of his mistakes on those he could destroy.
As Diane noted, a lot of Longstreet's passing of blame was in response to men like Jubal Early and came later in life, so it isn't exactly directly comparable to Lee's wartime statements - of even Longstreet's own wartime statements, for that matter.

I have to disagree with you about his independent talents, however; we perceive the two most prominent example's of Longstreet's independent commands - Knoxville and Norfolk - as failures, but a few things are worth noting: First, Chickamauga could theoretically be counted as a Longstreet-victory; Bragg was completely divorced from that battle, and Longstreet basically called most of the shots, winning a spectacular victory with an army mostly comprised of troops he'd not only never fought with, but only met that day.
Second, Knoxville was an impossible objective; he was sent there because Davis wanted it taken (both Lincoln and Davis obsessed about Knoxville frequently during the war), and Bragg chose Longstreet to do the job to get rid of a perceived threat to his position. What Longstreet did not have, however, was anything remotely resembling adequate forces of materiél to do the job with which he'd been tasked.
Third, we tend to look at Norfolk as a failure because he didn't take the city, but we forget that he wasn't supposed to take the city; the purpose of the Norfolk siege was to keep the Union forces bottled up with as few men as possible while the rest of his command was left unmolested to conduct forage operations that were so successful that they fed and supplied the Army of Northern Virginia for months. He had even been told that if he did take the city, there were insufficient troops to hold it, thus meaning that the Union would just move in and take it back as soon as Longstreet's corp returned to Lee when foraging was completed.

I think when left to act on his own, Longstreet's talents were similar to his talents when under Lee; he accomplished that which he set out to do if it was possible, and made as much progress towards his goal as he could when it wasn't.
 
I think a lot of that was defensiveness, as he was attacked pretty heavily from all sides, but you're essentially right. He really did a number on some, and he waited until after Lee was dead to blame him for things like Gettysburg. Dead men don't talk! Although I think he was right on one thing - something was definitely wrong with Lee at that battle. What it was I guess we'll never know!
diane, I have just re-read the preface of Longstreet's book “From Manassas to Appomattox“. He relates there that after the surrender Lee wanted to write a book about the campaigns of the ANV and had asked Longstreet to send him whatever papers and letters he still had to provide Lee with facts he might otherwise not have remembered correctly. Longstreet agreed - and I think he waited if Lee would use them and publish his book, which we know Lee did not. Therefore it was IMHO rather an act of respect that Longstreet did not address the public while Lee was still alive - he wanted Lee to be the first - than to wait until his superior could not reply anymore and then spread lies about him. He may not have remembered everything correctly - who of us could have done that after three decades? - but I doubt that he waited because he was afraid of being attacked for what he recalled of the events.
 
As Diane noted, a lot of Longstreet's passing of blame was in response to men like Jubal Early and came later in life, so it isn't exactly directly comparable to Lee's wartime statements - of even Longstreet's own wartime statements, for that matter.

I have to disagree with you about his independent talents, however; we perceive the two most prominent example's of Longstreet's independent commands - Knoxville and Norfolk - as failures, but a few things are worth noting: First, Chickamauga could theoretically be counted as a Longstreet-victory; Bragg was completely divorced from that battle, and Longstreet basically called most of the shots, winning a spectacular victory with an army mostly comprised of troops he'd not only never fought with, but only met that day.
Second, Knoxville was an impossible objective; he was sent there because Davis wanted it taken (both Lincoln and Davis obsessed about Knoxville frequently during the war), and Bragg chose Longstreet to do the job to get rid of a perceived threat to his position. What Longstreet did not have, however, was anything remotely resembling adequate forces of materiél to do the job with which he'd been tasked.
Third, we tend to look at Norfolk as a failure because he didn't take the city, but we forget that he wasn't supposed to take the city; the purpose of the Norfolk siege was to keep the Union forces bottled up with as few men as possible while the rest of his command was left unmolested to conduct forage operations that were so successful that they fed and supplied the Army of Northern Virginia for months. He had even been told that if he did take the city, there were insufficient troops to hold it, thus meaning that the Union would just move in and take it back as soon as Longstreet's corp returned to Lee when foraging was completed.

I think when left to act on his own, Longstreet's talents were similar to his talents when under Lee; he accomplished that which he set out to do if it was possible, and made as much progress towards his goal as he could when it wasn't.


You left out 7 pines.
 
My paternal grandmother once told me that her father was proud to have been one of Longstreet’s men so I tend to go a little easy on him. I My problem is not so with his wartime service as it is with his post war activity -- notably in Louisiana.
 
Back to the first few posts for a minute......I recall reading a detailed description of the wound Longstreet suffered in the Wilderness that included a diagram or description of the bullet trajectory. Does anyone know if that was on this board.....I'd like to read it again.
 
Back to the first few posts for a minute......I recall reading a detailed description of the wound Longstreet suffered in the Wilderness that included a diagram or description of the bullet trajectory. Does anyone know if that was on this board.....I'd like to read it again.

I was looking for that one, too! The search engine is not my friend... :x3: For a long while it was thought that Longstreet's wound was from the front, exiting below the right shoulder blade. They reconstructed the path of the bullet and found it was just the opposite - exiting at the throat. That then meant he was shot by someone lying on the ground behind him. Definitely one of his own men - that's all who was behind him.
 
I was looking for that one, too! The search engine is not my friend... :x3: For a long while it was thought that Longstreet's wound was from the front, exiting below the right shoulder blade. They reconstructed the path of the bullet and found it was just the opposite - exiting at the throat. That then meant he was shot by someone lying on the ground behind him. Definitely one of his own men - that's all who was behind him.

Found the article online at http://archotol.jamanetwork.com/sol...gology–Head & Neck Surgery&SearchSourceType=3
 
Thanks! That is a great article. He didn't get shot just a little bit, that's for sure.

Definitely a nasty wound.....the article says that he hemorrhaged "profusely" but doesn't say whether it was the original wound reopening. Without an autopsy at the time it would be hard to tell.
 
Definitely a nasty wound.....the article says that he hemorrhaged "profusely" but doesn't say whether it was the original wound reopening. Without an autopsy at the time it would be hard to tell.

I remember reading somewhere that was the official cause of death - his old wound reopening. It seems the heavy coughing from the pneumonia and the nerve damage from the injury managed to combine and do him in. He never had good swallowing or functions like that after the shooting - I can see how that would cause the weak spot to open again. Today that could have been repaired much, much better and not have killed him later in life. That's why, I suppose, so many old veterans lived for years with only partly healed wounds and died of them later.
 
I agree to a point here, Diane, but he could never uphold his greatness with being on his own. General Lee took the blame
for his mistakes. Longstreet placed the blame of his mistakes on those he could destroy.

Rebforever,

I am in a personal disagreement with your feelings about Longstreet, yet I respect them. I hope that you may consider, if you read the Official Records of the Rebellion of General Longstreet's actions in Tennessee under Bragg and Beauregard, he did rather well alone and not with his entire Corps, being that a portion of his Corps and his staff remained with Lee. Longstreet, in my opinion was brilliant in my opinion to gather every hoofed mode of transportation to mount his Infantry and did so in a shift of position as to counter the Union military. Longstreet was also able to mobilize and get through the mountain range as to reach Lee in the contest at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court-House campaign.

I must mention that General Joe Johnston was the general commanding that decided the placement of Longstreet's seniority by one day over "Stonewall" Jackson. Under Johnston, he did very well and as all know, each 'boss' has their own style of leadership.

I must believe that Lee and Longstreet had a closeness, to which Lee was God-Father to Longstreet's son, and Lee's namesake. The wisdom of both Johnston and Lee, knew that what Longstreet lacked, Jackson made up for it. What Jackson lacked, Longstreet made up for it. The mentality of the military is creating a 'team' effort and the 'whole' reach the goals, not just a singular person.

Personally, there will be many who have preferences when it comes to military leaders ...and that is ok. :thumbsup:

M. E. Wolf
 
I think that a lot of the post war criticism leveled at Longstreet was due to his willingness to get past the war and repair relations between the North and South. Many from the South saw this as a betrayal. In my opinion it was just a feeling on Longstreet's part of the war was over and now it was time to get on with life and be a part of the new Union.
 
From Manassas to Appomattox (Longstreet)
Chapter XXXVIII.—Battle Of The Wilderness.
[excerpt]
General Smith then came and reported a way across the Brock road that would turn Hancock's extreme left. He was asked to conduct the flanking brigades and handle them as the ranking officer. He was a splendid tactician as well as skilful engineer, and gallant withal. He started, and, not to lose time or distance, moved by inversion, Wofford's left leading, Wofford's favorite manoeuvre. As Wofford's left stepped out, the other troops moved down the Plank road, Jenkins's brigade by the road, Kershaw's division alongside. I rode at the head of the column, Jenkins, Kershaw, and the staff with me. After discussing the dispositions of their troops for reopening battle, Jenkins rode closer to offer congratulations, saying, "I am happy; I have felt despair of the cause for some months, but am relieved, and feel assured that we will put the enemy back across the Rapidan before night." Little did he or I think these sanguine words were the last he would utter.

When Wadsworth fell the Union battle broke up in hasty retreat. Field's brigades closed to fresh ranks, the flanking brigades drew into line near the Plank road, and with them the other regiments of Mahone's brigade; but the Twelfth Regiment, some distance in advance of the others, had crossed the road to strike at Wadsworth's left before the other regiments were in sight, and was returning to find its place in line. The order for the flanking brigades to resume march by their left had not moved those brigades of the right. As the Twelfth Regiment marched back to find its place on the other side of the Plank road, it was mistaken, in the wood, for an advance of the enemy, and fire was opened on it from the other regiments of the brigade. The men threw themselves to the ground to let the fire pass. Just then our party of officers was up and rode under the fire. General Jenkins had not finished the expressions of joyful congratulations which I have quoted when he fell mortally wounded.

Captain Doby and the orderly, Bowen, of Kershaw's staff, were killed. General Kershaw turned to quiet the troops, when Jenkins's brigade with levelled guns were in the act of returning the fire of the supposed enemy concealed in the wood, but as Kershaw's clear voice called out "F-r-i-e-n-d-s !" the arms were recovered, without a shot in return, and the men threw themselves down upon their faces.

At the moment that Jenkins fell I received a severe shock from a minie ball passing through my throat and right shoulder. The blow lifted me from the saddle, and my right arm dropped to my side, but I settled back to my seat, and started to ride on, when in a minute the flow of blood admonished me that my work for the day was done. As I turned to ride back, members of the staff, seeing me about to fall, dismounted and lifted me to the ground.

Orders were given General Field, the senior officer present, to push on before the enemy could have time to rally. The two lines marching along the Plank road, southward, in pursuit, and the flanking brigades to move in the other direction, were, for the moment, a little perplexing, as he was not accurately advised of the combinations, but he grasped the situation. Before he was prepared, however, General R. H. Anderson came into command as senior, and then General Lee came up. The plans, orders, and opportunity were explained to him, but the woods concealed everything except the lines of troops alongside the road. General Lee did not care to handle the troops in broken lines, and ordered formation in a general line for parallel battle. The change in the forest tangle consumed several hours of precious time, and gave General Hancock time to collect his men into battle order, post his heavy reinforcements, and improve his intrenchments.

[extract]
As my litter was borne to the rear my hat was placed over my face, and soldiers by the road-side said, "He is dead, and they are telling us he is only wounded." Hearing this repeated from time to time, I raised my hat with my left hand, when the burst of voices and the flying of hats in the air eased my pains somewhat. But Micah Jenkins, who fell by the same fire, was no more. He was one of the most estimable characters of the army. His taste and talent were for military service. He was intelligent, quick, untiring, attentive, zealous in discharge of duty, truly faithful to official obligations, abreast with the foremost in battle, and withal a humble, noble Christian. In a moment of highest earthly hope he was transported to serenest heavenly joy; to that life beyond that knows no bugle call, beat of drum, or clash of steel. May his beautiful spirit, through the mercy of God, rest in peace ! Amen !

[excerpt]
General Field says in his account of the day,—
I was at Longstreet's side in a moment, and in answer to my anxious inquiry as to his condition, he replied that he would be looked after by others, and directed me to take command of the corps and push ahead. Though at this moment he could not have known the extent or character of his wounds (that they were severe was apparent), he seemed to forget himself in the absorbing interest of the movement he was making."

"Had our advance not been suspended by this disaster, I have always believed that Grant would have been driven across the Rapidan before night; but .General Lee was present, and ordered that our line, which was nearly a right angle (my division being the base, and Kershaw's and the other flanking force the perpendicular), should first be straightened out. The difficulty of manoeuvring through the brush made this a tedious operation, so that when we did advance with large reinforcements from Ewell's corps placed under my orders, the enemy was found awaiting us behind new breastworks, thoroughly prepared."

Colonel Fairfax says,-
"On reaching the line of troops you were taken off the horse and propped against a tree. You blew the bloody foam from your mouth and said, 'Tell General Field to take command, and move forward with the whole force and gain the Brock road,' but hours were lost."

[end of excerpt]

M. E. Wolf
 
I think that a lot of the post war criticism leveled at Longstreet was due to his willingness to get past the war and repair relations between the North and South. Many from the South saw this as a betrayal. In my opinion it was just a feeling on Longstreet's part of the war was over and now it was time to get on with life and be a part of the new Union.

It has been 'mentioned' in many of my discussions with Southern re-enactors involving Longstreet, having 20/20 vision of course; think that Longstreet has been given a raw deal by the "Lost Cause" sorts. The historians among the banter are of the opinion that Longstreet's association with the "White Republicans" was to counter the "Black Republicans."

The "Democratic Party" which was still connected as being "Rebels," as one has to go back to the first secession where Howell Cobb and most of President Buchanan's Administration was Democrat. It too was unpopular in the North. So, I can see from hind-sight the possible desire to splinter the Republican Party as to gain popularity and to distance from the 'rebellious' Democratic party--which General McClellan was soundly defeated and others who ran on the Democratic ticket. From what I gather, its similar to modern politics where the current Democrats said that the Republican Party now days is Jeff Davis' party. [[scratching chin here....]]. One thing about politics -- it is fickle.

Sooooooooooooo, I can't help but wonder if Longstreet was a better public speaker, which to be perfectly honest--he was awful!, though his intent was good -- was just not a man constructed to deal with political politics--maybe military but, not political. Would the "White Republican Party" be similar to today's "Tea Party?" I suspect we'll (in general terms) not know entirely the political mechanics going through Longstreet's mind at that time but, I maintain that Longstreet wasn't being severely critical of Lee the General commanding as a person but, having hindsight and the O.R.s published, could see how Lee's plan was flawed. I believe this defined line between man verses the plan, is ignored or purposefully covered up with diversion as to keep the detraction on Longstreet as a man with an opinion.

Having the luxury of being in Virginia, access the Museum of the Confederacy, access to the historians and keepers of relics, to include Lee's personal papers -- even his John Foley, Banker's Nib #10 dated 1865--nowhere can it be found Lee's criticisms of Longstreet -- quite the opposite.

But, it is fact that up to Longstreet's death, the General was never at full peace, to which this alone could have caused chronic depression, chronic sleep issues, stress, high blood pressure along with a host of other medical issues.

I am satisfied that a lot of accusations by others, are not supported by the Official Records of the Rebellion,
nor with Lieutenant-Colonel Walter H. Taylor's and Colonel Charles Marshall's written works around the controversy of "Gettysburg" and other pop-up allegations of failures, to which Longstreet publishes in his memoirs` "Manassas to Appomattox."

Just some personal thoughts and opinions.

M. E. Wolf
 
Rebforever,

I am in a personal disagreement with your feelings about Longstreet, yet I respect them. I hope that you may consider, if you read the Official Records of the Rebellion of General Longstreet's actions in Tennessee under Bragg and Beauregard, he did rather well alone and not with his entire Corps, being that a portion of his Corps and his staff remained with Lee. Longstreet, in my opinion was brilliant in my opinion to gather every hoofed mode of transportation to mount his Infantry and did so in a shift of position as to counter the Union military. Longstreet was also able to mobilize and get through the mountain range as to reach Lee in the contest at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court-House campaign.

I must mention that General Joe Johnston was the general commanding that decided the placement of Longstreet's seniority by one day over "Stonewall" Jackson. Under Johnston, he did very well and as all know, each 'boss' has their own style of leadership.

I must believe that Lee and Longstreet had a closeness, to which Lee was God-Father to Longstreet's son, and Lee's namesake. The wisdom of both Johnston and Lee, knew that what Longstreet lacked, Jackson made up for it. What Jackson lacked, Longstreet made up for it. The mentality of the military is creating a 'team' effort and the 'whole' reach the goals, not just a singular person.

Personally, there will be many who have preferences when it comes to military leaders ...and that is ok. :thumbsup:

M. E. Wolf

Thanks for the response, Wolf. I understand what you are saying. There is much more to my dislike that holds me
to my opinion. He made stupid mistakes and wouldn't listen to those that tried to help him and if that
didn't work out right he started the CM on them. I give him credit where it is due as much as I give to him of my dislikes.
He was late getting to the battlefield at the Wilderness because he would not take the word of a junior officer the best way to get there which was a direct order from General Lee.

IMO
 
Rebforever,

By any chance have you visited the Wilderness Battlefield in Virginia? Even cleaned up the re-enactors at the latest one there, a Lieutenant-Colonel on the CSA General Staff (and a personal friend), said that he really got twisted around and momentarily lost.

General Longstreet's reply to the criticisms of the Wilderness campaign was and has been dismissed. I remind myself that it wasn't that far distant from where Stonewall Jackson was mortally wounded when Longstreet was seriously wounded and M. Jenkins, a promising General was killed as he spoke with Longstreet.

This is an excerpt:

From Manassas to Appotamox (Longstreet)
Chapter XXXVIII.—Battle Of The Wilderness.

Bad as was being shot by some of our own troops in the battle of the Wilderness,—that was an honest mistake, one of the accidents of war,—being shot at, since the war, by many officers, was worse. Fitzhugh Lee wrote of me in the Southern Historical Society papers, vol. v., No. 4, April, 1878, saying, among other things," He lost his way and reached the Wilderness twenty-four hours behind time."

Now, from Mechanicsville to Parker's Store by our line of march was thirty-four miles,—by the Plank road, thirty-five; from Parker's Store to the battle, three miles. From the time of our march to going into battle was thirty-six hours, including all of two nights. Deducting twenty-four hours alleged as lost leaves twelve hours, including all night of the 4th, for the march of thirty-seven miles!

His logic and method of injury remind one of the French teacher who, when out of patience with the boys, used to say, "I will give you zero and mark you absent."

Another report started by Fitzhugh Lee as coming from his cousin, G. W. C. Lee, was that General Lee said that he "sent an officer to Longstreet to stay with and show him the roads."

This, like all other reported sayings of General Lee in regard to me, was not published until after General Lee's death. When it was first published I wrote General G. W. C. Lee for the name of the officer sent. He referred me to the members of General Lee's staff. Not one of them knew of the circumstance or the officer, but referred me to General Lee's engineers. After long search I found the engineers and applied for information, but not one of them knew anything of the alleged fact. I had the letters published as an advertisement for the officer who was claimed as my guide. No response came. I inquired of the members of the staff, First Corps; not one had seen or heard of such a person. The quartermaster, Colonel Taylor, who was ordered to secure a competent guide at the first moment of receipt of orders to march, reported of the matter thus:

“MEADOW FARM, ORANGE COURT-HOUSE,
“ July 1, 1879.
“ GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET:
"DEAR GENERAL,—Your favor of the 30th ultimo is this moment to hand, and I reply at once. I think General Fitzhugh Lee entirely in error as to any engineer or other officer being sent to guide you in the spring of 1864 from your camp near Gordonsville to the Wilderness. I well remember your sending for me, and directing me to procure a guide for you, which I did after some difficulty in the person of Mr. James Robinson, the then sheriff of the county. I saw no such person, nor can I think that any such was at any time at our quarters before we broke
"Sincerely yours,
“ ERASMUS TAYLOR.”

These efforts to secure one witness in support of the allegation, or rather to prove a negation, were all that occurred to me at the time, and now I can think of but one more chance, which is for Fitzhugh Lee to offer a liberal reward. It is not probable that he would fail to find a false witness who could answer for a time to support the false charges.

It may be added that the accounts of the march by other officers agree with mine, as already given. I present here a letter from General Alexander and an extract from one written me by Colonel Venable. The former says,-

"AUGUSTA, GA., June 12, 1879.
"MY DEAR GENERAL,—Absence prevented an earlier response to your favor of the 5th. My recollection of the events is as follows: My command, the artillery, got orders to move about noon on May 4, 1864, being in camp near Mechanicsville, some four or five miles west of Gordonsville. We marched about four P.M., and with only short rests all night and all next day till about five P.M., when we halted to rest and bivouac at a point which I cannot remember; but our cavalry had had a skirmish there with the enemy's cavalry just before our arrival, and I remember seeing some killed and wounded of each side. Your whole corps, Hood's and McLaws's, and the artillery, I think, was concentrated at that point, and my recollection is that we had orders to move on during the night, or before daylight the next morning, to get on the enemy's left flank on the Brock road.

"But whatever the orders were, I remember distinctly that during the night news of the fight on the Plank road came, and with it a change of orders, and that we marched at one A.M., or earlier, and turned to the left and struck the Plank road at Parker's Store, and pushed rapidly down it to where the battle had already begun. I remember, too, that the march was so hurried that at one point, the head of the leading division (I forget which it was, however) having lost a little distance by taking the wrong road, the rear division was not allowed to halt, but pushed right on, so that it got abreast of the leading division, and the two came down the road side by side, filling the whole road and crowding the retreating men of the divisions which were being driven back into the woods on each side.

"These are facts as I recollect them, and while I don't know what your orders were, I remember that there was a change in them during the night, according to my understanding, and that the change was as promptly and vigorously and successfully carried out as time and distance could possibly permit. There was certainly no loss of time from the moment we received orders to the moment we went under fire in the Wilderness, as the distance covered will show.
"Very truly yours,
“ E. P. ALEXANDER.

“ GENERAL LONGSTREET.”

Colonel Venable writes,—
“ July 25, 1879.
“ DEAR GENERAL—... Well, the morning came. The enemy attacked Wilcox and Heth before your arrival. Disaster seemed imminent. I was sent to meet you and hasten your march. I met your two divisions within less than half a mile of the battlefield coming up in parallel columns very rapidly (I was going to say in double-quick) on the Plank road, side by side, and that they came in grandly, forming line of battle, Kershaw on the right and Field on the left, restoring the battle. It was superb, and my heart beats quicker to think about it even at this distance of time ....
"Yours, very truly,
“ CHARLES S. VENABLE.
“ GENERAL LONGSTREET.”

Charles S. Venable was on General R. E. Lee's staff at the time and had been for most of the war. He states he was the sent officer from Lee's staff and this statement of his, does not support the criticisms of Longstreet post-Civil War.

General E. P. Alexander also has a good reputation to which should be held in account.

E. Taylor, the "Engineer" to whom knew the problems and topography of the battle site, having an independent opinion, expressing them fully -- and diplomatically states that General Fitz Lee was totally in error. That is pretty risky as his rank wasn't as lofty nor, able to withstand criticisms if General Fitz Lee responded with evidence.

I am of the opinion that the troops lead by Longstreet to the Wildnerness from Tennessee, is nothing short of heroic and much like Patton's pulling up and marching his troops in winter to save the troops surrounded by the Nazis at the "Battle of the Bulge" where General McAuliffe's one word response said it all "Nuts!".

I am of the opinion, that there were no Generals in the Civil War, that didn't make mistakes.
Mistakes are what changes battle tactics and inventions of better weapons. :thumbsup:

Just some thoughts, observations and opinions.

M. E. Wolf
 
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