Robert E. Lee, in fact and legend

[nbforrest]

I think the idea that Lee was a "hands off" superior, while grounded in some truth, is exaggerated. In any event, he was able to hammer out better cooperation between corps and division commanders, in general. Certainly there were notable lapses, but he didn't seem to have the same problems trying to successfully coordinate his subordinates as his opponents did, including Grant.

Respectfully

[samgrant]

One of Lee's faults was that some of his orders were not as specific as they should have been, perhaps leading subordinates to at times go off on their own way (Stewart?), or to be hesitant and indecisive (Ewell?).

[unionblue]

Mattew Mckeon,

And yet John F. Kennedy and his administration is being rather harshly reexamined and this only 43 years after his death.

Whereas Robert E. Lee seems to have held a rather lofty and untouchable place in our history, even after 145 years.

While I consider him a great man and a great soldier, I do not consider him perfect by any means, any more than I consider my heroes Lincoln and Grant perfect.

The British General Liddal Hart considered Lee a good tactical commander, but a poor strategic one while considering Grant good, if not superior in both areas. It seems Lee could fight the battles, but could not win the war. And that was a mighty part of his problem, that he was such a good man that could win battles that the entire Confederacy placed the burden of winning on his shoulders alone. They thought he could perform miracles, without supplies, men, arms and support because he had become the symbol of the South.

That reminds me that George Washington lost most of his battles and yet did win the war. Who was the better general? The one that could deliver the overall strategic goal of the war? Or merely win battles at the theater level?

Sincerely,
Unionblue

[trice]

I think the idea that Lee was a "hands off" superior, while grounded in some truth, is exaggerated. In any event, he was able to hammer out better cooperation between corps and division commanders, in general. Certainly there were notable lapses, but he didn't seem to have the same problems trying to successfully coordinate his subordinates as his opponents did, including Grant.

Early in the war, Lee had a very "hands off" leadership style. But in the first year he commanded the ANV, he had Jackson, Longstreet, and Stuart to run his major commands. Lee was very adroit at maneuvering people he didn't want out of his command in those days, and used much of his leadership in seeing that the quarrels among his major subordinates (Jackson and anybody, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, etc.) didn't get out of hand.

By May 1864, Jackson and Stuart were dead, with Longstreet seriously wounded. The only Corps level commander of that ability who arose was Hampton for the cavalry (and that took a month or so to work out). Lee, faced with a lesser level of subordinates, suddenly became a very hands-on manager and continued so throughout the rest of the war.

Another factor that affects all this is the shortage of trained officers. Lee got by with a staff that was miniscule by 1860 standards and laughable by the standards that would develop a few years later, when everything Prussian was copied by the world's militaries after the Franco-Prussian War. Lee, it seems, preferred to use qualified officers as combat commanders and, given the shortage he had and the results he got early on, it is easy to see the advantage he gained.

But there was a cost to that, and it would show up in a long war. As casualties removed the Jacksons, the Longstreets, and the Stuarts, Lee's staff buckled under the strain. Ewell and A. P. Hill together could not handle forces the way Jackson could, nor manage the details of them as organizations.

For example, there is a point in 1864, just before the battle of Cold Harbor, when Grant/Meade has an opening to get around the Rebel right (south) flank. Sheridan has seized a crucial crossroads, Smith's reinforced corps has arrived, and the way to Richmond is open for a Union push.

The only available force that can close the gap is Breckinridge's 5,000 -- newly arrived from victory in the Valley at New Market. Lee's staff has lost track of them and can't get the order to them. Messengers can't find them. So Robert E. Lee, commanding general, rides out across the country to find them. He does. They are sitting quietly, the troops eating, awaiting orders. Lee gets them moving, they arrive just in time to block the route and allow Lee to shift more troops down that way. Some 48 hours more of tough fighting and Union blunders and we see the Cold Harbor assault with 7,000 Union casualties -- but if that thrust had been pushed when it should, the Union would have been in Richmond and Lee's ANV isolated to the north of it.

Another aspect of all this is that Lee pushed what would be major staff functions downline to combat commanders. For example, the problem in the Gettysburg Campaign isn't that Stuart left Lee without cavalry. Lee had 4 brigades available while Stuart took the other 3 with him. The problem is that Stuart was in effect Lee's intel chief as well as his cavalry commander. With Stuart and Hampton away, no one at Lee's HQ seemed to take charge of the functions and the general was left in the dark. To make things worse, Beverly Robertson was senior cavalry general in their absence.

Robertson, commanding the two best of the four brigades Lee had with him, was given some of the clearest orders you will ever see by Stuart. He failed to follow them. No one at Lee's HQ noticed for 2 or 3 days, and suddenly there was the AoP, north of the Potomac and moving fast, and Lee with no advance notice. That is how Lee ends up with 5 of his 7 cavalry brigades out of touch when the battle begins on July 1.

Overall, I think Lee was a very good general. If placed in command of a Union force, as Winfield Scott wanted in 1861, he probably would have carved up the Confederacy by 1863 or 1864, IMHO. But then he would have had the advantage of greater resources in men, material, organization, etc. at his command -- and Lee fighting for the Union means VA is not in the Confederacy. If he'd had the trained men available, his staffs might have been more like George Thomas or Longstreet or Grant or Sherman. He was from the same common background, and had been a student of Napoleon -- whose staffs were the best of their time.

Regards,
Tim

[matthew mckeon]

Dear Tim,
Great post, especially about the staff and field functions of the ANV, and Lee's changing style.

Judged by the other major organizations in the war, North and South, how does the ANV stack up in terms of being able to execute plans, deal with emergencies, respond to Lee's directions. Did Lee forge an effective force, by the standards of his war and his peers, North and South?

I'm repeating myself, but Lee's diplomatic skills, both up to Davis and down to his commanders, were a major plus.

[nbforrest]

It seems most criticism leveled at Lee has to do with his generalship, which is only a part of the Lee icon. The other part is his image as a perfect gentlemen (which is probably rather difficult to dispute). That obviously is going to enhance his reputation.
Maybe this is digressing from the thread's purpose, but I absolutely agree with Lee's strategic vision. To me, that seems the only way the South could possibly win.

In any event, the ANV just seemed to function more smoothly than the AOP. Certainly it had its moments, but some of the attempts to coordinate effective actions with the AOP's corps just makes one wince. One of my favorite examples is always Petersburg. Even the lauded Grant could not effectively control the situation (Jerusalem Plank Road? ouch!) An interesting comparison to say, to the smaller forces Lee sent out, often made up of brigades from more than one division under a single commander.

Respectfully

[trice]

Dear Tim,
Great post, especially about the staff and field functions of the ANV, and Lee's changing style.

Thanks.

Judged by the other major organizations in the war, North and South, how does the ANV stack up in terms of being able to execute plans, deal with emergencies, respond to Lee's directions. Did Lee forge an effective force, by the standards of his war and his peers, North and South?

The ANV at its peak was as good as any army formed in the Civil War, and was pretty clearly the best of the major Confederate armies. There was abook about 10 years or so back called "Two Great Rebel Armies" that compared the Johnston/Bragg/Johnston/Hood Army of Tennessee to the Lee's ANV. You name the category, the ANV comes out ahead.

One large part of that was the number of VMI grads in the ANV. Lee had a greater core of men with actual professional backgrounds and training than any other Rebel force. His artillery and equipment was also usually better, due to his position in front of Richmond.

By 1865, you can make a case the Federals were superior, at least in the sense that they had very large forces of very good, experienced, well-equipped troops with very good leaders (Grant, Meade, Sherman, Sheridan, etc.) They had superior supply and equipment, better supply arrangements, etc.

Some forces have to be examined carefully. For example, Sherman culled his force before leaving Atlanta in 1864. Of the 60000 men, almost all had enlisted in 1861 or 1862 according to one study. Raw recruits, less-experienced units, the sick and the weak were sent back to Thomas in TN -- which might account for some of that general's difficulties against Hood. Sherman took a picked force across GA and the Carolinas.

But to the end, Lee's ANV was dangerous. Pickett gave Sheridan and Custer everything they could handle on the day before Five Forks, and Custer's pursuit after that battle was stymied by a tough rearguard (by one of the Lee boys). Hancock's II Corps got chopped up pretty good by A. P. Hill in the Fall of 1864.

I'm repeating myself, but Lee's diplomatic skills, both up to Davis and down to his commanders, were a major plus.

Yes. Lee generally knew how to play that game well. From his Old Army days he had the habit of command and the prestige of success with most of those he faced; after Seven Days he had the presence of victory.

Regards,
Tim

[matthew mckeon]

My own opinion is that Lee created a highly effective force.

Another criticism of Lee was (1) his forward defense of Virginia, instead of the option of drawing Union armies into the Southern interior and confronting them far from sources of supply and with threatened communications, as the Americans did to General Burgoyne in the Revolution.

(2) Michael Fellman in his bio of Lee(which I didn't care for, but the argument has been made elsewhere) describes Lee as a conventional military officer, who fought conventionally and mistrusted "irregular" forces and unconventional tactics. If he had made more use of these types of partisans and other methods, he would have had more success.

[larry_cockerham]

I'm afraid his stubborness and adherence to traditional tactics at Gettysburg sacrificed a lot of good men. Longstreet and others tried to tell him...

[nbforrest]

There wasn't anything "traditional" about Lee's tactics on July 3. They were the current tactics circa 1863. Doesn't mean they were great tactics, but at that stage of development they were the tactics of the day.

Respectfully