Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
Even under the best of circumstances (actually being able to make a flanking march, undetected And Unmolested) such a flanking movement, would not necessarily have provoked Meade into a headlong attack. If Longstreet was aware of the advantage of the properly prepared defensive over the frontal offensive, how much more was Meade aware of that advantage? Did, Meade, EVER order an all-out attack at Anytime, while he was in complete control of the AoP?
Hmm. Meade almost ordered that attack a few days later. Lee was pinned against the Potomac, swollen by rain, with no bridge train, in a strong position. With trepedation, Meade ordered the attack: even a success would be a bloodbath, as both sides knew. But Lee had improvided bridges and had been crossing throughout the night; Meade could only get his cavalry into action at Falling Waters.
Then in the Fall, Meade orders an assault on Lee and Warren calls it off. Meade furious, but decides to support Warren. Mine Run Campaign, maybe?
Meade ordered a whole bunch of assaults in 1864, but people usually give responsibility for them to Grant because of the two-headed nature of their command. The idea behind the movements around Cold Harbor in June was Meade's. He thought of bringing Smith up from Bermuda Hundred and thrusting down there with Sheridan; he swung Hancock over on a night march to try to break the front. He ordered the assault we all recall, although Grant OK'd it.
Quote:
Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
Strategically, being between the AoP and the Capital in Va. is not the same as the same situation in Pa.
Such a maneuver, presupposes that Meade would make a frontal attack rather than move a little bit to the South and get between Longstreet and Va.
Moving between Meade and the Washington Defenses would require Longstreet to abandon his LOC and if Meade does not take the bait and attack where Lontgstgreet wants him too, how long will his ammunition and supplies last before he is surrounded or forced to flee to the Potomac as best he can?
I'm not sure this works out exactly like that. It depends on where Longstreet takes the ANV.
Longstreet doesn't really abandon his LOC if he can control the north bank of the Potomac and remain in MD. In that case, he actually shortens his LOC as long as he can bridge the river, and shifts it eastward over the Blue Ridge. Longstreet needs to retain the ability to either move west towards Harpers Ferry in a retreat or directly South into Washington.
Meanwhile, pressure on Meade to act will be strong. In the worst case, if Longstreet can assault and capture the Washington works, Meade will be forced to attack those with Rebels inside them. (All this works much better if Beauregard with 10-20,000 troops is sitting in northern VA as Lee hoped.)
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
Whitworth, Lee report could just as easily have been Longstreet's, if he had assumed command after Lee's 'What If..' incapacitation had occurred and could just as easily explained a retreat rather than an attack.
Trice, I guess I should have specified that did Meade Ever 'execute' a all out attack while AoP commander before Grant arrived? It seems that Meade's plans for full blooded attacks, never seemed to come to fruition on a regular basis. He seems to be a practitioner of Sun-Tzu's school of generalship, 'if you don't want to fight, always leave a defeated enemy a line of retreat.'
Without a bridging train could Longstreet be confident of controlling the North bank of the Potomac?
In actual fact, Lee was trapped by the rising of the Potomac after the Battle of Gettysburg. In this 'What if..' IMO Longstreet would probably have been as anxious about his line of retreat as Lee. Continuing the campaign i.e., moving around Meade's flank, threatening Washington D.C. or Baltimore, etc., would require the exposure of the ANV's almost irreplaceable Wagons to attack or capture.
Lee's request for a diversonary/relieving army under Beauregard's command, was quite beyond the resources of the confederacy (or at least those of Davis anyway) That would be for another 'What If .... ?' post.
Trice, I guess I should have specified that did Meade Ever 'execute' a all out attack while AoP commander before Grant arrived? It seems that Meade's plans for full blooded attacks, never seemed to come to fruition on a regular basis. He seems to be a practitioner of Sun-Tzu's school of generalship, 'if you don't want to fight, always leave a defeated enemy a line of retreat.'
Quote:
Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
Without a bridging train could Longstreet be confident of controlling the North bank of the Potomac?
Well, if Longstreet moves to get South of Meade, the bridge train might not be lost. It depends on timing aand other things as well -- such as whether or not the Confederacy has a large force in the NVa area to support and protect Lee's LOC. Without one, Lee is running a big gamble, because there is nothing to stop any substantial Union raid. That's how thge train is lost in real life.
Quote:
Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
In actual fact, Lee was trapped by the rising of the Potomac after the Battle of Gettysburg. In this 'What if..' IMO Longstreet would probably have been as anxious about his line of retreat as Lee. Continuing the campaign i.e., moving around Meade's flank, threatening Washington D.C. or Baltimore, etc., would require the exposure of the ANV's almost irreplaceable Wagons to attack or capture.
Hmm. I was thinking in terms of the what-if from the start of this thread: "What if Gen. Lee had another heart attack on the morning of July 1, 1863 and was unable to due his duties as commander of the AoNV."
I'd agree with you Longstreet in that situation after July 3 would have pretty much the same choices Lee had, and the sensible thing to do would be to get across the Potomac as quickly as possible. Lee did (his retreat is very well managed), and I presume Longstreet would as well.
If the July 1, what-if is in force, I doubt we see much of a battle at Gettysburg. It's too hurly-burly for Longstreet's style. He could hit hard and he could react to a crisis, but his inclination was to get all his forces under his hand before striking. He might have tried Lee's other option of concentrating behind the mountain, which means little more than skirmishing or a sharp action near Gettysburg. He might then have waited to see what Meade would try, or looked for a way to get between Meade and Washington.
Quote:
Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
Lee's request for a diversonary/relieving army under Beauregard's command, was quite beyond the resources of the confederacy (or at least those of Davis anyway) That would be for another 'What If .... ?' post.
This I would disagree with. It could have been done, but the nature of Confederate command structures made it unlikely. It involves risk; it particularly involves the risk of losing territory along the Carolina coasts while the troops are gone, which might have to be recovered later. This in turn would mean great agitation in the political chain of command.
If you drop a Wellington or a Napoleon or a Frederick the Great in at the top (with all the power they would have expected) it probably would have been done. Davis was too much of a hedger, and his personality (as well as other Southerners) tended to lead to turf wars over picky points. Probably 5-10,000 men were lost to those sort of things easily enough.
Lee, of course, gets his share of the blame. He never explained what he wanted clearly, even to Davis. I think part of that was simply not wanting to be told NO. But I think the CSA could have easily cooked up 10,000 men from the rest of VA, NC, SC, and GA if they had wanted to do so, and maybe 10-20,000. The quality of the troops would be uneven; commanders will send their greenest and worst if they can. One solution to that is to bring the commander to VA -- then he'll try to bring his best.
I regard the entire mess as a Confederate command failure. Davis wasn't bold enough or decisive enough; Lee was too reticent or too involved in sliding his plan through; Beauregard and D. H. Hill and others too concerned with their own areas; the local politicians did what came naturally and bleated about their own needs. If this was going to be done, the man at the top had to order it done -- and didn't. An unfortunate Confederate trait, I think, if you look at the overall picture.
A force that size doesn't automatically change the entire picture; it does create more Rebel threats and confuse the Union strategy; it protects Richmond by being near Manassas; it gives Lee/the ANV more options and protection north of the Potomac. It would be interesting to see how it would have worked out -- but of course it doidn't happen.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
Concerning the 'Availability' of anything: I have often questioned whether the millions of dollars a private donor provides for the building of a new sports stadium was ever actually available for the building of a new school for the poor or vice-versa?
If there are 10,00 extra soldiers scattered over three states, but cannot, for whatever reason, be assembled or cannot be used except for certain activities, it would seem that if the discretionary power is limited or circumscribed then they are not available to those uses beyond those limits or controls.
Concerning the 'Availability' of anything: I have often questioned whether the millions of dollars a private donor provides for the building of a new sports stadium was ever actually available for the building of a new school for the poor or vice-versa?
If there are 10,00 extra soldiers scattered over three states, but cannot, for whatever reason, be assembled or cannot be used except for certain activities, it would seem that if the discretionary power is limited or circumscribed then they are not available to those uses beyond those limits or controls.
The way the military works, all commanders know in their gut that they can find lots of troops if they can shake the tree hard enough. This is the normal condition. Bureaucracy, malingering, other commanders finding excuses not to turn troops loose, conflicting priorities, the reluctance of soldiers to leave quiet spots, etc., etc. -- dozens of reasons can cause troops to fritter away or not appear.
On top of that, there is the question of power politics among the players. For example, Lee got rid of D. H. Hill after Fredericksburg and did not get a Corps when his brother-in-law, Stonewall Jackson, died. He was a contentious man at the best of times, and in the Spring of 1863 he commanded in NC -- where some of Lee's troops were. He played the "Old Army Game" there, dragging his feet, coming up with reasosn he needed the troops more than Lee, keeping the veteran units and better commanders, sticking Lee with what he didn't want. Beauregard in SC wasn't as open or as bad about it, but he did some of the same. So did other (lesser) commanders).
Plus, of course, there was the legitimate question of what to do about Vicksburg.
The solution to such conflicts is a strong organization with a man at the top to both guide and discipline it. Davis tended to want to hold everything and despite his reputation for rigidness, often let local areas get away with more than they should.
If the Confederacy had decided it needed to support Lee more, it had the men. Getting them there was a question of effort and will, of determination and discipline. It involved risk -- but all choices involved risk. By not sending troops from Lee to the West, the Confederacy essentially conceded the loss of Vicksburg. By not going to the absolute max, they reduced the chances of Lee succeeding. 5 or 10 or 20 thousand men under a good commander (Lee's Beauregard nomination was a good one) might have changed something enough. Or the Union might have reacted very differently, transferring troops of their own. No one can say what would have happened then, other than it would be different.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
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