Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
OK, the hard wond won victory scenario. My scenario in post #6 was based on the Hard fought battle, supposition.
One fly in my ointment thought. In Meade's original Pipe Creek plan, I believe he had O.O. Howard on the extreme Left Flank of the Union Line, (the direction that Lee would necessarily approach from Gettysburg, If Meade had waited at Pipe Creek and, instead, called Reynolds and Buford back)
I know it is unlikely that after the maneuverings and movements during the battle at Gettysburg (and postulated Union retreat) that Howard and his Corps would end up on an exposed flank of the Army. But if I were Meade I would want to knew where Howard was, at all times. After all, in fact, Howard was indeed flanked and crushed at Gettysburg as he was at Chancellorsville.
Okay Opn, lets go with a less hard fought victory scenario by Lee.
Lee wins the Battle of Gettysburg on day two but the night of day one Longstreet is motivated and moves his Corp into position. He is able to begin his assault on Devils Den and LRT at first light.
He takes the these areas before the union forces can occupy them on the morning of day two. Upon Lee learning of Longstreet's early success he orders a full assault along the entire union lines.
Meade seeing he was flanked on the left and being pressed along his entire line retreats under fire toward his fullback position at Pipe Creeks.
What orders would Lee have issue for his army after his great victory at Gettysburg?
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
Depends on how early Longstreet could have made his attack. Except for Sixth Corps (force marching from Manchester) the AoP was assembled by 0600 on July 2d and already outnumbered the ANV.
We have discussed Lee's plan, for the 2d days battle on other threads and have had some difficulty determining the Axis of Lee's planned attack. But early in the morning, Sickle's Thrid Corps, was still on Cemetary Ridge in line with Hancocks Corps, so I do not think an early morning attack by Longstreet, even if he could get into position and make his attack very early (I do not), it would seem that the battle would still be hard fought and problematic.
The easy victory was possible on the 1st day, when Ewell's corps could have wrested control, of both Culp's Hill And (most likely) Cemetary Hill. Even, then the victory would have occurred too late in the evening to effectively pursue, the retreating Union forces very far.
Lee's victory would have aborted Meade's plans of moving to Gettysburg and the retreating Corps' would have linked up with the reinforcing corps' still advancing on Gettysburg and the AoP would have been reunited on it march back to Pipe Creek.
No matter how we slice it, the odd's were longer than normal for Lee and the AoP in Pa.
Depends on how early Longstreet could have made his attack. Except for Sixth Corps (force marching from Manchester) the AoP was assembled by 0600 on July 2d and already outnumbered the ANV.
We have discussed Lee's plan, for the 2d days battle on other threads and have had some difficulty determining the Axis of Lee's planned attack. But early in the morning, Sickle's Third Corps, was still on Cemetery Ridge in line with Hancocks Corps, so I do not think an early morning attack by Longstreet, even if he could get into position and make his attack very early (I do not), it would seem that the battle would still be hard fought and problematic.
The easy victory was possible on the 1st day, when Ewell's corps could have wrested control, of both Culp's Hill And (most likely) Cemetary Hill. Even, then the victory would have occurred too late in the evening to effectively pursue, the retreating Union forces very far.
Lee's victory would have aborted Meade's plans of moving to Gettysburg and the retreating Corps' would have linked up with the reinforcing corps' still advancing on Gettysburg and the AoP would have been reunited on it march back to Pipe Creek.
No matter how we slice it, the odd's were longer than normal for Lee and the AoP in Pa.
I think this tread is going different ways. If the battle at Gettysburg took two or three hard fought days for Lee to win, it would have been a Pyrrhic victory for him. He would have had to retire back to VA.
If he could have had a decisive victory on day one or if Longstreet could have attack at or before sunrise on day two. He would not have suffered the lose of men he did from history.
If day two could have achieved victory without the great loss of manpower and material as what happen in history then everything changes.
Lee could have chased Meade to Pipe Creek and engaged him there but again Meade would have hailed the high ground. Would Lee have attack Meade on High ground just waiting for him?
Lee could have tried to by pass Meade Pipe Creek forcing Meade to move an engage Lee where Lee chose the ground to fight.
Lee could have moved further east an crossing on of two rivers threatening Philadelphia instead of Washington, forcing Meade to moved against him and giving him the advantage in battle.
Remember Lee will have Stuart back as his eyes of the army from Day two onward.
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
Lee advanced into Pennsylvania, without enough resources to occupy enemy territory for very long. They bought inadequate feed for the numerous horses/mules pulling the artillery, the supply wagons and ammunition.
Lee had enough ammunition for one good battle. That he got at Gettysburg, running out of long range artillery ammunition on July 3rd.
Lee also had severed his connection with Virginia, and the high water of the Potomac made resupply impractical, all the way to Pennsylvania and eastern Maryland.
Meade's move to Gettysburg was brilliant. Grab onto Lee and block his egress. Meade did this for three days, wearing out the Confederate army with large casualties and reducing what supplies Lee had. It was the work of quick attrition -wearing down Lee's thrust in three days.
After Gettysburg, the last thing Lee would do is attack towards Washington. He had too little forage and he was in no position to attack another position, without artillery.
By the time Lee got back to Virginia, he wrote Jefferson Davis that he lost half his artillery and cavalry's effectiveness to worn down and dead horses.
The Army of the Potomac, had both forage and ammunition in Westminster, MD and supplies in Washington and Baltimore. Lee was running on vapors by July 3rd.
It was impossible for Lee to sustain another one or two week fight with an entrenched Army of the Potomac. So a move towards Washington was impossible for Lee.
What Whitworth said: Lee simply didn't have the wherewithall to proceed. Even if he'd won at Gettysburg and forced Meade to withdraw to the Pipe Creek line, he'd still have a well fed, equipped, and entrenched army to contend with.
Has everyone seen a map of the Pipe Creek Line and the roads going through and around it? To get to Washington, Lee would have to cross it -- he couldn't skirt it to the south. He could skirt it to the north, but that would give Meade the opportunity of cutting him off from his line of retreat and capturing the entire AoNV. Lee was audacious, but not insane.
So. He wins at Gettysburg, his army is all but out of ammo and hasn't eaten for a while. (It has already been noted that there's not a lot of water available on Cemetery Ridge.) If Meade doesn't counterattack on the 4th, Lee has another day of horses dying and men going crazy with thirst, further reducing his chances of getting back to Virginia.
I thought the Gettysburg Campaign ill-advised from the getgo. Extending it, even with a victory at Gettysburg, was quite impossible and adding a definition of "rash" in the dictionaries.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Crossing large rivers, in enemy territory, without a bridging train, was not really an option to Lee.
As a matter of historical interest, it should be noted that in Meade's orders for June 29 and 30 the AoP was formed in two north-south columns within supporting distance of each other.Meade's order for July, 1 had four of the seven corps converging on Gettysbur, while 2d, 5th and 6th Corps were to be located within a short distance to the proposed defense line of Big Pipe Creek.
So, even if First and Eleven Corps had been defeated and routed, earlier in the afternoon of July 1st, Meade had positioned his forces to check such a rout and be in a position to either reengage at Gettysburg or move to his previously planned position on Pipe Creek; as he and not Lee, should decide.
It would still be almost 24 more hours before Stuart's jaded cavalry force regain contact with Lee and another 24 hours before they would be fit for even minimal service in helping the ANV pursuit.
The truth from this "What if" is that Lee went into PA. with only one objective and everything else was secondary.
His move into PA. may have been going Harrisburg, or collect supplies for his badly under supplied army but he move into to PA. to engage the Union AoP and not only defeat it but to destroy it.
All the facts are there the campaign had no true strategic purpose and he only brought enough material for one good engagement.
It also supports the fact why Lee throw everything he had it the union army and was more then willing to destroy his army at Gettysburg.
It was an all or nothing gamble that failed. The only thing Lee didn't foresee the union not counter attacking after Pickett's charge and inept union efforts to stop his retreat.... I believe on day three Lee thought the war would be over one way or another and Meade did not corporate by not counter attacking.
Lee's goal was the destruction of his army or the union army. It was all or nothing.....
I believe Lee had a spot pick out in PA. where he wanted to meet and engage the union army but he never got there because of Gettysburg....
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
If Meade had fallen back to the Pipe Creek Line...
How much sooner could he had pursued Lee to the Potomac River.
Meade's supply line from Washington would have been closer, and he would have had better access to Hagerstown and Williamsport, Lee's retreat line.
Lee had to retreat. He did not have enough artillery ammunition to get caught in the Union wheel house of supplies, so close to Baltimore and Washington. That was the achilles heel; Lee had the troops but not the ammunition for continued attack.
At Gettysburg, Lee had a great advantage; he merely had to block the Fairfield Road gap to get his army to the Potomac River, without much hinderance.
In actual fact, from first to last, Meade's two main concerns was protecting Washington D.C. and Baltimore and Then inducing Lee to retreat back to Va., preferably without a fight.
As long as Meade perceived Lee to be retreating, he was more than willing for the AoP to serve as the escort for Lee's army out of Pa.
In getting Meade, to press the enemy, he was as difficult to control as McClellan or Rosecrans.
Lee's goal was to crush the AOP, but after 2 or 3 very hard days of fighting he's in no position to do so. Meade could simply fall all the way back to the fort system around DC if he so choosed. This would give him strong defensive positions and an increase in manpower.
Lee's stuck going back to VA with a win in hand, but no follow up to it that might bring about an end to the war, short of that win bringing France or England into it.
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Opn another twist!! 
Linear Mode
