Neil

You raise very good points. I will not tackle them all just now, but will start. I should first say that I should have introduced this topic more concisely. I originally made no mention of Ft Sumter and only secession so as to discuss choices, actions, and events up to that fateful day, which could only inaugurate war. But up until that time, there was no shooting war, and each such day might lead to another, then another- and until the shooting started, well perhaps it could be avoided for just another day, and perhaps, just perhaps every day!.

Yes, for survival doubtlessly the Confederacy needed the upper tier of slave states, and fully expected them to join. The Southerners considered the Ohio River and the Mason-Dixon Line to be the natural frontier. Many of the actions of the Provincial Congress were taken with just such a thing in mind. They wrote a ban on the importation of slaves into the Constitution, (to the dismay of the fire-eaters who maintained such an act blighted the right to property in slaves, a right for which they left behind the ****ed perfidious Yankees to uphold in the first place.) They elected Jefferson Davis president, a man well known for upholding Southern values in the Senate and well regarded in the upper South, but who cried at the breaking up of the Union. They elected Alexander Stephens vice-president, a man who opposed secession to the last, spoke against it at every turn, and who voted against it in Georgia's convention. Besides honoring the South's most acclaimed statesman with high office, this selection of a moderate and nationalist was obviously a move to woo the border states and it served to show the North that, after all, we're not rabid down here. However, the rabid element went fairly ballistic over this, no doubt the wild wailing and gnashing of teeth was truly epic to behold. They sent emissaries to their brethren slave-holding states to talk, soothe, and cajole. They sent commissioners to Washington to treat of questions pertaining to peace as one civilized nation does with another. The selection of these 'ambassadors' by Davis is interesting; they were Martin Crawford- a moderate of the Stephens stamp and latecomer to secession,-John Forsyth, an outspoken Douglas Democrat, and AB Roman, a Louisiana grandee with strong economic ties to the North. No fire-breather among them. The Confederate Congress also proposed favorable trade offers and blandishments on Mississippi River traffic.

So such were some attempts at moderation and seeking a peaceful way by the Confederates. The Confederacy was not then, (in fact, never was at any time,) a monolith. It had its divisions, and President Davis was going to have just as difficult and aggravating a time as President Lincoln in appeasing, cajoling, and managing the disparate and exasperating factions within his borders. Generally, the Southern attitude was one of wishing to be left in peace. But at the same time, they managed to make very aggressive if not war-like statements and fit actions to words. So wilfully or not, the Confederacy moved towards war.

Lincoln's situation in many ways was much messier and tumultuous than Davis's. His was a new administration by a new party new to governance. The Republicans themselves represented many disparate elements, a good many of whom did not like nor trust the other. Then there were the Douglas men, the Buch-aneer men, the border and Union slave states- some with sitting secession conventions. There were the reconciliation committees in Congress and the Peace Convention; there were the Crittenden and other peace proposals. And there were guns pointed at United States soldiers serving their country. Whatever the men at the top were going to do was not going to be easy and was not going to pacify somebody and very likely make them blistering mad. It was all Buchanan could do to hold the fort (in a manner of speaking) and hand over a functioning government not at war to the incoming administration. Lincoln had his hands full immediately and sooner. (Many of his countrymen would liken it to be more like over his head!) Basically, what Lincoln would do with every breath would determine the fate of the republic.

As to Lincoln's handling of the Ft Sumter crisis, what I meant was that his decision was to send only supplies to the garrison and not land troops. He thus showed that he would hold his ground, feed his soldiers, and not otherwise antagonize the Southerners. If shots were to be fired , it would be not he the aggressor nor transgressor, but an official doing his appointed duty. In other words, for a shooting war to break out, it would not be him doing the shooting, but only his men rightly defending their flag. By saying Lincoln 'set it up', I merely mean that he maneuvred the Southerners thus into firing the first shots of any war. He himself would be, and needs be, blameless of such an act. Here again is Lincoln at his finest. He succeeded here as well as he did in most of his undertakings. Where that left him is an issue I would like to take up at a later time.

As to the Union top military men, by the time Lincoln assumed the presidency, they felt that as much as they would prefer to hold on to Ft Sumter- aye, all the forts in their possession- there was no way for it to be done in practicality and the logical course to pursue was its evacuation. This was so because to reinforce or relieve Ft Sumter, ships would have to run batteries commanding the harbor, now an unlikely proposition. This was not the case with the other Southern forts in Union hands- all could be supplied by sea, and General Scott had already taken measures to secure them. Scott is an interesting study during this time frame. He is a Virginian of nationalist sentiment. For him, it was country and country only. Secessionists ****ed him because they knew he would never be with them. (If only Lee had thought like him, what! But Lee for all his service had not the scope, experience, and clarity of vision as Scott, who at this time was by far and all America's greatest soldier.) His headquarters were in New York, so he was out of the picture during the days of cabinet infighting in Buchanan's White House. With South Carolina's secession, he asked Buchanan what shall we do to protect the public weal, but Buchanan did not know his right from his left just then and deferred to consensus in his cabinet. Secretary of War Floyd deliberately kept Scott out of the loop so as to keep Scott and the Army out of political questions where his nationalist sympathies could upset the apple cart. Finally with Anderson's transfer of his command and an increasingly alarmed Buchanan, Old Buck brought him back into the picture. He came to Washington to make sure his voice would be heard. He strongly promoted reinforcing the garrison, and urged it be done immediately. That led to the 'Star of the West' expedition, which rebuffed at Charleston, chugged back to New York, to the immense displeasure of General Scott. He outfitted a new expedition which was not to turn back, but Buchanan had by this time decided it was best to keep Anderson in the harbor, but to not further antagonize the Carolinians. While Buchanan searched for some balance, Scott saw his chances slipping away until there was no way to get into the harbor without very great risk. Thus happened his considered opinion that by the time Lincoln arrived on the scene, his military duty was to present Lincoln the risks and recommend withdrawal in Charleston harbor; the time for reinforcement had passed and for Major Anderson and his men to be brought out of a useless situation. He personally wanted no abandonment, and said so. Lincoln, in the same boat himself, understood.

I've written enough for one night. I'm tired. I will continue this theme later.

ewc