Gettysburg was before it occured Part 2

[Ed Hill]

Tragic as it was to see the faithful animals of the army die for lack of forage, and bitter as were the un-escapable reflections of Lee on what might happen the next winter, he had daily to face a worse condition in the hunger of his own men. Provisions came to the Rappahannock from Richmond by a single-track railroad that was far from regular in its delivery of cars.113 The nearby country supplied almost nothing. Because of the condition of the horses, only a limited number of wagons could be sent into distant counties to collect provisions there.114 As early as January 5, Lee doubted whether starvation might not prove a more potent foe than the Army of the Potomac,115 and thereafter he had to resort to every expedient to keep even a few days ahead of actual hunger in the ranks.116 Colonel Cole, the chief commissary, went to Richmond to plead with the authorities and brought back many promises but no provisions.117 Such beeves as were sent forward were generally so thin that Lee had to ask that they be kept to fatten in the spring, and that salt meat be issued instead.118 Cavalry were used to supplement the government agents in collecting cattle; the commander of a proposed expedition to cut the B. & O. Railroad was told that the meat he might bring back was as important as the damage he might inflict;119 wagons were furnished to haul to the railroad the wheat purchased by the commissary;120 appeals to the public were urged on the President by Lee;121 the dispatch of men to collect grain along the James River and Kanawha Canal was suggested;122 the War Department was importuned to send men southward along the railroads to hasten the movement of supply trains;123 a report that there was beef in Florida was instantly hurried to the President.124
Scurvy began to appear; at the first signs of spring in the woods the soldiers were sent out to collect sassafras buds, onions, and other wild vegetation.125 Vigorous warning was issued that the men must not damage growing crops on which their subsistence might depend.126 At a time when 100 cars of sugar, intended for the army, were reported to have stood more than a fortnight on sidings in North Carolina, the soldiers went without that item of food for ten days. "Their ration," Lee wrote Seddon, ". . . consists of one-fourth pound of bacon, 18 ounces of flour, 10 pounds of rice to each 100 men about every third day, with some few peas and a small amount of dried fruit occasionally as they can be obtained. This may give existence to the troops while idle, but will certainly cause them to break down when called upon for exertion."127 This was only two weeks before the beginning of the Chancellorsville campaign. Still later, when any day, any hour, might see the Federals on the move, Lee had to write the secretary, "I am painfully anxious lest the spirit and efficiency of the men should become impaired, and they be rendered unable to sustain their former reputation, or perform the service necessary for our safety."128
Lee watched every development intently. He was satisfied that if Hooker delayed until the army could be reunited, he could defeat him. "Should he attempt such a movement when the army is able to operate," he said in characteristically un-boastful language, "I think he will find it very difficult to reach his destination."194 But with the army divided, the horses feeble and provisions low, he doubted his ability "even to act on the defensive" — to quote his words — "as vigorously as circumstances may require."195 Still, when Longstreet reported that he was getting all the provisions out of North Carolina as rapidly as possible, the bacon of that state seemed so important to the half-starved army that Lee merely inquired how soon Longstreet could finish his task and rejoin.196
Hooker's officers had a magnificent total to compile — 138,378 present for duty.198 Spies' reports and a study of the incautious Northern newspapers had led the Confederate signal corps to believe that the number was as high as 150,000 to 160,000, a figure that Lee thought much exaggerated. His own strength cannot be stated with absolute certainty, as events were to prevent the completion of the returns, but the total, excluding Jones's little force of cavalry in the Shenandoah Valley, was not much, if any, in excess of 62,500 of all arms — less than half the force his powerful adversary commanded.199 Except on the day before the battle of Sharpsburg, he had never faced such crushing odds, yet he had been planning to take the offensive if Hooker did not!
Thanks to the pitiful supply situation, Longstreet with the Divisions of Hood and Pickett were not present at Chancellorsville and yet Lee still manages to defeat a numerically superior foe that was supplied down the last tent peg.
What if Longstreet with Hood and Pickett were present for Chancellorsville?
Would A.P. Hill still have been seriously wounded?
Would Jackson still have been killed?
Would there be a different story written on the bloody fields of Gettysburg if Jackson was commanding the II Corps rather than Ewell?

[Ed Hill]

Part 1

The year of 1862 had, indeed, been one of victory in Virginia, at least during the seven months Lee had commanded the army. Port Republic, Cross Keys, Mechanicsville, Gaines's Mill, Savage Station, Frayser's Farm, Malvern Hill, Cedar Mountain, Second Manassas, Boonsboro, Harper’s Ferry, Sharpsburg, and Fredericksburg — thirteen battles great and small — had been fought during that time, and the Confederates had remained masters of the field in every instance except at Boonsboro and at Sharpsburg. Leaving out of account the actions at Cross Keys, Port Republic, and Cedar Mountain, which were tactically Jackson's though Lee had a part in the general strategy, the troops under Lee's command had this account of gains and losses: They had sustained 48,171 casualties and had inflicted 70,725.9 They had taken from the enemy approximately 75,000 small arms and had yielded scarcely more than 6,000. With the loss of 8 cannon, they had secured 155. The infantry practically had been rearmed with improved, captured rifles, and half the batteries boasted superior ordnance that had belonged to the Army of the Potomac.
The morale of the Army of Northern Virginia was vastly higher than it had been when Lee took command, yet there was a consciousness in the ranks, though not in the Richmond executive offices, of the persistent, determined spirit of an enemy who could replace every fallen soldier, make good every captured arm, and supply every necessity of the Army of the Potomac from ample manufactories and open ports. Richmond was fearful of military defeat but refused to admit the inevitable consequences of economic attrition. The Army of Northern Virginia was confident of victory in the field but fearful of economic disaster behind the lines. Before the winter was to end, the danger of starvation and of immobility, resulting from a collapse of transportation, was to be plain to every private in the ranks.
Far more serious than reorganization of staff and gunners was the shortage of horses and the danger that lack of forage would cause the death of many of those that had survived the long campaign from Mechanicsville to Fredericksburg. Every horse with the army had to be conserved and additional animals had to be provided, because the heavier cannon would demand larger teams.96 The specter of a paralyzing shortage of horses was already haunting the mind of Lee. He mentioned the condition of the animals as one of the chief reasons why he could not take the offensive after the detachment of troops from the Army of the Potomac in February,97 and from the labor he expended in trying to save the army's horses during the winter of 1862 63, there can be little doubt that even then he saw in the prospective failure of the horse supply one of the most serious obstacles to the establishment of Southern independence. Some 600 or 700 mules had been purchased in the Trans-Mississippi Department and were being wintered at Alexandria, La.98 Four hundred artillery horses had been procured in Georgia but had not been brought nearer than North Carolina, because they could not be foraged with the army.99 These were all that could be counted upon to supplement the gaunt and jaded animals with the trains, except, of course, for such additional horses as could be picked up in the un-plundered sections of nearby states. The country immediately adjacent to the army had been so completely swept of fodder that as soon as the first threat of a new offensive had passed after the battle of Fredericksburg, he had ordered the whole of the artillery to the rear, except twelve batteries.100 All the draught horses that could possibly be spared thereafter were sent back from the Rappahannock, some of them as far south as Brunswick County, which lies on the North Carolina border.101 When Pickett and Hood went to Richmond, Lee was so fearful the artillery horses would break down that he suggested the guns be forwarded by train and the animals be led through the country.102 The quartermaster of the artillery scoured the line of the Virginia Central for fodder and grain, 103 to increase the limited supply brought by rail from Richmond.104 Rooney Lee's cavalry brigade was foraged miles from the right of the line, in Essex and Middlesex Counties, though it had to get its meat from the Northern Neck counties across the Rappahannock.105 The transportation of the army was reduced to the absolute minimum, 106 but even then it was admitted that many of the horses would have to suffer.107 As the late spring held back the grass,108 Lee was compelled on April 6, when the advance of the enemy was only a matter of days, to warn Pendleton not to bring up his teams from the south more rapidly than he could find feed for them.109
The danger to the cavalry from the shortage of feed was every bit as serious as the threatened paralysis of the artillery. The army would be feeble without artillery but it would be blind without cavalry. The superiority of the Confederate mounted forces, a potent factor in the operations of 1862, was not only challenged, but was in danger of being lost completely. Hampton had been detached and sent southward to recruit, primarily because his horses could not remain with the main army and be supplied.110 The position of W. E. Jones and that of Rooney Lee have been described. Fitz Lee, who contrived to subsist his men and horses where Hampton's had been in danger of starvation, covered the left flank of the army from the Blue Ridge to the Rapidan.111 These two brigades were all that Lee had with him during the late winter. Repeatedly through the dark months, by letter and in person, he asked for reinforcements, and as the time for the opening of the campaign approached, he besought the President to find him two more brigades,112 though he could not graze their mounts and therefore could not order them up until the spring opened, even if they were made available.

[20ME]

tragic as it was to see the faithful animals of the army die for lack of forage, and bitter as were the un-escapable reflections of lee on what might happen the next winter, he had daily to face a worse condition in the hunger of his own men. Provisions came to the rappahannock from richmond by a single-track railroad that was far from regular in its delivery of cars.113 the nearby country supplied almost nothing. Because of the condition of the horses, only a limited number of wagons could be sent into distant counties to collect provisions there.114 as early as january 5, lee doubted whether starvation might not prove a more potent foe than the army of the potomac,115 and thereafter he had to resort to every expedient to keep even a few days ahead of actual hunger in the ranks.116 colonel cole, the chief commissary, went to richmond to plead with the authorities and brought back many promises but no provisions.117 such beeves as were sent forward were generally so thin that lee had to ask that they be kept to fatten in the spring, and that salt meat be issued instead.118 cavalry were used to supplement the government agents in collecting cattle; the commander of a proposed expedition to cut the b. & o. Railroad was told that the meat he might bring back was as important as the damage he might inflict;119 wagons were furnished to haul to the railroad the wheat purchased by the commissary;120 appeals to the public were urged on the president by lee;121 the dispatch of men to collect grain along the james river and kanawha canal was suggested;122 the war department was importuned to send men southward along the railroads to hasten the movement of supply trains;123 a report that there was beef in florida was instantly hurried to the president.124
scurvy began to appear; at the first signs of spring in the woods the soldiers were sent out to collect sassafras buds, onions, and other wild vegetation.125 vigorous warning was issued that the men must not damage growing crops on which their subsistence might depend.126 at a time when 100 cars of sugar, intended for the army, were reported to have stood more than a fortnight on sidings in north carolina, the soldiers went without that item of food for ten days. "their ration," lee wrote seddon, ". . . Consists of one-fourth pound of bacon, 18 ounces of flour, 10 pounds of rice to each 100 men about every third day, with some few peas and a small amount of dried fruit occasionally as they can be obtained. This may give existence to the troops while idle, but will certainly cause them to break down when called upon for exertion."127 this was only two weeks before the beginning of the chancellorsville campaign. still later, when any day, any hour, might see the federals on the move, lee had to write the secretary, "i am painfully anxious lest the spirit and efficiency of the men should become impaired, and they be rendered unable to sustain their former reputation, or perform the service necessary for our safety."128
lee watched every development intently. he was satisfied that if hooker delayed until the army could be reunited, he could defeat him. "should he attempt such a movement when the army is able to operate," he said in characteristically un-boastful language, "i think he will find it very difficult to reach his destination."194 but with the army divided, the horses feeble and provisions low, he doubted his ability "even to act on the defensive" — to quote his words — "as vigorously as circumstances may require."195 still, when longstreet reported that he was getting all the provisions out of north carolina as rapidly as possible, the bacon of that state seemed so important to the half-starved army that lee merely inquired how soon longstreet could finish his task and rejoin.196
hooker's officers had a magnificent total to compile — 138,378 present for duty.198 spies' reports and a study of the incautious northern newspapers had led the confederate signal corps to believe that the number was as high as 150,000 to 160,000, a figure that lee thought much exaggerated. His own strength cannot be stated with absolute certainty, as events were to prevent the completion of the returns, but the total, excluding jones's little force of cavalry in the shenandoah valley, was not much, if any, in excess of 62,500 of all arms — less than half the force his powerful adversary commanded.199 except on the day before the battle of sharpsburg, he had never faced such crushing odds, yet he had been planning to take the offensive if hooker did not!
thanks to the pitiful supply situation, longstreet with the divisions of hood and pickett were not present at chancellorsville and yet lee still manages to defeat a numerically superior foe that was supplied down the last tent peg.
what if longstreet with hood and pickett were present for chancellorsville?
would a.p. Hill still have been seriously wounded?
would jackson still have been killed?
would there be a different story written on the bloody fields of gettysburg if jackson was commanding the ii corps rather than ewell?

i think your suggesting that had stonewall jackson been in command of the second corp instead of ewell that he would have retaken cemetery hill on the first evening of the gettysburg battle.i believe you are correct the order from lee though probably verbal with compliments only was supposed to have been to take the hill if practicable
or i have also read the word was if feasible either way i think jackson proved by his previous engagements that he would have taken lee's orders to heart almost as a friend asking him for a crucial favor.by all reports the hill was ripe for the taking when ewell stood down much to the dismay of his commanders.this would have been a huge strategic victory as the confederates could have staged artillery there and bombarded the entire ridge from that location possibly crippling the union line in preparation for a charge on the second day,this could have change the entire outcome of the battle and thus the war.great post really makes you think.

[Stonewall1982]

i think your suggesting that had stonewall jackson been in command of the second corp instead of ewell that he would have retaken cemetery hill on the first evening of the gettysburg battle.i believe you are correct the order from lee though probably verbal with compliments only was supposed to have been to take the hill if practicable
or i have also read the word was if feasible either way i think jackson proved by his previous engagements that he would have taken lee's orders to heart almost as a friend asking him for a crucial favor.by all reports the hill was ripe for the taking when ewell stood down much to the dismay of his commanders.this would have been a huge strategic victory as the confederates could have staged artillery there and bombarded the entire ridge from that location possibly crippling the union line in preparation for a charge on the second day,this could have change the entire outcome of the battle and thus the war.great post really makes you think.

I agree with you that Jackson would have taken Cemetery Hill. In fact John Gordon later stated that he wanted to take the hill but Ewell wouldn't allow him and that if Jackson was there he would have taken it.

[Ed Hill]

Talk about when it's not meant to be, it is not meant to be.
Lee's plan was to pick good ground at Cashtown and wait for Meade to attack. It was hotter than usual and he knew that the Yanks would be exhausted and he planned on beating them in detail.
That obviously is a great plan; he would have his whole army waiting for segments of the tired Union army to show up.
J.E.B. Stuart; No matter what everybody else did, he has to be the major culprit. When the AoP crossed the Potomac he was supposed to be on the right flank of the Second Corps and wasn't there. If JEB had his cavalry there Lee wouldn't have been playing in the dark on day one and then everything would have been different.
A.P. Hill; He went into G-burg without orders and from there all Hell broke loose. Your orders were to not bring on a general engagement, yet Hill managed to get Heth's and Pender's divisions heavily engaged. After Rodes and Early showed up the Rebs had such an awesome position that a total rout was almost unavoidable. Heth and Pender are attacking from the west, Rodes is attacking from the north, and Early is coming down behind the Federal position from the northeast. Just when Rodes is ready to turn the whole episode into another Chancellorsville, he gets orders from Lee to not bring on a general engagement. He doesn't want to stop because he could see that if he continued a major rout was going to happen, but after receiving Lee's order for the fourth time he stopped and allowed Reynolds and Howard to get away and fall back to the hills south of town.
Robert E. Lee was in Fayetteville 17 miles west of G-burg when Hill got engaged, so of course he gave orders to not bring on a general engagement. With Stuart missing, Lee was playing blindfolded and wanted to get his entire army concentrated before engaging Meade. If Lee was on the field he would have seen what was happening and would have never made Rodes stop his attack and two Federal divisions would have been crushed.
Richard Ewell; He was accustomed to serving under Jackson who gave explicit orders and was not accustomed to Lee’s style when it came to dealing with Lt. Generals. After the 1st and 11th Federal corps were driven through town, Hill was literally spent, and Ewell was thrown off balance when he received Lee’s order, “take that hill if practicable.” Gordon, Early, and Trimble were all for hitting the Yankees when they had them “on the scare” before they could regroup. Ewell had never commanded anywhere near this many men and wanted to wait for Johnson’s division to show up before striking. Ewell lost a leg at Second Manassas and hadn’t served since. Jackson’s old Corp was accustomed to hitting hard and Ewell was simply too timid to be in control of this corps.
James Longstreet; he was simply defensive minded and wasn’t comfortable taking the offensive, yet the way everything transpired, it fell on his corps to take the offensive. Longstreet was sulking when Lee wouldn’t adopt his plan of going around the right flank of the Federal army and picking good ground between them and Washington and awaiting an attack. He knew that Lee plans were to attack the Federal position early in the morning of day two and came up with every possible excuse to not make the attack because he didn’t approve of Lee’s aggressive plan.
It wasn’t his place to approve or disapprove of the commanding generals’ plan, it was his job to implement Lee’s plan and he didn’t do it! Hood and McLaws should have been ordered up at daybreak and weren’t, both generals after the war testified that Longstreet was in a “dark” mood on the morning of day two. Apparently after Longstreet ran out of excuses for delaying the attack, Lee literally ordered him to make it at 11 A.M. and he still didn’t begin it until 2 P.M.
Hood found a way around Big Round Top where he could take the Federal position from the rear and Longstreet wouldn’t allow him to implement the attack. He was now off his temper and forced Hood to obey Lee’s orders to the letter, when a better way was right in front of him. Lee’s Lt. Generals had the power to do something better if it presented itself.
At Second Manassas when Jackson was calling for re-enforcements, instead Longstreet found a good cannon position to enfilade the entire left flank of the attacking column and then both Jackson and Longstreet simultaneously attacked resulting in a major victory!
As hard as it is to believe, it seems like Longstreet was determined to force Lee into adopting his flanking plan.
Longstreet’s plan; Longstreet studied the terrain closely by the side of the chief with whom there had not been a ripple of disagreement since they had entered Pennsylvania;15 but when Longstreet put down his glasses and turned to Lee, it was to assert his innate self-confidence and his faith in the plan he had formulated, ere he left Virginia, for offensive strategy and defensive tactics. Without waiting, apparently, for Lee to ask his opinion, he declared the field ideal for the course on which he had set his heart. "All we have to do," he later quoted himself as saying in substance, "is to throw our army around by their left, and we shall interpose between the Federal army and Washington. We can get a strong position and wait, and if they fail to attack us we shall have everything in condition to move back tomorrow night in the direction of Washington, selecting beforehand a good position into which we can put our troops to receive battle next day. Finding our object is Washington, the Federals will be sure to attack us. When they attack, we shall beat them, as we proposed to do before we left Fredericksburg, and the probabilities are that the fruits of our success will be great."16
This was rather remarkable language for a subordinate to address to the commanding general, ten minutes after his arrival on the field of battle, and when he had not been advised of the strength of the enemy. It was, moreover, a proposal that involved great risks. Meade presumably was moving from the direction of Washington, but how close he was and how fully concentrated, Lee did not know and could not ascertain in the absence of his cavalry. The Southern army had been compelled to advance cautiously to Gettysburg, and had been more than fortunate in finding and in driving the enemy there. To have led the army blindly around the Federal left "would have been wildly rash."17 The surest hope of victory, the best defensive, was to attack the two corps immediately in front, as soon as a sufficient force for the purpose could be brought up. To delay and to maneuver was to gamble with ruin.
Lee therefore answered Longstreet at once: "If the enemy is there, we must attack him."18
Longstreet retorted sharply: "If he is there, it will be because he is anxious that we should attack him — a good reason, in my judgment, for not doing so." And he proceeded to argue his point.19
Lee said little more but displayed not the slightest intention of changing his plan of attacking the enemy at the earliest possible moment, before the whole of the Army of the Potomac could be brought up.20
At some stage of the discussion Colonel A. L. Long returned from a reconnaissance Lee had ordered him to make in front of Cemetery Hill. Long reported that the position seemed to be occupied in considerable force, with some troops behind a stone fence near the crest, and with others on the reverse slope. An attack, he said, would be hazardous and doubtful of success.21 About the same time, Lieutenant James Power Smith arrived with a message from Ewell. He probably had passed Taylor as the latter was hurrying to the commander of the Second Corps with Lee's orders to take Cemetery Ridge if practicable. Ewell, said Smith, desired him to inform the commander that General Rodes and General Early believed they could take Cemetery Hill if they were supported on the right, and that "it would be well if Lee occupied at once the higher ground in front of our right, which seemed to command the Cemetery Hill."
"I suppose," Lee answered, "this is the higher ground to which these gentlemen refer," and, pointing to the front, he handed Smith his field-glasses. "You will find that some of those people are there now."22
After Smith had looked, Lee went on. "Our people are not yet up, and I have no troops with which to occupy this higher ground."
Then he turned to Longstreet with a question that officer had not previously given him opportunity of asking: Where on the road were the troops of the First Corps? But Longstreet was angry because his counsel had been rejected, and he was not disposed to be communicative. McLaws's division, he said, was about six miles away, but beyond that he was indefinite and non-committal.
Lee urged him to bring his corps up as rapidly as possible, and turning to Smith gave him this message to Ewell: Smith was to tell Ewell that Lee did not then have troops to support him on the right, but that Lee wished Ewell to take Cemetery Hill if it was possible. He added that he would ride over to see Ewell very shortly.23
Longstreet did not like this either. Although the troops about whose position he was so vague were those on whom Lee would naturally rely for an assault on the western flank of Cemetery Hill, Longstreet argued — then or before this time — that if Lee intended to attack, he should do so immediately.24
The only alternative to a direct attack before the enemy was fully concentrated was, therefore, to move to the right, turn the flank of Meade and get between him and Washington. But if this were undertaken at once it would have to be done in the absence of the greater part of the cavalry. It would entail a wide flanking march against an enemy of whose position he was still uncertain and could only learn through Jenkins's inexperienced troopers. Such a march, moreover, would necessitate a continuous concentration, with no chance of foraging for the army. If Lee considered such a move a second time, after having dismissed it in his conversation with Longstreet, he definitely abandoned it later in the day as impracticable, and in this decision he has since been sustained by nearly all military critics. Strategically, then, Lee saw no alternative to attacking the enemy before Meade concentrated, much as he disliked to force a general engagement so early in the campaign and at such a distance from Virginia.
Hill started the battle by moving on his own authority.
Ewell became timid when he should have been aggressive.
Longstreet was insubordinate.
Stuart wasn’t present, when his presence on day one would have certainly made the major victory, MUCH BIGGER!
No wonder Lee was defeated!