I'm reading Last Chance For Victory, R.E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign, by Scott Bowden and Bill Ward. I'm late in the First Day and just find the book outstanding. Has anybody else out there read this work and if so what do you think of it?
Whitworth, you actually seem to be mellowing, and I agree mostly with what you've written. My take from this book so far is that despite logistical problems, the absence of Stuart, the rashness of Hill and Heath in the beginning, the situation came together for Lee as he had hoped it would in the days leading up to July 1. That is, enough of his army came together at the right time to destroy the lead elements of a strung out AoP. But seemingly small things like the reluctance of Lane on the right to cooperate with Perrin in the assault on the US 1st Corps at Seminary ridge. Yes the Federals were routed but as Perrin wrote "If we had any support from Lane we could have taken every piece of artillery they had and thousands of prisoners." Then there was Lee's ignored order to Pendleton to find an artillery position to the right of the Seminary and smother Cemetery Hill. That was as the same time Generals Ewell, Early and Rodes were 'busy convincing themselves that Second Corps needed assistance from Hill's Third Corps in order to attack Cemetery Hill' Pendleton was deciding to keep his 31 guns 'in park.' Not only did Pendleton's act allow demoralized Federals to regroup and organize a defense, but it also certainly had a negative impact on the Second Corps decision not to continue the attack.As an aging taciturn curmudgeon, in my best pantomime of the late Andy Rooney, the Confederate army was grasping at straws, by the time of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Plus I don't read newbies who seem only good at copying footnotes of the many wrong historians. Gettysburg - some last grasp.
The Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania was a very hard and difficult offensive campaign that would go wrong, if only a few wrong happenings occurred. And they did. If you read the OR's instead of the battle book historians and read some of R.E. Lee's very own writings on the campaign, you might learn something.
First, the Army of Northern Virginia was unprepared for an invasion campaign, away from their logistics in Richmond.
Their forage, rations and artillery ammunition were so short, R.E. Lee wondered in a dispatch to Gen. Ewell, whether even one corps had the ability to stay in Pennsylvania.
Lee as is known in history to some, only had three battle days of artillery ammunition, a very difficult situation to be in when northern civilians only have to count Confederate wagons moving into Pennsylvania.
The worst thing happened to the Confederates at Gettysburg. They got trapped in a three day knock down battle of the time, where they had the option to only go on the attack and then attack the opposing army in their fixed positions. That a very bad situation to be in militarily, if only the many civilian students only had some military training and education on war.
If only some had the training to realize what the British military observer wrote when he said simply that the Confederate army only had three pounds of corn a day for the artillery horses on their way to Pennsylvania. It's meaningless to almost every civilian. The don't really know artillery and its importance; never know artillery horses; or really know anything about forage for large artillery horses.
But then we are talking of American civilians of the 21st century, who think they know war and 19th century war. And of course, many do know where the monuments are, commemorating a battle of Gettysburg, some 150 years ago.
Whitworth, you actually seem to be mellowing, and I agree mostly with what you've written. My take from this book so far is that despite logistical problems, the absence of Stuart, the rashness of Hill and Heath in the beginning, the situation came together for Lee as he had hoped it would in the days leading up to July 1. That is, enough of his army came together at the right time to destroy the lead elements of a strung out AoP. But seemingly small things like the reluctance of Lane on the right to cooperate with Perrin in the assault on the US 1st Corps at Seminary ridge. Yes the Federals were routed but as Perrin wrote "If we had any support from Lane we could have taken every piece of artillery they had and thousands of prisoners." Then there was Lee's ignored order to Pendleton to find an artillery position to the right of the Seminary and smother Cemetery Hill. That was as the same time Generals Ewell, Early and Rodes were 'busy convincing themselves that Second Corps needed assistance from Hill's Third Corps in order to attack Cemetery Hill' Pendleton was deciding to keep his 31 guns 'in park.' Not only did Pendleton's act allow demoralized Federals to regroup and organize a defense, but it also certainly had a negative impact on the Second Corps decision not to continue the attack.
Whitworth, you actually seem to be mellowing, and I agree mostly with what you've written. My take from this book so far is that despite logistical problems, the absence of Stuart, the rashness of Hill and Heath in the beginning, the situation came together for Lee as he had hoped it would in the days leading up to July 1. That is, enough of his army came together at the right time to destroy the lead elements of a strung out AoP. But seemingly small things like the reluctance of Lane on the right to cooperate with Perrin in the assault on the US 1st Corps at Seminary ridge. Yes the Federals were routed but as Perrin wrote "If we had any support from Lane we could have taken every piece of artillery they had and thousands of prisoners." Then there was Lee's ignored order to Pendleton to find an artillery position to the right of the Seminary and smother Cemetery Hill. That was as the same time Generals Ewell, Early and Rodes were 'busy convincing themselves that Second Corps needed assistance from Hill's Third Corps in order to attack Cemetery Hill' Pendleton was deciding to keep his 31 guns 'in park.' Not only did Pendleton's act allow demoralized Federals to regroup and organize a defense, but it also certainly had a negative impact on the Second Corps decision not to continue the attack.
To start with, I have not read this particular book on Gettysburg but my comments on your takeaways so far:
On Lane: Lane was clearly timid on July 1st but to me, that takes away from what Gamble and Buford accomplished on the far right of the Union line alone Seminary Ridge. The cavalry forced Lane to protect his flank and slowed his advance to the point where he basically was held out of the fight.
R
Do you mean the far left of the Union line? Bowden in this book says, "Perrin's remarkable attack would have been even more successful had James Lane advanced his North Carolinians with the same determination. Lane's languid exhibition including allowing his brigade to drift south and become distracted by the demonstrations of a single regiment of Federal cavalry (8th Illinois), instead of sweeping in on the Federal left flank as Pender intended."
If Bowden is correct it does seem that Lane's Brigade of some 1700 men according to the Order of Battle in the appendix was held up by 465 men of the 8th Illinois. Were I Perrin and his South Carolina brigade I'd be none too happy either.
To start with, I have not read this particular book on Gettysburg but my comments on your takeaways so far:
On Lane: Lane was clearly timid on July 1st but to me, that takes away from what Gamble and Buford accomplished on the far right of the Union line alone Seminary Ridge. The cavalry forced Lane to protect his flank and slowed his advance to the point where he basically was held out of the fight.
On Pendleton: What position was Pendleton supposed to take? Seminary Ridge is a relatively low ridge that could be dominated by Cemetery Hill and the northern end of Cemetery Ridge. There simply was no good position that could smother Cemetery Hill without coming under major fire. As incompetent as Pendleton was, I think Lee was wrong on this one.R
I'm still slogging my way thru Pfanz's "Gettysburg-The Second Day". I'm just leaving The Wheatfield and back to Little Round Top.
Oh, don't miss the peach orchard; quite lively. Folks, check out the new tome concerning the harrowing retreat after 7\4\63. All this time I thought the Blues had been following discreetly; Hell no! A continuous fight.
I think that's something that most people don't realize about the campaign. The cavalry was skirmishing almost every day of the campaign as the armies maneuvered. Most of the fights were small skirmishes but still, almost 2 months of near constant fighting has to be unbelievably exhausting.
R
I'm reading Last Chance For Victory, R.E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign, by Scott Bowden and Bill Ward. I'm late in the First Day and just find the book outstanding. Has anybody else out there read this work and if so what do you think of it?
I'm *very anti "Parson" Pendleton, a military nincompoop. And an outright liar like Early concerning the alleged day break attack order supposedly given to Longstreet before day 2.
Lee needed a victory in the North near Washington to get the point across to Lincoln, now! He couldn't just wander around Pennsylvania indefinitely, horses need forage, and how much food do you think they had by July?
Too bad for him, Ewell and Hill together were less than Jackson.
Longstreet's plan to make a wholesale move around the Union left (with lord knows how many wagons), in front of thousands of Union troops, was a pipe dream. The enemy is there, strike them!
Right. It's Lee that is "Frozen" not Ewell.In regards to Ewell;"He was getting reports of Union troops coming from the east (false report) not to mention looking at the position from the town in which they could see Union troops and 40+ guns. In addition, which troops would be used for the attack?" I have placed the blame here at Lee's feet long ago,that being said,my research says Williams Division of "Slowcome's"(Sears) corp was indeed approaching Brenners Hill. My main reason for placing the blame on Lee,is that he bivoucked Anderson before recieving the request for reinforcement.
Messed up the format,sorry.
No. Lee could easily have ridden to Ewell and directed the finale with Ewell. Lee was,already, in a advantageous position thru Fate on day 1. Stuart can't improve on Fate. P. S. The South wins Day 1 through circumstance,with no input from Lee. When Lee begins "commanding" on Days 2 & 3,the South loses.Lee was constrained(frozen) in his tactical choices on Day One(and Two, for that matter) because of his lack of the precise and up to date intelligence, that he was used to receiving from Stuart, concerning the dispositions and movements of the opposing army(AoP).