Buford Knew

whitworth

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Jun 18, 2005
Buford knew -that A.P. Hill's Corps was back of Cashtown on the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike on June 30.
Had heard rumors that Ewell was coming over the mountain from Carlisle. A captured escort had said part of Ewell's Corps had already crossed from Carlisle.
Buford was informed that day, that Lee had signed a pass for a citizen in Chambersburg, that very morning. Buford knew.

Buford knew the conditions of the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike and knew the Confederates would arrive a brigade at a time. Buford knew he could start to stack them up, like a cork in a bottle neck, when they did come.

Buford had a cavalry division; not a corps. His mission was to delay and wait for the AoP corps to arrive. It was his job to delay as best he could. It was the decision of other generals, whether a battle would take place by the AoP Corps in Gettysburg.

The Battle of Gettysburg was no guarantee on July 1. Meade could decide to fall back to Maryland and defend at his original Pike Creek line. Gettysburg held no strategic value; Gettysburg and Adams County held no great supplies.

Gettysburg was not a very good place for a large Confederate army to come. Buford indirectly referred to that fact in a dispatch on June 30th.
The ANV was sending two corps down a narrow road. It would become important for the Confederate army to fight past the Gettysburg junctures and move south, or retreat back to Virginia.

Gettysburg was not a good place for an army, cut off from its Virginia supplies, to fight. Gettysburg never was the place for the ANV to fight. Buford knew.
 
Gettysburg was an accident. It's value was simply its roads. It was there that Lee needed to concentrate his scattered forces. Once the Federals began to arrive, it became the place, not of his choosing, that Lee would have to face the decisive battle he sought.

Buford had the foresight and grit to select the battlefield. Whether his thought processes followed exactly that line, I can't say. But he was proven right: Hold them until the AoP can select and settle the most advantageous ground. The film, Gettysbury, notwithstanding, he had only to know that his efforts would give Meade the choice of ground.

Ole
 
And, I believe Lee did not want a 'general engagement' in that area, but Heth (?) encountering Bufords relatively small number of troops, and not knowing the whole Federal army was not far behind, went at Buford, and the game was on. (????)
 
whitworth said:
Buford knew ...

Generally, you're right.:smile:

In particular, you are right about Buford's place in the scheme of things. He was a cavalry division commander and knew that the real decisions belonged to Meade and Reynolds, not him. As such, Buford performed brilliantly (even if Pleasonton couldn't seem to understand it).

If Meade intended to form defensively along Big Pipe Creek, Gettysburg was an important advance post to disrupt Confederate movements and provide intel. If Meade intended to move offensively against Lee, Gettysburg was an important forward concentration point for further operations.

However, Buford knew a few other things as well. He was a very professional cavalry soldier, and knew the strategic, operational, and tactical value of Gettysburg would shift according to what Lee and Meade intended.

For example, if Lee was simply in Gettysburg to gather supplies and avoid a fight, Lee would not have much use for Gettysburg except as a transit point or forward observation post. He would remain behing the mountain with his main force, guarding the gaps. Possibly counter-attacking if Meade exposed himself.

But if Lee was looking to fight offensively, Gettysburg was the nexus from which he could do it against a Union advance from the South. In that case, Buford must delay as long as possible, whether Meade wants to be at Gettysburg or Big Pipe Creek.

The actual big worry of July 1 for the Union is about how fast Lee might be concentrating and striking. When Meade first gets the news (Noonish?) the situation is very hazy. The "worst-case" scenario would have been if Lee was somehow pouring through Gettysburg in blitzkrieg fashion, driving over Cemetery Hill and out the Baltimore Pike/Taneytown Rd. If that is going on, there is a chance Lee can split the AoP and turn against one half or the other: a nightmare.

If that happens, Meade better get the AoP back behind Big Pipe Creek real quick, or he'll be finding part of his army in Baltimore and part in Washington. It isn't real likely, and clearly it wasn't a worked-out plan of Lee's. But that is the immediate worry, and was strongly on Meade's mind when he sent Hancock forward.

Regards,
Tim
 
Buford did a great job at this time regardless of what you think of the situation. To bad he died so soon after the battle. Does anyone know if he ever really wrote down any of his thoughts on that day.
 
civilwarbuglertn said:
Buford did a great job at this time regardless of what you think of the situation. To bad he died so soon after the battle. Does anyone know if he ever really wrote down any of his thoughts on that day.

Yes, that is what I said about him. Very good, very controlled, very aware of what his job was and willing to make sure he got it done.

Regards,
Tim
 
Buford was a very good division commander and had he lived longer probably would have upheld that trust, but in some respects I think the Buford legend has grown to larger than life proportions. I've even seen people suggest that somehow he developed the idea of having his cavalry fight dismounted!

A great cavalryman that did great at Gettysburg, but perhaps not as influential as some might think.

(Although I have never understood his actions at 2nd Manassas. That proved to be a minor slip up, but could have potentially caused Pope some embarrasment.)

Respectfully
 
nbforrest said:
Buford was a very good division commander and had he lived longer probably would have upheld that trust, but in some respects I think the Buford legend has grown to larger than life proportions. I've even seen people suggest that somehow he developed the idea of having his cavalry fight dismounted!

A great cavalryman that did great at Gettysburg, but perhaps not as influential as some might think.

In rough terms, military professionals in the 19th century thought it took 2 years to train a raw recruit into a cavalryman. This is harder when the man you are training doesn't know how to ride a horse to begin with.

The South's early-war cavalry advantage is primarily based on this (and the quality of horses they started with due to men providing their own mounts). In Southern states, men generally rode horses and used them in daily activity. In Northern, particularly northeastern, states men normally drove wagons or buggies instead of riding horses. As a result, Southern cavalry regiments were concentrating on turning men into soldiers; Northern ones had the extra task of teaching them to ride.

In practice, this affected cavalry regiments from the East more, and was felt in the AoP/AoV. Union cavalry there often had enough trouble just moving mounted in formation, often losing a substantial number of men to falls and mishaps in a simple change of position. Actually fighting while mounted with such troops must have sent shudders through old mounted troopers like Buford. It was only practical for them to develop an early preference for dismounted action.

Buford actually ends up leading what is probably the first successful Union cavalry-on-cavalry saber charge of the war in the East, at 2nd Manassas.

nbforrest said:
(Although I have never understood his actions at 2nd Manassas. That proved to be a minor slip up, but could have potentially caused Pope some embarrasment.)

If you are talking about the days before the battle, Pope had terribly overworked his 2 cavalry brigades. In the short run this was good, and assisted him in escaping the first trap Lee tried to set. But when the actual battle is being fought, the brigades of Buford and Bayard, are way below their apparent strength.

If you are talking about the action on the 2nd day, Buford's charge may have prevented a much greater disaster. The Federal left had routed; Robertson's cavalry brigade was moving unopposed for the only bridge they could cross by, and Buford's understrength charge rocked them back before their counter-charge drove Buford's men away in a rout. But Beverly Robertson came up and decided his cavalry had done enough for the day. Night fell, and the Federals did make it across the bridge.

Lee and Stuart were furious; so were Robertson's subordinates. Lee and Stuart decided Robertson was desperately needed to train recruits in NC and managed to get rid of him within a week, in the short space before the ANV crossed the Potomac on the way to Antietam.

Regards,
Tim
 
My reference to 2nd Manassas was regarding the August 30 fight near Portici. My criticism stems from the fact that Buford only sent forward the 1st MI and 4th NY. While that was OK to drive back Robertson's first regiment (Munford's 2nd VA, I believe). But once Robertson brought up the rest of his brigade, Buford inexplicably did not move forward the 1st VT or 1st WV, but rather let the 1st MI and 4th NY get driven back straight into his other two regiments. Those two got carried away in the rout. As events proved, Robertson did not find the energy to pitch into the Warrenton Turnpike. However, had Robertson been more inclined to do some damage Buford's rather poor response to Robertson's attack would have been quite an embarrasment to Buford.

Respectfully
 
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