What if the Confederacy fought a true defensive war?

[MobileBoy]

This is often discussed, but I wonder what others think might have been different.I see casualties possibly being lower and the war maybe ending sooner.If the Confederate forces simply dug in behind entrenchments as they did around Petersburgh wouldn't it become a matter of who had more supplies and bigger guns.A siege war would seem to benefit the North to me but perhaps with no major victories to report the political support for the war would've been significantly altered.Thanks for any responses.

[r_moody]

I don't believe that a purely defensive war was possible in the western theater. Too many miles and the rivers favored the Union's advance. Any entrenched position out west could be easily flanked.

Rick

[matthew mckeon]

If the South went "purely defensive" basically what Lee did in 1864 in the Overland Campaign there are some possible consequences:

1. The casualities would be so great, the North would throw in the towel, Southern independence.


2. The North would make slow, but steady progress, ignore the casualities, and in a massive siege operation capture Richmond in 1862. This would encourage the North to continue the war, and discourage the South.

3. The CS army would retreat before the advancing Union army, across Virginia, nearly to North Carolina, where they would turn on the Union army, which weakened by the need to expend troops to guard its communications, and deep in hostile territory, would be destroyed. Confederate victory in 1862.

4. Or, the battle would be inconclusive, and extended Union occupation of Virginia would discourage the South and weaken its war effort. War lost in 1862-3

[samgrant]

There are some who suggest that the confederates should have adopted the strategy of the armies of the War of Independance and relied on avoiding general battles, while keeping the pressure on by small, targeted engagements, till the "agressor" was too 'worn out' or had lost his politcal/popular backing to continue with the war.

I somewhat agree that this might have been a more productive strategy on the part of the South than that which was implimented. But I cannot suggest that this was the only way for the Rebs to win.

[matthew mckeon]

Washington's strategy: which was forced upon him, afterall he would have preferred to win the battles to hold on to New York City etc., would that have worked in the Civil War?

If the Federal armies seized Virginia early on, they would hold a significant part of CS industry, population and resources. Also for the CSA to maintain itself, it had to demonstrate it could win against the North. Also if Federal armies advanced into the South, after issuing the EP they would be destroying slavery in the areas they controlled and disrupting it in the areas they didn't yet hold. Could the CSA afford to trade "space for time."

If it happened early enough in the war, before the EP, perhaps it could have worked.

[matthew mckeon]

However if the CS armies could move on the "strategic offensive," but the "tactical defensive" that is set up situations where the Yankees are attacking Rebel entrenchments, but in areas of the Rebel's choosing, that would be the most advantageous to the South, a series of Fredericksburgs.

[r_moody]

However if the CS armies could move on the "strategic offensive," but the "tactical defensive" that is set up situations where the Yankees are attacking Rebel entrenchments, but in areas of the Rebel's choosing, that would be the most advantageous to the South, a series of Fredericksburgs.

Or it could have been a series of Vicksburg’s. Everyone in the south thought that Vicksburg was a fortress and invincible. Grant showed them that it wasn’t and could be flanked. There were no entrenched positions in the west that were defendable. The only reason that Fredericksburg happened was that an incompetent general was in charge. It would not have happened if Hancock, Reynolds or Hooker had been in charge. They would have moved to attempt to flank Lee.
A defensive strategy had a fair chance in the east but no chance in the west.

Rick

[richard]

If the command structure of the South had been different and there was accountablity within the AONV along with a workable system of supply and the use of an enginerring corp, which did not exist, then the south may have had a chance in any type of campagne.

The lack of engineers to build roads and draw maps hindered the armys of the South greatly. The lack of command and control on the part of Lee was another thorn in the side of the AONV. With out a means of gleaning good intellange and putting it to good advantage proved to be a major error for Lee. Any type of war cannot be expected to be won without these elements.

[whitworth]

The arrogance of the Confederate leadership would never permit the army to fight a true defensive war.
Georgia Governor Joe Brown was not very happy when Robert E. Lee pulled troops from defending the barrier islands, early in the war.
The Confederacy had too many institutional and industrial vulnerabilities to defend its "territory."
Unfortunately, the Confederacy never anticipated that the United States would have the size army and the logistical supplies to invade and control every important state in the Confederacy.

[Fifth Iowa]

I agree with the general sentiment here that the Confederates could not have defended their strongpoints/line in the Western theater. However, in individual engagements it is a given that the person holding the defensive position can normally inflict greater casualties on their attackers than they experience themselves. Smaller forces, of course, can still be overrun. However, being well dug in makes the price in winning such victories that much higher. Nevertheless, the Union's resources (manpower and materiel) made the end result of the war a virtual certainty... no matter how it was fought.

[samgrant]

What if the Confederates had not put their capital in Richmond, tantalizingly close enough to the North to naturally be a focus point of the objective to be pursued as the way to win the war?

Some say that the South were willing to sacrifice large areas in the West, in order to prolong the ultimate victory in Virginia, hence the best officers in the ANV vs. those in the west (don't ask for sources, I've lost those, tho I might find them if pressed).

This theory may be flawed in that at the beginning A. S. Johnston was considered the best of the lot of generals, more than Lee, at the time.

The fact was that all of these generals were products of the standard military strategy of the times and guerrilla (Rev. war) tactics were just not in their playbook. Nor would the CSA deem itself as a band of guerrillas, they must have been a 'credible' big army.

[larry_cockerham]

Bob Lee was a school teacher when the war broke out, his having been a very creditable civil engineer. He had some battlefield experience down in Mexico of some credit also. None of these gentlemen had been in a civil war driven by the strongest country on earth at the time. I don't think the capital location was the problem for the south. (Yes, the Richmond site did give old Abe a bit of a scare at times.) The war was over when it began from a supply and manpower standpoint. Farmers with muzzle loaders did not an army make. Nathan Bedford Forrest could have whipped (and often did) any yankee in Tennessee in a fair fight. Problem was, there were too many of 'em with too many guns.

[ole]

Some say that the South were willing to sacrifice large areas in the West, in order to prolong the ultimate victory in Virginia, hence the best officers in the ANV vs. those in the west (don't ask for sources, I've lost those, tho I might find them if pressed).

It wasn't only the south. Militarily, holding territory puts an enormous burden on an army -- a burden the south couldn't afford. Like you, I don't remember the source, but I read where McClellan, when he was finally prodded into the Peninsula Campaign, was in favor of giving up Washington so he could have the troops to take Richmond. And the trading territory for troop concentration was a central belief for J. E. Johnston.

Politically, giving up territory doesn't fly very well. As war is an extension of politics (Jomini, I think), the primary consideration is keeping the people behind the effort. It's a bit hard to convince your supporters that giving up a state or a port is the best strategy. Davis and Lincoln kept that in mind. In Davis's case, he might have been better off if he'd given Johnston a looser rein.

Bob Lee was a school teacher when the war broke out, his having been a very creditable civil engineer. He had some battlefield experience down in Mexico of some credit also. None of these gentlemen had been in a civil war driven by the strongest country on earth at the time.

This is news to me. I thought he was in Texas at a military post there -- especially as he resigned his commission to lead Virginia troops. Lee probably had one of the longest resumes with regard to military experience (with the possible exception of A.S. Johnston) of all commanders on both sides. The Union was fortunate that Scott was too infirm to take command. He was probably an excellent general and certainly had more experience than anybody alive in 1860, but his experience was based on a different kind of war. The WBTS showed that generals who didn't quickly adapt to the new kind of war were handicapped and generally performed poorly.

Ole

[richard]

It is fortunate that we have the means of looking back and finding the mistakes of the Generals of this war. For it is with this hindsite, that we can decide the correct direction of action that should have taken place.

Many errors of judgment took place on the part of both sides. The sad part of this is that many of the Generals would not or could not, for what ever the reason, admit to there mistakes. In doing so, they were condemed to repeat them. Lee and Jackson blamed their failure on devine providence, if they beleaved that they had failed at all. In fact these failures were caused by lack of sound planning, poor intellengence, and a very poor command system.

The south could not have engaged in a static war. They could not aford the war that they fought. This was proven to Lee when he went into Maryland. He thought that he could live off the land. He found out that he was not welcome there and could not find what he needed to feed his army.

Bragg and Smith found out that they could not live off the land in Kentucky, let alone bring back thousands of new fresh troops to fight the Union.

Many Generals, as one person stated, did not change there tatics. A good example of that would be Gen. John B. Gordan. He never left the classic style of fighting. On the other hand, General Barlow and General Thomas were always changing there tatics to meet the challange.

One could look back and say that if the South had had better leadership both in Goverment and on the battlefield, they might have well won the war in the first year. It was the fighting men and not the Generals who won there battles. And it was the fighting men who suffured because of there Generals.

[larry_cockerham]

Ole, history was never my strong subject. I kept going to sleep in class. Come to think of it, I may not have had a strong subject. As I recall Gen. Lee was for a time commandant at West Point. He much prior to that was responsible for flood control measures on the river at St. Louis. I agree also that Winfield Scott had the record, but he was getting up in years, as was Lee. Youth, alas, sacrifices experience. A brutal circle. We are very reluctant as a nation to start the freshmen. Perhaps for good reason.

[jkeith21]

Well my guess would be something along the lines of what transpired Johnston vs Sherman in the 100 Days War, 1864, Chattanooga thru Atlanta. Dig in, get flanked or fall back, fall back, dig in.........