A few more Confederates at Gettysburg.

major bill

Brev. Brig. Gen'l
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Aug 25, 2012
When I read about the battle at Gettysburg it seems like if Lee had just a few more men, at just the right place, the outcome may have been different. I hate what is discussions as much as most folks here on CWT, but will ask anyway. Could have Davis and the governors of the Confederate State's have provided Lee with 5 to 10 thousand more men? I do understand that Davis and the governors had other concerns as well, but if the maximum effort been made to find more men, we're there available men? What if Davis was certain that it was victory now or no victory ever, could Davis have found another 5 thousand troops?
 
What if Davis was certain that it was victory now or no victory ever, could Davis have found another 5 thousand troops?

Easily. The additional forces available were, in order of possibility:

Corse's and Jenkin's bdes of Pickett's Division (3,300) from Richmond defences

Fourth Corps under DH Hill consisting of Whitting's Division of 4 bdes (6,900), Taliaferro's Division of 5 bdes (8,900) and Ransom's division of 2 bdes (4,900) (Evans' brigade has already been sent west) from NC

Jones' Division of 3 bdes (3,900) from SW Virginia

Buckner's Division of 3 bdes (5,800) from East Tennessee

= 33,700 infantry

The numbers are taken from Dave Powell's Thunder at the Crossroads game, which is well researched. I think it's quite possible to send a 4th Corps to Lee under DH Hill. Another proposal was for some of these forces and additional forces to gather under Beauregard and approach Washington to force Hooker/Meade to detach large forces.
 
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Lee talked davis out of a western transfer of longstreet/hood/pickett. once the anv is under way lee wants an army to move north from richmond. this would take, potentially, fred burg culp. and such.. lee may retreat from gburg but this territory/grains can be gleaned.
Does davis have in va. the troops? i think he does but we have to look if ft. monroe has/is/does moves troops at richmond to negate such a move. i say skip it and add them to lee for the extra div. at least.
 
When I read about the battle at Gettysburg it seems like if Lee had just a few more men, at just the right place, the outcome may have been different. I hate what is discussions as much as most folks here on CWT, but will ask anyway. Could have Davis and the governors of the Confederate State's have provided Lee with 5 to 10 thousand more men? I do understand that Davis and the governors had other concerns as well, but if the maximum effort been made to find more men, we're there available men? What if Davis was certain that it was victory now or no victory ever, could Davis have found another 5 thousand troops?

There was quite a back and forth from Lee to Richmond about getting the rest of Pickett's Division at least up in the Gettysburg Campaign and the request was denied.

Still, even if he had them, I don't think that it would had matter because they would have been in reserve some place, or participating in yet another uncoordinated attack. This is what killed the Confederates, plus going for the impossible, not the lack of 5-10K more troops. Rodes' division was just sitting around waiting for Godot on July 3rd for example...
 
There was quite a back and forth from Lee to Richmond about getting the rest of Pickett's Division at least up in the Gettysburg Campaign and the request was denied.

Still, even if he had them, I don't think that it would had matter because they would have been in reserve some place, or participating in yet another uncoordinated attack. This is what killed the Confederates, plus going for the impossible, not the lack of 5-10K more troops. Rodes' division was just sitting around waiting for Godot on July 3rd for example...

This is one of the things that so many histories get wrong. There was a second wave to support Pickett, but it wasn't sent in.

Rodes' AAR:

"On the 3d, my orders were general, and the same as those of the day before, and accordingly, when the heavy cannonade indicated that another attack was made from the right wing of our army, we were on the lookout for another favorable opportunity to co-operate. When the sound of musketry was heard, it became apparent that the enemy in our front was much excited. The favorable opportunity seemed to me close at hand. I sent word to Lieutenant-General Ewell by Major [H. A.] Whiting, of my staff, that in a few moments I should attack, and immediately had my handful of men, under Doles, Iverson, and Ramseur, prepared for the onset; but in less than five minutes after Major Whiting's departure, before the troops on my immediate right [Thomas' and Perrin's brigades] had made any advance or showed any preparation therefor, and just as the order forward was about to be given to my line, it was announced, and was apparent to me, that the attack had already failed."

Anderson's AAR:

"On July 3, nothing of consequence occurred along that portion of the line occupied by my division until the afternoon, when at 3.30 o'clock a great number of pieces of our artillery, massed against the enemy's center, opened upon it, and were replied to with equal force and fury. After about an hour's continuance of this conflict, the enemy's fire seemed to subside, and troops of General Longstreet's corps were advanced to the assault of the enemy's center. I received orders to hold my division in readiness to move up in support, if it should become necessary. The same success at first, and the same repulse, attended this assault as that made by my division on the preceding evening. The troops advanced gallantly under a galling and destructive storm of missiles of every description: gained the first ridge; were unable to hold it; gave way, and fell back, their support giving way at the same time.

Wilcox's and Perry's brigades had been moved forward, so as to be in position to render assistance, or to take advantage of any success gained by the assaulting column, and, at what I supposed to be the proper time, I was about to move forward Wright's and Posey's Brigades, when Lieutenant-General Longstreet directed me to stop the movement, adding that it was useless, and would only involve unnecessary loss, the assault having failed. I then caused the troops to resume their places in line, to afford a rallying point to those retiring and to oppose the enemy should he follow our retreating forces. No attempt at pursuit was made, and our troops resumed their line of battle."
 
A wave that does not move, it is not a wave, is it?

Thus the uncoordinated attacks statement...

Yeah, amazing how often imagination fails in the real world. If only armchair admirals, wannabee generals, and pretend historians could hand wave away heat, dust, fatigue, all that "friction" stuff that guy Clausewitz wrote about... :wink:

Much less Meade and company doing the things they wanted to do, not what the rebs wanted them to do.

Best.
 
This is one of the things that so many histories get wrong. There was a second wave to support Pickett, but it wasn't sent in.

Rodes' AAR:

"On the 3d, my orders were general, and the same as those of the day before, and accordingly, when the heavy cannonade indicated that another attack was made from the right wing of our army, we were on the lookout for another favorable opportunity to co-operate. When the sound of musketry was heard, it became apparent that the enemy in our front was much excited. The favorable opportunity seemed to me close at hand. I sent word to Lieutenant-General Ewell by Major [H. A.] Whiting, of my staff, that in a few moments I should attack, and immediately had my handful of men, under Doles, Iverson, and Ramseur, prepared for the onset; but in less than five minutes after Major Whiting's departure, before the troops on my immediate right [Thomas' and Perrin's brigades] had made any advance or showed any preparation therefor, and just as the order forward was about to be given to my line, it was announced, and was apparent to me, that the attack had already failed."

Anderson's AAR:

"On July 3, nothing of consequence occurred along that portion of the line occupied by my division until the afternoon, when at 3.30 o'clock a great number of pieces of our artillery, massed against the enemy's center, opened upon it, and were replied to with equal force and fury. After about an hour's continuance of this conflict, the enemy's fire seemed to subside, and troops of General Longstreet's corps were advanced to the assault of the enemy's center. I received orders to hold my division in readiness to move up in support, if it should become necessary. The same success at first, and the same repulse, attended this assault as that made by my division on the preceding evening. The troops advanced gallantly under a galling and destructive storm of missiles of every description: gained the first ridge; were unable to hold it; gave way, and fell back, their support giving way at the same time.

Wilcox's and Perry's brigades had been moved forward, so as to be in position to render assistance, or to take advantage of any success gained by the assaulting column, and, at what I supposed to be the proper time, I was about to move forward Wright's and Posey's Brigades, when Lieutenant-General Longstreet directed me to stop the movement, adding that it was useless, and would only involve unnecessary loss, the assault having failed. I then caused the troops to resume their places in line, to afford a rallying point to those retiring and to oppose the enemy should he follow our retreating forces. No attempt at pursuit was made, and our troops resumed their line of battle."

I find the second wave theory interesting since so many of those involved make no mention of it in contemporary writings. In his report, written on July 31st, Lee wrote (OR, series I, volume XXVII, part 2, s#44, page 308):

These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day. Pickett, with three of his brigades, joined Longstreet the following morning, and our batteries were moved forward to the positions gained by him the day before. The general plan of attack was unchanged, excepting that one division and two brigades of Hill's corps were ordered to support Longstreet.

Lee makes no mention of any planned second wave or support troops behind Pettigrew's Division and Trimble's two brigades.

Longstreet wrote on July 27th (page 360):

The enemy's batteries soon opened upon our lines with canister, and the left seemed to stagger under it, but the advance was resumed, and with some degree of steadiness. Pickett's troops did not appear to be checked by the batteries, and only halted to deliver a fire when close under musket-range. Major-General Anderson's division was ordered forward to support and assist the wavering columns of Pettigrew and Trimble. Pickett's troops, after delivering fire, advanced to the charge, and entered the enemy's lines, capturing some of his batteries, and gained his works. About the same moment, the troops that had before hesitated, broke their ranks and fell back in great disorder, many more falling under the enemy's fire in retiring than while they were attacking. This gave the enemy time to throw his entire force upon Pickett, with a strong prospect of being able to break up his lines or destroy him before Anderson's division could reach him, which would, in its turn, have greatly exposed Anderson. He was therefore, ordered to halt. In a few moments the enemy, marching against both flanks and the front of Pickett's division, overpowered it and drove it back, capturing about half of those of it who were not killed or wounded. General Wright, of Anderson's division, with all of the officers, was ordered to rally and collect the scattered troops behind Anderson's division, and many of my staff officers were sent to assist in the same service.

It's clear that Anderson was ordered forward because the lines were breaking apart (although I find it interesting that Longstreet said that it was to support Hill's troops and not his own who were not falling apart) but there's nothing here to indicate that there was a concerted plan of attack for a second wave here.

General Rodes report (page 557):

On the 3d, my orders were general, and the same as those of the day before, and accordingly, when the heavy cannonade indicated that another attack was made from the right wing of our army, we were on the lookout for another favorable opportunity to co-operate. When the sound of musketry was heard, it became apparent that the enemy in our front was much excited. The favorable opportunity seemed to me close at hand. I send word to Lieutenant-General Ewell by Major Whiting, of my staff, that in a few moments I should attack, and immediately had my handful of men, under Doles, Iverson, and Ramseur, prepared for the onset; but in less than five minutes after Major Whiting's departure, before the troops on my immediate right had made any advance or showed any preparation therefor, and just a the order forward was about to be given to my line, it was announced, and was apparent to me, that the attack had already failed.

To my mind, this indicates that the order was to attack if an opportunity presented itself but nothing to indicate any positive orders to support Longstreet's attack.

Anderson's report (page 614-615):

On July 3, nothing of consequence occurred along that portion of the line occupied by my division until the afternoon, when at 3.30 o'clock a great number of pieces of our artillery, massed against the enemy's center, opened upon it, and were replied to with equal force and fury. After about an hour's continuance of this conflict, the enemy's fire seemed to subside, and troops of General Longstreet's corps were advanced to the assault of the enemy's center. I received orders to hold my division in readiness to move up in support, if it should become necessary. The same success at first, and the same repulse, attended this assault as that made by my division on the preceding evening. The troops advanced gallantly under a galling and destructive storm of missiles of every description: gained the first ridge; were unable to hold it; gave way, and fell back, their support giving way at the same time

Wilcox's and Perry's brigades had been moved forward, so as to be in position to render assistance, or to take advantage of any success gained by the assaulting column, and, at what I supposed to be the proper time, I was about to move forward Wright's and Posey's Brigades, when Lieutenant-General Longstreet directed me to stop the movement, adding that it was useless, and would only involve unnecessary loss, the assault having failed. I then caused the troops to resume their places in line, to afford a rallying point to those retiring and to oppose the enemy should he follow our retreating forces. No attempt at pursuit was made, and out troops resumed their line of battle.

Again, I don't see anything to indicate a second wave outside of orders to take advantage of any opportunities that may present themselves.

Personally, I find the evidence of a planned second wave to be very thin and, frankly, a misreading of the contemporary evidence combined with Monday morning quarterbacking.

Ryan
 
based on this, which is pretty much his hypothesis and not supported by contemporary evidence. That's why you can pick it up for 39 cents, plus shipping...

That's not in that book from my memory, and I knew that a second wave was in place from reading the AAR's a decade back. However, I have read Harmann's book and it is actually very convincing IMHO.
 
Troy makes an interesting argument but the evidence is extremely thin and relies on hypothesizing to fill in the blanks.

Ryan

Yes. And the only contemporary evidence is C.Y.A.-type of evidence, by people who did nothing while claiming they were waiting for orders and/or their orders were to attack if practicable.

For everyone who knows the terrain and the distance between the two lines (and esp. what the left end of Rodes' needed to do and get through to get anywhere close to where the attack was), if "the second wave" did not start before the first wave was at Emmitsburg Rd, there was no way to be effective...

That's why I shake my head when I read that stuff that is trying to pass as scholarship. Right at the same level with Stuart was planning to attack the copse of trees...
 
To add some more reports.

General Iverson's report (page 580):

Arriving in the town, and having but very few troops left, I informed General Ramseur that I would attach them to his brigade, and act in concert with him, and we formed on the street facing the heights beyond Gettysburg occupied by the enemy, where we remained till the night of July 2, when I was informed by General Ramseur that a night attack was ordered upon the position of the enemy to the right of the town. I had received no instructions, and perceiving that General Ramseur was acquainted with the intentions of the major-general commanding the division, I raised no question of rank, but conformed the movements of my brigade to that of Brigadier-General Ramseur, advanced with him, got under the fire of the enemy's skirmishers and artillery without returning the fire, and perceiving, as I believe every one did, that we were advancing to certain destruction, when other parts of the line fell back, I also gave the order to retreat, and formed in the road, in which we maintained a position during that night and the whole of July 3, while the fight of that day was progressing, and from which we fell back about 3 a.m. of July 4 to the ridge near the theological seminary.

No mention of any plan to attack on July 3rd.

General Doles' report (page 582):

We remained in line here until about 8 p.m. July 2, when we moved by the right flank, forming line and advancing toward the enemy's position on Cemetery Hill. This column of attack was composed of Generals Ramseur's, Iverson's, and this brigade. We moved forward until the line arrived within 100 yards of the enemy's line. After consulting with Generals Ramseur and Iverson, the line was ordered to fall back to a dirt road some 300 yards to the rear. We remained in this position until 1 a.m. July 4. We were then ordered to fall back to the heights near the theological college. This command was actively engaged in heavy skirmishing during July 2, 3, and 4.

No mention of any plan to attack on July 3rd.

General Ramseur's report (page 588):

July 3, remained in line all day, with severe and damaging skirmishing in front, exposed to the artillery of the enemy and our own short-range guns, by the careless use or imperfect ammunition of which I lost 7 men killed and wounded. Withdrew at night, and formed line of battle near Gettysburg, where we remained on July 4. Commenced retreat with the army on the night of the 4th in-slant.

No mention of any plan to attack on July 3rd.

General Wilcox's report (pages 619-620):

With reference to the action of the 3d instant, I beg to report that early in the morning, before sunrise, the brigade was ordered out to support artillery under the command of Colonel Alexander, this artillery being placed along the Emmitsburg turnpike, and on ground won from the enemy the day before. My men had had nothing to eat since the morning of the 2d, and had confronted and endured the dangers and fatigues of that day. They nevertheless moved to the front to the support of the artillery, as ordered. The brigade was formed in line parallel to the Emmitsburg turnpike and about 200 yards from it, artillery being in front, much of it on the road, and extending far beyond either flank of the brigade. My men occupied this position till about 3.20 p.m. Our artillery opened fire upon the enemy's artillery, and upon ground supposed to be occupied by his infantry. This fire was responded to promptly by the enemy's artillery, and continued with the greatest vivacity on either side for about one hour. In no previous battle of the war had we so much artillery engaged, and the enemy seemed not to be inferior in quantity.

During all this fire, my men were exposed to the solid shot and shell of the enemy,but suffered comparatively little, probably less than a dozen men killed and wounded. The brigade lying on my right (Kemper's) suffered severely. Our artillery ceased to fire after about one hour. The enemy continued to fire for awhile after ours had ceased. I do not believe a single battery of the enemy had been disabled so as to stop its fire.

Pickett's division now advanced, and other brigades on his left. As soon as these troops rose to advance, the hostile artillery opened upon them. These brave men (Pickett's) nevertheless moved on, and, as far as I saw, without wavering. The enemy's artillery opposed them on both flanks and directly in front. Every variety of artillery missiles was thrown into their ranks.

The advance had not been made more than twenty or thirty minutes, before three staff officers in quick succession (one from the major-general commanding division) gave me orders to advance to the support of Pickett's division. My brigade, about 1,200 in number, then moved forward in the following order from right to left: Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Alabama Regiments. As they advanced, they changed direction slightly to the left, so as to cover in part the ground over which Pickett's division had moved. As they came in view on the turnpike, all of the enemy's terrible artillery that could bear on them was concentrated upon them from both flanks and directly in front, and more than on the evening previous. Not a man of the division that I was ordered to support could I see; but as my orders were to go to their support, on my men went down the slope until they came near the hill upon which were the enemy's batteries and intrenchments.

Here they were exposed to a close and terrible fire of artillery. Two lines of the enemy's infantry were seen moving by the flank toward the rear of my left. I ordered my men to hold their ground until I could get artillery to fire upon them. I then rode back rapidly to our artillery, but could find none near that had ammunition. After some little delay, not getting any artillery to fire upon the enemy's infantry that were on my left flank, and seeing none of the troops that I was ordered to support, and knowing that my small force could do nothing save to make a useless sacrifice of themselves, I ordered them back. The enemy did not pursue. My men, as on the day before, had to retire under a heavy artillery fire. My line was reformed on the ground it occupied before it advanced.

The casualties of the brigade on this day amounted to 204 killed, wounded, and missing.

Perhaps one could interpret Wilcox as saying his attack was a second wave but that's certainly not necessarily the only explanation and without anything else, it seems to be nothing more than support, rather than a second wave of attack.

General Mahone's report (page 621):

During the days and nights of July 2 and 3, the brigade was posted in line of battle immediately in front of the enemy, and in support of Pegram's batteries. In this front its skirmishers were quite constantly engaged, and inflicted much loss upon the enemy, and, after the repulse of our troops on the 3d, maintained firmly its line.

This is almost the entirety of his report so the evidence here doesn't indicate anything.

General Wright's report (page 625):

During the morning of Friday (the 3d), my brigade remained quietly in its original line of battle. Late in the afternoon, it was moved forward 500 or 600 yards, to cover the retreat of Pickett's division, which had assaulted the enemy's position at the same point where my brigade had advanced the day before, and had been forced to retire. Soon after, I was ordered by General Lee to move my brigade to the right several hundred yards, and form in rear of Wilcox's brigade, to support the latter in case the enemy should advance upon it, and which was now threatened. In this position I remained until after nightfall, when I retired to my original position in line of battle upon the hill.

No evidence for a second wave here.

Colonel Lang's report (page 632):

About 7 a.m. General Wilcox moved forward to the support of a portion of General Longstreet's artillery, then being placed in position; and, in accordance with orders, I moved up with his left, and put my command in front and at the foot of the hill upon which the batteries were in position, at the same time advancing my skirmishers to the crest of the next hill. Here we remained quietly until nearly 2 p.m., when the batteries opened a furious bombardment upon the enemy's stronghold, which lasted till nearly 4 p.m., when Pickett's division, of Longstreet's corps, charged the enemy's position, but were soon after driven back in confusion.

Soon after General Pickett's troops retired behind our position, General Wilcox began to advance, and, in accordance with previous orders to conform to his movements, I moved forward also, under a heavy fire from artillery, but without encountering any infantry until coming to the skirt of woods at the foot of the heights. Just before entering the woods, a heavy body of infantry advanced upon my left flank.

This indicates that Wilcox and Lang didn't advance until after Pickett had fallen back, clearly not acting as a second wave of attack.

General Posey's report (page 633):

On the 3d, my brigade was held in reserve to support the battery in my front.

No second wave here.

At least in the contemporary reports, there just is very little evidence for a second wave, other than orders to exploit any opportunities that may arise. I just am not buying the planned second wave theory.

Ryan
 
To add some more reports.

General Iverson's report (page 580):



No mention of any plan to attack on July 3rd.

General Doles' report (page 582):



No mention of any plan to attack on July 3rd.

General Ramseur's report (page 588):



No mention of any plan to attack on July 3rd.

General Wilcox's report (pages 619-620):



Perhaps one could interpret Wilcox as saying his attack was a second wave but that's certainly not necessarily the only explanation and without anything else, it seems to be nothing more than support, rather than a second wave of attack.

General Mahone's report (page 621):



This is almost the entirety of his report so the evidence here doesn't indicate anything.

General Wright's report (page 625):



No evidence for a second wave here.

Colonel Lang's report (page 632):



This indicates that Wilcox and Lang didn't advance until after Pickett had fallen back, clearly not acting as a second wave of attack.

General Posey's report (page 633):



No second wave here.

At least in the contemporary reports, there just is very little evidence for a second wave, other than orders to exploit any opportunities that may arise. I just am not buying the planned second wave theory.

Ryan

Appreciate the posts; are all these available on-line?

Best,
 
Appreciate the posts; are all these available on-line?

Best,

I know that the ORs are online but I'm not sure of the link. I have a searchable copy on my hard drive, something I picked up many years ago.

I do believe that the link for the ORs are stickied here on the site.

Ryan
 
During all this fire, my men were exposed to the solid shot and shell of the enemy,but suffered comparatively little, probably less than a dozen men killed and wounded. The brigade lying on my right (Kemper's) suffered severely. Our artillery ceased to fire after about one hour. The enemy continued to fire for awhile after ours had ceased. I do not believe a single battery of the enemy had been disabled so as to stop its fire.

I must have read those things a whole lot but I missed that one previously. Nothing much was on the right of Wilcox' Brigade: (of course this is not extremely accurate, but the relative position of Wilcox as the right-most CSA brigade that day is...)

:Expired Image Removed
 
I know that the ORs are online but I'm not sure of the link. I have a searchable copy on my hard drive, something I picked up many years ago.

I do believe that the link for the ORs are stickied here on the site.

Ryan

Yep, I like the Cornell version. Good search engine.

Best,
 
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