Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
On June 30th, 1863, Brigadier General Pettigrew marched most of his brigade with canons toward Gettysburg with orders to collect commissary and quartermaster goods. Upon approaching Gettysburg his advance guard informs him there were Union cavalry(Buford) in the town. History shows, General Pettigrew chose to retire back toward the Gap.
What if General Pettigrew choose to advance on the town and engage the union cavalry going against the standing order to avoid an engagement?
Remember, Gen. Reynolds is still a day away but Burford has a Division Cavalry armed with carbine rifles no canons. He has not prepared for the Confederates to assault the town...
Would Gen. Heth have supported Gen. Pettigrew assaulted on Gettysburg with the rest of his Division?
Would the outcome of the Battle of Gettysburg been changed by starting it a day early?
Something to ponder???
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
My first question is what time is it? It is my understanding the Pettigrew contacted Buford's force in the morning,
We know Buford and his Div. fought a skilful and tenacious defense against Heth's division on 1, July.so we can assume an even more tenacious defense against a brigade. I believe Hill's corps was still not completely thru the Cash Town Gap on the morning of the 30th.
Lee had issued his fall-back and concentrate orders on the morning of the 29th, Heth (and Hill) would have to be awful aggressive to precipitate a battle before Lee's orders had been fulfilled first. But say, Heth, for whatever reason's, respondis immediately his whole division would not be in position IMO before early afternoon at the earliest, as already noted, Buford held up Heth several hours by himself, against Heth's Div. on the 1st July, so I would expect Heth would accomplish pushing Buford's command to the Cemetary Hill and ridge by nightfall. If reynolds and Howard are too far to rapidly close on Gettysburg, Meade would probably order Buford to pull back, and the battle would be at Pipe Creek.
This is a little tough for you have to figure out where all the key players are on the 30th...Reynolds and Early are both still a day away...
If Gen. Pettigrew infantry had marched on Gen. Buford Cavalry, he would have needed the rest of Heth's Division to carry the day.
If Gen Heth had thrown his whole division at Gen Buford on the 30t, Gen Buford would have retired a save distance away and most likely in the direction of Gen. Reynolds Corp. Buford would not have been ready for a big engagement on the 30th.
The true question is what happen on the July, 1?
Does Reynolds come up and smash into Heth's Division?
Has Hill sent Heth's support or was Gen. Heth order to withdraw on the night 30th.
Let say Reynolds smashes into Heth division on July 1st but would not Early's Corp have smashed into Reynolds Corp later that day just repeating history.
A notion .....
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
Let say Reynolds smashes into Heth division on July 1st but would not Early's Corp have smashed into Reynolds Corp later that day just repeating history.
Heth would have had Buford's division holed up, probably on Cemetery Hill, by nightfall on the 30th, with the 1st and 11th Corps still coming up on the 1st.
I suspect Lee would have had Longstreet's Corps on a forced march on the night of the 30th and, if possible, Ewell's. Then, as 5fish has observed, "just repeating history," in a different location. However, Reynolds would have been smashing into Heth's flank instead of head on. And Ewell would have faced Reynold's front instead of his flank. Howard's arrival would have faced about the same situation as he actually experienced.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Hard to say, Longstreets corp is still strung out 2-3 days to the south depending on the unit.
I propose an alternate scenario, Say Pettigrew strikes with just weak enough forces that Buford is convinced he can take them awaiting support from Reynold's and Howard.
Pettigrew strikes and fades back, with each regiment successively slowly drawing Buford and the AOP west.
That far west, it would make sense for Lee to converge, not on Gettysburg, but on the passes by South Mountain west of Cashtown...Longstreet would've been happy with such a intrinsically defensible position, hence less chance of a clash between him and Lee.
It would be like using Dan Morgan's Cowpens strategy but on a larger scale
Draw the enemy into a trap by feigned incompetence and destroy him.
__________________ Great-Great Grand Nephew of George H. Pfau, 4th NJ Vol Infantry
If, Reynolds and Howard are a day away and Buford cannot fight a delaying actions until reinforced by Reynolds and Howard, then, being a cavalryman, Buford will not stay around too long bfter Heth's Div. appears; What would be the point. He has found the ANV and no AoP, support close enough to justify continued action. The thing to do is keep contact with the ANV and report back to Meade for further orders. Gettysburg has been lost, so Meade logically will do what he originally planned. Dig in at Pipe Creek and let Lee come to him.
Lee either has to retreat or attack Meade. To move East, puts the AoP on his flank, to move north puts the Meade on Lee's rear and to retreat without battle would be almost worse than a defeat, in political terms.
Not necesarily, and having Meade on his rear would not be such a bad move. Meade would be under immense political pressure to eject Lee from Northern soil, the further north Lee went, the greater the likelihood that Lincoln would not sanction Meade sitting at Pipe Creek....
__________________ Great-Great Grand Nephew of George H. Pfau, 4th NJ Vol Infantry
It depends on what Lee knows and when. Is the pressure to attack really greater on Meade than it is on Lee?
Lee is already having supply problems, he is already concerned about maintaining his LOC. He has already pulled back his advanced units. L
Lee original plan envisioned drawing the AoP to Ewell's Position NE or Gettysburg and by concentrating in this area defeat the Union Army. Instead, on first report of Meade's position further North and West than anticipated and this report by a spy, a source of intelligence Lee considers generally unreliable, Yet Lee sensitiveness to his LOC and Supply Train, that he cannot take the chance that the Spy's report Might not be correct.
It is hightly unlikely that Lee would be as sensitive to the political pressures that may be on Meade as he has of his own very real vulnerabilities.
IMO if Meade is careful (and we know he is) he can only be defeated and if Lee is too Aggressive (and we know he can be) he could lose his Army. Especially if he does move North and Meade moves up, but does not attack. (A familiar trait of Meade's from Gettysburg until Grant assumed command)
What lines of communications? Lee cut himself off already... (See Bevin Alexander's Robert E. Lee's Civil War on this. The federal garrison at Harper's Ferry cut off the supply routes even if Lee already hadn't. Either way, the distances were too vast for reliable communication.
__________________ Great-Great Grand Nephew of George H. Pfau, 4th NJ Vol Infantry