First Bull Run A GRAPHIC SKETCH OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS--(FIRST BATTLE.)

Barrycdog

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http://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/clarke/clarke.html


Diary of the War for Separation, a Daily Chronicle of the Principal Events and History of the Present Revolution, to Which is Added Notes and Descriptions of All the Great Battles, Including Walker's Narrative of the Battle of Shiloh: Electronic Edition. Clarke, H. C., of Vicksburg, Miss. Text transcribed by Apex Data Services, Inc. Text encoded by Lee Ann Morawski and Natalia Smith First edition, 2000 ca. 470K Academic Affairs Library, UNC-CH University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2000.

A GRAPHIC SKETCH OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS--(FIRST BATTLE.)

Gen. Johnston had arrived the preceding day with about half of the force he had, detailed from Winchester, and was the senior officer in command. He magnanimously insisted, however, that Gen. Beauregard's previous plan should be carried out, and he was guided entirely by the judgment and superior local knowledge of the latter. While, therefore, Gen. Johnston was nominally in command, Beauregard was really the officer and hero of the day. You will be glad to learn that he was this day advanced from a Brigadier to the rank of a full General. But to the battle.
At half past six in the morning, the enemy opened fire from a battery planted on a hill beyond Bull Run, and nearly opposite the centre of our lines. The battery was intended merely to "beat the bush," and to occupy our attention, while he moved a heavy column towards the Stone Bridge, over the same creek, upon our left. At 10 o'clock, another battery was pushed forward, and opened
fire a short distance to the left of the other, and near the road leading north to Centreville. This was a battery of rifled guns, and the object of its fire was the same as that of the other. They fired promiscuously into the woods and gorges on this, the southern, side of Bull Run, seeking to create the impression thereby that our centre would be attacked, and thus prevent us from sending reinforcements to our left, where the real attack was to be made. Beauregard was not deceived by the manoeuvre.
It might not be amiss to say that Bull Run, or creek, is north of this place, and runs nearly due east, slightly curving around the Junction, the nearest part of which is about 2½ miles. The Stone Bridge is some seven miles distant, in a northwesterly direction, upon which our left wing rested. Mitchel's Ford is directly north, and distant four miles, by the road leading to Centreville, which is seven miles from the Junction. On our right is Marion Mills, on the same stream, where the Alexandria and Manassas Railroad crosses the Run, and distant four miles. Proceeding from Fairfax Court House, by Centreville, to Stone Bridge, the enemy passed in front of our entire line, but at a distance ranging from five to two miles.
At 9 o'clock, I reached an eminence nearly opposite the two batteries mentioned above, and which commanded a full view of the country for miles around, except on the right. From this point I could trace the movements of the approaching hosts by the clouds of dust that rose high above the surrounding hills. Our left, under Brigadier Generals Evans, Jackson and Cocke, and Col. Bartow, with the Georgia Brigade, composed of the 7th and 8th Regiments, had been put in motion, and was advancing upon the enemy with a force of about 15,000, while the enemy himself was advancing upon our left with a compact column of at least 50,000. His entire force on this side of the Potomac is estimated at 75,000. These approaching columns encountered each other at 11 o'clock.
Meanwhile, the two batteries in front kept up their fire upon the wooded hill where they supposed our centre lay. They sent occasional balls from their rifled cannon to the eminence where your correspondent stood. Gens. Beauregard, Johnston and Bonham reached this point at 12 o'clock, and one of these balls passed directly over and very near them, and plunged into the ground a few paces from where I stood. I have the ball now, and hope to be able to show it to you at some future day. It is an eighteen pound ball, about 6 inches long. By the way, this thing of taking notes amidst a shower of shells and balls is more exciting than pleasant. At a quarter past 12 o'clock, Johnston and Beauregard galloped rapidly forward in the direction of Stone Bridge, where the ball had now fully opened. Your correspondent followed their example, and soon reached a position in front of the battle-field.
The artillery were the first to open fire, precisely at 11 o'clock. By 11½ the infantry had engaged, and there it was that the battle began to rage. The dusky columns which had thus far marked the approach of the two armies, now mingled with great clouds of smoke, as it rose from the flashing guns below, and the two shot up together like a huge pyramid of red and blue. The shock was as tremendous as were the odds between the two forces. With what anxious hearts did we watch that pyramid of smoke and dust. When it moved to the right we knew that the enemy were giving way; and when it moved to the left we knew that our friends were receding.
Twice the pyramid moved to the right, and as often returned. At last, about 2 o'clock, it began to move slowly to the left, and thus it continued to move for two mortal hours. The enemy was seeking to turn our left flank, and to reach the railroad leading hence in the direction of Winchester. To this, he extended his lines, which he was enabled to do by reason of his great numbers. This was unfortunate for us, as it required a corresponding extension of our own lines to prevent his extreme right from out flanking us--a movement on our part which weakened the
force of our resistance along the whole line of battle, which finally extended over a space of two miles. It also rendered it the more difficult to bring up reinforcements, as the further the enemy extended his right, the greater the distance our reserve forces had to travel to counteract the movement.
This effort to turn our flank was pressed with great determination for five long, weary hours, during which the tide of battle ebbed and flowed along the entire line with alternate fortunes. The enemy's column continued to stretch away to the left like a huge anaconda, seeking to envelope us within its mighty folds and crush us to death; and at one time it really looked as if he would succeed. But here let me pause to explain why it was our reinforcements were so late in arriving, and why a certain other important movement miscarried.
The moment he discovered the enemy's order of battle, Gen. Beauregard, it is said, dispatched orders to Gen. Ewell, on our extreme right, to move forward and turn his left or rear. At the same time he ordered Generals Jones, Longstreet and Bonham, occupying the centre of our lines, to co-operate in the movement, but not to move until Gen. Ewell had made the attack. The order to Gen. Ewell unfortunately miscarried. The others were delivered, but as the movements of the centre were to be regulated entirely by those on the right, nothing was done at all. Had the orders to Gen. Ewell been received and carried out, and our entire force brought upon the field, we should have destroyed the enemy's army almost literally. Attacked in front, on the flank and in the rear, he could not possibly have escaped, except at the loss of thousands of prisoners and all his batteries, while the field would have been strewed with his dead.
Finding that his orders had in some way failed to be executed, Gen. Beauregard at last ordered up a portion of the forces which were intended to co-operate with Gen. Ewell. It was late, however, before these reinforcements camp up. Only one brigade reached the field before the battle was won. This was led by Gen. E. K. Smith, of Florida, formerly of the United States army, and was a part of Gen. Johnston's column from Winchester. They should have reached here the day before, but were prevented by an accident on the railroad. They dashed on the charge with loud shouts, and in the most gallant style. About the same time, Maj. Elzey, (formerly of the Augusta Arsenal, I may have his title wrong,) coming down the railroad from Winchester with the last of Johnston's brigades, and hearing the firing, immediately quit the train and struck across the country, and as a gracious fortune would have it, he encountered the extreme right of the enemy as he was feeling his way around our flank, and with his brigade struck him like a thunderbolt, full in the face. Finding he was about to be outflanked himself, the enemy gave way after the second fire. Meanwhile Beauregard rallied the centre and dashed into the very thickest of the fight, and after him rushed our own brave boys with a shout that seemed to shake the very earth. The result of this movement, from three distinct points, was to force back the enemy, who began to retreat, first in good order, and finally in much confusion. At this point the cavalry were ordered upon the persuit. The retreat now became a perfect rout, and it is reported that the flying legions rushed past Centreville, in the direction of Fairfax, as if the earth had been opening behind them. It was when Gen. Beauregard led the final charge, that his horse was killed by a shell.
 
I've never heard the phrase "War of Separation". Wonder if it was much in use at the time? I think I'm going to use part of your source for some other threads - the descriptions of Sharpsburg / Antietam are interesting.
 
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