Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
Au contraire Ole. I think Lee would have deliberately placed his army in the path of Grant and compel Grant to conduct fruitless frontal assaults. What Lee feared was a siege which he knew he wouldn't win because of attrition. Heck, I'm thinking the Overland Campaign now.
Au contraire Ole. I think Lee would have deliberately placed his army in the path of Grant and compel Grant to conduct fruitless frontal assaults. What Lee feared was a siege which he knew he wouldn't win because of attrition. Heck, I'm thinking the Overland Campaign now.
Excellent observation, sir. But you underestimate Grant, who did make frontal assaults, but only when his choices were limited and he had a fair chance of success. Lee would have been flirting with the flank attack in every instance.
Lee couldn't afford to let Grant have the initiative, and Grant wouldn't let him have it. Totally new ball game for Lee who had things pretty much his own way since he took command. Then he ran into Meade, who didn't run, and then Grant, who played by different rules.
Kinda wanta sympathise with Lee who knew a seige would be fatal to the AoNV, and watched desperately while his army was inexorably being manipulated into one. What do you suppose he was thinking? "This summ*itch is trouble."?
Woof! Who else but Lee could cope with that?
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Not only did Grant fight against the major commanders of the Confederacy, but he also fought in all the major theaters from the Mississippi thru Tn, to the Va. Tidewater and defeated the three major armies of the south, capturing two of them.
There is a body of historical works, indicating that there were few situations occuring during the CW that Grant did not experience, thus allowing a rational discussion of many more 'what if' question than almost any other commander in the CW.
At least until Lee got used to the idea that keeping the heck out of Grant's direct pathway was a good idea. Still, Lee and his ragtags put up a good fight.
The difficulty is that Lee can't let Grant move as he wills.
For example, if Lee lets Grant through the Wilderness in the opening days of the Overland Campaign, Grant is suddenly:
1) in control of the Rappahannock crossings at Fredericksburg.
2) closer to Richmond than Lee
3) on a better and faster route to Richmond than Lee
4) with several secure supply routes available to support a quick march on Richmond, thanks to Union control of the waters and the Army of the James East of Richmond.
In these circumstances, Grant will quickly take Richmond and Lee will then be unable to continue to fight in northern Virginia. He will have to retreat upon either the Shenandoah (unlikely and probably disastrous) or North Carolina. With the loss of the Confederate capital and the armament complex at Richmond, odds are the war would be over much quicker.
Once Grant moves in May 1864, Lee's choices come down to this:
1) strike him immediately, as he did in The Wilderness
2) interpose the ANV between Grant and his road to Richmond -- as he did from Spotsylvania onward
3) launch an operation into Grant's rear to try to get him to abandon his offensive.
#1 and #2 were tried, with results we know.
#3 seems very unpromising. Washington was heavily fortified, and reinforcements could be routed to it with speed (as happened when Early raided north in different circumstances in July). Grant could easily detach enough forces to hold Washington while he took Richmond, then move to trap Lee by moving on him from the South. Richmond itself was heavily fortified, but without Lee's ANV in the trenches could never have been held against Grant.
If Lee had first managed to halt and throw back Grant (if the Wilderness had been the equivalent of Chancellorsville for Hooker), then perhaps Lee could have launched a riposte up towards the Potomac. Without doing that first, #3 looks very bad to me.
Although off topic for this thread, we often forget that Grant's Wilderness Campaign only a part of a coorddinated Union offensive in Va.
Grant to draw the major force (and attention) while Gen. Butler with approx. 33,000 in his Army of the James would strike from the Penninsula to destroy the vital Confederate rail lines around Petersburg and Richmond, without which Lee could not be adequately supplied.
Butler, of course, failed miserably and allowed himself and his army to be bottled up at Bermuda Hundred and was effectively out of the war until Grant linked up with him for the siege of Pertersburg.
But with a competent general in command, the Army of the James might have ended the war 6 mo's (approx) earlier. But that is for another 'What If' thread.
Although off topic for this thread, we often forget that Grant's Wilderness Campaign only a part of a coorddinated Union offensive in Va.
Grant to draw the major force (and attention) while Gen. Butler with approx. 33,000 in his Army of the James would strike from the Penninsula to destroy the vital Confederate rail lines around Petersburg and Richmond, without which Lee could not be adequately supplied.
Butler, of course, failed miserably and allowed himself and his army to be bottled up at Bermuda Hundred and was effectively out of the war until Grant linked up with him for the siege of Pertersburg.
But with a competent general in command, the Army of the James might have ended the war 6 mo's (approx) earlier. But that is for another 'What If' thread.
I agree with you. The poor performance of Butler's Army of the James and Sigel's army in the Shenandoah are usually overlooked when looking at Grant's Campaign. Grant had been hampered in appointing commanders for them by political constraints in an election year, and they failed miserably.
Grant had every reason to expect Union victory or at least a stand-off in the Shenandoah, tying up the Rebel troops there. Instead, Sigel's disaster at New Market allowed Breckinridge to move to support Lee with 5,000 men -- and those 5,000 saved the Confederate bacon at Cold Harbor, when Grant/Meade should have been able to punch through to Richmond easily and Lee personally found them and had them moved into position to delay the Union advance.
As you said, the AoJ has little excuse for not cutting the RR between Petersburg and Richmond. If they had done so, the capital could not be held long, and the AoJ would be reinforced immediately by the arrival of Sheridan with 10,000 cavalry while Grant still had Lee tied up at Spotsylvania.
But both failed. Instead of victory for the Union, the Rebels were actually able to reinforce Lee. By the following April, the Shenadoah had been swept of Confederates, and the RRs to Richmond were broken, and the war ended quickly. If Butler and Sigel had been up to the task, the war might have ended in 1864.
Another question: How much do suppose Grant knew about the lame-butts that commanded when he came east? Do you suppose he sat down with Meade, Lincoln, and others to get a reading?
Hadn't looked at that particular slant until trice mentioned the political restraint Grant was facing. He apparently didn't make allowances for the weak links when he issued orders. Would that have been to provide an excuse for the subsequent turnovers? Did he hope that they were at least capable of a few simple directions?
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Another question: How much do suppose Grant knew about the lame-butts that commanded when he came east? Do you suppose he sat down with Meade, Lincoln, and others to get a reading?
Hadn't looked at that particular slant until trice mentioned the political restraint Grant was facing. He apparently didn't make allowances for the weak links when he issued orders. Would that have been to provide an excuse for the subsequent turnovers? Did he hope that they were at least capable of a few simple directions?
Ole
Grant did not show any outstanding talent for evaluating men: some good judgements (Sherman, Sheridan, Meade, etc.) and some really bad ones (like the guy who surrendered Holly Springs, or Baldy Smith). But once Grant got to believing you were no good, you were gone in a hurry. The relief of Warren at Five Forks sends a message to the commanders: if Grant could fire Warren, anybody else might go as well.
He borught almost no one West with him, so any reliance he had was on Eastern officers for evaluations. He decided on Meade himself, and undoubtedly talked over officers with him.
OTOH, Grant's first idea was to reclaim some of the talent sitting on the bench: McClellan, Buell, and a few other Democrats. That didn't go well for him.
He did want to get rid of Butler in 1864. Lincoln told him he could do it -- but would have to bear the responsibility for it alone. Grant decided to keep him.
The military deficiencies of Butler were well known in Washington and the AoP. After discovering that political considerations rendered him untouchable, Grant had Gen. William F. Smith and a gen. Averill(?) (his name escapes me) as Butlers two corps commanders assuming that they were strong leaders and would be able to keep Butler, on the track enough to complete his assignment successfully.
As Trice has noted, Grant had not particular talent for discerning ability or character of other people. Smith and Averill(?) failed completely in overcoming Butler's total lack of military ability.
The only thing that can be said in favor of Grants choices, is that it is likely that Butler would have been as immune to learning how to be a real general, from anyone else Grant had sent to serve under Butler.
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