What Would Lee have Done Next---?

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members,

I also consider General Lee's use of the press. Lee came to find out, as did Lincoln and Grant; that the press would publish details of their home forces and often, this allowed spies to read, obtain and or forward papers to the enemy command and or intelligence.

What Lee may have felt truthfully, may not fully known as Lee did not write his personal memories, thoughts, etc. He passed around 2 years after the ending of the Civil War and a lot of his papers were destroyed prior to the surrender at Appomattox. I know Lee made an effort to gather from others but---that is history.

But, like politics--news papers always puts their own 'spin' on things. It is also evident that some Generals entered under non-de-plumes their 'side of the story' if they seemingly were being 'spanked' by the Commanding Generals for poor performances.

How much influence on Generals by newspaper stories/reports -- I don't know. I'm sure General Lee knew that back home, his Government was being manipulated by the press as much as the army indirectly was. Thus, understandingly towards the end of the war; General Lee screened each piece of document going through Col. Taylor (Chief of Staff) before going to Richmond. Grant, often wrote orders but; in such a way as to mislead from the real goal, e.g. Sherman's use of Cavalry.

I often wonder what would have happened if Virginia, et. al., did not join the rebellion. Got to admit, many good Generals have come from Virginia.

Just some thoughts.

Sincerely,
M. E. Wolf

[trice]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

"...to concentrate for the big win." "....but the south needed to do that, sometime, somewhere." Very true, but politically, Davis percieved the unity of the Confederacy as being to fragile, to risk the all -or-nothing military approach. That perception may have been faulty or completely wrong, but it was, in fact, a very real constraint on the south's military commanders, including Lee. From his days as Military Advisor to Davis, through various high level conferences with the Pres. during his tenure as Commanding Gen. of the ANV, it is unlikely that Lee was unaware of that particular constraint.

I underestand it was there, and I certainly think Lee was aware of it. Other Southern generals (like Beauregard) came up with unrealistic plans that seem to have made no effort to take it into account, but Lee always seemed aware of political constraints.

There are no absolutes in chosing a course of action in warfare (unless you are so desperate that only one chocie is possible). The South could have held out with a defensive cordon strategy, but that would require more success by the Western and Coastal commands, and the South didn't get it. Essentially, they needed the equivalent of a second Lee-Jackson-Longstreet-Stuart team out there somewhere, and they never developed one. Since they didn't have one, the idea of taking risks to win a big victory on a single front gains more appeal.

Tim

[ole]

It's been a while since a discussion has contributed so much to my understanding of the inner-workings of a war. A model of eloquence, scholarship and civility, gentlemen! Thank you.

ole

[whitworth]

prior to Pickett's Charge. He had to make a beeline back to the Potomac River.
Lee even wrote Jefferson Davis, previously, that he could never conduct a siege of Washington. He would either run out of ammunition or out of forage.

The Confederacy was always a near basket case when it came to logistics and supplies.

[M E Wolf]

Dear Whitworth and List Members,

According to many official reports by General Lee to either President J. Davis or the Secretary of War; Lee was always requesting supplies on the most basic levels. He had adequate supplies in the beginning but, never excess.

In General Lee's letter to President Davis about the surrendering of his force at Appomatox, in summary he wrote these words:
Mr. President: It is with pain that I announce to Your Excellency the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia. The operations which preceded this result will be reported in full. I will therefore only now state that, upon arriving at Amelia Court House on the morning of the 4th with the advance of the army, on the retreat from the line in front of Richmond and Petersburg, and not finding supplies ordered to be placed there, nearly twenty-four hours were lost in endeavoring to collect in the country subsistence for men and horses. This delay was fatal, and could not be retrieved. The troops, wearied by continual fighting and marching for several days and nights, obtained neither rest nor refreshment: and on moving, on the 5th, on the Richmond & Danville railroad, I found at Jotersville the enemy's cavalry, and learned of the approach of his infantry and the general advance of his army toward Burkeville. This deprived us of the use of the railroad, and rendered it impracticable to procure from Danville the supplies ordered to meet us at points of our march. Nothing could be obtained from the adjacent country. Our route to the Roanoke was therefore changed, and the march directed upon Farmville, where supplies were ordered from Lynchburg. The change of route threw the troops over the roads pursued by the artillery and wagon trains west of the railroad, which impeded our advance and embarrassed our movements. [Omitting the Longstreet and Gordon campaign details of 2nd Paragraph]
The army continued its march during the night, and every effort was made to reorganize the divisions which had been shattered by the day's operations; but the men being depressed by fatigue and hunger, many threw away their arms, while others followed the wagon trains and embarrassed their progress. On the morning of the 7th, rations were issued to the troops as they passed Farmville, but the safety of the trains requiring their removal upon the approach <cmh3_554>of the enemy, all could not be supplied. The army, reduced to two corps, under Longstreet and Gordon, moved steadily on the road to Appomattox Court House; thence its march was ordered by Campbell Court House, through Pittsylvania, toward Danville. The roads were wretched and the progress slow. By great efforts the head of the column reached Appomattox-Court House on the evening of the 8th, and the troops were halted for rest. The march was ordered to be resumed at 1 a.m. of the 9th. Fitz Lee, with the cavalry, supported by Gordon, was ordered to drive the enemy from his front, wheel to the left, and cover the passage of the trains; while Longstreet, who from Rice's station had formed the rear guard, should close up and hold the position. Two battalions o[ artillery and the ammunition wagons were directed to accompany the army, the rest of the artillery and wagons to move toward Lynchburg. In the early part of the night the enemy attacked Walker's artillery train near Appomattox station, on the Lynchburg railroad, and were repelled. Shortly afterward their cavalry dashed toward the Court House, till halted by our line. During the night there were indications of a large force massing on our left and front. Fitz Lee was directed to ascertain its strength, and to suspend his advance till daylight if necessary. About 5 a.m. on the 9th, with Gordon on his left, he moved forward and opened the way. A heavy force of the enemy was discovered opposite Gordon's right, which, moving in the direction of Appomattox Court House, drove back the left of the cavalry and threatened to cut off Gordon from Longstreet, his cavalry at the same time threatening to envelop his left flank. Gordon withdrew across the Appomattox river, and the cavalry advanced on the Lynchburg road and became separated from the army.
Learning the condition of affairs on the lines, where I had gone under the expectation of meeting General Grant to learn definitely the terms of the surrender of the army, I requested a suspension of hostilities until these terms could be arranged. In the interview which occurred with General Grant in compliance with my request, terms having been agreed on, I surrendered that portion of the army of Northern Virginia which was on the field, with its arms, artillery, and wagon trains, the officers and men to be paroled, retaining their side-arms and private effects. I deemed this course the best under all the circumstances by which we were surrounded.
On the morning of the 9th, according to the reports of the ordnance officers, there were 7,892 organized infantry with arms, with an average of seventy-five rounds of ammunition per man. The artillery, though reduced to sixty-three pieces, with ninety-three rounds of ammunition, was sufficient. These comprised all the supplies of ordnance that could be relied on in the State of Virginia. I have no accurate report of the cavalry, but believe it did not exceed 2,100 effective men. The enemy were more than five times our numbers. If we could have forced our way one day longer, it would have been at a great sacrifice of life, and at its end I did not see how a surrender could have been avoided. We had no subsistence for man or horse, and it could not be gathered in the country. The supplies ordered from Lynchburg could not reach us, and the men, deprived of food and sleep for many days, were worn out and exhausted.
With great respect, your obedient servant,
His Excellency Jefferson Davis.
R.E. LEE, General.

[Reference: Confederate Military History, Vol. 3
CHAPTER XXXI. ]

Many of General Lee's letters to his wife in regard to send more socks, as his men were in need of them. The General Hill movement into Gettysburg for shoes, the many incidents of food and feed, basic clothing needs and those for winter. The supplies were always lacking and thus manipulates that military.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[Cpt. Steinhauer]

he would do as planned. destroy the enemy. he would chase the enemy down and destroy them.