Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
I have to respectfully disagree that the war was in the East. I think the game was essentially up by Oct-Nov 1864 for Lee. Badly outnumbered by Grant, Lee was being choked to death. Even if Hood shows up Grant could detach part of the Army of Potomoc to deal with him. Frankly, many of the Union boys would have rather been actively engaged rather than sitting in the trenches.
As it turned out, the Army of Tennessee, regardless of its commander, was in a real fix. Offering assistance to Lee is virtually abandoning the West and Sherman is not going to be stopped as he moves toward Savannah.
Here's an idea (and the Johnston supporters will hate me for this). Put Johnston back in command in Sept 1864, let him try and stop Sherman, and Savannah falls in perhaps February instead of Christmas. End result is the same.
Hood striking toward Nashville and trying to liberate Middle Tennessee remained, in my opinion, the best option. Would you rather move toward a town that was garrisoned by 8,000 (with the potential of significant reinforcement) or deal with Sherman's 60,000 or Grant's 100,000 already in place?
Perhaps I should have written that the war SHOULD have been in the East. I agree that Lee was toast by then as far as continued serious warfare was concerned. The slaughter was being continued for no particular gain. Even Hood must have felt he was playing out a vanishing scene with no real hope of a future. I doubt there was a man left in the Army of Tennessee in the winter of 1864 who would not have preferred to be in Australia, aside from a few who were near their homes, one way or the other. That speaks to the courage of the Confederate soldier in that they chose to fight to the bloody end, lacking supplies of any significance, heat and much hope.
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Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
Ancestors in CSA Army: 48th VA; 63rd VA, 5th NC Cav; 37th NC
Wife and Grandson's CSA: 15th AL, 51st GA, 41st TN; 36th TN; GA Mil 1197 Dist
By the time Sherman captured Atlanta, the war was lost by the Confederacy. Hood certainly could have made Sherman's March to the Sea, more difficult if he had placed his army in defense of Georgia.
But seemingly, Hood never thought that Sherman would move to Savannah, if Hood moved toward Nashville.
Hood greatly miscalculated. Hood also chose a foolhardy winter campaign, without adequate supplies. Hood got his army destroyed, and Sherman captured Savannah and cut off Lee from much supplies from Georgia and Alabama.
Hood moving to Tennessee was a disaster, and shortened the war by months.
"But where's General Hood's army?" interposed Melanie hastily. "Surely he could have held Savannah."
"Why, Miss Melanie, " Frank was startled and reproachful, "General Hood hasn't been down in that section at all. He's been fighting up in Tennessee, trying to draw the Yankees out of Georgia."
"And didn't his little scheme work well!" cried Scarlett sarcastically. "He left the **** Yankees to go through us with nothing but schoolboys and convicts and Home Guards to protect us."
From everything that I have read, the election of 1864 turns to Lincoln after the seizure of Atlanta. Is this true? (Frankly I really don't know, but the 'conventional wisdom is that McClellan is a shoe in prior to Atlanta's fall).
Considering the deteriorating military situation the Confederacy was faced with, the South's only hope is a McClellan election victory and Hood's efforts should be directed at keeping Sherman out of Atlanta.
Frankly, I think Hood has a shot to defend Atlanta...but Hood is not a defensive minded general. Instead of using the limited military means at his disposal to achieve a feasible political goal, he attempted to use limited means to achieve the impossible.
Hood made the required attempt to defend Atlanta until after the elections. It was Only After his defense of Atlanta failed and Lincoln's reelection that Hood decided to invade Tn.
From everything that I have read, the election of 1864 turns to Lincoln after the seizure of Atlanta. Is this true? (Frankly I really don't know, but the 'conventional wisdom is that McClellan is a shoe in prior to Atlanta's fall).
Considering the deteriorating military situation the Confederacy was faced with, the South's only hope is a McClellan election victory and Hood's efforts should be directed at keeping Sherman out of Atlanta.
Frankly, I think Hood has a shot to defend Atlanta...but Hood is not a defensive minded general. Instead of using the limited military means at his disposal to achieve a feasible political goal, he attempted to use limited means to achieve the impossible.
CW1865,
The election of 1864 was felled with uncertainty because the war overshadow everything and as far a I know there was no polling of the population back in 1864.
A few notes the Republican party changed it name to "National Union party" until after the election then it changed its name back. The party wanted the war Democrats support.
The Radical Republicans ran their own candidate John Fremonte until September of 1864. When they and Lincoln cut a deal..
McClellen was a war Democrat but the party platform was a peace platform so if he had won he still would have supported the war effort instead of supporting peace...
In September between Fremonte's withdrawal and the fall of Atlanta, the uncertain of a Lincoln victory seem to vanish...
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"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
From everything that I have read, the election of 1864 turns to Lincoln after the seizure of Atlanta. Is this true? (Frankly I really don't know, but the 'conventional wisdom is that McClellan is a shoe in prior to Atlanta's fall).
In August of 1864, Lincoln thought it quite likely he would lose the election and was beginning to plan what he might do when that happened. Grant was stalled outside Richmond-Petersburg; Sherman was stalled outside Atlanta; Early had just raided north and was back below the Potomac; and the casualty lists seemed too much to bear. Then:
August 5-23: Farragut wins the Battle of Mobile Bay and takes the forts controlling the entrance, thus shutting the port.
September 1: Sherman takes Atlanta.
September 19: Sheridan wins the Battle of 3rd Winchester.
September 21-22: Sheridan won the Battle of Fisher Hill.
October 9: Sheridan's cavalry routs Rebel cavalry at Woodstock/Tom's Brook.
October 19: Sheridan wins the Battle of Cedar Creek.
Other things happened, but none big enough to move the needle. The above events changed everything. In retrospect, they look like the inevitable cracking of the Confederacy, but at the time they were greeted with wild enthusiasm as they rolled in one after the other. People then saw them as clear signs Lincoln was finally winning the war. By the end of the year, people were sure of it, as Sherman rumbled across Georgia to Savannah and Thomas smashed Hood in Tennessee.
Quote:
Originally Posted by cw1865
Considering the deteriorating military situation the Confederacy was faced with, the South's only hope is a McClellan election victory and Hood's efforts should be directed at keeping Sherman out of Atlanta.
Frankly, I think Hood has a shot to defend Atlanta...but Hood is not a defensive minded general. Instead of using the limited military means at his disposal to achieve a feasible political goal, he attempted to use limited means to achieve the impossible.
I agree with the belief that Hood was not the man to hold Atlanta. I think he needed someone above him to make use of his ability and control his many faults. But he was on the same page with Davis, which is why he got the command.
The loss of Atlanta in 1864 is a microcosm of why the Confederacy lost the war. Johnston's management of the first half of the campaign shows his strengths just as it shows his failings: unflappable in a crisis, popular with his soldiers, never quite fighting the big battle, never quite striking the enemy, somehow yielding all too easily in the eyes of Davis. Hood's is too bold and thoughtless, wasting lives that can be ill-spared.
What the Confederates really need in that camapaign is what they needed everywhere and never had: an extra corps of 10,000 to 15,000 men, particularly under a bold independent commander of good judgement. But then they had few enough of those (think Stonewall Jackson as the example needed).
With such a force, the right independent commander can hang on Sherman's flank and threaten the RR, Sherman's sole source of supply, while Johnston blocked his path forward. In north GA, Sherman's army began to starve when they tied to move east or west (actual limit three days haulage by wagon) of the RR.
But that is what the Confederate was short everywhere: 10,000 men and the one more good commander. Time after time and place after place, when the opportunity came they were always just a little short: Ft. Donelson, Shiloh, Seven Pines, Seven Days, 2nd Manassas, Antietam, Perryville, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Chattanooga ...
Lee's ANV is the only one that build's up a real 1st class command team: Lee-Jackson-Longstreet-Stuart. But by early 1863 Lee is already thinking he needs a third, and that 40-50,000 men is too big for a corps command. But he stayed with two because he wasn't sure of a viable third, then struggled when Jackson went down. A. P. Hill and Ewell didn't measure up. But even with Jackson, time after time the ANV seemed just a little short, able to win the battle but not complete the victory.
A good independent commander with those 10,000 men could hang out to the West and force Sherman to detach a larger force against him, constantly threatening the RR south of Chattanooga. Weakened that much, Sherman could not have wrinkled Johnston out of position after position.
But of course, the South never found that good independent commander in time, and never scraped together a reserve of 10,000 men...
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
Edward C. Walthall and Nathan B. Forrest could have commanded the 10,000 men. Those numbers, the necessary supplies, and the logistics to deliver just weren't there. Had that occurred, there would have been one more serious battle in Georgia. Probably would have drawn Thomas out of Nashville, discounting much of the imagined increase in Confederate power. None of that would have really helped Lee in the north. It would simply have slowed Sherman's movement to link with Grant, something that Grant, as it turned out, really didn't require.
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Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
Ancestors in CSA Army: 48th VA; 63rd VA, 5th NC Cav; 37th NC
Wife and Grandson's CSA: 15th AL, 51st GA, 41st TN; 36th TN; GA Mil 1197 Dist
Edward C. Walthall and Nathan B. Forrest could have commanded the 10,000 men. Those numbers, the necessary supplies, and the logistics to deliver just weren't there. Had that occurred, there would have been one more serious battle in Georgia. Probably would have drawn Thomas out of Nashville, discounting much of the imagined increase in Confederate power. None of that would have really helped Lee in the north. It would simply have slowed Sherman's movement to link with Grant, something that Grant, as it turned out, really didn't require.
Those are good men to consider; I'd go with Forrest myself. The problem is that this needs to be done in the first few months of 1864; no one would have put them in that position at the time. Forrest couldn't even get out of Mississippi to go to Middle TN at that point, and I am really talking about a force over near Rome, threatening the RR in north GA below Chattanooga here.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
Please ref. Trice's post #27. He posts six critical events from Sept. thru Oct. that many assume assured Lincoln's reelection. Sherman's victory came early (just after Farragauts Victory at Mobile Bay. Like Mobile none of the other victories are tied or have any direct relationship with Sherman or Atlanta.
Lincoln would still have gone into the elections with a string of impressive military victories.
Most likely Atlanta would have been under close siege, at the worst and like Vicksburg, would be assumed to be lost (by both sides) without immediate relief.
I tend to believe that the problems of Lincolns reelection were overblown and seemed more dire at the time to the politicians, even Lincoln (for a time), but in actuality, the President had a winning hand from the very start of the war and the election of 1865. He couldn't lose if he played his cards half way decently and we know that Lincoln was much more than that as a politician And Commander In Chief.
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