Battle of Shiloh April 6 & 7th 1862

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In memory of those that fought during the Battle of Shiloh 144 years ago.

Daniel Marion Craft "3rd grt Grandfather" Co. G 22nd Alabama
Moses Jasper Ball "3rd Grt GrandUncle" Co. G 22nd Alabama
Abner C. Ball "3rd Grt GrandUncle" Co. G 22nd Alabama

Allen P. Kepner: "Distant cousin" Co. A 41st. Ohio Vol. Infantry

Aftermarching From Nashville the 41st bivouacked two miles from Savannah with their wagon trains still miles in the rear struggling through the mud.On the 5th of April 1862

They spent most of the day sunday moving toward the sound of the battle. once they reached the river bank there was a steamer waiting to cross they troops Hazen brigade were the 2nd one to cross. The night was near at hand but the scene on the distant shore was distinct enough as the boat slowly made her way across. The bank down to the waters edge was covered with fugitives fromn the battlefield.. All of them belonged to units that had been cut to peices.. The 41st was deployed but moved only a few yards before the battle ended for the day. Darkness had fallen and all was still on the ground where the battle ended . The men lay down where they stood when halted and made themselves as comfortable as they could... Now and then someone would stumbled over the dead body of a soldier and moved a yard away to lie down for the night.

The men were aroused by the roar of the heavy shelling through out the night

By daylight the regiment stood at arms in readiness to receive an attack. There was none so the 41st and the rest of the brigades wrere called to attention and charged the confederates...

In their first engagement and in a fight that lasted hardly more than half a hour .. Out of the 373 officers and men of the 41st Ohio that were oon the field. (co. g was with the wagon train) One hubdred and fortytwo were killed or wounded none were missing.. total loss of 39 % of the # engaged. they were 2nd to only 9th Ill infantry that lost 50%

3 officers and 3 enlisted men who at diffrent times bore the colores of the 41st were either killed or wounded

In killed and Mortally wounded tother numbered 44%

The wagons arrived on April 11 five days after the battle and on the 13th after a week of burying the dead, the 41st recieved the order to resume drills and study the following day.

listing of the wounded and killed in Co A
1st Lt James McCleary age 22 Lost right arm to wunds
2nd Lt charles w. hills age 21 was wounded
1st sgt. Andrew C Paker age 23 wounded
Corp. Horace b Ames age 21 KIA
Corp Wallace B. Braden age 19 wounded twice
Corp. Orlando W Haynes age 23 wounded
Pvt Samuel Bennett age 27 Kia
Henry Barber age 18 wounded right arm
Welford J. Richmond age 16 Died from wounds april 13th at mound city Ill from wondes recieved at Shiloh
John ward age 21 kia

And one final thought all though this was written about Picketts Mill it could be said for any battlefield through out history.

A soldier lies prone on his back, scarce out of the weep off balls that fly abobe. Prone on his back and with closed eyes yet not dead. On his breast a darker stain spreads and spreads over his army shirt as his life pours out in the crimson spring. To the right the sun's last rays are shinng but in the valley where the soldier liesw, twilight is comming...

In a fair Ohio home a mother lifts her baby boy and holds him close to a soldiers picture onm the mantel. In the tree tops about the house the suns last rays are lingering and twilight comes.. "Kiss papa good night till he comes home again" she says

It is the self same hour on the battle battlefield and in the home; and the soldier-father's long good night is said.

Rest in peace
Steven Cone

[william42]

Steve, thanks for that. The night of April 6th was pretty dire for the yankee army, and I suppose it looked hopeless for a while. Grant just barely pulled the thing out of the fire.

The casualty ratio for the 41st was terrible. The description of the dying Ohio soldier at Picketts Mill could very well be applied to Shiloh, or any battle, and any soldier of either side who had family waiting for them to return home. Great post, thanks.

Terry

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The following info was compiled mostly by Don Drake But I have added a few things myself. Don is a a friend of mine and a fellow desendant of a member of the 22nd Alabama.. Private Samuel Drake of Co. G. Its highly likely that our relatives knew each other being they were in the same company

regards,
Steven

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The 22nd Infantry Regiment was organized in Montgomery, Alabama and placed under the command of Colonel Zach. C. Deas.

On 5 November 1861, Major-General Braxton Bragg ordered the 22nd Alabama and Beck's Alabama Regiment to report to Brigadier-General Jones M. Withers at Mobile Alabama. Bragg anticipated a U.S. Naval offensive against the Confederate coastlines on the Gulf of Mexico. The General hoped that by positioning 3000 men in New Orleans, 5000 in Mobile and 7000 in Pensacola, he could quickly assemble a defensive force at any point where the Union Navy might choose to attack.1 An abstract from a field return, dated 02 December 1861, of the District of Alabama, commanded by Withers reported that the 22nd Alabama had 37 officers and 376 men present for duty.

General Orders, No. 23, dated 27 January 1862, from the Headquarters of the Department of Alabama and West Florida stated that the "command of Brig. Gen. J. M. Withers will in future be known as the Army of Mobile . . . Brigadier-General Withers is specially charged with the defense of the coast from Perdido to Pascagoula Rivers."2

On 26 February 1862, by command of Major-General Bragg, the regiment of Louisiana infantry under Colonel Adams and the 18th and the 22nd infantry Regiments of Alabama under Colonels Shorter and Deas, were ordered to immediately proceed, via the Mobile-Ohio Railroad, to Corinth, Mississippi to strengthen those forces under the command of General P. G. T. Beauregard. While in Corinth, the 22nd was assigned to Brigadier-General Adley H. Gladden. 3

On 09 March 1862, Major-General Bragg ordered that "two regiments of infantry, one battery of light artillery, and three companies of cavalry will be detailed from Gladden's division at Corinth to take post at Bethel Station." Gladden is ordered to "throw forward strong guards and pickets to the Tennessee River, and keep a close observation on the enemy's movements."4



By 12 March, General Gladden had moved most of his troops east to Purdy, leaving the Alabama battalion and about 300 men at Bethel Station. From there, he sent Colonel D. W. Adams with 350 Louisiana Infantry, a detachment of Major Baskerville's cavalry and two of Ketchum's rifle guns towards Adamsville and within five miles of Crumps Landing. On 12 March, The 22nd Alabama under Colonel Deas and the remainder of Ketchum's battery were present at Purdy with General Gladden when he reported his intent to send this group forward.

Gladden's scouts reported that 18,000 union troops had arrived at Crump's Landing on 12 March. On 13 March these troops came within five miles of Purdy but returned to the river, leaving their encampment about 11 o'clock that evening. At 10 o'clock on the morning of 14 March, a scouting party made up of four companies of infantry (probably Adams' group) and one of cavalry left on the Savannah road. Two companies cavalry under Major Baskerville were sent to scout above the Savannah road. Other scouting parties, likely from the 22nd, were out all day on the 14th but reported nothing on or below the Savannah road. 5

I have not been able to determine the movements of Gladden's First Brigade between 14 March and early April. By 01 April, General Cheatham, commanding First Corps' Second Division, was in Bethel Station with Brigadier-General W. H. Stephens' Second Brigade, while Brigadier-General Bushrod Johnson's First Brigade was in Purdy. I believe that Gladden's brigade returned to Corinth with Major-General Bragg when the latter assumed command of all the troops in that vicinity.


By April 1862, approximately 50,000 Union troops under General Grant were encamped in Savannah, Crumps Landing and Pittsburg, Tennessee, approximately 22 miles north of Corinth. Here they awaited support from the army commanded by General Buell who was then moving toward Pittsburg from Nashville.


In his report, dated 11 April 1862 (OR Chapter XXII, Page 385), to Assistant Adjutant-General Cooper, General Beauregard indicated that on the night of 02 April 1862, " . . . it was heard, from a reliable quarter, that the junction of the enemy's armies was near at hand. It was then, at a late hour, determined that the attack should be attempted at once . . . Accordingly, that night at 1 a. m. the preliminary orders to the commanders of corps were issued for the movement."


Special Orders, No. 8 was issued on the morning of 03 April. At 3 o'clock a. m., 04 April, the Third Corps, commanded by Major-General Hardee, was to advance by the Bark road to within sight of the Federal outposts. At that point the Corps was to deploy with its left resting on Owl Creek and its right extending toward Lick Creek. A brigade from Bragg's Second Corps was to fill in the gap between Hardee's right and Lick Creek. According to Beauregard's report of 11 April (OR Chapter XXII Page 386), Gladden's brigade was chosen to fill this position.


The Army of the Mississippi began its slow march on the morning of 03 April. The huge numbers of men and materiel clogged the narrow streets of Corinth. The roads leading from Corinth to the intended battlefield were too narrow and too soft from the frequent rains to permit easy passage of the wagons and artillery. The fields and forests through which the men had to travel were muddy and swamp like. General Withers' division couldn't begin its advance to Monterey until late in the afternoon and its final column arrived late on the night of the third. 6


At 8:30 a.m. on the fourth, Withers' division passed through Monterey and proceeded up the Savannah Road to Michie's (alternatively spelled Mickey's) farmhouse. 7 Withers' division camped for the night along the Monterey-Savannah road at its intersection with the Ridge Road at Mickey's, one full day behind schedule.8


During late afternoon and evening of 04 April, Johnston conferred with Beauregard, Bragg and Breckenridge. Johnston then ordered a full-scale attack the following morning with the army to be fully deployed by 7:00 a. m. and engaged in an offensive assault an hour later. By 2:00 a. m. on the morning of the fifth, the rain began to fall in torrents and fully drenched the Confederate army laying exposed on the open ground without tents. 9 According to James Rosser, "One of the hardest rains fell I ever saw in life and wound up in considerable hail." A Tennessean noted that "to us who were simply standing in line in the rain it was bad enough, but those men who were going by were wading, stumbling and plunging through water a foot deep." 10


From his camp near Tupelo, Mississippi on 20 June 1862, General Withers reported that before dawn on 05 April, his division was reported ready to march. Immediately after the advanced command was in motion, the division moved forward, first Gladden's brigade, second, Chalmers' brigade and third, Jackson's brigade. As on the 4th, the condition of the roads and surrounding country impeded the army's progress, so much so that the final line was not in place until the evening of the 5th. Sometime after 4:00 p.m., Generals Bragg and Beauregard discussed the condition of the army. They determined that, because of the extended delays, lack of sufficient provisions and the possible loss of the advantage of surprise, it would be best to withdraw the army to Corinth without a battle. About 5:00 p.m., Bragg and Beauregard were joined by Generals Johnston and Polk in an informal council of war. In contrast to Beauregard, Polk insisted that his men were in good condition and ready for a battle. Breckinridge then joined the council and reported that the reserves had ample provisions. The council ended when Johnston announced that the attack would begin at daylight. 11

(06 April 1862, Dawn to 9:00 A.M.)

In stark contrast to the previous days' weather, "the night of 05 April was clear, cool and unusually quiet as daylight approached." 12 In the pre-dawn hours, Major James E. Powell of the 25th Missouri, USA, under orders of Colonel Peabody, First Brigade of General Prentiss' Sixth Division, was on patrol with approximately four hundred men near a forty-acre cotton field known as Fraley Field. As they neared the Pittsburg-Corinth Road, Confederate vedettes (cavalry) moving through the underbrush, fired three quick shots, wheeled about, and rode off into the pitch black. In response, Powell formed his five companies into a skirmish line and moved onto Fraley Field, not realizing the danger ahead. Barely seven hundred yards away was Brigadier-General Sterling A. M. Wood's brigade of Hardee's Corps. During the previous night, Major Aaron B. Hardcastle's 3rd Mississippi Battalion, 280 muskets strong, had been thrown forward in a skirmish line. About 5 a.m., the Mississippians opened fired on the advancing men of the 25th Missouri. For the next hour and fifteen minutes, brilliant flashes of light coming from the timber and brush could be seen through the darkness as the two sides traded blows. The battle had finally begun. 13

Before dawn, Johnston, his staff and several general officers were gathered around a small fire, having a breakfast of cold biscuits with coffee and continuing the discussion of the previous night. A sudden crash of musketry was heard up the Pittsburg-Corinth Road, to which Johnston replied, "The battle has opened gentlemen; it is too late to change our dispositions." The time was 5:14 a.m. Johnston, grabbing his hat, his sword and mounting his bay thoroughbred, called to his staff, "Tonight we will water our horses in the Tennessee River."14

At 6 o'clock, under orders of General Gladden, Colonel Deas assembled the 22nd Alabama, numbering 404 rifles and 31 officers, and moved out of camp, forming a part of General Gladden's brigade. General Chalmers brigade moved onto Gladden's right to close the gap to Lick Creek. With Robertson's battery in support behind Gladden and Gage's battery behind Chalmers, the two brigades moved, with their extreme left crossing the Eastern Corinth Road, north towards Spain Field. 15



About 7 o'clock, General Prentiss learned of the Confederate advance and galloped among the Sixth Division's camps to spread the alarm. Colonel Madison Miller, commanding the 2nd Brigade, was having breakfast with his staff (sliced beef, baked chicken, hot biscuits, butter and coffee) when General Prentiss rode up and shouted "Colonel Miller, get out your brigade! They are fighting on the right!" Minutes later, the 18th Missouri was formed in line. The remaining regiments of the 2nd Brigade; the 61st Illinois and the 18th Wisconsin, joined with the 18th Missouri in an L-shaped line facing south and west on the southern portion of Spain Field. Miller's flank was anchored by the 5th Ohio battery, in the northwestern corner of the field, east of the Eastern Corinth Road, and the 1st Minnesota Battery, deployed astride and west of the road. 16, 17


Notes & References
1 The first two paragraphs contain a brief summary of "Chronology of the Secession Crisis", copyright 1996 by James F. Epperson. For other Chronologies by James F. Epperson, go to "Civil War Chronologies."

2 Letter from Major-General Braxton Bragg, Headquarters, Department Alabama and West Florida to Adjutant-General C. S. Army, Richmond, Virginia. Official Records, Chapter XVI pp. 764, 765

3 Official Records, Chapter XVI p. 815

4 Official Records, Chapter XXII p.p. 305,306 (General Orders, No. 6.)

5 Official Records, Chapter XXII p.p. 12, 13, 14, 15
6 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April,pages 100 to 101
7 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War,
pages 123, 124
8 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 102
9 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 103
10 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, page 125
11 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 107, 108
12 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 142
13 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, pages 143, 144

14 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, pages 144, 145
15 Official Records, Chapter XXII pages 541, 542
16 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, pages 152, 153
17 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 155

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Sometime around 8 o'clock, General Prentiss, who was observing from the right (west) of his line, noted the heavy pressure brought to bear against Peabody. As the firing became heavier beyond his right and moved closer, Prentiss ordered a "change front to the right." Gladden's brigade was just then approaching from the south on Prentiss' front when Miller's brigade began executing the maneuver. 18 As the Confederates came through the woods, Gladden's skirmishers sighted a line of blue-clad soldiers through the trees and immediately began to fire. Prentiss then ordered Miller to retreat with the entire brigade to the north side of Spain field. There, Miller's brigade hastily re-formed as best they could in dense timber along the north edge of the field. The Missourians took cover behind trees and opened fire on the heavy masses of gray infantry emerging onto the open ground. 19


The soldiers of Gladdens brigade crossed a shallow branch of Locust Grove and then advanced up a gentle slop, reaching the summit a mere 150 to 200 yards from the Federal line. 20 The Union Artillery Batteries then began spraying shell into the oncoming Confederate forces. General Gladden was at the front leading his brigade as they came across Spain field. A thin haze of smoke hung low over the field, obscuring the Federal line. Gladden galloped ahead amidst the roar of cannon for a better view and was knocked from his saddle by an exploding shell. The General's wounds proved to be mortal and he died in Corinth at Beauregard's headquarters on 12 April 1862. Colonel Daniel W. Adams assumed command of Gladden's brigade and a few minutes after Gladden fell, ordered an immediate advance. 21


With banners flying, the Confederates swept across the open field and the 5th Ohio Battery, under Captain Andrew Hickenlooper, switched to canister: twenty-seven iron balls, each over an inch in diameter, packed in a tin case. The effect of canister fire was to spray the iron balls in the pattern of a gigantic shotgun. Hickenlooper's guns fired about every thirty seconds and severely punished the Confederate battle line. As Adams' men began to approach midfield, the gunners switched to double charges of canister and the Rebel line was seen to shake from one end to the other. Then Prentiss' infantry added rapid small-arms fire and Adams' whole brigade began to falter and fall back, leaving a carpet of dead and wounded upon the field. 22


Adams, amid the smoke of battle, rode to his own regiment, seized its blue battle flag, began waving it to rally his men and ordered a charge. The Confederates again stormed across Spain Field. Hickenlooper later wrote that the Rebel Yell of hundreds of advancing men "caused an involuntary thrill of terror to pass like an electric shock through even the bravest hearts." 23


All of the Union batteries' guns were still in action and the constant canister fire tore gaping holes in the Rebel lines, costing the lives of many officers, including Robert B. Armistead of the 22nd Alabama. Then, Captain Robertson's battery of 12-pounder guns wheeled into position to support the attack and rained storms of lead about Hickenlooper's battery. As the Confederates approached within a few yards of his position, Hickenlooper, mounted upon his white horse, Gray Eagle, gave the order to limber to the rear. Before the maneuver could be executed, a point-blank volley of musketry swept through his ranks. Every horse (hitched in pairs) in the section went down in a jumbled mass. Gray Eagle was struck three times in the neck, trembled, lost its balance and fell to the earth throwing its rider. Hickenlooper glanced up to see the Confederates dash among his disabled guns. He drew his revolvers and sprinted to safety, abandoning two bronze 6-pounders to the 22nd Alabama. 24


Infantry support for Captain Munch's battery was also broken during the second attack and he gave the order to retreat. During the retreat Munch's horse was killed and the Captain was carried from the field after receiving a musket ball in his thigh. The attack also routed Prentiss' remaining infantry. His Sixth Division was now a total wreck. Only two or three regiments out of seven retained some strength. By 9 o'clock, the division was pouring north in full flight toward Pittsburg Landing. As the rear elements retreated down Eastern Corinth Road, a rider-less white horse appeared through the dense smoke and trotted among the men. With his back, neck and forelegs covered with blood, Gray Eagle had followed the retreating lines looking for his master. He gave a loud neigh and halted in front of the surprised Hickenlooper, who mounted the gallant horse and rode off to re-gather his broken battery. 25

(06 April 1862, 9:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M.)

On the morning of 06 April, the men of Brigadier-General Stephen A. Hurlbut's Fourth Division awoke to a beautiful, clear, spring morning and prepared for their usual Sunday inspection. While waiting for the proper signals to form, the sudden sound of musket fire prompted the division's brigade commanders to order their men into line. About 7:30 a.m., General Hurlbut received an urgent message from General Sherman that he was heavily engaged. Colonel James C. Veatch's brigade was immediately sent to Sherman's aid. Then, at 8:00 a.m., an urgent request for reinforcement was received from General Prentiss. Hurlbut then ordered his entire command to advance to Prentiss' support. 26

By 8:30 a.m., as Hurlbut's division was advancing down the Hamburg-Savannah road, they were met by increasing numbers of men from Prentiss' division rushing towards Pittsburg Landing. Hurlbut soon reached a large open field nearly a half mile north of Prentiss' abandoned camps. He deployed his two brigades here, Lauman's 3rd Brigade on the western side and Williams' 1st Brigade on the southern edge of the field. Hurlbut supported this position with three artillery units; Mann's Missouri Light Artillery between the two infantry brigades, Ross's 2nd Michigan behind Williams and Meyers' 13th Ohio in front of Lauman. 27

As the division deployed, it came under immediate fire from Robertson's battery of Adams' brigade. One of the first rounds struck Colonel Williams' horse, killing it instantly. Williams himself, was so severely shocked by the concussion that he had to leave the field. Another round struck a caisson of Meyers' 13th Ohio Battery, exploding the ammunition chest. As more shells began bursting nearby, both horses and men began to panic and run. The guns of the 13th Ohio were abandoned without ever having fired a shot. 28




After the rout of Prentiss' division, the brigades under Withers' command; those commanded by Adams, Jackson and Chalmers, were halted temporarily to regroup. The division reformed on the north side of Prentiss' camps for a further advance. At about 9:30, the men of Hurlbut's division were seen "advancing" some 300 to 400 yards distance and Colonel Adams ordered Robertson's battery to place fire on their position. General Hardee and his staff then passed the lines and instructed Adams to throw out some companies "to see if the enemy were really in front of us in large force." 29


Two companies from the 22nd Alabama were sent forward to observe the Federal position. As they moved towards the angle between the two Federal brigades, those on Lauman's left began opening fire. The men of the 22nd were out of range of most of Lauman's infantry but those from the 17th Kentucky were able to inflict some "tremendous losses," forcing the Confederates to turn sharply towards the east. This turn brought them under fire from Williams' brigade, at which point they returned to report to Colonel Adams. 30

Upon hearing the musketry fire, the entire left of the Federal line assumed they were under attack by a significant force and began firing at will. Colonel Isaac Pugh, who had taken over for the wounded Williams, feared he was about to be flanked and ordered his men to fall back towards the north side of the field into a peach orchard. When Hurlbut saw his left side withdrawing, he ordered the remainder of his men to retire to the same line. Hurlbut's brigades, now fronted on moderately open ground, were under cover of the peach orchard and an old fence along the edge of the woods. 31

As the three brigades were about to engage, Generals Chalmers and Jackson received orders from Johnston to fall back and move to the extreme right of the army and attack Stuart. The removal of these two brigades left Adams alone to face Hurlbut's brigades. Adams' men had suffered heavy losses and nearly exhausted their ammunition. Fearing that the Federal troops across the field from him would soon make an advance, Adams formed his brigade into a defensive square and waited while Robertson's battery of field guns dueled with the enemy batteries supporting Hurlbut's line. 32

While Adams waited for ammunition and reinforcements, Hurlbut calmed his troops and reorganized his battle line. Most importantly, the Union army had time to strengthen its front lines. Prentiss' had reorganized some of his battered division and formed to Hurlbut's right in the sunken road. To Prentiss' right, crossing Duncan's field, were two brigades from W. H. L. Wallace's Second Division, led by Sweeny and Tuttle. By 10:00 a.m., an arc ranging more than a half-mile had formed, consisting of more than 11,000 men. In support of this sweeping line were seven batteries of artillery totaling thirty-eight guns. 33

Notes & References

18 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, pages 153
19 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 158, 159, 160
20Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, pages 154
21Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 161, 162
22 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 162
23 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 162, 166
24 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 166, 167

25 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 167, 168, 169, 170

26 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 235

27 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 236
28 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 236
29 Official Records, Chapter XXII pages 536, 537
30 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 238
31 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 238, 239
32 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 239
33 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 240, 241, 242, 243

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Brigadier General Benjamin F. Cheatham, commanding the 2nd Division of Polk's Corps, approached Duncan's Field as the last of Wallace's men were filing into position. Cheatham quickly recognized that his three regiments were no match for the "strong force" of Federals posted across the field and bade his men to wait while he called up Captain Melanchton Smith's Mississippi Battery of six guns. Munch's Federal Battery immediately opened fire, killing several horses, but Smith's guns were soon in action, shelling the fencerow occupied by Wallace's and Prentiss' infantry. This artillery exchange continued about an hour, while Adams brigade lay about 400 yards distant, still awaiting ammunition and Cheatham sat unsupported and unable to advance. 34

About 11:00 o'clock, General Cheatham was ordered to attack at the corner of Lauman's and Wallace's lines. Led by Colonel William H. Stephens, the men rushed "at double-quick time" across three hundred yards of open field, with only their right regiment, the 9th Tennessee, extended into the woods at the edge of the field. In double line formation, the Confederates advanced to within thirty paces of the Duncan Field fencerow. When the men of the 14th Iowa opened fire, the first line was completely destroyed. Halted by the 14th Iowa's fire, they were then cut by crossfire on the left side from the 7th and 8th Illinois and were driven back across the field. The 9th Tennessee, somewhat protected by the brush, were able to fight for nearly a half-hour against the 31st Indiana, but still the slaughter was terrible. The division retreated back to its original line with severe casualties. 35

Immediately, Colonel Shaw of the 14th Iowa had his men pursue the retreating Confederates. A portion of the 12th Iowa noticed the retreat and quickly joined in the pursuit. The Federals soon met resistance, however, from the soldiers of the 1st Arkansas of Colonel Randall Lee Gibson's brigade and Shaw returned his men to their original line, taking several prisoners. Fighting on the sunken road momentarily ceased. 36

General Bragg, known for his terrible disposition, was so sorely frustrated with the confusion and delays of the day, that when he saw Gibson's men standing idly by in Barnes Field, he ordered an assault on what was now being called the "Hornet's Nest." Gibson's brigade made at least three attempts at the center of the Federal line, all resulting in retreat and heavy casualties. During the first assault, the woods near Lauman's position caught fire and many of the wounded were trapped in the blaze (Daniel, page 212). The brigade lost forty percent of its force in the attempts. 37 After 2:00 o'clock, the brigade retired from the field and was not engaged again until the following day (Daniel, page 213).

Sometime near 11:00 a.m., the Reserve Corps under General Breckenridge (who was defeated by Lincoln in a bid for the Presidency), began to emerge in the Confederate rear. Bowen's brigade moved in to the right near Jackson and Chalmers. Statham's brigade deployed about eight hundred yards to the left and rear of Bowen. Shortly after 12:00 noon, Statham's men reached Sarah Bell's field somewhere to the right of Adam's brigade. From here they engaged in heavy long-range fighting with Pugh's men across the field.38

Coordinating the attacks, were Generals Johnston and Breckenridge, who were in the company of Isham Harris, Confederate Governor of Tennessee. After observing the stubbornness of the Federal lines, Johnston decided to "put the bayonet to them." Approximately 7000 men of Breckenridge's Corps, under the commands of Statham and Bowen prepared for the charge. These were joined by about 1000 men of Stephen's brigade and one or two regiments from Jackson's brigade.39 A few minutes before 2:00 p.m., with Johnston, Breckenridge and Harris in front leading the way, the Confederate line began sweeping forward.40 The bayonet charges were met with fierce resistance from the Union forces resulting in severe Confederate casualties, most notably, the death of General Johnston. The General was hit behind the knee and at 2:30 p.m., died on the field due to loss of blood.

(06 April 1862, 2:00 P.M. to Dusk)

Colonel Adams was preparing his brigade for Johnston's bayonet charge when the brigades of Cheatham and Breckenridge converged in his immediate front. About 2:30 o'clock, Adams was ordered to hold back until a space in line became available. While riding along the line of his brigade, he was struck in the head by a rifle-ball and taken from the field. 41

He would survive the wound and continue to serve the Confederacy. Command of the brigade then fell upon Colonel Zack C. Deas of the 22nd Alabama, leaving the 22nd under the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Marrast. 42

Earlier that morning, Colonels George Maney and Nathan Bedford Forrest were ordered to guard Greer's Ford on Lick Creek against a possible Federal assault on the Confederate right flank. This position left them three miles south of the rear lines and completely out of the battle. About 11:00 a.m., Colonel Maney determined that there was no threat on this position and left for the battlefield. Colonel Forrest, hearing the sounds of battle, turned to his men and exclaimed that he wasn't going to guard a **** creek while their friends and brothers were dying by the hundreds. His men agreed and they too left to join the battle. 43

Colonel Maney arrived on the battlefield around 2:00 p.m. and was ordered by Cheatham to reassume command of Stephen's brigade (originally Maney's) and attack Ross's battery in his front. Maney pressed the attack at 2:30 p.m. and gained the woods to the west of the Sarah Bell Field, where his men came under a heavy crossfire. Here they lay down and exchanged fire with Lauman's brigade.44

After assuming command of Adams' brigade, Colonel Deas brought his men forward to offer assistance wherever he could. He soon came upon General Breckenridge, engaged on his right, and was ordered to support Maney's left flank.45 In his report of 25 April 1862, Deas states that he "immediately advanced to his assistance." Finding the fire to be very severe, Deas called forward the 26th Alabama, which failed to respond, and a battery, who responded promptly and offered great assistance. Here, the brigade was engaged in a "hard and long-continued struggle," but succeeded in driving the Federals back. 46

Notes & References

34 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 244
35 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 245, 246
36 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 246, 247
37 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 247 through 256
38 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 258, 259, 260
39 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, page 217
40 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 264
41 Official Records, Chapter XXII pages 536, 537
42 Official Records, Chapter XXII pages 541, 542
43 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 300
44 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, page 219
45 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, pages 221
46 Official Records, Chapter XXII pages 538

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Colonel Forrest approached the field around 2:30 p.m. near Deas' brigade amid heavy artillery fire. Forrest asked permission from General Cheatham, who was nearby, to charge the battery, but was refused. He charged anyway under his own orders with the 26th Alabama, from Deas' brigade, in support on his right. This might explain why the 26th failed to respond to Deas' order. Forrest's cavalry advance was slowed by the thick woods, but the 26th overran the enemy's battery and gained the Manse George cabin, pushing the 3rd Iowa back from their position. They quickly found themselves under heavy fire with little support and, sometime between 4:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m., returned to their original line. 47

Colonel Maney, supported by the remainder of Deas' brigade, now began his charge across the open field. The retreating 26th Alabama drew most of the enemy fire and Maney was able to gain the cover of the woods. Here, he commanded his men to lie down just as the Federals began firing over their heads. 48 After ascertaining the enemy's position from the direction of their fire, Maney ordered his men to charge. They rose with a cheer and pushed the Union forces, who broke in disarray and fled before them. Maney moved forward and occupied the ravine where the Federals had been positioned through most of the day. 49

At some point during these engagements, General Bragg approached Colonel Deas' while his brigade was lying down about one half mile behind the front line and ordered him "forward, nothing but forward." Deas marched the remnants of his brigade in a left oblique towards the Manse George cabin and the 3rd Iowa. 50

The brigades under Chalmers and Jackson had been successful in breaking the left side of the Union line. What had once been a long, sweeping arc was now doubled back into a tight "U." About 4:30 p.m., General Hurlbut found the 3rd Iowa, under Major William M. Stone, in the southwest corner of Wicker Field. Hurlbut warned Stone that the Union left had broken and, expressing surprise that the 3rd Iowa had not been captured, ordered the regiment to the rear. 51

Deas' charged the cabin just as the 3rd Iowa began its retreat. After moving about three hundred yards through the woods, the Iowans turned about and again faced their enemy. The Confederates' charge came so close that the officers of the 3rd Iowa began using their revolvers. One Iowan noted that they "beheld the enemy's hated flag floating above the house behind which we had rested most of the day." 52

Deas' brigade had become separated in the woods and only remnants of the 1st Louisiana and the 22nd Alabama, numbering 101 and 123 men respectively, remained under his command. 53 The Iowans, though few in number themselves, were able to hold Deas' regiments at bay until Confederate reinforcements forced them into another retreat. The retreating Iowans ran into Prentiss' makeshift line and formed on his extreme left. 54



The Hornet's Nest began to collapse around 5:00 o'clock and by 5:30 p.m., over 2200 Union soldiers, including General Prentiss, were forced to lay down their arms and surrender. Of the Union forces who had so obstinately held their ground that day, only the 3rd Iowa and the7th Illinois escaped capture. 55

Encouraged by the success of the day, Generals Bragg and Polk were anxious to press forward and push Grant's Army into the Tennessee River. However, Bragg was frustrated again by the time wasted in organizing for his final assault. It took time to separate prisoners and arrange for escorts to carry them back to Corinth. The Confederate soldiers, nearly famished, were raiding the abandoned Union camps, some looking for food and others for souvenirs. Finally, the troops were gathered and placed in line of battle on the ridge to the south of Dill Creek. 56

Notes & References
47 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, pages 221
48 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 302
49 Official Records, Chapter XXII pages 454, 455
50 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 287
51 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, page 225
52 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 287
53 Official Records, Chapter XXII pages 538
54 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 287, 288
55 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, page 236
56 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 343, 343, 344, 345

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While the Confederates were reorganizing for another attack, Grant was assembling his army for one last stand. The Federal line began at Pittsburg Landing on the cliffs above the Tennessee River with the 36th Indiana on the extreme left. Extending nearly a mile and a half along the Pittsburg-Corinth Road, the line ended with the 14th Missouri positioned just past the intersection with the Hamburg-Savannah Road. General Sherman later estimated that the line numbered nearly 18,000 men. Grant had also assembled as many pieces of artillery as could be found. Ten guns from the batteries of Margraf and Munch were placed on a high ridge near the mouth of Dill Creek, facing west, so as to provide enfilade fire on the enemy advance. The remaining guns were placed in front of the infantry lines, facing south along the Pittsburg-Corinth Road. 57

Throughout the day, thousands of Union troops ran in fear and gathered under the protection of the cliffs on the banks of the Tennessee River. General Nelson and the 36th Indiana arrived at Pittsburg Landing by boat from Savannah about 5:20 Sunday afternoon. As he approached the landing, his ship's Captain began to stop so as not to run over men attempting to swim towards safety on the opposite shore. Angered by what he considered an extreme show of cowardice, Nelson swore, told the Captain what he thought of the swimming men, and ordered the boat to continue on. As the prow touched the shore, some of the men jumped off and cleared space on the shore at the point of the bayonet. Nelson, weighing over three hundred pounds and standing six feet tall, mounted his horse, said to stand seventeen hands high. He ordered his aides to position themselves on either side of his horse and his other mounted officers immediately behind. He drew his saber and shouted, "Gentlemen, draw your sabers and trample these [cowards] into the mud!" Then, the 36th Indiana, with Nelson leading the way, charged up the steep slope shouting "Buell" to encourage Grant's disheartened men. 58

Chalmers' brigade fell in on the far right of the Confederate line at the Tennessee River bottoms, facing the Federal forces across Dill Creek. Jackson's brigade, on Chalmers' left, took the center, followed by remnants of the 22nd Alabama and the 1st Louisiana. Anderson's brigade held the Confederate left. The remaining troops were formed behind in lines of support. Bragg believed that with one more charge, his front line of barely 4,000 men would capture them all. 59

At 6:00 p.m., amid a barrage of fire from the Union gunboats, Tyler and Lexington anchored in the Tennessee River, Chalmers' brigade descended a sixty-foot-deep slope into a shallow backwater. The Confederates then began climbing the slope on the far side of the ravine. As Chalmers' skirmishers reached the top of the hill, the Federal guns opened fire and completely checked their advance. The brigade made several charges, with but minimal effect. Unlike Chalmers' brigade, many of Jackson's men were without ammunition and had to make their charge with fixed bayonets. As they reached the crest of the opposite slope, they lay down to shelter themselves from the enemy artillery fire. 60

As dusk approached, General Withers rode off in search of support, but found that Jackson's men were retreating from the field of battle. He sent aides to arrest the officer who ordered the retreat, but was informed that the order came from General Beauregard himself. General Bragg was observing Chalmers' repeated attacks when Major Augustin, volunteer aide-de-camp, delivered Beauregard's order to stop the pursuit. Bragg was taken completely by surprise and asked if the order had been given to anyone else. Augustin replied that it had and pointed to Jackson's retreating brigade. Bragg exclaimed "My God it is too late!" and dispatched several aides to go and disengage the remaining troops. As the sun set and darkness fell, fighting came to a gradual halt. 61

(06 April 1862, Dusk to Dawn 07 April 1862)

As darkness approached, the Confederates dispersed from the line of battle and occupied the camps abandoned during the day by the retreating Federal Army. Generals Beauregard and Bragg spent the night in General Sherman's tent. Most of the Southern Army had dined Saturday evening and Sunday morning on crackers and bad coffee. They fought twelve long hours with no food and very little water. Some soldiers had found the opportunity to drink from a body of still water which would become known as the Bloody Pond. Their thirst was so acute that even the sight of a dead soldier laying in the pond could not deter them. Sunday night brought a virtual feast. In the Union camps, they found beef, ham, coffee, sugar, rice, flour, apples, candy and various sundries. In one of General Sherman's abandoned camps, they even found a bakery complete with ovens, flour and supplies. Cooks were detailed and the air was soon filled with aroma of fresh bread. 61

Food wasn't the only luxury found that night. Many men exchanged their outdated muskets for Enfield rifles. Others searched for needed equipment such as overcoats, blankets and haversacks. Still others grabbed personal items such as stationary, love letters, and other mementos. There were also reports of many men drunk on Cincinnati whiskey.62

Deas reported that he attempted to find the camp he had left before but had gotten to a different one and decided to stay there. After an inspection, he found that he had under his command, only the 22nd Alabama and the 1st Louisiana, numbering, respectively, 123 and 101 men. His men, on average, had only 15 rounds of ammunition, although both regiments had replenished during the day. 63

Conditions among the Federal soldiers were miserable. Their enemies slept in Federal tents, ate Federal food and read the love letters sent from Federal sweethearts, while they ate meager rations and slept out in the open air. Even General Grant passed a sleepless night under a tree nursing a swollen ankle. One soldier stuck his bayonet in the ground, rested his chin on the butt of his rifle and slept standing up. 64

Though conditions along the Federal lines were bleak, not all was hopeless. Lew Wallace's division had left Crump's Landing Sunday morning in route to the battlefield. Though it took over seven hours to cover the fourteen mile distance, they arrived around 7:30 Sunday evening. Ammen's brigade of General "Bull" Nelson's division arrived around 5:30 p.m. and participated in the final hour of Sunday's fighting. Even more encouraging, was the arrival throughout Sunday evening and early Monday morning of more than eighteen thousand men under the command of Major General Don Carlos Buell. 65

About 9:00 o'clock, Lieutenant Gwin of the gunboat Tyler was looking for an opportunity to be of service. His guns had been silent since 6:30 p.m. and he was getting restless, so he sent word to General Nelson for instructions. Nelson sent word back with orders to shell the enemy camps every 10 minutes. The shells weren't intended to cause any physical damage, but the noise and shock waves kept the Confederates from getting any sleep or rest the entire night. At 1:00 a.m., The Lexington relieved the Tyler and kept up the shelling until daylight. 66

That evening, the sky became overcast and a drizzling rain began about 10:30. By midnight, a severe thunderstorm had settled overhead. The storm brought torrents of rain, blinding lighting and incessant thunder. The rain poured on yank and rebel alike. There were the wounded, many too seriously to move. Throughout the night, their cries and moans could be heard above the din of the driving rain. The blinding light from the bursts of gunboat fire and flashes of lighting illuminated the ghostly figures of the dead lying in the fields. A Confederate soldier on a night patrol could hear the sound of hogs "quarreling over their carnival feast." Another Confederate described it as a night of horrors that would haunt him to his grave. 67 There were those lucky enough to have found tents for the night. However, the canvas of the Sibleys was so shredded by gunfire that some men of the 22nd Alabama complained that little, if any, rain was kept out. 68

By 9:00 o'clock Sunday evening, Nelson's division had been completely ferried across the river by small steamers. Their arrival was heralded by cheers and by the sounds of a band playing "Hail Columbia." Nelson's men extended Grants line along the Dill Branch. Heavy picket detachments were sent forward across the ravine to occupy the ridge were the men of Chalmers' and Jackson's brigades had begun their final assault on Sunday afternoon. Buell's men began arriving by steamboat at about 9:00 p.m. As the men arrived, they were placed in line of battle about three hundred yards in front of Grant's men. Here, they lay down to pass the night, waiting to receive the orders to charge the enemy. At 3:00 a.m. Monday morning, General Nelson road among his men and issued instructions to "move as soon as you can see . . . find the enemy and whip him." At 4:00 a.m. the men were aroused, formed in line of battle and began to move slowly through the forests. 69



57 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, pages 245, 246, 247
58 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 358, 359
59 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, pages 253, 254
60 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, pages 253, 254
61 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 363, 366
61 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 372
62 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 372, 373
63 Official Records, Chapter XXII pages 538
64 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 373, 374
65 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 380, 381
66 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 374
67 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 374, 375
68 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, page 263
69 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 376, 380

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(07 April 1862, Dawn to 5:00 P.M.)

About midnight on 7 April, Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest ordered some of his men to dress in captured Union uniforms and reconnoiter the Federal lines. A detachment of scouts under Lieutenant Sheridan set out and discovered Buell's debarking troops. They quickly returned to camp and reported their findings to Colonel Forrest. Understanding the importance of this information, Forrest immediately mounted his horse and set out to find the nearest corps commander. He found Hardee and Breckenridge nearby, who ordered him to take the news directly to General Beauregard. Unfortunately, Beauregard retired without establishing a central headquarters and Forrest never found him. After receiving a like report at 2:00 a.m., Colonel Forrest returned to Hardee and was told to maintain a vigilant watch. Beauregard never received the news. 70

As dawn began to break, the Confederate forces were in a complete disarray. Brigades and regiments were broken up and bivouacked in different parts of the battlefield. When Colonel Preston Pond awoke Monday morning, he found his brigade alone and dangerously exposed nearly one mile in front of the entire Confederate Army. Regiment commanders were searching for higher officers and instructions on how to conduct the affairs of the coming day. Beauregard and Bragg were peacefully asleep in Sherman's captured tent, expecting the day's fighting to end in a complete defeat of Grant's army. Neither one knowing that Buell and Wallace had arrived during the night, bringing nearly twenty-five thousand fresh troops. 71

The Federal lines formed, with Buell on the left. Wallace took the Union right and remnants of Grant's other divisions formed in the center. 72 Bull Nelson's division was the first to engage. About 3:00 a.m., the rain began to subside and Nelson's troops moved slowly through the broken trees, mud and heavy underbrush. At 5:20, Hazen's brigade came in contact with some skirmishers of Forrest's cavalry who offered some light resistance. As Hazen approached Wicker Field, above Bloody Pond, they found three guns of an apparently unsupported Confederate battery. Hazen's skirmishers ran across the clearing towards the cannon and were met by Chalmers brigade and the first heavy fighting of the morning began. 73




Preston Pond was positioned in front of a ravine on the north side of Jones Field. At 6:30 a.m., Lew Wallace's skirmishers and Thompson's 9th Indiana Artillery opened fire on Pond's brigade at four hundred yards. Ketchum's Alabama Battery came forward and the two units exchanged artillery fire until 7:00 a.m. Pond's infantry was forced to withdraw by 9:00 a.m. to the Purdy-Hamburg road, while Ketchum's Battery and the Texas Rangers remained behind to conduct a rear-guard action. Shortly, they too withdrew to a position southeast of Jones Field. About 9:00 o'clock, Gibson's brigade advanced towards Jones Field with S. A. M. Wood's brigade two hundred yards in advance and on his right. 74

At daylight, Colonel Deas sent Captain R. J. Hill to search for General Withers' division and to get information. Captain Hill soon returned with news that the enemy were advancing. Deas assembled his two-regiment brigade and marched over to Jones field. Here General Ruggles was forming a line of mixed regiments and Deas' men were positioned on the extreme left of this line. Ruggles' line of infantry was backed by Ketchum's, Smith's and Girardey's batteries. 75, 76




By 10:00 a.m., Thompson's Battery had pulled back to replenish its caissons and was replaced in the center of Jones Field by Thurber's Battery I, 1st Missouri Light Artillery. Two companies of the Texas Rangers made a cavalry dash against Thurber's battery but were easily repelled by skirmishers of the 8th Missouri. Gibson's brigade made the next charge and were also driven back, but not before the 1st Arkansas captured one gun. 77 From a nearby strip of timber, Wallace's infantry fired on the Arkansas troops, forcing them to retreat before they could move the gun. 78 Wallace then moved Smith's brigade of one Missouri and two Indiana regiments in front of Thurber's guns. 79

70 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 378, 379
71 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, page 386
72 James Arnold, Shiloh 1862, pages 74, 75
73 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 383, 384
74 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, page 278, 279
75 Official Records, Chapter XXII page 539
76 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, page 280
77 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, page 279, 280
78 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 383, 384
79 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, page 280

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The 22nd Alabama, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Marrast, received orders to advance and moved forward three hundred yards in the direction of enemies batteries, where they took cover in a hollow. From this position, Marrast "threw out a skirmishing party of twenty men, under command of Captain Hart, of Company K." 80



At 10:30, Wallace's men began a general advance towards the Confederate lines. Deas then found skirmishers on his left and rear and the order was given to fall back to their first position. 81 Captain Hart did not hear the call to return and Marrast ordered Lieutenant Wood of Company I, with 2 men, to ascend the hill and warn Hart's skirmishing party. Hart and his men all safely returned, but reported not seeing Lieutenant Wood. The three men were never seen again and Marrast assumed they had been taken prisoner. 82



In this new position, under the crest of a hill, the 22nd Alabama and the 1st Louisiana offered support for two Confederate batteries, probably those of Ketchum and Smith. The regiments lay in this position for about two hours, when Bragg ordered them to attack a force on their left. Having been placed again on the extreme left of the line, Deas' brigade advanced some three hundred yards towards the enemy's position. During this advance, Deas was joined by the 4th Kentucky Infantry, making the number under Deas' command something less than five hundred men. The unit advanced until it came under cover of some timber and there engaged two enemy brigades. During this engagement, the main line fell back to its original position, leaving Deas' command isolated and alone. This unequal struggle continued for the space of nearly one half hour, resulting in severe casualties, with nearly one half of Deas' men killed or wounded. Deas' then ordered his men to fall back to their position in the main line, which was done in good order. 83, 84 A second advance against the enemy position was attempted. According to Marrast, they advanced some two hundred yards where he placed the men under cover of timber and opened fire. The enemy return fire was very heavy and the small brigade sustained the attack for only a few minutes before falling back. 85

80 Official Records, Chapter XXII page 542
81 Official Records, Chapter XXII page 539
82 Official Records, Chapter XXII pages 542, 543
83 Official Records, Chapter XXII page 539
84 Official Records, Chapter XXII page 543
85 Official Records, Chapter XXII page 543

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General Bragg positioned the Confederate left in a new line north of Shiloh Church and on either side of the Pittsburg-Corinth Road. He then called for reinforcements, and Beauregard committed Preston Pond's brigade. 86 Deas again formed his brigade, now numbering only 60 men, on the extreme left of the Confederate line. Under command of General Beauregard, another advance of some 100 to 200 yards was attempted but the line soon fell back under orders. In this attack, Colonel Deas' second horse was killed and he was compelled, from the loss of blood due to wounds received hours earlier, to retire from the field. From this point, the 22nd Alabama was represented in every movement made toward the enemy, never retreating without an order. 87, 88

By 2:30 p.m., Bragg's line on the Confederate left was beginning to crumble as was the remainder of the Confederate force. Colonel Jordan described the army to General Beauregard as being somewhat like a lump of wet sugar, still holding its shape, but ready to dissolve at any moment. The General then expressed his intention to withdraw the army. Preparations were made and a company of cavalry was sent to the rear to repair the roads. Colonel Jordan was commanded to place a rear-guard on the ridge south of Shiloh Church. 89

Marrast reported that he was informed by the officer in command of Ketchum's battery that he had been deserted by the troops left for his support. The services of the 22nd were volunteered and the regiment remained on the field until the horses and gunners were removed from the two guns, which had to be abandoned. According to Marrast, when his men left this position, not a man of the Confederate army was left in front of his command. 90

The command ordering a general retreat was given about 3:00 p.m. and between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock, the last of the infantry had left the battlefield. Except for a few minor skirmishes, the fighting was over. For the Confederate Army, the march back to Corinth was miserable. The roads were scattered with the mangled bodies of the dead. Everywhere, could be heard the cries of the wounded. The rain again began to fall and the men marched through knee-deep mud. They spent the long night in silence, lying in the mud under the driving rain. In the Federal camps, conditions were just as miserable. Two Federal soldiers, soaked and shivering from the cold, were standing out in the rain over a mortally wounded Confederate who was covered with an Army blanket. They waited for him to die, then sought shelter and warmth together under the discarded blanket. 91

The Confederates needed a complete victory if they were to have any hope of winning the war. In the aftermath of the defeat at Shiloh, the Confederacy lost nearly all of its lands in the western theater. Although the Union Armies were victorious, any hopes for a swift end to the war were dashed. They now knew they were facing a formidable foe who possessed as much will and courage to sacrifice for his cause as the Union did for theirs. The battle at Shiloh was the bloodiest ever fought on American soil until that time. The Confederate Army of the Mississippi had thrown 44,699 men into the battle, and suffered losses of 10,699 (1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded and 959 missing). As for the Union armies of Grant and Buell, 66,812 men were placed on the field during the two days and casualties totaled 13,047 (1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and 2,885 missing).

The 22nd Alabama began the conflict with 435 men and officers and lost more than 375. In his report of 25 April 1862, Deas' reported that only 60 men under his command were available for Beauregard's last attack, including those of the 1st Louisiana.

According to Larry J. Daniel, in his book, Shiloh, the Battle That Changed the Civil War, the 23,000 combined losses for both armies nearly doubled those at Manassas, Wilson's Creek, Fort Donelson, and Pea Ridge combined. The two days of fighting had produced more casualties than had been lost in all of America's previous wars, and with the battles of Chancellorsville, Chickamauga and Gettysburg still on the horizon, this one would continue for another three years. 92

On Tuesday, 08 April, the Army of the Mississippi continued its march back to Corinth, a distance of twenty-three miles from Pittsburg Landing. The roadsides were littered with abandoned wagons and cannons stuck in the mire. Houses along the way were converted into temporary hospitals and the "whole road was lined with wagons freighted with dead and wounded." Most of the troops arrived after nightfall with little rations and many had to dig into the mud to find water. 93

The men awoke on the morning of 09 April to the grisly sights of "death and suffering." Coffins and wounded soldiers nearly covered the railroad platform. The arrival of physicians, nurses and anxious parents looking for their sons added to the overcrowded conditions around Corinth. Hospitals were overflowing and many of the wounded were removed to other Mississippi cities, to Memphis and to the Marine Hospital in Natchez on the Mississippi River. 94 One surgeon determined that a change of location and the thought of going home might improve the condition of many of the wounded, perhaps even saving their lives. Accordingly, he prescribed furloughs for many of his patients. 95 A soldier named Horatio, from the 22nd Alabama, indicated in a letter home dated 11 April 1862, that furloughs of 30, 40, 50 and 60 days were issued to many of the wounded according to the seriousness of their wounds. 96

86 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, page 289
87 Official Records, Chapter XXII page 539
88 Official Records, Chapter XXII page 543
89 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle That Changed the Civil War, pages 289, 290
90 Official Records, Chapter XXII page 543
91 Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April, pages 416, 422
92 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh, The Battle