Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
What Whitworth said: Lee simply didn't have the wherewithall to proceed. Even if he'd won at Gettysburg and forced Meade to withdraw to the Pipe Creek line, he'd still have a well fed, equipped, and entrenched army to contend with.
Has everyone seen a map of the Pipe Creek Line and the roads going through and around it? To get to Washington, Lee would have to cross it -- he couldn't skirt it to the south. He could skirt it to the north, but that would give Meade the opportunity of cutting him off from his line of retreat and capturing the entire AoNV. Lee was audacious, but not insane.
So. He wins at Gettysburg, his army is all but out of ammo and hasn't eaten for a while. (It has already been noted that there's not a lot of water available on Cemetery Ridge.) If Meade doesn't counterattack on the 4th, Lee has another day of horses dying and men going crazy with thirst, further reducing his chances of getting back to Virginia.
I thought the Gettysburg Campaign ill-advised from the getgo. Extending it, even with a victory at Gettysburg, was quite impossible and adding a definition of "rash" in the dictionaries.
ole
I've often wondered why Lee went to Gettysburg. What if Lee had fought a strictly defensive war? How much longer would the war have lasted?
A purely defensive war still requires supplies. Virginia was tapped out and supplies were laboriously coming from elsewhere -- I'm assuming at a barely adequate volume. The blockade was becoming more effective and the supplies from western states was dropping off precipitously. What Lee was getting was coming up from Georgia, Florida and the Carolinas over tracks that failed regularly.
Sound like a "now or never"?
I'm with you bankerpapaw. Have long been looking for some logic in Lee's invasion. So I just made one up. Although I can conjure up an explanation for the expedition, I can't do the same for expectations of success. Maybe he just had to do something dramatic after his glorious victory at Chancellorsville? Or maybe Chancellorsville was the impetus giving rise to a belief that his army could perform miracles? Maybe he figured the long odds were only going to get longer, so he had to take the chance?
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I have long contended that the major (unstated) reason for Lee's Pa. Campaign, was to preempt any plans to send himself and/or units from the ANV and his beloved Va. to reinforce Johnston's efforts to save Vicksburg.
I have long contended that the major (unstated) reason for Lee's Pa. Campaign, was to preempt any plans to send himself and/or units from the ANV and his beloved Va. to reinforce Johnston's efforts to save Vicksburg.
While I have toyed with this idea as well, I am willing to give Lee the benefit of the doubt. Perhaps he truly believed that one good blow north of the Potomac could so demoralize the North that it would end the war, or at least make it more winnable. In this, I think he was wrong, but what else could be do?
I think it was impossible for Lee, being who he was, to think of a purely defensive war. To Lee, war could only be won on the offensive and even when he was on the strategic defensive he went on the tactical offensive. I think Lee was far sighted enough to see that if the war became a defensive war of attrition for him, he would eventually lose.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
I have long contended that the major (unstated) reason for Lee's Pa. Campaign, was to preempt any plans to send himself and/or units from the ANV and his beloved Va. to reinforce Johnston's efforts to save Vicksburg.
If this was true and Lee was trying to keep himself and parts of his army in the east.
Why did he allow Longstreet to go west later in the war?
What would have changed Lee's mind?
Remember, Jackson was dead and gone when Longstreet went west...
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
It is entirely possible that Lee was not completely aware of all his feelings, that led to his planning his Pa. Campaign. But, the many and varied reasons that was supposed to justify the proposed invasion, can certainly be ascribed to a lack of any real focus on any underlying strategic benefits that justified the risk of losing the ANV.
After Gettysburg, all the reasons for keeping the ANV concentrated at the expense of the West, had been used to justify the failed Pa. invasion. The result of Gettysburg, was the loss of the Mississippi River and effectively, the trans-Mississippi. How could Lee rationally now, justify no attempt to save Chattanooga and the southern heartland?
P.S. Even then, Davis (and/or Lee) still tried to have it both ways. They,apparently, sent the minimum forces required rather than the maximum.
To give Lee the benefit of the doubt, given Halleck's nature (a nervous Nelly) it is possible that a victory in the East by Lee would have resulted in Halleck stripping Grant and Banks of forces sufficient to allow Joseph Johnston to break the siege of Vicksburg (although given JEJ's nature, I wonder if he ever would have attacked Grant's forces at Vicksburg).
That was, after all, the idea. A bad idea, clearly, since it was too little, too late. By the time Lee got rolling, Vicksburg was toast. However, even if he had dispatched significant forces, could they have gotten to Johnston in time to make any difference? Would Johnston have make proper use of them?
Perhaps two other what-ifs: What if Lee had detached forces and sent them to Johnston? What if he had sent them to Bragg?
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
Outside a maximum effort to end the War, none of the other stated reason's favoring the Pa. adventure, would have justified the sacrifice of Vicksburg and the Mississippi River, even at the time.
That Lee was wrong can be forgiven, very few plans of any type, much less military, are ever 100%, but ending the war favorably to the south was only one of many other less plausible or convincing reasons.
It is fairly obvious now, if not then, that the Pa. campaign was a major (but not maximum) effort to achieve various limited goals, none of which or altogether (excepting ending the war) justified the risks; not only to the ANV, but Vicksburg and the south's strategic position in the West.
All doubts, concerning Gen. Johnston are justified. From the Historical Record indicates that Even with the entire ANV available, it is unlikely that Johnston would whole heartedly favor any offensive, until it was too late.
It was more important to send Lee than reinforcements to Mississippi, if the choice had to be Lee or Units from the ANV. Always providing that Lee would actually go and that he showed more competence and effort than his previous forays outside Va. during the war.
To give Lee the benefit of the doubt, given Halleck's nature (a nervous Nelly) it is possible that a victory in the East by Lee would have resulted in Halleck stripping Grant and Banks of forces sufficient to allow Joseph Johnston to break the siege of Vicksburg (although given JEJ's nature, I wonder if he ever would have attacked Grant's forces at Vicksburg).
That was, after all, the idea. A bad idea, clearly, since it was too little, too late. By the time Lee got rolling, Vicksburg was toast. However, even if he had dispatched significant forces, could they have gotten to Johnston in time to make any difference? Would Johnston have make proper use of them?
One of the things to remember when evaluating Lee's plans are these letters of Lee's:
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HDQRS. ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, June 23, 1863.
General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:
GENERAL: Upon leaving Fredericksburg, a regiment of General Pettigrew's brigade was sent to relieve General Corse's brigade at Hanover Junction, to enable the latter to rejoin his division.
General Corse was subsequently ordered to remain at the Junction, and I have not heard whether he has yet been sent forward or not. If not. I think the regiment will suffice for a guard at that point, and wish Corse's brigade to be ordered to rejoin its division, under General Pickett, as soon as possible.
He will march by Culpeper Court-House, and thence through Chester Gap to Winchester, where he will be instructed by what route to proceed. I wish to have every man that can be spared, and desire that Cooke's brigade may be sent forward by the same route, if it is not needed at Richmond. I think there will be no necessity for keeping a large number of troops at that place, especially if the plan of assembling an army at Culpeper Court-House, under General Beauregard, be adopted.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 23, 1863.
His Excellency President DAVIS, Richmond:
Mr. PRESIDENT: The season is now so far advanced as to render it improbable that the enemy will undertake active operations on the Carolina and Georgia coast before the return of frost. This impression is confirmed by the statements contained in Northern papers, that part of General Hunter's force had gone to re-enforce General Banks, and that Admiral Foote, the successor of Admiral DuPont in the command of the South Atlantic fleet, lies dangerously ill, a circumstance that will tend further to embarrass any designs the enemy may entertain of operating against the cities of the seaboard. Federal papers of the 19th allude to the frequent arrival or departure of troops and munitions at Old Point, and those of the 20th announce the arrival of General Peck and staff in Washington, without indicating the object of his visit, further than it may be connected with the movements just referred to.
At this distance, I can see no benefit to be derived from maintaining a large force on the southern coast during the unhealthy months of the summer and autumn, and I think that a part, at least, of the <ar45_925> troops in North Carolina, and of those under General Beauregard, can be employed at this time to great advantage in Virginia.
If an army could be organized under the command of General Beauregard, and pushed forward to Culpeper Court-House, threatening Washington from that direction, it would not only effect a diversion most favorable for this army, but would, I think, relieve us of any apprehension of an attack upon Richmond during our absence. The well known anxiety of the Northern Government for the safety of its capital would induce it to retain a large force for its defense, and thus sensibly relieve the opposition to our advance. Last summer, you will remember, that troops were recalled from Hilton Head. North Carolina, and Western Virginia for the protection of Washington, and there can be little doubt that if our present movements northward are accompanied by a demonstration on the south side of the Potomac, the coast would be again relieved, and the troops now on the Peninsula and south of the Potomac be withdrawn.
If success should attend the operations of this army, and what I now suggest would greatly increase the probability of that result, we might even hope to compel the recall of some of the enemy's troops from the west.
I think it most important that, whatever troops be used for the purpose I have named, General Beauregard be placed in command, and that his department be extended over North Carolina and Virginia. His presence would give magnitude to even a small demonstration, and tend greatly to perplex and confound the enemy. Of course, the larger the force that we can employ the better, but should you think it imprudent to withdraw a part of General Beauregard's army for the purpose indicated, I think good results would follow from sending forward, under General Beauregard, such of the troops about Richmond and in North Carolina as could be spared for a short time.
The good effects of beginning to assemble an army at Culpeper Court-House would, I think, soon become apparent, and the movement might be increased in importance as the result might appear to justify. Should you agree with me, I need not say that it is desirable that the execution of the plan proposed should immediately begin. The enemy will hear of it soon enough, and a proper reticence on the part of our papers will cause them to attribute greater importance to it. I need not mention the benefit that the troops themselves would derive from being transferred to a more healthy climate.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
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It would have taken a very different Confederate structure to manage this movement by Beauregard, one that didn't exist. Also June 23rd is too late to be coming up with this idea. But it does show how Lee's brain was working in late June.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
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