Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
I am a little unclear as to the premise. Is Hood marching north before the fall of Petersburg? So Hood's boys file into the trenches beside Lee's?
If so, I do not see much difference in the overall outcome. Lee is able to extend his lines easier so that Grant cannot flank as easily. The only question is how many troops Grant then pulls into Virginia knowing he now has two Confederate armies to bag instead of one.
If I recall, by now Lee had enough trouble supplying his troops in Petersburg. Where is he going to get the additional supplies for Hood's men as well? With Grant entrenched as well as Lee, no real offensive operations, unless another end run to try to threaten Washington.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
As we know Lee was moving west with his army's in its retreat from Petersburg with a plan to meet and merge his AoNV with Johnston's AoT in NC.
What if Hood had marched the AoT north after the fall of Atlanta and merge with Lee's army in VA.?
With the two Southern armies merged the numerical advantage in men Grant once held would be gone.
Sherman diddled around in Atlanta once it fell so Hood could have gotten a away without Sherman in pursuit.
What troubles could Lee's new army have brought to Grant and Sherman?
A musing thought.....
There were Confederates who talked of such things in late 1864. I have always wondered what they were smoking, because this is a thoroughly impractical idea.
Atlanta falls September 2, 1864. Hood's army is in bad shape and in full retreat. Sherman turns back to Atlanta, allowing Hood to rest and regroup.
In real life, Hood and Davis decide that Hood will move out towards north GA/north AL to strike at Sherman's LOC and try to draw him into battle in the rugged terrain out that way. Why they would think this would be more effective after Atlanta fell rather than before it fell is beyond me, but that is what they tried to do. Sherman did follow Hood for a while, but decided chasing Hood through those hills wasn't very worthwhile. He gave up the chase, sent Thomas to TN, and marched towards Savannah.
This is where your what-if starts, somewhere in late September, with Hood marching to join Lee instead of marching into the north GA-AL hills. In real life, Hood marched north on September 29, and the battle at Allatoona was on October 5. Hood's force at the time is about 39,000 men.
What route do you plan to take? Hood is literally hundreds of miles away from Lee, and I am sure the Confederate RRs are not in shape to transport most of his troops. There seem only two:
1) east across GA-SC-NC (no enemy opposition)
2) north past Atlanta, Chattanooga and Knoxville, up the Great Valley to the Shenandoah (lots of enemy opposition).
Given the logistical and transportation difficulties involved, I think either route would take a month or more, and I have difficulties seeing the army arriving in good shape.
Sherman was not diddling around in Atlanta during that time in real life. He first pursued Hood up into the hills. Then he began serious preparations for the March to the Sea. So if you march Hood away with most or all of his force, Sherman will do something. What do tyou think it will be? Follow Hood? Take Savannah? Take Mobile? The Deep South is now totally stripped of defenses, and Sherman can go anywhere he wants -- and has all the troops he sent back to TN in real life available to do something else.
While we're at it, Sherman can send Grant reinforcements by RR from Atlanta faster than Hood can get to Lee. So expect that XXIII Corps or the IV Corps or both to show up in Virginia by the time Hood gets there -- or earlier.
If Hood is coming up the Great Valley-Shenandoah route, he is in big trouble. About the time he starts, Sheridan smashes Early in the Valley (3rd Winchester through Cedar Creek). There will be a very unfriendly reception for him.
If Hood is coming through the Carolinas, he gets to Petersburg about late October. Grant can easily bring VI Corps back down from the Shenandoah in addition to other forces that will be arriving from Sherman and elsewhere. Hood's presence will not change much -- and the Confederacy was barely capable of supplying Lee's army with enough supplies to live on at Petersburg-Richmond. Add Hood with 30,000 men or so and a supply disaster is not far away.
This is one of the situations where Whitworth's arguments about Union logistical and other capacities dooming the South rings true. There is no way, IMHO, that the Confederacy can pull this off in late 1864.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
I disagree with trice that the transportation issues would have hinder Hoods movement north. The rail system in the Carolina's should have been still intact for they had avoided the ravages war until Sept. 1864. I think Hood could have found a rail link somewhere in west SC. or east GA. to move his army north. I think Hood could have reach Lee by the first week of Oct 1864.
I think once Hood was in the Carolina's the union intelligences would have lost track of Hood's army. Hood could have emerged in West VA., TN. or in VA. before Grant could have moved troops to counter Hood's movements.
Timewalker with Lee's and Hood's army merged and led by to aggressive leaders, they would not have just marched up there and lined the trenches. They would have forced a big fight somewhere in the tidewater area of VA.
Grant has been caught off guard at Shiloh and Ft. Donelson so if Hood could have come up from Elisabeth City(Next to My Mom's Home town) and struck Grants underbelly or from somewhere and surprised Grant.
This 'What if" is trying to find an alternative to the historical outcome that led to the defeat of Lee in April of 1865. If Lee could have destroyed Grant before November 1864, Lincoln could lost the election.
A musing of thoughts.....
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
I disagree with trice that the transportation issues would have hinder Hoods movement north. The rail system in the Carolina's should have been still intact for they had avoided the ravages war until Sept. 1864. I think Hood could have found a rail link somewhere in west SC. or east GA. to move his army north. I think Hood could have reach Lee by the first week of Oct 1864.
Hood isn't ready to move anywhere before late September -- he moved on September 29 in real life.
By late 1864, describing any part of the Confederate RR system as "still intact" is a stretch. They existed, and sections of it had trains running on them -- but four years of war without replacement parts for cars, engines, and rails had left them pretty rickety. Derailments were very common.
The year before this, when things were somewhat better, the Confederates strained themselves to move Longstreet and two divisions to Chickamauga from Virginia. The first orders from Lee to Longstreet on this move are issued August 31. The first troops board the trains September 7. Longstreet himself arrives at Ringgold Station near Chickamauga late on September 19th, and Longstreet's Corps did not bring its wagons and transport animals with it, and so was really dependent upon others. It did not arrive capable of a major offensive movement; only fighting within a short distance of where it stood.
That's over a RR system in better shape, using trains the whole way, with about 1/3rd of the troops you are contemplating moving. It is simply impossible to make the movement you are describing in late 1864, when Hood has to make a major march just to get to the RR, in the time period you are describing.
To give you another indication of what is involved, in April 1864 the Confederacy moved Longstreet's troops back to Virginia from western North Carolina. Lee discovered the trains could only deliver 1500 men/day over that short distance, and Longstreet was only moving about 9000 men. Try calculating how long it will take to move Hood's 30,000+ men by RR at that rate once they actually get to a working RR connection.
Starting in late September, you'll need a month or more to get Hood and 30,000 men to Virginia. You cannot, by any means, get them to where you want in a week -- and when they arrive they will be unable to take the field more than a few miles from where they get off the trains.
This is all just practical logistics and transportation. It takes time, lots of resources, and lots of planning. In late 1864, the Confederacy simply can't accomplish what you want in that timeframe. And then they'd have great difficulty feeding Hood's troops in Virginia.
Quote:
Originally Posted by 5fish
I think once Hood was in the Carolina's the union intelligences would have lost track of Hood's army. Hood could have emerged in West VA., TN. or in VA. before Grant could have moved troops to counter Hood's movements.
He probably would have left the area where Sherman could keep track of him. So? Where would the Union think he was going?
If he headed towards "west SC. or east GA", where can he come out? Savannah -- why? Charleston -- why? Wilmington -- why? West Virginia involves a long march over the mountains, will be very slow, and does nothing useful. Tennessee means what -- taking Knoxville or Chattanooga after doubling back through the mountains?
So if Hood disappears from Sherman's front by heading East, where is he going? Nowhere besides Lee makes sense, so the Union will take precautions -- and they'll have plenty of available troops to do it with.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
I have to agree that Hood moving to assist Lee is impractical. In fact, Hood himself wrote of such a plan in his memoirs, but I think he was dreaming. Hood thought he could do it after Nashville - perhaps even a bigger dream. There was no way the primary Confederate army in the West was going to be allowed to move East and abandon all of Tennessee and open up Mississippi and central Alabama to invasion.
On a side note, I've always thought if somehow Hood could have taken Nashville he doesn't even have to hold it. Just losing Nashville for a few weeks would have been a huge pyschological loss for the North. With the cards somewhat in Hood's favor he could grab some good ground near Nashville and hope the Yankees would attack him.
Losing Nashville for a few weeks as a huge pyschological blow is based on...what?
No, seriously. What indicates that the people willing to carry on the war would suddenly get a slug in the stomach from Hood somehow pulling off taking Nashville? I don't get it.
If it would work as a demoralizer, its an interesting possibility. I'm just stating a lack of understanding for how and why it would be, at this point in the war.
I still think Thomas would have smashed Hood's army like a sledgehammer against a gnat, myself.
__________________ Do your duty in all things. You cannot do more, you should never wish to do less. - Robert E. Lee
The probability that we may fail in the struggle ought not to deter us from the support of a cause we believe to be just. - Abraham Lincoln
Sherman had the Armies of the TN, Cumberland, and OH at his disposal. He could have dispatched any of them to counter Hood. Besides O.O.Howard and Sykes were already familiar with Virginia and the AoP.
I see there is much vigor against moving Hood north to the VA.. Trice thinks even with trains it would take over a month or more to move Hood's army north. The dice has been thrown and the south gets snake eyes.... Without concentration of the confederate forces either against Sherman or Grant the war is lost. The one to concentrate against would have been Grant but with all this vigor against the idea. Then the war is lost and we will just follow the tracks of Hood and Lee into the defeat of their cause.
A sad notion...
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
I see there is much vigor against moving Hood north to the VA.. Trice thinks even with trains it would take over a month or more to move Hood's army north. The dice has been thrown and the south gets snake eyes.... Without concentration of the confederate forces either against Sherman or Grant the war is lost. The one to concentrate against would have been Grant but with all this vigor against the idea. Then the war is lost and we will just follow the tracks of Hood and Lee into the defeat of their cause.
A sad notion...
There are two problems to face on such a move.
The first is the lateness of the attempt. Doing it in October of 1864, after Atlanta falls, means the Confederacy is already in a very bad position. The only thing they can really hope for then is that Lincoln wil;l somehow lose the election (and even that probably won't work.)
The second is that it is extremely difficult to withdraw forces from one front to reinforce another, and the time and distance involved here multiplies the difficulty of success. That's why you generally need to smack the opponent on one front before you pull the troops out, to rock him back on his heels. But neither Hood nor Johnston ever did that.
Johnston is actually the one with the best chance for this. If he had whacked Sherman good, somewhere up near Rocky Face, Dalton, Adairsville, etc. and sent him into retreat -- then he might have been able to detach a small corps (10,000+) to head for Virginia. But then Sherman moved very cautiously in the earrly phases, in some part because he understood that his mission was to prevent Johnston from re-inforcing Lee. (Sherman believed the game was to set Grant up to win the war in Virginia until Grant wrote him from petersburg to tell it that Sherman was now the main thrust.)
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
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Hood merges with Lee...."What if" 
I disagree with trice that the transportation issues would have hinder Hoods movement north. The rail system in the Carolina's should have been still intact for they had avoided the ravages war until Sept. 1864. I think Hood could have found a rail link somewhere in west SC. or east GA. to move his army north. I think Hood could have reach Lee by the first week of Oct 1864. 
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