Texas Secession

[TxSouthpaw]

NB1 may be able to clarify things a little, but I read this in Lone Star by TR Fehrenbach about Texas secession, 1st edition page 345. It seems that a special convention was held in January 1861 to vote on Texas secession. After the affirmative vote took place, "Sam Houston threw his whole weight into an attempt to have the ordinance voted down by the people."

I thought the next part was interesting (verbatim from the book, quotes are the author's):

"The ordinance, together with a declaration of causes, was printed and distributed throughout the state. The six causes for Texas' secession are historically important; they revealed the dominant Texas mind. Even those men who opposed secession agreed with all, or some, of these statements. The "causes" were as follows:

1) The general government of the United States had administered the common territory so as to exclude Southern people from it (meaning, Congress had consistently barred or tried to bar slavery in the Western territories).
2) The disloyalty of the people of the North and the "imbecility" of their leadership had created incendiarism and outlawry in Kansas.
3) The Union had failed to defend Texas against both Mexicans and Indians.
4) The Northern people had become inimical to the South and to "their beneficent and patriarchical system of African slavery, preaching the debasing doctrine of the equality of all men, irrespective of race or color."
5) The slaveholding states had become a minority, unable to defend themselves against northern aggression against slavery.
6) The extremists of the North had elected as President and Vice President "two men whose chief claims to such high positions" were the approval of all the above wrongs, and these men were pledged to the final ruin of the slaveholding South.

For what it's worth..........

[Nathanb1]

My favorite professor used to tear this statement up one side and down the other, to use an old Texan idiom.....Other than #3, I believe Fehrenbach got a little ambitious when he claimed "Even those men who opposed secession....." and as far as the Indian dilemma, I'm not so sure Houston wouldn't have disagreed somewhat. If he'd used some other qualifiers, maybe. There was a pretty large population of northern transplants in North Texas (see McCaslin, etc.) that voted against secession (although certainly not enough to win a majority) a number of whom were abolitionists.

However, #3 was a big sticking point for most people, and certainly didn't hurt the secessionists' cause in building up support for the other points. Ironically, #3 will become a big bone of contention in Texas during the war and cause a considerable amount of heartburn once conscription becomes an issue. A good deal of the internal strife in that period was caused by men who wanted to stay at home and defend their families or at least serve on the frontier in the militia, rather than go off to Virginia or Tennessee. I really haven't found a lot of support for the idea that these men were either cowards or even staunch anti-secessionists--they seem to have been lukewarm on the idea, at best. They just realized that in Texas the biggest threat to their homes and families was coming from a bunch of painted-up guys irritated over the loss of their own territory. IMHO, of course.

[ForeverFree]

TxSouthpaw

One factor in the Texas secession decision, which you may already have read about, is the so-called Texas Troubles.

The "Troubles" are described in the book Texas Terror: The Slave Insurrection Panic of 1860 and the Secession of the Lower South, by Donald E. Reynolds. This is from a description of the book on Amazon.com:

On July 8, 1860, fire destroyed the entire business section of Dallas, Texas. At about the same time, two other fires damaged towns near Dallas. Early reports indicated that spontaneous combustion was the cause of the blazes, but four days later, Charles Pryor, editor of the Dallas Herald, wrote letters to editors of pro-Democratic newspapers, alleging that the fires were the result of a vast abolitionist conspiracy, the purpose of which was to devastate northern Texas and free the region's slaves. White preachers from the North, he asserted, had recruited local slaves to set the fires, murder the white men of their region, and rape their wives and daughters. These sensational allegations set off a panic of unprecedented proportions that extended throughout the Lone Star State and beyond.

In Texas Terror, Donald E. Reynolds offers a deft analysis of these events and illuminates the ways in which this fictionalized conspiracy determined the course of southern secession immediately before the Civil War.

As Reynolds explains, all three fires probably resulted from a combination of extreme heat and the presence of new, and highly volatile, phosphorous matches in local stores. But from July until mid-September, vigilantes from the Red River to the Gulf of Mexico charged numerous whites and blacks with involvement in the alleged conspiracy and summarily hanged many of them. Lurid stories of the alleged abolitionist plot in Texas were reprinted in most southern newspapers, and a spate of similar panics occurred in other states. States-rights Democrats asserted that the Republican Party had given tacit approval, if not active support, to the abolitionist scheme, and they repeatedly cited the "Texas Troubles" as an example of what would happen throughout the South if Lincoln were elected President.

After Lincoln's election, secessionists charged that all who opposed immediate secession were inviting abolitionists to commit unspeakable depredations. This argument, as Reynolds clearly shows, was used with great effectiveness, particularly where there was significant opposition to immediate secession.

Mining a rich vein of primary sources, Reynolds shows how secessionists throughout the Lower South created public panic for a purpose: preparing a region that traditionally had been nationalistic for withdrawal from the Union. Their exploitation of the "Texas Troubles," Reynolds asserts, was a critical and possibly decisive factor in the Lower South's decision to leave the Union of their fathers and form the Confederacy.

During the Troubles, someone from Fort Worth, I believe, spoke the famous line "It is better for us to hang ninety-nine innocent (suspicious) men than to let one guilty one pass." That line always struck me as... Texan.

[Nathanb1]

And they hung 42 men who were mostly innocent in Gainesville by October 1862. Hmph.

[Tin cup]

"They have, through the mails and hired emissaries, sent seditious pamphlets and papers among us to stir up servile insurrection and bring blood and carnage to our firesides.
They have sent hired emissaries among us to burn our towns and distribute arms and poison to our slaves for the same purpose."

The "Texas troubles" which was what they talked of in
A declaration of the causes which impel the State of Texas to secede from the Federal Union never held water. A lot of paranoia was spread on purpose by the Slave owners/Civic leaders to get what they wanted, Secession.

Not a real proud period for the Lone Star State. The Great Hanging mentioned was an extention of the attitude of the day...so much for "Rights"!

Kevin Dally

[Nathanb1]

If you study that period, as you get farther and farther from the Dallas area, the newspapers' accounts become more and more inflammatory. As I have pointed out in other discussions, however, people didn't have the same "distrust" of the media we have today (for lack of a better term) and were truly terrified. We really cannot understand the impact those wildly inaccurate stories had in that time period (in many other places and on both sides, to be fair).

[Freddy]

So Lincoln threw people in jail and closed newspapers of those who spoke out against the Union and the war, but in Texas if you failed to volunteer or spoke out against the Confederacy you were hung.

[Nathanb1]

Unless you could sneak off to the frontier and get in the militia on the way, way, way far side, and take your chances with the Comanches. What fun. (There are a couple of other notable "group" massacres, too...I just didn't have family involved, so I haven't researched them as much)

[trice]

NB1 may be able to clarify things a little, but I read this in Lone Star by TR Fehrenbach about Texas secession, 1st edition page 345. It seems that a special convention was held in January 1861 to vote on Texas secession. After the affirmative vote took place, "Sam Houston threw his whole weight into an attempt to have the ordinance voted down by the people."

The January special convention was organized illegally under Texas law. Houston, who was opposed to secession anyway, was opposed to the election of delegates to the special convention (which was called illegally anyway, since the legislature was out of secession). Many non-secessionists boycotted the election of delegates as a result (which led to overwhelming secessionist strength in the delegates that were sent to the illegal special convention). Some Texas counties sent no delegates and so were not represented in the special convention. When it became obvious that this was happening anyway, illegal or not, Houston agreed to a deal with members of the legislature, then tried to fight the secession ordinance that resulted.

Tim

[Nathanb1]

The best resource about Texas and Secession is the Handbook of Texas. Here's one of the articles (there is much more). In addition, check out the secession documents in the Texas State Library. There's a complete assortment of all the major actions, plus a summary.

SECESSION CONVENTION. In late January and early February 1861 a convention of the people of Texas met in Austin and voted to secede from the Union. Pressure to call a convention to consider secession began in October 1860, when it became apparent that Abraham Lincoln would be elected to the presidency. The secession of South Carolina in mid-December intensified this pressure and led to the secession of five other states in the lower South. In Texas, however, only the governor could call the legislature into special session, and only the legislature could convene a convention. Governor Sam Houston refused to act and hoped that with time, ardor for secession would cool. Realizing that Houston would not act, Oran M. Roberts, chief justice of the Texas Supreme Court, John S. Ford, and several other prominent Texans took the law into their own hands. Starting around December 3 they had printed in several Texas newspapers calls for the election on January 8, 1861, of delegates to a secession convention. The elections were to be supervised by the county judges of the state, and the convention was to meet on January 28. Once it was clear that a secession convention of some sort would meet, Houston convened the legislature in mid-January with the hope that it would declare the convention illegal. Instead, legislators validated the calling of a convention, turned over the House chambers to the convention, and adjourned. The election of delegates needed all the legitimacy the Texas legislature could give it, because what evidence still exists indicates that the election procedures did not even meet the minimal standards of the day. Delegates were often elected by voice votes at public meetings. Unionists were discouraged from attending such meetings or chose to ignore the process because they considered it illegal. As a result the delegates overwhelmingly favored secession. Delegates to the convention were in some ways a typical cross section of the free male population of the state. Their average age was about forty, and almost all had been born in slaveholding states. Though they were slightly wealthier than the average Texan, the great planters and merchants of the state did not dominate the convention. In two significant ways, however, the convention differed from the population as a whole. Lawyers made up 40 percent of the membership and slaveowners about 70 percent, although most owned fewer than fifty slaves.
After opening with prayer on Monday afternoon, January 28, 1861, the delegates to the convention elected O. M. Roberts presiding officer. Roberts's words at that time demonstrate the conviction that the delegates were acting as the special representatives of the people: "All political power is inherent in the people. That power, I assert, you now represent." On January 29, John H. Wharton moved "that without determining now the manner in which this result should be effected, it is the deliberate sense of this Convention that the state of Texas should separately secede." Seconded by George M. Flournoy, the motion passed 152 to 6. In the next two days the convention delegates worked out a formal ordinance of secession which, unlike those of the other lower South states, called for a popular referendum to resolve the secession question. The idea of submitting the convention's action to a popular vote drew opposition, but a motion to delete that provision was defeated 145 to 29. Antebellum Texans held a referendum on joining the Union in 1845, and most insisted on holding another to ratify leaving the Union in 1861. Besides, Governor Houston and the legislature had asked for such a referendum, and a popular vote would end all doubt about the legality of secession. Just after 11:00 A.M. on February 1, with Governor Houston in attendance, the convention met to take a final vote on the ordinance of secession. It was a roll-call vote done in alphabetical order. When it was over, 166 had voted for secession and 8 against. The most outspoken of those voting against was James W. Throckmorton of Collin County, who was later a Confederate general and a Reconstructionqv-era governor of Texas.
After voting for secession the convention formed a committee on public safety, sent seven delegates to Montgomery, Alabama, to participate in the establishment of the Confederate States of America, and adjourned on February 4 to await the popular vote. Before the popular vote, the convention's committee on public safety used the power given it by the convention to authorize the seizure of all federal property in Texas. That included the arsenal at San Antonio. The committee order forced the evacuation of the almost 3,000 federal troops in Texas. The seizure of the San Antonio arsenal, the evacuation of federal troops, and the sending of delegates to Montgomery made the secession referendum appear an insignificant afterthought. By a vote of 44,317 to 13,020, Texans ratified secession on February 23, 1861. The Secession Convention reassembled on March 5, declared Texas independent, took further steps to join it to the Confederacy, and reorganized the state's government. In doing this it declared that all current officeholders must swear a loyalty oath to the Confederacy. Sam Houston refused, saying that the actions of the convention after it adjourned in February were illegal. Convention delegates declared the office of governor vacant and instructed Lt. Gov. Edward Clarkqv to assume the office of governor. On March 23 the convention adjourned for the last time, having taken Texas out of the Union, allied it with the Confederacy, and ended the political career of its most prominent citizen. See also ANTEBELLUM TEXAS, CIVIL WAR.
BIBLIOGRAPHY: Walter L. Buenger, Secession and the Union in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984). Anna Irene Sandbo, "The First Session of the Secession Convention of Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 18 (October 1914). E. W. Winkler, ed., Journal of the Secession Convention of Texas (Austin, 1912). Ralph A. Wooster, The Secession Conventions of the South (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962; rpt., Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1976).

[ole]

Texans were, and apprarently still are, a bit strange. Bless their hearts. (Secret code.) It is a whole 'nother country encapsulated in a nation, however unwillingly.

I'm awaiting the time when it exercises its option do divide into five states. Fat chance, but it is an interesting subject. How would it divide?

[K Hale]

If it did, if I had to pick out five distinct regions of the state, I am guessing it would be north Texas, east Texas, west Texas, and south Texas, with Austin encapsulated within, like the Vatican.

[ole]

Dreamer!

Ole

[K Hale]

Now that said, I would NEVER vote for this. My own city can't even run itself, and we'd probably be the capital of something.

[Nathanb1]

Why not just cut it to four?

texas.jpg

[1SGDan]

When I was in west Texas the border patrol there said there was a movement afoot to give west Texas back to the Indians. Why would you wait?

[Nathanb1]

Does anybody remember the idiots out at Ft. Davis who declared themselves the "Republic of Texas" and took over some property? I had about 120 4-Hers on the other side of the mountain at Prude Ranch at the time. Frankly, I thought they could have it, just let us get the heck outta Dodge.

[K Hale]

Why not just cut it to four?

Attachment 1541

Why does Abilene get a little star-shaped state all to itself?

[Nathanb1]

Why does Abilene get a little star-shaped state all to itself?

Actually, I think that's Lubbock.

[K Hale]

Does anybody remember the idiots out at Ft. Davis who declared themselves the "Republic of Texas" and took over some property? I had about 120 4-Hers on the other side of the mountain at Prude Ranch at the time. Frankly, I thought they could have it, just let us get the heck outta Dodge.

Good Lord, when was this? That sounds like it could have gone Waco real fast.

[K Hale]

Actually, I think that's Lubbock.

Well, that REALLY begs the question...

[Nathanb1]

Think of it more as "No one wants to live there."

[K Hale]

So they wouldn't need much space? I see...

[Nathanb1]

So they wouldn't need much space? I see...

Yeah....just enough for Llano Estacado winery and one college campus.