Ooooo! I haven't seen this before. Will devote some time to perusing it. Thanks for finding!
While looking up something about the battle of Aldie, I stumbled on this well-written and unbiased account of Stuart's famous ride during the Gettysburg campaign that was published in Gettysburg magazine
http://www.gdg.org/Research/Authored...tuartRide.html
Brgds,
Pat
Very good article, prroh! I enjoyed it and think some of the folks who are so critical of Stuart might benefit from reading it and considering the points it makes (particularly regarding the wagons and the grain for the horses). What if he had NOT captured those wagons? Might his horses have been unable to make it to Gettysburg as quickly as they did? That's rough country between the Potomac and Gettysburg...and at the pace he was setting, the grain may have been the difference between arriving in time for the fight on July 3rd and missing it entirely.
The subject came up in chat last night and that's the exact point I made. People who are used to stopping for 5min at a gas station don't understand what it took to keep cavalry and artillery on the march. Keeping the wagons with their load of grain kept Stuart from having to spend hours stopping to graze.
Man, that font is hard to read. I need a cold compress for my eyes now...
Aside from that, this is a very good piece. In sum, the whole idea of the ride was the result of overconfidence on both Stuart's and Lee's part about what could reasonably be accomplished in this situation. There were basically two possible outcomes of the plan: either A) everything would go perfectly, or B) it would be a total disaster. There really was little chance for anything in between. So, when the wheels came off less than one day into the expedition, it was basically doomed.
The trip should really not have been undertaken at all. Once it was, however, and Stuart was faced with a domino-row of choices, none of them very good, there's plenty of coulda-woulda-shoulda that can be leveled about one choice or another, but how much of that is grounded in hindsight?
K Hale: A fair amount (is hindsight).
One of the great problems I personally have with judging Stuart's performance is that I believe Stuart erred in the direction of his natural tendancies - and its hard to fault a man for feeling confident in what he does well at.
But I believe Stuart did not act as a man under a time crunch or whose presence was urgently necessary (after having read the essay linked in the original post and Wittenburg's well titled book).
Not to say he dawdled, but I do not get the impression that he moved with all the speed he could (subject to the weaknesses of his horses) to link back up either.
The wagons may have contained very valuable food for the horses, but they also did cause something of an impediment, making them a rather mixed blessing.
I do not believe Stuart can be held responsible for what happened in his absence, though going with what Lee suggested to Davis (link below) on the North Carolina regiments and pressing it (form the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th North Carolina cavalry regiments into a brigade, assign that brigade to the colonel of the 1st, and find somewhere else for Robertson: ) might have been a good idea, as it would keep Robertson's ineptitude out of the way.
http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/...tent=/026/1088
However, that's not really related to his ride, just thinking of what areas Stuart could have done better.
By and large, Stuart did his best. Had the Federal opposition been less vigorous (effective may not be a good word), it may have been enough to make a difference in terms of timeliness.
Though Duty's face is stern, her path is best:
They sweetly sleep who die upon her breast.
Henry Abbey, "The Roman Sentinel"
I ask a simple question.....Who knows if Stuart being there would have made difference? He may not have stopped the two armies form running into each other that faithful day in July. He may not have had the information Lee needed to make an informed decision on Day One at Gettysburg as in history. Stuart only crime was out being where he should have been as the Gettysburg campaign began beyond that its only speculations and wishful thinking.
A thought...
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
Well, Stuart and three veteran cavalry brigades would have been a valuable asset for Lee. Whether or not Lee would be able to take advantage of that asset is another story, but him being missing was like playing chess without all the pieces.
I would think similar circumstances would have arisen on day 1, but Stuart being present on July 2 (had Stuart arrived late on day 1 or even the day before instead of late on day 2) could cause many desirable things.
For instance, it would make taking advantage of Longstreet's and Hill's breakthroughs much easier - sending Stuart up with Anderson to pulverize the Union center could have shattered the spine of the Army of the Potomac.
Speculation? Of course. But I think it rests on solid enough foundations to merit consideration.
Though Duty's face is stern, her path is best:
They sweetly sleep who die upon her breast.
Henry Abbey, "The Roman Sentinel"
Ellensar, I agree...those missing pieces of the puzzle at Gettysburg (Jackson's death, Stuart's absence on Days 1 and 2) are part of what make that battle so tantalizing to those of us who like to analyze and "what if". Simple study of everything that had taken place up to that point make it impossible to ignore the possibilities--unless Ole simply orders us to do so![]()
It is indeed what makes Gettysburg so interesting. No other battle in the war has so much room for "What if we adjusted this situation and added this general instead of the other one?"
I suppose one could do it with say, Shiloh, but somehow Shiloh fails to inspire such interest. Maybe its that there's less room to change - one unseasoned brigade commander vs. another unseasoned brigade commander is six of one, half a dozen the other.
But Jackson vs. Ewell will be debated as long as there are Civil War historians.
Stuart's ride is another such issue. Even if no blame is given to him, we'll always wonder how him being present would make a difference.
Though Duty's face is stern, her path is best:
They sweetly sleep who die upon her breast.
Henry Abbey, "The Roman Sentinel"
I don't know that much about the exact situation there on day 2, so let me just say this and you tell me how it would have related to day 2: Not one time in the whole war did Stuart attack entrenched infantry with his cavalry (nor was he ever ordered to). And he was specifically outspoken against such a thing.
Not so much moved faster as moved better is the real problem, my appologies to Stuart's ghost for confusing the two. To clarify: Stuart seems to have felt he could fit in dealing with things that happened to be in the way and still meet up in time.Originally Posted by K Hale
For instance, to quote from Plenty of Blame to Go Around: "Had Stuart not lost several hours battling the 1st Delaware Cavalry and chasing fugitives, he might have caught up with Ewell's infantry near York."
Now, the 1st Delaware deserves credit for the fight (the idiotic major commanding the battalion initiated it, not Stuart), but Stuart still seems to have spent a few hours too many on the affair (given the circumstances). Could he have done better? I would hope so. That less than a hundred men could tie up over five thousand for several hours (a performance also done with marginally better odds by the 11th New York earlier in Stuart's ride) does not reflect well on Stuart.
And thank you for the welcome back.
If Stuart and his men had been able to support McLaws's attack (the infantry smashing Sickles's corps as historically and the cavalry thundering in pursuit of the disorganized fragments), it would have been possible for Lee to have managed to - as stated - break the spine of the Army of the Potomac. It wouldn't be necessary to attack fortified infantry, but having three veteran cavalry brigades "to keep the scare up" would make it a lot harder for the Army of the Potomac to reform and patch its lines up.I don't know that much about the exact situation there on day 2, so let me just say this and you tell me how it would have related to day 2: Not one time in the whole war did Stuart attack entrenched infantry with his cavalry (nor was he ever ordered to). And he was specifically outspoken against such a thing.
Similarly (and elsewhere on the field), a brigade of cavalry skirmishing instead of Posey's brigade of infantry would free up the veteran Missisippians to help Wright crack the center. Or you could put it where historically the Stonewall Brigade was tied up and release that. Heck, if you don't mind splitting up Stuart's command, you could do both.
Or you could have Stuart's men exploit the gap between Hancock's and Sickles's lines (after Sickles has moved out of position).
No self respecting cavalry officer could fail to use having a flank to fall on.
Though Duty's face is stern, her path is best:
They sweetly sleep who die upon her breast.
Henry Abbey, "The Roman Sentinel"
I am not sure what you mean here. The things that happened to be in the way were in the way, and he had to deal with them no matter how he felt about it. I am sure he would rather they had NOT been in the way. But, I do think the whole expedition was the result of overconfidence on Stuart's, Lee's, and Longstreet's part (since all of them signed off on it) with too much expected to be accomplished, and Stuart being Stuart did try to accomplish everything he was supposed to do. Which he did do, sooner or later, if you read the orders (and I know you have).
Well, sure, but... what other option did he have other than to fight what was in front of him? He can't exactly go around without losing even more time.For instance, to quote from Plenty of Blame to Go Around: "Had Stuart not lost several hours battling the 1st Delaware Cavalry and chasing fugitives, he might have caught up with Ewell's infantry near York."
I suppose he could have left 100 of his own men to deal with the 100 Delawareans and sent the rest on. Would that have made more sense than keeping the command together in enemy territory until the battle and its aftermath were dealt with?Now, the 1st Delaware deserves credit for the fight (the idiotic major commanding the battalion initiated it, not Stuart), but Stuart still seems to have spent a few hours too many on the affair (given the circumstances). Could he have done better? I would hope so. That less than a hundred men could tie up over five thousand for several hours (a performance also done with marginally better odds by the 11th New York earlier in Stuart's ride) does not reflect well on Stuart.
Yes, and had the battle taken place even a day later it would mean much less.Originally Posted by K Hale
The problem is that while yes, he had to take care of them, spending several hours (a half day for each the 11th New York and the 1st Delaware, so a total of a full day's riding - say thirty miles) taking care of less than a regiment when he has (by Federal standards) a good sized division of cavalry with him is...I hate, hate, hate to use the word, but I can't think of a better - sloppy.
No matter how plucky the 95 odd horsemen of the 1st Delaware were, there should have been no possible way for them to cost Stuart "from ten to twelve hours, or to be more precise from five or six o'clock when they halted that afternoon, till four or five o'clock the next morning when they resumed the march" (stated by General Wilson, quoted by Wittenburg and Petruzzi in Plenty of Blame to go Around) as they claimed.
No possible argument on Stuart fulfilling his orders, subject to the failure on the (too optimistic to begin with, so I'm only noting this for completeness) timetable part. Stuart may or may not have been as efficient as he could have been. If this was "joyriding", its like Longstreet sulking - a little more joyriding would have won the Confederacy the campaign.
It in fact speaks very well of Stuart that other than the delays caused by the Federal cavalry (the two units mentioned above and having to fight Kilpatrick at Hanover), he probably would have done just fine - however, I cannot help but think that the first two do not reflect well on him.
Still, he did his best, and several others (Mosby, say) caused problems that would make his task significantly more difficult, so by and large he merits a favorable report.
Detach a regiment or two, order them to catch up as soon as they can.Well, sure, but... what other option did he have other than to fight what was in front of him? He can't exactly go around without losing even more time.
The 11th New York had 82 men charging (not larger than the 1st Delaware force, my memory apparently failed me on the post stating such) and the 1st Delaware 95. That it would take five thousand men several hours to deal with them (the fight, prisoners, casualties...) is appaling.
If he was concerned about the consequences of detaching part of his command, no. If he was concerned about the amount of time it would take, yes.I suppose he could have left 100 of his own men to deal with the 100 Delawareans and sent the rest on. Would that have made more sense than keeping the command together in enemy territory until the battle and its aftermath were dealt with?
I believe Stuart picked the wrong priority, if that is how he thought of it (and I think you put it in the terms he undoubtedly weighed it in).
The skirmish itself took less than an hour. Which means if Stuart lost "several hours", then the "chasing fugitives" half of things must have consumed quite some time. Time that could have been spent more profitably on almost anything, including simple rest.
Last edited by Elennsar; 03-14-2010 at 01:29 AM.
Though Duty's face is stern, her path is best:
They sweetly sleep who die upon her breast.
Henry Abbey, "The Roman Sentinel"
According to Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Stuart purused "the fugitives for a long distance on the Baltimore road" (quoted from Stuart's report) between the end of the skirmish and his cavalry leisurely (my word choice) moved to Union Mills.Originally Posted by Prroh
Stuart paroled the prisoners the next morning.How do you know that his men didn't get some rest and horses fed and watered while a handful of officers saw to the paroles? All five thousand troopers weren't involved.
As for moving to Union Mills: "(Stuart) did not indicate that it was time to leave until almost midnight. By this late hour a large crowd and had gathered in the hope of catching a glimpse of the famous cavalrymen. ...According to local lore, after he was informed of the disposition of of his column, which was strung along the road to Union Mills..."
Stuart refers to obtaining "a full supply of forage" ("but the delay and difficulty of procuring it kept many of the men up all night"), but that does not appear to have been a
Wittenburg and Petruzzi state "The delay engenderd by the clash at Westminster had prevented Stuart from crossing into Pennsylvania one day earlier." and that Stuart "lost several hours battling the 1st Delaware cavalry and chasing fugitives" if most of that time was spent resting and taking care of the horses.
Indeed.Agreed, he did lose a day due to these two fights but the big lose of time was backtracking a day and a half to the Potomac, due to Mosby's bum intel.
However, Stuart must be held responsible for his response to those two fights in a way that he cannot be for being misinformed by Mosby - Mosby blew that one, not Stuart.
All of this being said, one thing Stuart ought to be praised for - having his command be more or less in good shape when he caught up with Lee. Sure, they were tired and their horses looking more like meals on hooves than mounts, but he took care of his forces. Given the hardships lesser men (Morgan, Wheeler) inflicted on their troops when going a-raiding, clearly this was the result of care on the part of Stuart and his subordinates.
Though Duty's face is stern, her path is best:
They sweetly sleep who die upon her breast.
Henry Abbey, "The Roman Sentinel"
I just looked up Westminster in Plenty of Blame. Stuart's force was led that day (6/29) by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Virginia, who seem to have done all of the fighting with the 1st Delaware. The clash began at about 5pm and seems to have lasted an hour or two, maybe? I can't tell. After this, some elements did pursue the fugitives, while the rest foraged in the town. As Stuart put it, "Here, for the first time since leaving Rector's Cross-Roads, we obtained a full supply of forage, but the delay and difficulty of procuring it kept many of the men up all night."
Stuart also had a meeting with the three brigade leaders and cared for his casualties ("Dead and wounded men were in the streets of Westminster where they fell in the heat of combat," as Plenty of Blame put it). The cavalry started ahead towards Union Mills some time in the evening and Stuart left at midnight. The van arrived at Union Mills at 10pm on June 29 and Stuart showed up "before daylight" on June 30. Breakfast was eaten with the friendly Shrivers, songs were sung, the Delaware prisoners were paroled, and Stuart set off for Hanover and the encounter with Kilpatrick.
The fighting didn't take up that much time, it was the aftermath and the acquiring of forage. Part of the cavalry seems to have left Westminster almost right away, since they got to Union Mills five hours after the battle began at Westminster. They continued to trickle in during the night with Stuart among the last to arrive at daylight. I don't see time wasted here, just another night with people riding all night long.
No, he ate breakfast, sang a few songs, and then recruited the Shrivers' teenage son as a guide. He could not have been there very long because by 9am they were well on the way to Hanover; that is the time on a note Fitz Lee sent to Stuart saying that he had spotted elements of Kilpatrick's cavalry on their way to intercept Stuart at Hanover.
In a world where meeting up with the main army is not important (sooner is better but not specifically necessary), Stuart did fine in terms of how much time he spent - it would take stronger evidence than I have that he "dawdled", to use the best word I can think of for deliberate sluggishness.Originally Posted by K Hale
Howeer, his orders state: "In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions &c." My emphasis. Stuart is obligated to meet up with the main army as well as the "raiding", and the affairs with the 11th New York and 1st Delaware eat up valuable time to little use. Ironically the "raiding" seems not to have done so, contrary to the traditional hostile portrayal (sure it used up time, but it was part of what Stuart was directed to do and ignoring it to link up with Ewell would just be choosing what part of his orders to follow, which is inappropriate).
Clearly time is being spent other than the time for acquiring forage (which would have been necessary whether there was any such battalion as the 1st Delaware Cavalry or not, so I cannot believe it is being counted against Stuart here by the authors when refering to the Delawareans holding Stuart up for "several hours") - and moving leisurely to Union Mills is not the work of someone eager to cover as much ground as possible before resting for the night, though it would make sense if time wasn't an issue (furthering my feeling that Stuart did not consider it vital - important, but not vital).
The question is, how could a "brief but stubborn" fight (Major McClellan's words) and its aftermath take up "several hours"?
The incident is refered to as to the credit of the Federal cavalry rather than blaming Stuart in the Conclusion to Plenty of Blame to Go Around, which does not help clarify matters.
Something went wrong here, and responsibility on the Confederate side for the decisions made (good, bad, and best available) rests on the shoulders of Stuart.
Though Duty's face is stern, her path is best:
They sweetly sleep who die upon her breast.
Henry Abbey, "The Roman Sentinel"
And he did move on. The fight at Westminster began at 5pm; by 10pm Stuart's people were reaching Union Mills. Some of them had to stay in Westminster to deal with the exigencies there (casualties, forage), but it can't be said that he did not keep the main body moving. You're making it sound like the whole 4,000-some-odd force hung around Westminster for hours, but that isn't what happened.
Nobody moved leisurely. If the fight started at 5pm and took -- I don't know -- let's say an hour and a half, then it's over by 6:30pm. While some pursue fugitives, others gather forage, which according to Stuart took all night. Also in the mix is caring for the wounded and burying the dead. At some point people have to eat, thousands of horses have to be fed and watered, and Stuart has a meeting with the three brigade leaders. In spite of this, the van reaches Union Mills by 10pm. As people arrived, they set up camp and rested for the night -- AT Union Mills. And then Stuart showed up at daylight. I suppose he may have slept a couple of hours at some point either before leaving Westminster or by stopping somewhere on the road, but nobody "rested for the night" until they got to Union Mills. For example, Fitz Lee arrived at 2am, and was offered a bed but instead camped an apple orchard, and Stuart did not sleep at all after reaching there a few hours later. Stuart hardly slept at any point on the entire campaign.Clearly time is being spent other than the time for acquiring forage (which would have been necessary whether there was any such battalion as the 1st Delaware Cavalry or not, so I cannot believe it is being counted against Stuart here by the authors when refering to the Delawareans holding Stuart up for "several hours") - and moving leisurely to Union Mills is not the work of someone eager to cover as much ground as possible before resting for the night
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