Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
What if Hooker had not been replaced on the eve of Gettysburg? Would he have handled the situation more ably than Meade?
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Hmm, Hooker wasn't exactly known for his patience or defensive ability. I'd imagine this would be even more pronounced following his drubbing at Chancellorsville. With something to prove, I think he attacks the second day against Seminary Ridge and is soundly repulsed. Both armies remain intact, however, and neither would yet be inclined to quit the field.
If this were the case, what would happen on the third day?
Thanks for the come-back, Don. Maybe we can get some action going.
Given that Hooker was carrying some psychological baggage with him on the mover north, he did skillfully move to block Lee's access to Washington and Baltimore.
Do we know if Buford was in Gettysburg because Meade ordered it? Or was he just ordered to probe? (Something Hooker might also ordered just because that would be SOP.) Looks like we might have to accept that the conflict would develop in or near Gettysburg no matter who was running the AotP.
Seems to me that Meade rather competently made haste on that first day. Have we a reason to believe that Hooker would have come up short in doing the same?
My conclusion: The first day would have been the same.
The second day is where my question falls apart. Hooker was an aggressive general (unless thumped on the head). He had demonstrated the ability to orchestrate mass movement and some doggone good planning.
Given that there was little time to develop an aggressive plan as neither army had much of an idea where the other was, so we're talking about on-the-spot decisions. But on the second day, with much of the army still trailing in, would Hooker have managed the day with any less skill than Meade?
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
It has largely been forgotten now, that the AoP was the most clique ridden, politicized of the Union Armies. Within the close knit West Point Fraternity of the pre-war professional army, Hooker was viewed with askance by his brother officers.
The senior officer corps within the AoP were willing to serve 'with' Hooker but many were less than willing to serve 'under' his command.
Hooker's braggadacio, blatant ambition for higher command and political wire pulling to gain command of the AoP, had a significant affect on the kind of cooperation he would recieve from his subordinate commanders. It affected the battle at Chancellorsville and after tasting blood from that debacle, Lincoln was right to replace him with the quintessential insider (team player) from within the ranks of the AoP, for the approaching hight water battle of the war.
It is doubtful that the Meade's, Sykes', Couch's, Sickles', Howard's, etc., would have rendered good service at Gettysburg (they were barely adequate, as it was)
Strictly on ability, I would not doubt that Hooker was fully as capable, if not better, as Meade to command the AoP.
Taking in the realities of the situation as they existed at the time, leaving him in command would most likely have led to a Union disaster at Gettysburg.
I agree with your conclusions about the approach march and the first day of the battle. The arrival of the army at Gettysburg was due primarily to subordinate orders and initiative, so I don't think there would be much of a difference between the two.
Buford was there pretty much because of himself and his nose for finding the enemy. He had guidance from Pleasonton, but not specific orders putting him in Gettysburg. And Pleasonton was still in place from when Hooker had the army anyway (I have another what-if related to that, but let's chase this one a while first).
Similarly, Reynolds moved his corps and the one following it to Gettysburg on his own initiative and without waiting for orders. To Meade's credit, he had been given that latitude. Would Hooker have done the same? Given Reynolds' abilities and reputation, I think so.
Either way, Meade/ Hooker isn't yet on the field and doesn't effect the first day.
I'm not certain about the Union disaster, either. Hooker would certainly be leery of his flanks after Chancellorsville, but I think he would still try to be the aggressor, particularly on northern soil.
The clique observation is a good one as we look at day 2, though. Which subordinates (corps commanders) would have acted differently with Hooker in command?
I wish I had a mental map of how things stood at the end of the first day. Time to go drag out the atlas...
As noted on other threads, the AoP never marched so far so fast as they did from the time Meade issued his Pipe Creek Circular until the 2d day at Gettysburg. I really have trouble seeing the senior officers responding with such alacrity to such orders from Hooker as they did for Meade. (Not impossible, merely IMO. very unlikely.)
Almost every Union Officer and, surprisingly, most especially the corps commanders except, of course, Howard, did 'just' enough to achieve success at Gettysburg. The battle itself, was a near run thing and with Hooker in charge, I have difficulty believing all of them would have been as dilligent or competent as they were under Meade.
Okay, I will agree in general that the corps commanders might not have been as quick or exercised as much initiative under Hooker. But what specifically do you think would have ben different?
I think the morning of the 1st would happen pretty much the same way. I think the corps (11th, IIRC) following Reynolds would not arrive as quickly, and they would eventually early-mid afternoon be forced back off of Seminary Ridge. Given the units and commanders on the field minus the 11th Corps disaster, I think they end up on Cemetery Ridge by late afternoon in fairly good order. Hancock wouldn't have been trusted by Hooker to move forward, take command of the situation and decide whether or not the army would fight Lee there. So Hooker rushes to the sound of the guns and arrives after dark on the 1st, 7-8 hours before Meade did. He's still too late to see the ground in daylight and doesn't trust his subordinates enough to blindly launch an attack the next morning, particularly after Chancellorsville. He spends the morning of the 2nd consolidating his army on Cemetery Ridge, and quite possibly uses his cavalry (about a division and a half by the morning of the 2nd) to define Lee's positions and look for another flanking maneuver.
So what does Lee do with this extra time? He still doesn't have Stuart until late afternoon of the 2nd. Does Longstreet still attack, or does Lee now have time to look for an opening around the Union left flank?
What happens on the 2nd?
(We could take the position that Buford and reynolds aren't there in time, and then the battle of course happens somewhere else. But I don't think that's quite the thread Ole intended to start. Or is it? He is fiendishly clever. The whole thing's simply a mental exercise.)
To set the stage, Hooker has just been defeated at Chancellorsville, Lee begins his movement North.
When Hooker first assumed command of the AoP he had established a line of direct contact with Lincoln in order that the hostile Halleck might intefere as little as possible in Hookers command. After Chancellorsville, Lincoln pointedly, reestablished normal command relationships and instructs Hooker that all further communications will be through normal command channels i.e., Halleck and the Secy of War.
Halleck and Stanton withhold any major reinforcements to replace the losses of the Chancellorsville Battle (the same ones, that were later rushed to Meade's assistence)
So without firm backing from Lincoln (which he has lost), Hooker cannot and does not expect any timely assistance from his immediate superiors.
One of Hookers complaints is that he receives no help from Halleck, whose only actions are merely to vetoe any and all of Hookers plans and ideas.
In actual fact from the time Hookers receives news of Lee's movements, his own movements are rather more quick than most today realize, (his only orders are to keep between the ANV and the Capital and /or Baltimore, he can get nothing more precise out of Halleck or Stanton or, presumeably, Lincoln)
Hooker uses his newly reconstituted cavalry fairly effectively. Although Pleasanton cannot break thru Stuarts screen, his efforts have the effect of screening the movements of Hooker and thus Lee has no better idea of where the AoP is than Hooker does of the ANV (although, over time, being in Northern Territory, Hooker is more likely to gain timely intelligence than Lee)
The fact that Hooker is not recieving adequate or timely reinforcements and knowing that Halleck and Stanton are out for his scalp, Hooker IMO, would make the same deduction that Meade, did, concentrating the AoP would almost certainly draw Lee to him.
Again, the Pipe Creek Area would catch his eye as the best place to, not only effect the concentration but also, to fight on.
Hooker would certaiinly have his cavalry out and would, I think, find the ANV approximately where Buford did, but Hooker IMO would fight defensively (lack of adequatesupport in Materiale, manpower or from his immediate superiors).
Lee would still be distracted by the loss of Stuart and his logistical and supply problems and would most likely insist on the offensive as the logical solution to his problems (much to the annoyance of Longstreet, even at Pipe Creek) With time, supplies and ammunition running low and approx. 10,000 Union cavalry under active commanders, time consuming flank attacks was not commendable to Lee at Gettysburg, nor would they be at Pipe Creek, IMO.
In all likelyhood, we, today, would be celebrating the great Union Victory at Pipe Creek and would still be considered the high-water mark of the Confederacy.
Well thought out and stated, nicely done. Where is the battlefield, in this case? Near Taneytown in Maryland?
Considerations: Would Lee venture that far from the mountains shielding his communications if not forced to? Moving his army south and east would have effectively linked him up with Stuart sooner. This would probably lead to some great cavalry fights with that many active horsemen in the area, but I don't think it would have changed the fight itself that much.
Yes, around Taneytown, I believe.
Lee was leadding an invading army, not a mobile raiding party. He came to Pa. to inflict a defeat of the Union Army on Northern soil. He could hardly turn tail and scamper back to Va. without a battle.
With his supply and transportation troubles, Lee had to keep moving and at the same time he could not have the AoP between his Army and Va.
In Pa. as almost always, Time was rarely a Confederate ally.
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