Book: Last Chance For Victory

RobertP

Lt. Colonel
Joined
Nov 11, 2009
Location
Dallas
I'm reading Last Chance For Victory, R.E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign, by Scott Bowden and Bill Ward. I'm late in the First Day and just find the book outstanding. Has anybody else out there read this work and if so what do you think of it?
 
As an aging taciturn curmudgeon, in my best pantomime of the late Andy Rooney, the Confederate army was grasping at straws, by the time of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Plus I don't read newbies who seem only good at copying footnotes of the many wrong historians. Gettysburg - some last grasp.
The Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania was a very hard and difficult offensive campaign that would go wrong, if only a few wrong happenings occurred. And they did. If you read the OR's instead of the battle book historians and read some of R.E. Lee's very own writings on the campaign, you might learn something.

First, the Army of Northern Virginia was unprepared for an invasion campaign, away from their logistics in Richmond.
Their forage, rations and artillery ammunition were so short, R.E. Lee wondered in a dispatch to Gen. Ewell, whether even one corps had the ability to stay in Pennsylvania.
Lee as is known in history to some, only had three battle days of artillery ammunition, a very difficult situation to be in when northern civilians only have to count Confederate wagons moving into Pennsylvania.

The worst thing happened to the Confederates at Gettysburg. They got trapped in a three day knock down battle of the time, where they had the option to only go on the attack and then attack the opposing army in their fixed positions. That a very bad situation to be in militarily, if only the many civilian students only had some military training and education on war.
If only some had the training to realize what the British military observer wrote when he said simply that the Confederate army only had three pounds of corn a day for the artillery horses on their way to Pennsylvania. It's meaningless to almost every civilian. The don't really know artillery and its importance; never know artillery horses; or really know anything about forage for large artillery horses.
But then we are talking of American civilians of the 21st century, who think they know war and 19th century war. And of course, many do know where the monuments are, commemorating a battle of Gettysburg, some 150 years ago.
 
As an aging taciturn curmudgeon, in my best pantomime of the late Andy Rooney, the Confederate army was grasping at straws, by the time of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Plus I don't read newbies who seem only good at copying footnotes of the many wrong historians. Gettysburg - some last grasp.
The Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania was a very hard and difficult offensive campaign that would go wrong, if only a few wrong happenings occurred. And they did. If you read the OR's instead of the battle book historians and read some of R.E. Lee's very own writings on the campaign, you might learn something.

First, the Army of Northern Virginia was unprepared for an invasion campaign, away from their logistics in Richmond.
Their forage, rations and artillery ammunition were so short, R.E. Lee wondered in a dispatch to Gen. Ewell, whether even one corps had the ability to stay in Pennsylvania.
Lee as is known in history to some, only had three battle days of artillery ammunition, a very difficult situation to be in when northern civilians only have to count Confederate wagons moving into Pennsylvania.

The worst thing happened to the Confederates at Gettysburg. They got trapped in a three day knock down battle of the time, where they had the option to only go on the attack and then attack the opposing army in their fixed positions. That a very bad situation to be in militarily, if only the many civilian students only had some military training and education on war.
If only some had the training to realize what the British military observer wrote when he said simply that the Confederate army only had three pounds of corn a day for the artillery horses on their way to Pennsylvania. It's meaningless to almost every civilian. The don't really know artillery and its importance; never know artillery horses; or really know anything about forage for large artillery horses.
But then we are talking of American civilians of the 21st century, who think they know war and 19th century war. And of course, many do know where the monuments are, commemorating a battle of Gettysburg, some 150 years ago.
Whitworth, you actually seem to be mellowing, :smile: and I agree mostly with what you've written. My take from this book so far is that despite logistical problems, the absence of Stuart, the rashness of Hill and Heath in the beginning, the situation came together for Lee as he had hoped it would in the days leading up to July 1. That is, enough of his army came together at the right time to destroy the lead elements of a strung out AoP. But seemingly small things like the reluctance of Lane on the right to cooperate with Perrin in the assault on the US 1st Corps at Seminary ridge. Yes the Federals were routed but as Perrin wrote "If we had any support from Lane we could have taken every piece of artillery they had and thousands of prisoners." Then there was Lee's ignored order to Pendleton to find an artillery position to the right of the Seminary and smother Cemetery Hill. That was as the same time Generals Ewell, Early and Rodes were 'busy convincing themselves that Second Corps needed assistance from Hill's Third Corps in order to attack Cemetery Hill' Pendleton was deciding to keep his 31 guns 'in park.' Not only did Pendleton's act allow demoralized Federals to regroup and organize a defense, but it also certainly had a negative impact on the Second Corps decision not to continue the attack.
 
Whitworth, you actually seem to be mellowing, :smile: and I agree mostly with what you've written. My take from this book so far is that despite logistical problems, the absence of Stuart, the rashness of Hill and Heath in the beginning, the situation came together for Lee as he had hoped it would in the days leading up to July 1. That is, enough of his army came together at the right time to destroy the lead elements of a strung out AoP. But seemingly small things like the reluctance of Lane on the right to cooperate with Perrin in the assault on the US 1st Corps at Seminary ridge. Yes the Federals were routed but as Perrin wrote "If we had any support from Lane we could have taken every piece of artillery they had and thousands of prisoners." Then there was Lee's ignored order to Pendleton to find an artillery position to the right of the Seminary and smother Cemetery Hill. That was as the same time Generals Ewell, Early and Rodes were 'busy convincing themselves that Second Corps needed assistance from Hill's Third Corps in order to attack Cemetery Hill' Pendleton was deciding to keep his 31 guns 'in park.' Not only did Pendleton's act allow demoralized Federals to regroup and organize a defense, but it also certainly had a negative impact on the Second Corps decision not to continue the attack.

To start with, I have not read this particular book on Gettysburg but my comments on your takeaways so far:

On Lane: Lane was clearly timid on July 1st but to me, that takes away from what Gamble and Buford accomplished on the far right of the Union line alone Seminary Ridge. The cavalry forced Lane to protect his flank and slowed his advance to the point where he basically was held out of the fight.

On Pendleton: What position was Pendleton supposed to take? Seminary Ridge is a relatively low ridge that could be dominated by Cemetery Hill and the northern end of Cemetery Ridge. There simply was no good position that could smother Cemetery Hill without coming under major fire. As incompetent as Pendleton was, I think Lee was wrong on this one.

I think July 1st is the time when Stuart was missed the most. Simply, Lee, Ewell, and Hill didn't have the necessary information on the Union strength and location (they knew where the First and Eleventh Corps were but none of the others). Jenkins cavalry was not up to snuff in this respect and this lack of intelligence froze Ewell in particular. He was getting reports of Union troops coming from the east (false report) not to mention looking at the position from the town in which they could see Union troops and 40+ guns. In addition, which troops would be used for the attack? Rodes' Division was a wreck, Early's had been disorganized by the fighting and the town with his fresh brigade off to protect his flank from the phantom Union troops, and Johnson's didn't arrive until late. Frankly, the idea of an attack on the evening of the 1st is mostly a pipe dream, IMO.

R
 
Whitworth, you actually seem to be mellowing, :smile: and I agree mostly with what you've written. My take from this book so far is that despite logistical problems, the absence of Stuart, the rashness of Hill and Heath in the beginning, the situation came together for Lee as he had hoped it would in the days leading up to July 1. That is, enough of his army came together at the right time to destroy the lead elements of a strung out AoP. But seemingly small things like the reluctance of Lane on the right to cooperate with Perrin in the assault on the US 1st Corps at Seminary ridge. Yes the Federals were routed but as Perrin wrote "If we had any support from Lane we could have taken every piece of artillery they had and thousands of prisoners." Then there was Lee's ignored order to Pendleton to find an artillery position to the right of the Seminary and smother Cemetery Hill. That was as the same time Generals Ewell, Early and Rodes were 'busy convincing themselves that Second Corps needed assistance from Hill's Third Corps in order to attack Cemetery Hill' Pendleton was deciding to keep his 31 guns 'in park.' Not only did Pendleton's act allow demoralized Federals to regroup and organize a defense, but it also certainly had a negative impact on the Second Corps decision not to continue the attack.


I'm *very anti "Parson" Pendleton, a military nincompoop. And an outright liar like Early concerning the alleged day break attack order supposedly given to Longstreet before day 2.
Lee needed a victory in the North near Washington to get the point across to Lincoln, now! He couldn't just wander around Pennsylvania indefinitely, horses need forage, and how much food do you think they had by July?
Too bad for him, Ewell and Hill together were less than Jackson.
Longstreet's plan to make a wholesale move around the Union left (with lord knows how many wagons), in front of thousands of Union troops, was a pipe dream. The enemy is there, strike them!
 
It would be interesting to see what the authors thought Lee's 'real' purpose was for being in Pa. and at Gettysburg in particular?
In other threads it has been discussed, whether Lee obfuscated his real purpose so much, not only to his superiors and especially Davis, but also his corps commanders, that in the necessities of the moment it was too easy to lose sight of any strategic goals that may or may not have been planned by Lee, but not communicated with sufficient clarity to his superiors or subordinates.
 
To start with, I have not read this particular book on Gettysburg but my comments on your takeaways so far:

On Lane: Lane was clearly timid on July 1st but to me, that takes away from what Gamble and Buford accomplished on the far right of the Union line alone Seminary Ridge. The cavalry forced Lane to protect his flank and slowed his advance to the point where he basically was held out of the fight.
R

Do you mean the far left of the Union line? Bowden in this book says, "Perrin's remarkable attack would have been even more successful had James Lane advanced his North Carolinians with the same determination. Lane's languid exhibition including allowing his brigade to drift south and become distracted by the demonstrations of a single regiment of Federal cavalry (8th Illinois), instead of sweeping in on the Federal left flank as Pender intended."

If Bowden is correct it does seem that Lane's Brigade of some 1700 men according to the Order of Battle in the appendix was held up by 465 men of the 8th Illinois. Were I Perrin and his South Carolina brigade I'd be none too happy either.
 
Do you mean the far left of the Union line? Bowden in this book says, "Perrin's remarkable attack would have been even more successful had James Lane advanced his North Carolinians with the same determination. Lane's languid exhibition including allowing his brigade to drift south and become distracted by the demonstrations of a single regiment of Federal cavalry (8th Illinois), instead of sweeping in on the Federal left flank as Pender intended."

If Bowden is correct it does seem that Lane's Brigade of some 1700 men according to the Order of Battle in the appendix was held up by 465 men of the 8th Illinois. Were I Perrin and his South Carolina brigade I'd be none too happy either.

Yup, I didn't proofread what I wrote. I did indeed intend the far left of the Union line. I can't fault Lane too much. He was the flank of the army that was present on the field and had Union cavalry forming for charges against his line. This caused him to stop and, in at least one instance, form squares to repel an attack. Like you, if I were Perrin, I'd be pretty POed too but Perrin would have likely done the same thing if he was in Lane's position. Honestly, while Perrin has some valid criticisms of Lane, I think a lot of what he says is bitterness over what happened to his brigade during the charge from McPherson's Ridge to Seminary Ridge and he wants their sacrifice to have meant more than what was actually achieved.

R
 
To start with, I have not read this particular book on Gettysburg but my comments on your takeaways so far:

On Lane: Lane was clearly timid on July 1st but to me, that takes away from what Gamble and Buford accomplished on the far right of the Union line alone Seminary Ridge. The cavalry forced Lane to protect his flank and slowed his advance to the point where he basically was held out of the fight.

On Pendleton: What position was Pendleton supposed to take? Seminary Ridge is a relatively low ridge that could be dominated by Cemetery Hill and the northern end of Cemetery Ridge. There simply was no good position that could smother Cemetery Hill without coming under major fire. As incompetent as Pendleton was, I think Lee was wrong on this one.R

In regards to Ewell;"He was getting reports of Union troops coming from the east (false report) not to mention looking at the position from the town in which they could see Union troops and 40+ guns. In addition, which troops would be used for the attack?" I have placed the blame here at Lee's feet long ago,that being said,my research says Williams Division of "Slowcome's"(Sears) corp was indeed approaching Brenners Hill. My main reason for placing the blame on Lee,is that he bivoucked Anderson before recieving the request for reinforcement.
Messed up the format,sorry.
 
I'm still slogging my way thru Pfanz's "Gettysburg-The Second Day". I'm just leaving The Wheatfield and back to Little Round Top.

Oh, don't miss the peach orchard; quite lively. Folks, check out the new tome concerning the harrowing retreat after 7\4\63. All this time I thought the Blues had been following discreetly; Hell no! A continuous fight.
 
Oh, don't miss the peach orchard; quite lively. Folks, check out the new tome concerning the harrowing retreat after 7\4\63. All this time I thought the Blues had been following discreetly; Hell no! A continuous fight.

I think that's something that most people don't realize about the campaign. The cavalry was skirmishing almost every day of the campaign as the armies maneuvered. Most of the fights were small skirmishes but still, almost 2 months of near constant fighting has to be unbelievably exhausting.

R
 
I think that's something that most people don't realize about the campaign. The cavalry was skirmishing almost every day of the campaign as the armies maneuvered. Most of the fights were small skirmishes but still, almost 2 months of near constant fighting has to be unbelievably exhausting.

R

I read long ago that Meade had another meeting with the top generals about Lee's retreat. I read the generals counselled caution, (ala Montgomery after Rommel retreated from El Alamein 1942). So, all this time I didn't read much on the withdrawl.
Some place named Funkstown had *two battles in this period.
 
I'm reading Last Chance For Victory, R.E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign, by Scott Bowden and Bill Ward. I'm late in the First Day and just find the book outstanding. Has anybody else out there read this work and if so what do you think of it?

I have to admit that I dislike the book. It was without a doubt the worst book I'd read about Gettysburg ever. It seems to be a rehash of Freeman (with the exception of its defense of Longstreet's actions on the second day). Other than that, one doesn't have to read very deeply to get the point of the authors' conclusions that everyone except for Lee was at fault for the ANV's loss at Gettysburg. Stuart's at fault for riding away and wasting time (forget about the fact that his ride was authorized by Lee, and that he left four brigades with Lee); D.H. Hill is at fault for not properly reinforcing Lee (and, by extension Davis, for not forcing Hill to do so); Heth and A.P. Hill for forcing an engagement beyond the orders not to force a major engagement (the authors were right about that one); Ewell didn't follow up (despite the fact that the end of Lee's orders undoubtedly gave Ewell the impression that the earlier orders not to bring on a major engagement were still in effect) on attacking hills for which Lee didn't provide support, on which the Yankees were rallying, which still had thousands of refugees from the afternoon fight and which Buford's people were helping to prevent. Add to that, the casualties already suffered by Rodes and the fact that Early's division was scattered (leaving only two brigades to assault a position growing in infantry and artillery strength, and the fact that Johnson's division was stuck in a traffic jam denying them an opportunity to arrive until about 7 pm that night.

I'd never read his book, but saw the documentary that it was based on, and perhaps Tom Carhart's book is even worse than Last Chance For Victory. The documentary was worse than the Bowden and Ward book, and was perhaps the worst retelling of the Battle of Gettysburg that I'd ever had the displeasure of witnessing.
 
I'm *very anti "Parson" Pendleton, a military nincompoop. And an outright liar like Early concerning the alleged day break attack order supposedly given to Longstreet before day 2.
Lee needed a victory in the North near Washington to get the point across to Lincoln, now! He couldn't just wander around Pennsylvania indefinitely, horses need forage, and how much food do you think they had by July?
Too bad for him, Ewell and Hill together were less than Jackson.
Longstreet's plan to make a wholesale move around the Union left (with lord knows how many wagons), in front of thousands of Union troops, was a pipe dream. The enemy is there, strike them!

What proof do you have that Jackson would have taken the heights south of town (the "C hills")? I agree that Longstreet's plan would have very difficult to implement without Stuart to run the needed interference, but two days' worth of attacks against an enemy strengthening in numbers and by position expecting success is equally a pipe dream.

Ewell had every good reason for not attacking Cemetery Hill late that afternoon. Whitworth spelled it out nicely and could probably have added more reasons if he wanted.
 
In regards to Ewell;"He was getting reports of Union troops coming from the east (false report) not to mention looking at the position from the town in which they could see Union troops and 40+ guns. In addition, which troops would be used for the attack?" I have placed the blame here at Lee's feet long ago,that being said,my research says Williams Division of "Slowcome's"(Sears) corp was indeed approaching Brenners Hill. My main reason for placing the blame on Lee,is that he bivoucked Anderson before recieving the request for reinforcement.
Messed up the format,sorry.
Right. It's Lee that is "Frozen" not Ewell.
 
Lee was constrained(frozen) in his tactical choices on Day One(and Two, for that matter) because of his lack of the precise and up to date intelligence, that he was used to receiving from Stuart, concerning the dispositions and movements of the opposing army(AoP).
 
Lee was constrained(frozen) in his tactical choices on Day One(and Two, for that matter) because of his lack of the precise and up to date intelligence, that he was used to receiving from Stuart, concerning the dispositions and movements of the opposing army(AoP).
No. Lee could easily have ridden to Ewell and directed the finale with Ewell. Lee was,already, in a advantageous position thru Fate on day 1. Stuart can't improve on Fate. P. S. The South wins Day 1 through circumstance,with no input from Lee. When Lee begins "commanding" on Days 2 & 3,the South loses.
 
What is important is not what was known after the event, but what was known at the time. All Lee knows his army is in the process of concentrating(still dispersed) and is in unexpected contact with the AoP.
Is he facing all or most of the Union Army, a part of it; how big a part; where is it coming from and where is it headed; etc., etc., etc., ad infinitum and on Day one(and part of DayTtwo) Lee knows knows almost nothing of the answers. Except he is in the presence of the AoP of unknown force and as far as he knows he is down to his last brigade as a reserve, if he guesses wrong on any of estimates of the situation, with almost no reliable intelligence to guide him.
 
Back
Top