Dear Friends,
In the Confederate attempt to relieve the siege of Knoxville by Federal troops under Burnside, General Longstreet decided that Fort Sanders was the only vulnerable place in the Union defenses.
On November 29, 1863, Longstreet proceeded with an assault on the Fort, which stood on a hill, on an almost vertical slope, and had before it a huge ditch with vertical sides. Moreover, there were low-strung Union telegraphic wires (strung from one tree stump to another) crisscrossing the area leading to the Fort. Confederate forces became trapped in the ditch and were slaughtered. The battle was over in twenty minutes.
The Confederate losses were an estimated 800 to only 15 on the Union side. There were only 250 Union men garrisoned at Fort Sanders fighting against Longstreet's famous lst Corp. The venerable Douglas Southall Freeman said of the battle of Fort Sanders, "The entire war had witnessed no repulse more complete, by a force of insignificant numbers." These are ****ing words.
It is said by some historians that Longstreet had received conflicting reports on the status of this "vulnerable place." Longstreet is said to have believed the ditch in front of the fort to be only three feet deep, despite reports to the contrary. He apparently ignored his own trusted and esteemed Jenkins who delivered a warning about the ditch.
My questions are as follows:
Why would Longstreet, an otherwise cautious general, venture such an assault, even despite a warning from a trusted friend? What would have compelled Longstreet to make the attempt on Fort Sanders?
Why, now after Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, would Longstreet throw men into a situation where there was a possibility of slaughter?
Do any of you have some insight into this battle or information that I do not have? Have any of you visited this battle site?
LongstreetLass
Perhaps the opportunity was too great for him to resist, especially after his disappointment at Gettysburg. Perhaps the thought of victory was enough to get him to attack. I also wonder about his decision though, because yes, he was an otherwise cautious general.
Hi Aimee,
Thank you for your post. I find any speculation on this difficult, as a woman, and am hoping that our male friends who have had military experience respond here, who may be better able to put themselves in Longstreet's position.
Longstreet's Mexican War experience flashes across my mind, too, the taking of Chapultepec.
One of the Longstreet mysteries?
I do hope some of the men decide to post here. That would be most interesting.
I'm not very well-versed on the action in the western theatre of the Civil War, but I did look up what Shelby Foote had to say about Fort Sanders in the second book of his Civil War trilogy, "Fredericksburg to Meridian."
According to Foote, Longstreet was in the process of trying to take Fort Sanders by siege when he heard rumors that Bragg had been defeated at Chattanooga. McLaws suggested that perhaps the thing to do was to abandon the siege and withdraw to Virginia, to avoid the possibility of being trapped between two Union forces.
Longstreet decided otherwise. He felt that the best solution would be a quick settlement of the issue before him at Knoxville. There were two primary reasons for the decision. One was that it simply would not do to abandon a fellow commander in trouble (no matter how little regard Longstreet had for Bragg personally). The other was the thought that, if he could win the day at Knoxville, Longstreet could, at least temporarily, relieve himself of the threat posed by one of the two Union forces.
Therefore, Longstreet decided to mount an assault as quickly as possible, in order to have the element of surprise. Unfortunately, once the assault began, the Confederates quickly learned two things they had not known previously. One, that the low-lying telegraph wires were in the area (which, because the advancing rebels made a considerable amount of noise tripping and falling over them, removed whatever element of surprise there might have been). Two, that the ditch was, indeed, nine feet deep. Foote says that the best estimates, prior to the charge, had been that the ditch was, at most, five feet deep, so the Confederates didn't bring any scaling ladders with them as they advanced.
Foote makes no mention of Jenkins attempting to warn Longstreet that the ditch was as deep as it was. In fact, Foote indicates that, as the initial assault faltered, Jenkins pleaded for an opportunity to try his hand at leading in a second wave, a plea which Longstreet rejected.
Nice post, Hoosier. I just wanted to add that Fort Sanders was classified by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission (CWSAC), in their 1993 Report, as a Class IV.2 battlefield - meaning that the integrity of the battlefield has been lost. From what I can gather, it is a mostly residential area. It was also rated "B" in that it had a direct and decisive influence on the campaign (Knoxville).
This was a tough time for Old Pete. Assaults against fortified positions were tough for everyone in this war.
Here is the abridged explanation taken from Longstreet's memoirs "From Manassas to Appomattox".
In Longstreet's detailed description of the fort in his front he reported, "The ditch was twelve feet wide, and generally seven to eight feet deep. From the fort the ground sloped in a heavy grade, from which the trees had been cut and used as a abatis, and wire net-work was stretched between the stumps." He had detailed information that the ditch had been dug by unwilling citizens pressed into the service by Burnside. On the 25th Longstreet recieved orders delivered personally by General Leadbetter, chief engineer of Bragg's army, ordering that he should attack at Knoxville; and very promptly. He asked Leadbetter to assist in the reconassaince. After some initial second guessing, Leadbetter agreed that Fort Sanders was the best place to assault and a battle plan was formed.
As for the fateful ditch, Longstreet was well aware of its existence as can be noted from the following excerpt: "The ditch and parapets about the fort were objects of careful observation from the moment of placing our lines, and opinions coincided with those of reconnoitering officers that the former could be passed without ladders. General Alexander and I made frequent examinations of them within four-hundred yards."
McLaws drew up the orders of attack for his command and was to be followed up in his attack by General B.R. Johnson. The attack was to commence on the morning of the 28th but a heavy fog hid the fort from the view of Longstreet's artillery on that morning and the attack was postponed. It was during this postponement that McLaws and others began to have second thoughts. Evidently, rumors were rampant that Bragg had been defeated at Chattanooga although no official word to that effect had arrived. McLaws sent a letter to Longstreet voicing his view that if Bragg had indeed been defeated they were in fact in danger of being cut off and suggesting that if such were the case they might be forced to try and make their way overland back to Virginia. He suggested that it would be prudent to at least wait for word of Bragg and how his army was faring at Chattanooga.
Longstreet responded to this letter with information that he too was aware of the rumors but was not convinced of their truthfulness. He also opined that even if Bragg had been defeated, their best course of action would be to complete the attack as planned: "Under this report I am entirely convinced that our only safety is in making the assault upon the enemy's position to-morrow at daylight, and it is the more important that I should have the entire support and cooperation of the officers in this connection; and I do hope and trust that I may have your entire support and the the force you may be possessed of in the execution of my views. It is a great mistake to suppose that there is any safety for us in going to Virginia if General Bragg has been defeated, for we leave him at the mercy of his victors, and with his army destroyed our own had better be, for we will not only be destroyed but disgraced. There is neither safety nor honor in any other course than the one I have chosen and ordered."
Longstreet was convinced that the attack as ordered was both prudent and neccessary. On the morning of the actual attack Longstreet was with Johnson and his brigades who were to follow McLaws over the works. Longstreet writes that he was within five-hundred yards of the fort and observing the attack when a Major Goggin of McLaw's staff rode back to inform him that the attack was a failure because the enemy had surrounded the fort with networks of wires and that the attacking troops were completely without the axes needed to penetrate the wire. Goggins was a classmate of Longstreet's at West Point and a personal aquaintance whom Longstreet held in high regard. He immediately called off the attack even though Johnson pleaded to be allowed to continue the attack. Shortly after Longstreet called off the attack he noticed that some of the men were in the process of passing over the supposedly impassable wire-networked parapets but he states that it was too late to renew the attack as he had already called off the attack. Longstreet further states that after later reading the accounts of General Poe, the engineer in charge of the works, that he was convinced that the attack as originally ordered would have been successful if not for his premature order of recall. Note the following excerpt:
"It is not a part of my nature to listen to reports that always come when stunning blows are felt, but confidence in the conduct of the war was broken, and with it the tone and spirit for battle farther impaired by the efforts fo those in authority to damage, if not prevent, the success of work ordered in their own vital interest: a poor excuse for want of golden equipoise in one who presumes to hold the lives of his soldiers, but better than to look for ways to shift the responsibility of a wavering spirit that sometimes comes unawares."
Some half-hour after the assault Major Branch of Ransom's staff arrived at Longstreet's headquarters with a telegram from Davis informing Longstreet that Bragg had been forced back by superior numbers and ordering him to co-operate with Bragg. Shortly afterwards, he recieved orders from Bragg to join him at Ringgold, Georgia if possible.
It is somewhat interesting to read Longstreet's estimates at the end of the chapter detailing his experiences at Knoxville:
Confederate loss in the assault........822
Union loss in the assault..............673
Confederate losses during the campaig..1296
Union losses during the campaign.......1481
blackirish
Gentlemen,
Thank you.
I am sorry to hear that there is little or no evidence of this battlefield left: I had supposed that if one could walk the ground that it would be easier to see Longstreet's viewpoint.
Still, was it really the best and only place to make an assault?
Did Longstreet know that the fort was manned with a small number of Union soldiers? If so, was that the information which determined that they would carry out the assault here?
And, yes, those figures above are a little telltale.
Longstreet Lass,
Rick’s post does an excellent job of summing up Longstreet’s account of the battle. I would like to offer some thoughts on you specific questions.
1. Why would Longstreet, an otherwise cautious general, venture such an assault, even despite a warning from a trusted friend? Longstreet was a professional soldier. He was under orders from his commander (Bragg) to attack, and promptly. Longstreet makes it clear in his account that he would have preferred to capture Knoxville by siege. He states that he wanted to await coming reinforcements to fully surround the Federal Positions and estimated that the enemy would surrender in two weeks. Bragg’s messenger rejected this option. Longstreet, as he did at Gettysburg, obeyed his orders.
2. Why, now after Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, would Longstreet throw men into a situation where there was a possibility of slaughter? Because there was a war on. Longstreet had a specific objective Knoxville, and a directive from his commander as when to achieve it “promptly.” He had been in position since November 18th. He and his staff, all experienced soldiers, had made an assessment of the enemy’s positions, and had concluded that fort Sanders, although strong, was the best place to attack. In war you have to take risks, battles cannot be won nor positions taken without the risk of slaughter. This is why Longstreet assaulted Fort Sanders, and why Eisenhower assaulted Normandy. By the way 822 casualties, in an assault on a well-fortified position, are not excessive by the standards of the time.
3. Was it the best and only place to make an assault? Longstreet thought so. He was there; he assessed the information available, and made a decision. We can second-guess him till the cows come home, but he was in command and had to make a decision.
4. Did Longstreet know that the fort was manned with a small number of Union soldiers? If so, was that the information which determined that they would carry out the assault here? There is no indication form Longstreet’s account that he knew the exact strength of the enemy at the point of assault. I would imagine that he had an estimate of how many men it would take to defend such a position. Longstreet assessed all the information available to him. I doubt that any one single factor was, by it’s self determative.
Doug
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