Buford knew -that A.P. Hill's Corps was back of Cashtown on the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike on June 30.
Had heard rumors that Ewell was coming over the mountain from Carlisle. A captured escort had said part of Ewell's Corps had already crossed from Carlisle.
Buford was informed that day, that Lee had signed a pass for a citizen in Chambersburg, that very morning. Buford knew.
Buford knew the conditions of the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike and knew the Confederates would arrive a brigade at a time. Buford knew he could start to stack them up, like a cork in a bottle neck, when they did come.
Buford had a cavalry division; not a corps. His mission was to delay and wait for the AoP corps to arrive. It was his job to delay as best he could. It was the decision of other generals, whether a battle would take place by the AoP Corps in Gettysburg.
The Battle of Gettysburg was no guarantee on July 1. Meade could decide to fall back to Maryland and defend at his original Pike Creek line. Gettysburg held no strategic value; Gettysburg and Adams County held no great supplies.
Gettysburg was not a very good place for a large Confederate army to come. Buford indirectly referred to that fact in a dispatch on June 30th.
The ANV was sending two corps down a narrow road. It would become important for the Confederate army to fight past the Gettysburg junctures and move south, or retreat back to Virginia.
Gettysburg was not a good place for an army, cut off from its Virginia supplies, to fight. Gettysburg never was the place for the ANV to fight. Buford knew.
Had heard rumors that Ewell was coming over the mountain from Carlisle. A captured escort had said part of Ewell's Corps had already crossed from Carlisle.
Buford was informed that day, that Lee had signed a pass for a citizen in Chambersburg, that very morning. Buford knew.
Buford knew the conditions of the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike and knew the Confederates would arrive a brigade at a time. Buford knew he could start to stack them up, like a cork in a bottle neck, when they did come.
Buford had a cavalry division; not a corps. His mission was to delay and wait for the AoP corps to arrive. It was his job to delay as best he could. It was the decision of other generals, whether a battle would take place by the AoP Corps in Gettysburg.
The Battle of Gettysburg was no guarantee on July 1. Meade could decide to fall back to Maryland and defend at his original Pike Creek line. Gettysburg held no strategic value; Gettysburg and Adams County held no great supplies.
Gettysburg was not a very good place for a large Confederate army to come. Buford indirectly referred to that fact in a dispatch on June 30th.
The ANV was sending two corps down a narrow road. It would become important for the Confederate army to fight past the Gettysburg junctures and move south, or retreat back to Virginia.
Gettysburg was not a good place for an army, cut off from its Virginia supplies, to fight. Gettysburg never was the place for the ANV to fight. Buford knew.