Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
Didn't know about that part of Lee's midsummer night's dream.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
From what I have read over the years, Lee suggested bring Beauregard to Va. along with units from NC., SC, GA. in his earlier discussions with Pres. Davis in May to support him in his invasion of the North.
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
From what I have read over the years, Lee suggested bring Beauregard to Va. along with units from NC., SC, GA. in his earlier discussions with Pres. Davis in May to support him in his invasion of the North.
Yet Cooper replies to Lee's 6/23 letter by saying the President was embarassed when he received it because it was the first he'd heard of it.
Not sure what was going on. At a minimum, it looks like gross inefficiencies and lack-of-communication among the players. I'm not even sure that what Lee wanted was possible without incurring the risk of grave losses along the Carolinas coast when the troops were withdrawn.
OTOH, a viable threat near Washington might have kept one of Meade's Corps away from Gettysburg. It sure would have been handy when the time to retreat came anyway.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
It does seem that if reinforcing Lee with Troops from the Carolina's and Ga. under Beauregard, was discussed with Davis, then it appears that the Pres. did not take the plan very seriously and dismissed it from his mind, immediately after the discussion.
Would Davis seriously consider giving Beauregard an important and possibly important command in Va. All southern states were calling for reinforcements and supplies. Could a Major reallocation of military forces to Va. even be contemplated without creating a major politicalcrisis for the Davis Administration? (with the resulting political firestorm being reported in the newspapers, much to the delight of Union Intelligence services)
Most likely, Lee's plan was merely window dressing (a best case scenario) for his invasion of Pa. Campaign, with, no real expectation that it could or would be realizable and/or laying the ground work, to excuse a failure, if the Pa. venture failed.
On the other hand Opn, had Davis risked the ire of the Carolinas and Georgia and arranged for a small army to threaten Washington, it wouldn't be hard to convince me that Hooker/Meade would have been required to leave at least one Corps to cover Washington.
Two of the seven Corps left behind would most certainly have made a difference at Gettysburg. It is not certain that Lee would have prevailed against five Corps, (if we accept that the same mis-coordination would have been made) and Meade might have been able to put the five on the scene faster than he did the seven.
Makes for interesting speculation.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
It does seem that if reinforcing Lee with Troops from the Carolina's and Ga. under Beauregard, was discussed with Davis, then it appears that the Pres. did not take the plan very seriously and dismissed it from his mind, immediately after the discussion.
Would Davis seriously consider giving Beauregard an important and possibly important command in Va. All southern states were calling for reinforcements and supplies. Could a Major reallocation of military forces to Va. even be contemplated without creating a major politicalcrisis for the Davis Administration? (with the resulting political firestorm being reported in the newspapers, much to the delight of Union Intelligence services)
Most likely, Lee's plan was merely window dressing (a best case scenario) for his invasion of Pa. Campaign, with, no real expectation that it could or would be realizable and/or laying the ground work, to excuse a failure, if the Pa. venture failed.
Oh, no -- Lee wasn't the excuse sort.
The forward deployment of troops like this would be the mark of an aggressive commander, and is perfectly in accord with how Lee liked to act.
There are benefits to doing this. Lee is clearly playing to them in his letter. Threatening Washington would have made the administration nervous, and might easily have caused the retention of part of Hooker/Meade's force near Washington. The risk -- which Lee obviously would have taken -- is that sending troops to northern VA from the GA-SC-NC coast might give important advances to the Union. The gamble is that what you'll gain will be more important, or that you can recover what was lost after you win the big victory. Very Napoleonic; very much like Lee.
Most people -- heck, most commanders -- would not do what Lee is proposing here. It usually takes a well-established central command; the Confederate system is not designed for it. Not too surprising that Davis was not on-board with it.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
On the other hand Opn, had Davis risked the ire of the Carolinas and Georgia and arranged for a small army to threaten Washington, it wouldn't be hard to convince me that Hooker/Meade would have been required to leave at least one Corps to cover Washington.
Two of the seven Corps left behind would most certainly have made a difference at Gettysburg. It is not certain that Lee would have prevailed against five Corps, (if we accept that the same mis-coordination would have been made) and Meade might have been able to put the five on the scene faster than he did the seven.
Makes for interesting speculation.
With only 5 or 6 Corps, Lee probably would not have found Meade as far forward as Gettysburg. Meade would have been much more likely to move cautiously in that situation. Even if struck there, Meade would probably have recoiled in the situation of July 1.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
No matter how one slice's it, Lee was violating his own prerequisites, he himself laid down as necessary for a succerssful offensive. Why? Was there another unstated reason that overrode even Lee's expert military opinion and common sense? (In fact, his expert military opinion was borne out by events.)
The Beauregard army plan, 'may' have been militarily possible, but was it politically possible?
Trice has already described Hill's delaying actions concerning returning troops to the ANV. IMO,the Gov's of the Carolina's and Ga. could be expected to be as recalcitrant, if not more so, than they already were, concerning sending troops out of their states.
Davis would be required to expend an almost, impossible amount of political capital to facilitate such a movement. As Davis' faulty memory seems to indicate, even he had no stomach for such a confrontation.
No matter how one slice's it, Lee was violating his own prerequisites, he himself laid down as necessary for a succerssful offensive. Why? Was there another unstated reason that overrode even Lee's expert military opinion and common sense? (In fact, his expert military opinion was borne out by events.)
I don't think you can find Lee's actual thoughts because he chose not to reveal them as his normal policy. While he "shared" more than Jackson did, I have never thought it was by much. It is just that while Jackson came across as obsessively secretive, Lee had the political skill to appear like he was co-operative and forthcoming while not really saying much.
Lee was no dummy. He knew the situation was bad out West. Some of his statements about other areas seem unrealistic, but you can never be sure how much of that is really a self-serving effort to preserve forces in his own area -- as most commanders are prone to do.
Quote:
Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
The Beauregard army plan, 'may' have been militarily possible, but was it politically possible?
Trice has already described Hill's delaying actions concerning returning troops to the ANV. IMO,the Gov's of the Carolina's and Ga. could be expected to be as recalcitrant, if not more so, than they already were, concerning sending troops out of their states.
They definitely weren't all that co-operatiuve about it. Certainly the governors of GA and NC were not in the Summer of 1863.
Quote:
Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
Davis would be required to expend an almost, impossible amount of political capital to facilitate such a movement. As Davis' faulty memory seems to indicate, even he had no stomach for such a confrontation.
Here's the problem with this: at some point, trying to hold everything means you lose everything. Sometimes you have to be willing to lose something to concentrate for the big win. The South may have been unwilling to do that, but the South needed to do that sometime, somewhere.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
"...to concentrate for the big win." "....but the south needed to do that, sometime, somewhere." Very true, but politically, Davis percieved the unity of the Confederacy as being to fragile, to risk the all -or-nothing military approach. That perception may have been faulty or completely wrong, but it was, in fact, a very real constraint on the south's military commanders, including Lee. From his days as Military Advisor to Davis, through various high level conferences with the Pres. during his tenure as Commanding Gen. of the ANV, it is unlikely that Lee was unaware of that particular constraint.
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