A few more Confederates at Gettysburg.

And since we are dealing in what ifs, find a way to get stuart out the gap first both times. once when jackson lead's the van to the bridges, then again when longstreet comes thru to look for shoos. and stays i guess.
 
Nothing more than historically happened. Buford wasn't heavily engaged, but it took about 90 minutes for Heth to get his two lead brigades off the road and into line.

Compare with how long it took Jackson to line up three divisions at Chancellorsville, about 3 or 3.5 hrs. Simply it takes quite a lot of time to form a division or the like, and I doubt Jackson could have come off the road and into line with 2 brigades any quicker than Heth. In fact I think Heth was pretty rapid.
By 9:00AM according to every reference that I can find, Heth had both Archer and Davis in battle formation with skirmishers in front, pushing Buford's men, with Pettigrew and Brockenbrough in line of column coming down the Chambersburg Pike.
 
Nothing more than historically happened. Buford wasn't heavily engaged, but it took about 90 minutes for Heth to get his two lead brigades off the road and into line.

Compare with how long it took Jackson to line up three divisions at Chancellorsville, about 3 or 3.5 hrs. Simply it takes quite a lot of time to form a division or the like, and I doubt Jackson could have come off the road and into line with 2 brigades any quicker than Heth. In fact I think Heth was pretty rapid.
Chancellorsville's terrain and woods are a far cry from the open fields between Cashtown & Gettysburg, plus Jackson was forming his divisions while trying to maintain complete secrecy of his movements in that terrain, an entirely different set of circumstances.
 
Everyone, if not most, assume(s) the infallibility of Thos. Jackson and his ability to carry Culp's Hill on the 1st. Day had he been in command. Most assuredly Jackson would have pressed, but don't discount the Federal defenders. Several Union Corps were on the field and others pouring in. The day's combatants were pulling-back from Gettysburg, but the main army was not in flight as the momentum of fresh Union troops was 180 degrees and coming-on strong and steady and would have supported the action on Culp's Hill, (in my humble opinion).

It's worth noting Banks' command defeated Jackson's at Kernstown and Burnside defeated Longstreet at Knoxville, and that's setting aside their records on the Peninsula...

As you point out, no general officer is or was infallible, although Grant probably comes closest based on his track record than any of his contemporaries, including Lee.

Best,
 
Mansfield was a 58 y/o general with 40 years of military experience, the highlight of which was firing shore batteries at the CSS Virginia. Then being mortally wounded, at Sharpsburg, trying to stop the 10th Maine along the Smoketown Road from firing into the woods, thinking that they were firing upon Union troops, when they were really Jackson's men. Hard to compare Mansfield with anyone, since he really didn't have much combat experience leading troops.

Mansfield won three brevets in 1846-48, running the table from major to full colonel; all three for combat action (Fort Brown, Monterrey, and Buena Vista) and he was WIA at Monterrey. In terms of prewar combat service, his record - as recognized by his superiors - was the same as RE Lee's...

Best,
 
It all depends on which Jackson showed up on July 1st. The Valley Jackson or the Seven Days Jackson. Even more so, with whom is he going to attack Culp's Hill?

Ryan
Ryan - surely it would have been the Chancellorsville Jackson and he would have carried out dual flanking attacks at the same time. Never the suicidal Frontal attack as on Day 3 !
 
I read somewhere that Pickett's charge was supposed to have been a Supported attack and not an isolated one.
The original plan was that 2 Corps were to be attacking- Hood's Men should have been behind the Virginians !
It was supposed to be a Converging attack on the centre of the Union line, supported by mobile Artillery units.
 
Ryan - surely it would have been the Chancellorsville Jackson and he would have carried out dual flanking attacks at the same time. Never the suicidal Frontal attack as on Day 3 !

It's possible but it's equally possible that the letter of the law Jackson would show up and not force a fight past the town because of Lee's orders to avoid a general engagement. I don't like what-ifs much because the possibilities are endless.

Ryan
 
Going WAY back to the OP, Davis in particular was very concerned that Union forces would take advantage of Lee's absence and attack Richmond. In fact, there were several Union probes east and northeast of Richmond that seriously unsettled the city. Fortunately for Richmond, the Union forces appear to have been just harassing raids and each left after only a day or two ashore.

Lee would have best removed troops from North Carolina. There were enough there to have spared 5,000 or so and still been able to handle minor Union activity.

Before moving troops away from their posts, you need to remember that the forces in SW Virginia and in eastern North Carolina were protecting the two railroad routes from the rest of the South to Richmond/Lee. A miscalculation about Union intentions and force levels could have been very costly.
 
I read somewhere that Pickett's charge was supposed to have been a Supported attack and not an isolated one.
The original plan was that 2 Corps were to be attacking- Hood's Men should have been behind the Virginians !
It was supposed to be a Converging attack on the centre of the Union line, supported by mobile Artillery units.

Too bad no one knew anything about this supported attack. Apparently, not even Lee.

Ryan
 
I would think that if Lee had another 5 to 10 thousand men, he could have won on day two. There were a couple of times on day two that 5,000 extra men at the right place could have broken the Union line. This is just my opinion.
 
I would think that if Lee had another 5 to 10 thousand men, he could have won on day two. There were a couple of times on day two that 5,000 extra men at the right place could have broken the Union line. This is just my opinion.
Longstreet went-in with Hood & McLaws. Not sure if Pickett's boys would have gone-in had they arrived on the field. Pretty sure Pickett's divisional strength was 5000+. Hood's & McLaws' combined divisions were in the 13,000+ range and already easily outnumbered Sickles III Corps.
 
The accepted standard is 3 to 1 at the point of attack. So if we take the 10,000 as a number for Sickles II Corps, the attack force should be around 30,000. Now you only need a 3 to 1 at the decision point and I would have to see if the Confederate attack could bypass part of III Corps.
 
Longstreet went-in with Hood & McLaws. Not sure if Pickett's boys would have gone-in had they arrived on the field. Pretty sure Pickett's divisional strength was 5000+. Hood's & McLaws' combined divisions were in the 13,000+ range and already easily outnumbered Sickles III Corps.
Anderson's division also. w/ pickett included..almost 25,000 men.
 
The accepted standard is 3 to 1 at the point of attack. So if we take the 10,000 as a number for Sickles II Corps, the attack force should be around 30,000. Now you only need a 3 to 1 at the decision point and I would have to see if the Confederate attack could bypass part of III Corps.

This figure 3 to 1 figure is often bandied about, so much I think it's become "common knowledge" but I wonder about it's source. The history of black powder open field warfare doesn't show that 3 to 1 odds were needed for successful assaults, or even common for them. Attacking fortifications is a different story of course but there was little use of those at Gettysburg excepting Culp's Hill.
 
I believe the 3 to 1 goes back at least to Napoleon and probably even earlier. The 3 to 1 is still thought at military schools today. It is not 3 to 1 in men, but 3 to 1 in combat power. It is also 3 to 1 at the decision point not an overall 3 to 1.
 
Back
Top