Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
What if Gen. Lee had another heart attack on the morning of July 1, 1863 and was unable to due his duties as commander of the AoNV. Thrusting Gen. Longstreet into the command of the AoNV as the first shots of the Battle of Gettysburg were being fired.
What would he have done? When he reached the battlefield and saw the union forces were being routed.
Would he have ordered Ewell to take the hill in direct order?
Would he have moved the army as he had suggested to Lee in that fateful moment in history?
Would there have been a Little Round Top or a Pickett's charge?
What If Gen. Lee Had Another Heartattack ....... ?
We know Longstreet was not particularly in favor of the Pa. adventure, anyway, so IMO he would not have had any personal fish to fry, as far as fighting in Pa. or not.
On the morning of the 2d, neither Lee nor Longstreet knew whether they faced all the AoP or not and, if not, how few or how many that was.
Given his conviction that if Pa. had to be invaded, then the battle itself should be tactically defensive and leave the attacking up to Meade.
It is possible that Longstreet's plea's for an extended flanking movement, was only an excuse not to attack on the 2d day and with Lee incapacitated and Longstreet in command, the necessity of such a movement may not have occurred to him then.
Longstreet, probably, have immediately to order the ANV to dig in and await further orders. But would not have felt safe in withdrawing immediately, without more information.
With Stuart's arrival later on the 2d day and the growing evidence that Meade was not going to attack any time soon (if, at all), he would probably have sent Stuart out on the 3d to scout for a weakness on the Union Flanks, but with 10,000 Union cavalry under active commanders, it is likely that little of importance would be learned, quickly enough to benefit the ANV.
The imperitives, that forced Lee to fight or retreat would now be bearing down on Longstreet as well. The scarcity of supplies in Adams Cty, low ammunition, inadequate transport etc. all dictated quick decision on what to do.
IMO, Longstreet would retreat and Meade, facing solid Confederate entrenchment, would let him. Since there would have been no battle at Gettysburg after the 1st day (probably) both armies would have been relatively unscathed by a major battle, thus it be up to the initiative and confidendence of the two army commanders. Longstreet would make and more orderly and longer retreat. Moving back to the mountain passes in the Chambersburg and Cashtown area's. Once there the ANV would retreat into the valley, with stuart whol command this time guarding the gaps. Besides skirmishing with his cavalry Meade would, otherwise keep a respectful distance and escort Longstreet out of Pa.
Such an event would surely have cost Meade his job, ad brought Grant East immediately.
Assuming Longstreet kept command of the ANV, then he would not be going West and in the political firestorm following the Pa. Fiasco (for it would probably have been viewed as such in the South and certainly so in Congress. With Davis' enemies quickly sharpening their knives.)
Opn it looks like your reply must have scared everyone else away.
If Longstreet reaches the battlefield and is seeing the union army being routed, he would have order Ewell to take the high ground in a more direct order and that changes your scenario.
I know his memoirs state he told he to move to the right when he and Lee first reach Gettysburg. I believe Longstreet's memoirs are self-serving and distort the truth. He notes on Gettysburg are just a self-serving after fact distortion.
He may gave been defensive minded but he knew a opportunity and taking the high ground was an opportunity. I believe he would have order Ewell to take the high ground.
After that I do not think he would have attack Meade the next day unless the union position was weak. The question becomes if the union forces are pushed off the high ground where would have the union and confederate lines been on July 2nd.
I believe his defensive/offensive theory that he and Lee supposedly were going to use against the union during their raid into PA. is nothing more then his self serving after fact bull to make Lee look bad and him look good.
He may have decided once Stuart showed up to find suitable ground to due this defensive/offensive theory by moving around the right of Meade's army placing him between Washington and the AoP.
As corps commander, Longstreet generally resisted precipitate action. "fighting with one boot off" was not his style. Being brought into command of an army, at the very biginning of a major battle, generally results in a sense of caution rather than aggressiveness.
On the first day of battle, Lee was at the front, Longstreet, in the rear, extricating his corps from the 'traffic jam' outside of Cashtown. Not arriving at the front until after dark on July 1st. The AoP is present, in unknown force, but full of fight. Longstreet has no cavalry to speak of, most of his artillery yet to come up on the line. A pell-mell attack against a possibly larger force just as evening light is failing, would give even Lee pause (as it did in real life).
Again, Longstreet never favored the Pa. invasion and argued so vigorously with Lee, that Longstreet 'thought' he had convinced Lee to implement a strategic offensisive/tactical defensive campaign.
Now 'unexpectedly' in command of the ANV by the death or incapacitation of Lee, in the middle of a battle, not of his choosing and in his view using faulty tactics and in the proverbial 'fog of war' (made much more dense and impenetrable, by the absence of cavalry), deep in enemy territory, low on supplies and ammunition, it is dificult to assume Longstreet would have opted for Lee' All or Nothing approach to the coming battle.
Almost certainly, Longstreet would have ordered the army to entrench immediately and on the morning of the 2d, when Meade saw the entrenchments, he almost as certainly would have ordered the AoP to entrench.
Once in their entrenchments, the natural reluctance to continue a hard fought battle would influence many of the officers of both armies to let sleeping dogs lie. Both Meade and Longstreet would have their various problems to straighten out before continuing the battle, but the constraints of time and location would be most severly felt by Longstreet and his lack of faith in the invasion in the first place, would, I think, induce him to retreat (rather more or less as I have previously projected) rather than continue a campaign in which he never believed, in the first place.
With Stuart's arrival later on the 2d day and the growing evidence that Meade was not going to attack any time soon (if, at all), he would probably have sent Stuart out on the 3d to scout for a weakness on the Union Flanks, but with 10,000 Union cavalry under active commanders, it is likely that little of importance would be learned, quickly enough to benefit the ANV.
This made me think of another question. IF Stuart had arrived earlier, how much difference could it have made with 10,000 union cavalry blocking any aproaches to scout the AoP position anyways?
__________________
"In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
Historically, on June 30, Stuart, still trying to find his way around the AoP met with Judson Kilpatrick's force at Hanover, the fight between the cavalry was inconclusive, but because Stuart did not defeat Kilpatrick, he was blocked from two roads leading north from Hanover to Carlisle. The Southerners were forced to bypass Hanover and take a more round about route through Jefferson to Dover, a few miles NW of York, which they reached on the morning of the 1st, exhausted after an all night march.
Later, on the 3d, Lee sent Stuart with approx. 6,000 men to the Hanover area, to attack the AoP from the rear, in coordination with Pickett's expected breakthrough on Cemetary Ridge.
Stuart was met by a cavalry force led by Gen. Irvin Gregg's brigade reinforced by Gen. George A. Custer's brigade, approx. 5,000 men. By all accounts it was a wild cavalry melee, with Suart withdrawing to his original lines, leaving Gregg and Custer in charge of the field. Since Pickett's attack failed, Stuart did not press the affair to a conclusion, but both the above actions proves, IMO, that any serious efforts on Stuarts part would be met with force and energy and a southern victory could no longer be assumed.
Entrenching was not an option; Even for Longstreet
"Almost certainly, Longstreet would have ordered the army to entrench immediately and on the morning of the 2d, when Meade saw the entrenchments, he almost as certainly would have ordered the AoP to entrench."
Lee said this was impossible. That entrenching was not possible, since it surely would allow all of the AoP Corps to arrive at Gettysburg.
Lee had control of only one egress out of Adams County. Lee had a limited amount of forage for his horses and mules. He indicated that he lacked sufficient supplies and the means to obtain them in the area. By entrenching, the Confederate army would put themselves in position to starve many of their horses, and lose much of their wagon stock on a retreat.
The Confederates had enough artillery ammunition for one good fight. The AoP was shipping artillery ammunition from Baltimore, by train, to Westminster, Maryland. (Some 25 miles southeast of Gettysburg) Entrenched, the Confederates would sadly come to realize that supply fact.
Last edited by whitworth : 01-10-2008 at 08:43 AM.
Entrenching, would be viewed by Longstreet as a deterrant to the AoP attacking his army, until he decided on what he wanted to do. (IMO, it would certainly have deterred Meade)
As I said, it would not take much time for Longstreet to decide that a retreat was in order. In my scenario, he would have sent Stuart araiding to find any weaknesses in the Union position, but IMO he would have already made up his mind to retreat. Stuarts movement being more of holding Meade's attention and keep Union cavalry close to home while he, Longstreet, pull out.
Most probably, depending upon the aggressiveness of Meade, Longstreet would have begun his retreat approximately when Lee did in actual fact around the 5th of July and would go back through the mountains the same way he came rather than the desperate lunge to the Potomac, followed by the defeated Lee.
The retreat would have been slower and methodically prepared and executed, with Meade giving all the time needed for a successful and tidy retreat.
Longstreet may not have entrench by July 2nd all of the confederate cavalry had arrived at Gettysburg. It would have been obvious that Meade was not going to attack but just dig in.
With his cavalry in hand he may have tried to flank the union army for he could still move faster the union army.
Remember, he wanted to out from under both Lee's, Jackson's and even Grant's shadows. He may have been more aggressive then you think. He had something to prove.
Totally, out of character for Longstreet during the Pa. Campaign IMO. He was reluctant during the entire venture.
Longstreet, was not necessarily trying to get out from anyones shadow, but like any good, professional soldier, he did aspire to higher command, but certainly not to the extent acting out of character in a tight situation. The situation at Gettysburg under this thread's 'what if' question, would call for caution. If the situation had been reversed, with Lee as senior corps commander and Longstreet as Army Commander and suffered the Heart Attack, it is not likely that Lee would have felt comfortable fighting someone else's battle, especially if he did not believe in it, Nor the tactics to be employed, in the first place.
The two cavalry actions I have described (even before them, we have the example at Brandy Station) shows that the Confederate Cavalry had lost it's old ascendency over it Union opponents.
In the little time available to recast and revamp a new campaign in the face of a bigger army which had the ability to grow larger, faster than your own, is not a scenario for success, even for a Lee, who was bold; not reckless.
Everything about the Pa. Invasion cried out for longer, deeper, clearer thought and planning. By the time of Gettysburg, a lot of chickens were coming home to roost for the ANV and if Lee was unaware, Longstreet certainly suspected them.
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
What if Gen. Lee had another......... 
Linear Mode
