Robert E. Lee, in fact and legend

[matthew mckeon]

For me, one of the most fascinating characters of the Civil War was Robert E. Lee, IMO, the greatest Confederate. Because he wrote so little after the war, he has an enigmatic quality. At the surrender Grant remembers he could tell nothing about Lee's feelings from his manner or facial expression. "He was a man of much dignity." Grant concludes, a little lamely.

Lee was the great icon of what is loosely called "The Lost Cause" ideology, as the perfect Christian warrior, great in battle, greater in defeat, George Washington without the stony inhumanity.

Recently, Lee's reputation has come under fire, his personality probed, his beliefs on slavery and secession examined, and his generalship criticized.

What are peoples' opinions of Lee the man, the general, his beliefs about slavery, secession, and how to win the war?

[ole]

Lee, as THE personification of the confederacy, will necessarily be examined ad nauseum. I believe he was simply a good man caught in a bad situation. He did his best, which was admirable, in a hopeless situation.

I would prefer that his character remain as legend has it. I find no pleasure in discovering flaws -- which he certainly had, being human. He earned his place in history. I'd say, let him have it.

Just a thought.
Ole

[samgrant]

Well, he made mistakes (see Gettysburg), but did a fine job mostly otherwise, out-generalling most of those thrown against him, and even held Grant pretty much to a stalemate till the inevitable dissolution of his army.

I see him as a great soldier/general, not as an idol or a saint.

[larry_cockerham]

Robert Edward Lee stands as an icon in the South, not for being a great general, but for his stand to risk his life and honor for something in which he believed, his home state of Virginia. A good engineer, an educator, and a leader of men. He did it all, with dignity.

[unionblue]

And yet...,

He was a man before he was an icon. He was not considered an icon at times, even when he was much admired as a General leading his army.

'Granny Lee' 'King of Spades' and other names were first attached to him when he first took command of the ANV. He was even severly critizied for his support of enlisting slaves as soldiers.

In some ways, Lee might be viewed having the same type of 'lucky' legacy as President John Kennedy. They were both involved in tragic events and these events have colored our perception of them. With Kennedy, it was his assasination. With Lee, it was the Civil War.

It is sometimes interesting to dwell on the idea of how we would view these men today if Kennedy has finished out his first term or if there had been no war for Lee to participate in.

The Civil War was like that with many of the soldiers in the ranks, taking ordinary men from many different occupations and walks of life and putting them into extraordinary events making them do amazing things they would have never even contemplated in their previous lives.

Timing has a lot to do with becoming a hero or an icon.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

[lrd89]

Lee was a great American who can be admired as a hero by all Americans, north and south. He was not perfect but he was a very good general.

[matthew mckeon]

Dear Neil,

Kennedy was idolized because of his attractive personality, charisma, and above all, his unrealized potential. His death was a tragedy because of what might of been.

Lee got the chance that Kennedy didn't. The middle aged engineering officer is revealed as a great general. His potential is realized. While he was involved in tragic events, his life isn't really a tragedy. Kennedy was once asked if he was happy as president. He said, "I am happy as the Greeks defined it; pursuing excellence." Lee, as the Greeks defined it, was happy.

In fact, Lee makes a Classical Greek hero. He makes a fatal choice. He demonstrates excellence, greatness and gains glory and honor. You can even consider Pickett's Charge as hubris.

[matthew mckeon]

Leaving aside Lee as mythic figure. I was thinking about his actual leadership style. What were his strengths and weaknesses? A received wisdom is that he gave his subordinates too much leeway, which played him false at Gettysburg.

As I have posted elsewhere, I think one of Lee's greatest achievements was to weld together his generals into a team. Contrast him with the turmoil in the leadership of the Army of Tennessee, or the Army of the Potomac. Certainly between Longstreet, D.H. Hill, Jackson Stuart Early and the rest, he had some abrasive followers!

Both the AoT and the AoP lost many battles, while Lee supplied victories, but that's not his secret: he still commanded respect and loyalty when things turned bad.

[nbforrest]

I think the idea that Lee was a "hands off" superior, while grounded in some truth, is exaggerated. In any event, he was able to hammer out better cooperation between corps and division commanders, in general. Certainly there were notable lapses, but he didn't seem to have the same problems trying to successfully coordinate his subordinates as his opponents did, including Grant.

Respectfully

[samgrant]

One of Lee's faults was that some of his orders were not as specific as they should have been, perhaps leading subordinates to at times go off on their own way (Stewart?), or to be hesitant and indecisive (Ewell?).

[unionblue]

Mattew Mckeon,

And yet John F. Kennedy and his administration is being rather harshly reexamined and this only 43 years after his death.

Whereas Robert E. Lee seems to have held a rather lofty and untouchable place in our history, even after 145 years.

While I consider him a great man and a great soldier, I do not consider him perfect by any means, any more than I consider my heroes Lincoln and Grant perfect.

The British General Liddal Hart considered Lee a good tactical commander, but a poor strategic one while considering Grant good, if not superior in both areas. It seems Lee could fight the battles, but could not win the war. And that was a mighty part of his problem, that he was such a good man that could win battles that the entire Confederacy placed the burden of winning on his shoulders alone. They thought he could perform miracles, without supplies, men, arms and support because he had become the symbol of the South.

That reminds me that George Washington lost most of his battles and yet did win the war. Who was the better general? The one that could deliver the overall strategic goal of the war? Or merely win battles at the theater level?

Sincerely,
Unionblue

[trice]

I think the idea that Lee was a "hands off" superior, while grounded in some truth, is exaggerated. In any event, he was able to hammer out better cooperation between corps and division commanders, in general. Certainly there were notable lapses, but he didn't seem to have the same problems trying to successfully coordinate his subordinates as his opponents did, including Grant.

Early in the war, Lee had a very "hands off" leadership style. But in the first year he commanded the ANV, he had Jackson, Longstreet, and Stuart to run his major commands. Lee was very adroit at maneuvering people he didn't want out of his command in those days, and used much of his leadership in seeing that the quarrels among his major subordinates (Jackson and anybody, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, etc.) didn't get out of hand.

By May 1864, Jackson and Stuart were dead, with Longstreet seriously wounded. The only Corps level commander of that ability who arose was Hampton for the cavalry (and that took a month or so to work out). Lee, faced with a lesser level of subordinates, suddenly became a very hands-on manager and continued so throughout the rest of the war.

Another factor that affects all this is the shortage of trained officers. Lee got by with a staff that was miniscule by 1860 standards and laughable by the standards that would develop a few years later, when everything Prussian was copied by the world's militaries after the Franco-Prussian War. Lee, it seems, preferred to use qualified officers as combat commanders and, given the shortage he had and the results he got early on, it is easy to see the advantage he gained.

But there was a cost to that, and it would show up in a long war. As casualties removed the Jacksons, the Longstreets, and the Stuarts, Lee's staff buckled under the strain. Ewell and A. P. Hill together could not handle forces the way Jackson could, nor manage the details of them as organizations.

For example, there is a point in 1864, just before the battle of Cold Harbor, when Grant/Meade has an opening to get around the Rebel right (south) flank. Sheridan has seized a crucial crossroads, Smith's reinforced corps has arrived, and the way to Richmond is open for a Union push.

The only available force that can close the gap is Breckinridge's 5,000 -- newly arrived from victory in the Valley at New Market. Lee's staff has lost track of them and can't get the order to them. Messengers can't find them. So Robert E. Lee, commanding general, rides out across the country to find them. He does. They are sitting quietly, the troops eating, awaiting orders. Lee gets them moving, they arrive just in time to block the route and allow Lee to shift more troops down that way. Some 48 hours more of tough fighting and Union blunders and we see the Cold Harbor assault with 7,000 Union casualties -- but if that thrust had been pushed when it should, the Union would have been in Richmond and Lee's ANV isolated to the north of it.

Another aspect of all this is that Lee pushed what would be major staff functions downline to combat commanders. For example, the problem in the Gettysburg Campaign isn't that Stuart left Lee without cavalry. Lee had 4 brigades available while Stuart took the other 3 with him. The problem is that Stuart was in effect Lee's intel chief as well as his cavalry commander. With Stuart and Hampton away, no one at Lee's HQ seemed to take charge of the functions and the general was left in the dark. To make things worse, Beverly Robertson was senior cavalry general in their absence.

Robertson, commanding the two best of the four brigades Lee had with him, was given some of the clearest orders you will ever see by Stuart. He failed to follow them. No one at Lee's HQ noticed for 2 or 3 days, and suddenly there was the AoP, north of the Potomac and moving fast, and Lee with no advance notice. That is how Lee ends up with 5 of his 7 cavalry brigades out of touch when the battle begins on July 1.

Overall, I think Lee was a very good general. If placed in command of a Union force, as Winfield Scott wanted in 1861, he probably would have carved up the Confederacy by 1863 or 1864, IMHO. But then he would have had the advantage of greater resources in men, material, organization, etc. at his command -- and Lee fighting for the Union means VA is not in the Confederacy. If he'd had the trained men available, his staffs might have been more like George Thomas or Longstreet or Grant or Sherman. He was from the same common background, and had been a student of Napoleon -- whose staffs were the best of their time.

Regards,
Tim

[matthew mckeon]

Dear Tim,
Great post, especially about the staff and field functions of the ANV, and Lee's changing style.

Judged by the other major organizations in the war, North and South, how does the ANV stack up in terms of being able to execute plans, deal with emergencies, respond to Lee's directions. Did Lee forge an effective force, by the standards of his war and his peers, North and South?

I'm repeating myself, but Lee's diplomatic skills, both up to Davis and down to his commanders, were a major plus.

[nbforrest]

It seems most criticism leveled at Lee has to do with his generalship, which is only a part of the Lee icon. The other part is his image as a perfect gentlemen (which is probably rather difficult to dispute). That obviously is going to enhance his reputation.
Maybe this is digressing from the thread's purpose, but I absolutely agree with Lee's strategic vision. To me, that seems the only way the South could possibly win.

In any event, the ANV just seemed to function more smoothly than the AOP. Certainly it had its moments, but some of the attempts to coordinate effective actions with the AOP's corps just makes one wince. One of my favorite examples is always Petersburg. Even the lauded Grant could not effectively control the situation (Jerusalem Plank Road? ouch!) An interesting comparison to say, to the smaller forces Lee sent out, often made up of brigades from more than one division under a single commander.

Respectfully

[trice]

Dear Tim,
Great post, especially about the staff and field functions of the ANV, and Lee's changing style.

Thanks.

Judged by the other major organizations in the war, North and South, how does the ANV stack up in terms of being able to execute plans, deal with emergencies, respond to Lee's directions. Did Lee forge an effective force, by the standards of his war and his peers, North and South?

The ANV at its peak was as good as any army formed in the Civil War, and was pretty clearly the best of the major Confederate armies. There was abook about 10 years or so back called "Two Great Rebel Armies" that compared the Johnston/Bragg/Johnston/Hood Army of Tennessee to the Lee's ANV. You name the category, the ANV comes out ahead.

One large part of that was the number of VMI grads in the ANV. Lee had a greater core of men with actual professional backgrounds and training than any other Rebel force. His artillery and equipment was also usually better, due to his position in front of Richmond.

By 1865, you can make a case the Federals were superior, at least in the sense that they had very large forces of very good, experienced, well-equipped troops with very good leaders (Grant, Meade, Sherman, Sheridan, etc.) They had superior supply and equipment, better supply arrangements, etc.

Some forces have to be examined carefully. For example, Sherman culled his force before leaving Atlanta in 1864. Of the 60000 men, almost all had enlisted in 1861 or 1862 according to one study. Raw recruits, less-experienced units, the sick and the weak were sent back to Thomas in TN -- which might account for some of that general's difficulties against Hood. Sherman took a picked force across GA and the Carolinas.

But to the end, Lee's ANV was dangerous. Pickett gave Sheridan and Custer everything they could handle on the day before Five Forks, and Custer's pursuit after that battle was stymied by a tough rearguard (by one of the Lee boys). Hancock's II Corps got chopped up pretty good by A. P. Hill in the Fall of 1864.

I'm repeating myself, but Lee's diplomatic skills, both up to Davis and down to his commanders, were a major plus.

Yes. Lee generally knew how to play that game well. From his Old Army days he had the habit of command and the prestige of success with most of those he faced; after Seven Days he had the presence of victory.

Regards,
Tim

[matthew mckeon]

My own opinion is that Lee created a highly effective force.

Another criticism of Lee was (1) his forward defense of Virginia, instead of the option of drawing Union armies into the Southern interior and confronting them far from sources of supply and with threatened communications, as the Americans did to General Burgoyne in the Revolution.

(2) Michael Fellman in his bio of Lee(which I didn't care for, but the argument has been made elsewhere) describes Lee as a conventional military officer, who fought conventionally and mistrusted "irregular" forces and unconventional tactics. If he had made more use of these types of partisans and other methods, he would have had more success.

[larry_cockerham]

I'm afraid his stubborness and adherence to traditional tactics at Gettysburg sacrificed a lot of good men. Longstreet and others tried to tell him...

[nbforrest]

There wasn't anything "traditional" about Lee's tactics on July 3. They were the current tactics circa 1863. Doesn't mean they were great tactics, but at that stage of development they were the tactics of the day.

Respectfully

[Fifth Iowa]

Just saw this online tonight and thought it was hilarious:

http://www.scriptoriumnovum.com/g/lee_secede.jpg

[nbforrest]

Doesn't make much sense considering Lee was so reluctant to leave the Union...wait, I'm historically analyzing a t-shirt! I need to lie down.

Respectfully

[Fifth Iowa]

Doesn't make much sense considering Lee was so reluctant to leave the Union...wait, I'm historically analyzing a t-shirt! I need to lie down.

You're right, it's ironic that a general who mourned the collapse of the Union but remained a patriot, to his state is on the shirt. Historically more accurate might be the phrase "least likely to secede," but that would be inconsistent with his battlefield victories (upon which they are, of course, playing). Outside of the South... and the ranks of civil war aficionados... most people would be hard-pressed to recognize any other Confederate general.

Well, that's enough t-shirt analysis for me too!

[matthew mckeon]

Loved the t shirt!

On another thread, Lee's ideas about secession are being extensively discussed, so I won't go into it here.

Despite his skill as a commander, Lee would eventually be forced to surrender. What could he have done personally as commander of the ANV, or urged the CSA as a whole that would have staved off defeat?

What could he have done differently in the battles he conducted? IMO, his one weakeness as a commander was ordering frontal assaults, which he did at the Seven Days, Gettysburg, and during the Wilderness, never successfully(but correct me). Union generals made similar mistakes at Fredericksburg, Cold Harbor and other, less famous sites.

[milhistbuff1]

Ole,

Re: post 2 of this thread

I don't view examining Lee's faults as taking away from his rightfully earned place in history,quite the opposite. I see it as putting the man as opposed to the myth into that earned niche. I found as a student i related least to those who were presented as "legends". analyzing his mistakes simply shows his humanity.
Respectfully,
Matt

[whitworth]

The romance and flaws of the losing side. Historians did much, not to lay any blame on Lee and his Confederate army.
There are accounts that the ANV was not properly equipped to endure a long campaign in Pennsylvania.
By the time of Lee's move in Pennsylvania, Vicksburg was cut off and surely lost to a siege. An American general would have been seriously questioned in the late 20th Century, if they went into battle with so little fuel for their tanks, as Lee was going into battle with so little forage for his horses and mules.
Perhaps by not faulting Lee, one can retain Lee as a great general, ignore his shortage of supplies, and not conclude that Lee might have thought the Confederacy at the time of Gettysburg, was very capable of losing the war. If one studies the logistics of the Confederate move into Pennsylvania, one might, I think, correctly ask why the Confederacy thought it could win the war.
I think one can suspect that Lee attacked at Gettysburg because his time was running out, not only in Pennsylvania, but in Virginia and thoughout the Confederacy.
Perhaps Lee was thinking that his magnificent infantry could win one, late in the "fourth quarter" , as he truly may have known it was the "fourth quarter" of the war.
Lee fought to the virtual end. He never admitted the war was probably lost until near the very end. And even then, Lee seemed to have difficulties accepting defeat at Appomattox.

[larry_cockerham]

Whitworth, we don't always agree, but this one is pretty much on target. Lee was a man fighting a war that he knew should never have happened.