Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
So, I've been working on-and-off on a little what-if story and decided to ask people more knowledgable than I if the general course of events is plausible. (Hope I got the right forum)
-The South wins Gettysburg on July 2 when the Union flank collapses. Meade pulls back to avoid being encircled.
-Philadelphia is too deep in the Union and DC is too well defended for the ANV to attack while the Army of the Potamic still exists, so Lee withdraws back to Virginia.
-Vicksburg still falls on July 4, but its impact on Southern and Northern morale is greatly lessened by the Rebel victory in Pennslyvania.
-In the long run, the victory at Gettysburg delays the Union advance into Dixie enough for Lincoln to lose the 1864 election. The South then holds on until the new President is inaugerated in March 1865.
The scenario posited, is well within the realm of possible. Like all 'What If' questions, it leads to other What If's, but I think the reasoning is sound, depending upon ones own temperament and views.
In political terms, another 'just as likely' scenario would be that after a victory on Northern soil was followed by a retreat south, it could have precipitated a crisis in Davis' administration.
Militarily, the Mississippi is lost, the war in the West is even more unstable. The AoNV, bloodied by its hard won victory in Pa. is probably, no longer a significant source of reinforcement for the West (Lee's view even Before his invasion of Pa.). Without Longstreet's corps at Chickamauga, would Roscrans have been defeated?
The war is visibly crumbling in the West, Maybe even losing Atlanta in 1863 or early 1864 and the loss of Mobile Bay to Farragut would probably still have happened.
Grant would have been available much earlier tha he was in fact, due to Roscrans winning rather than losing at Chickamauga and he would most certainly have been called East immediately to minister to the AoP (licking it's wounds at Pipe Creek or Washington defenses) Thus the war in the East would IMO bear a striking resemblence to the actual campaign to happened in reality. Lincoln even more reluctant to uncover Washington, dictating an overland route and the reasons for choosing the Wilderness route would sill be in existence. The only real difference being that Davis might not be running the war as independent of his Congress as he once did.
Militarily, the Mississippi is lost, the war in the West is even more unstable. The AoNV, bloodied by its hard won victory in Pa. is probably, no longer a significant source of reinforcement for the West (Lee's view even Before his invasion of Pa.). Without Longstreet's corps at Chickamauga, would Roscrans have been defeated?
The war is visibly crumbling in the West, Maybe even losing Atlanta in 1863 or early 1864 and the loss of Mobile Bay to Farragut would probably still have happened.
I'm not sure I would agree with this specific thought. Longstreet's Corps was badly blooded at Gettysburg and still went to Chickamauga in real life. In the posited July 2 victory, Pickett's division will be untouched and so Longstreet's Corps is in better, not worse, shape. That would strengthen the case for sending him West when needed, not weaken it.
The situation in the West that Summer looks much the same. The big question would be whether or not the Union pulled troops from somewhere to reinforce the East. Burnside in Cincinatti might be a good bet, with other commands shuffling troops sideways to cover.
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Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
Grant would have been available much earlier tha he was in fact, due to Roscrans winning rather than losing at Chickamauga and he would most certainly have been called East immediately to minister to the AoP (licking it's wounds at Pipe Creek or Washington defenses).
Grant was badly banged up by an accident that threw him from a horse when he visited Banks (early September). He was still on crutches when he went to Chattanooga in October/November. Unless he was saved from that by being called East (which it might), he wouldn't be leading any active campaigns in the Fall.
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Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
Thus the war in the East would IMO bear a striking resemblence to the actual campaign to happened in reality. Lincoln even more reluctant to uncover Washington, dictating an overland route and the reasons for choosing the Wilderness route would sill be in existence. The only real difference being that Davis might not be running the war as independent of his Congress as he once did.
We seem to be looking at a situation where Lee has beaten Meade on July 2, but where Meade has managed to get off with a relatively intact AoP. If anything, this is a little better for the South than what actually happened. I would agree you'd probably see much the same plan of advance.
An interesting point occurs to me. If Lee wins on July 2d, then the reason (or reasons?) of why Lee was in Pa. becomes very relevent in predicting his future actions.
Military and Political realities would seem to preclude an immediate retreat.
Was Lee in Pa. attempting to end the war with a bold stroke? What does he do, when (as demonstrated all through the war) he cannot pursue and destroy the rival army, before it reaches safety (Pipe Creek or the Washington Defenses or somewhere in between), If Lee is leading a raiding party to get supplies, then wagons and horses would need to be collected and distributed to supplement his meagre and rickety supply train, some time would be needed to accomplish the task. If his main intent was to keep himself or some part of the AoNV from being sent West, then, again, Lee would not be in a hurry to return South too soon.
With the elections still far in the future and we can be pretty sure Lincoln would still, not be willing to talk of Peace Without Reunion and while Lee is wandering about in Pa. the war is being lost in the West and the likelyhood that Bragg would receive any significant reinforcements from the AoNV recedes the longer Lee continued his sojourn in the North.
Time was rarely a confederate ally.
An interesting point occurs to me. If Lee wins on July 2d, then the reason (or reasons?) of why Lee was in Pa. becomes very relevent in predicting his future actions.
Military and Political realities would seem to preclude an immediate retreat.
Was Lee in Pa. attempting to end the war with a bold stroke? What does he do, when (as demonstrated all through the war) he cannot pursue and destroy the rival army, before it reaches safety (Pipe Creek or the Washington Defenses or somewhere in between), If Lee is leading a raiding party to get supplies, then wagons and horses would need to be collected and distributed to supplement his meagre and rickety supply train, some time would be needed to accomplish the task. If his main intent was to keep himself or some part of the AoNV from being sent West, then, again, Lee would not be in a hurry to return South too soon.
With the elections still far in the future and we can be pretty sure Lincoln would still, not be willing to talk of Peace Without Reunion and while Lee is wandering about in Pa. the war is being lost in the West and the likelyhood that Bragg would receive any significant reinforcements from the AoNV recedes the longer Lee continued his sojourn in the North.
Time was rarely a confederate ally.
All indications were that he had planned to take Harrisburg, if possible. If he can, he has cut both of the two main East-West RR routes (he has already cut the B&O) and Harrisburg is a major RR engine/car repair and construction center. The longer he holds this area (destroying the RR shops and the bridges), the worse it gets for the Union.
At this point, the trains would be carrying coal East for Winter use. If they can't build up the Winter fuel supply in the Summer and Fall, the Northeast suffers badly over the Winter.
If he has beaten Meade badly enough to have a free hand, but not enough to try for Baltimore or Washington, that is probably what he would do.
If he had beaten Meade badly enough to send him flying into Washington, he might have tried for Baltimore. An AoP at Washington without the RR lines to the North will have great difficulties.
But if Meade can maintain a strong position at Big Pipe Creek, Lee can't really head for Harrisburg. He'll either have to figure out how to make Meade move again, or start thinking about a slow retreat.
Good scenario(s), I like them. However, I doubt that the plan(s) of Lee were so precise or clear in his or Davis' mind.
We still have the old conumdrum facing the southern leadership; how much longer could the confederacy afford to win battles in the East while losing the war in the West?
None of our scenario's promises much immediate help to Bragg in Tn. Were the RR's in Pa. more important to the Confederacy's war effort than Bragg's AoT?
It is possible that Lee rampaging in Pa. would not only bring Grant East sooner than planned, but also his army.
Good scenario(s), I like them. However, I doubt that the plan(s) of Lee were so precise or clear in his or Davis' mind.
I don't think "plans" in a formal sense was the right way to put it. Lee never discussed his plans with others very much, or put them in writing in advance. I think Jackson, Longstreet, and Stuart might have had a glimmer of what he intended -- but Stuart died without speaking, as did Jackson, and I don't think Longstreet had quite as much of his commander's thought as Longstreet thought he did.
I can tell you one interesting insight, perhaps doubly so if you ever read The Warrior Generals by Tom Buell. In his book he criticizes Lee for not having mapped the area of Chancellorsville before the battle when he had the chance, during the Winter after Fredericksburg. I also remember discussing it with him, and he thought it implied a certain carelessness in Lee. Tom was a Navy officer who had been an instructor at West Point back in the late 1970s; I knew a man who had him as a professor in a course then. Tom unfortunately passed away before I discovered all that, so I never got the chance to talk to him about that.
I had to agree it seemed like a natural thing to do, thoroughly mapping an area the enemy might pass through into your rear. I later discovered why Lee didn't have that area mapped. Skilled mapmakers were in short supply, but Lee had one and so did Jackson. Both were available that Winter around Fredericksburg, so why didn't Lee use them? Because he and Jackson had them drawing maps for the route from the Shenandoah up the Cumberland Valley to Harrisburg.
While he was sitting at Fredericksburg in Winter quarters, Lee and Jackson were apparently discussing an offensive movement up to that point. They were making preparations for the next attempt, and found them more important than defensive preparations against a Union thrust in the Spring. When Chancellorsville threw the Union back, Lee saw the opportunity he had planned for opened up, and he went for it. This was probably the operation Lee had spent the most time working out during the war.
Jackson, of course, died and said not a word, but this idea of bringing the torch of war into this area was his from January of 1861 on. His mapmaker, who was in charge of this effort, lived and mentioned a bit about this later on, and I think you can find this in Make Me A Map of the Valley. It is not definitive, but it clearly shows where Lee was looking as he planned.
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Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
We still have the old conumdrum facing the southern leadership; how much longer could the confederacy afford to win battles in the East while losing the war in the West?
Yes, but with a new twist. The Union absolutely cannot let Lee seevr the B&O and the Penn Central for long. If they do, the economy of New England, MD, NY, NJ and PA goes down the tubes, and a Winter disaster looms because of the lack of coal. If Lee doesn't withdraw, the Union needs to push him out.
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Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
None of our scenario's promises much immediate help to Bragg in Tn. Were the RR's in Pa. more important to the Confederacy's war effort than Bragg's AoT?
The same help he got, really: 2 divisions from the ANV if we postulate a Lee back in VA by September. The problem for the Confederacy at Chickamauga isn't number of troops. It is Braxton Bragg and the fractured command structure of his army.
Without the 2 RRs, the Eastern economy dies or is very sick. The NY Central will still run, but it is not built to handle heavy coal traffic and would be overwhelmed with traffic diverted around wherever possible. It may not be possible to divert the coal to that route. Other products/commodities as well, of course.
Quote:
Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
It is possible that Lee rampaging in Pa. would not only bring Grant East sooner than planned, but also his army.
If they're in a hurry, the troops probably come from Burnside because he is closer and can get to central PA quicker. Then you probably shuffle troops from Rosecrans or Grant to Kentucky (Grant already had a bunch of troops that weren't supposed to be there, because the Union had been determined to take Vicksburg.) This may actually help Bragg by delaying Rosecrans advance on Chattanooga and Burnside's push on Knoxville.
Lee's army would have been plenty bloodied by then. Maybe not able to resume the offensive, as presumably enough of the Union army is still viable. I think they would have declared victory and headed back to Virginia.
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"It was a very peculiar time." - Franklin D. Cossitt
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I think the most important aspect of this What If is how badly Lee beats Meade.
If Ewell takes the high ground on the first and it's won on the second by Meade attacking and failing to dislodge Lee, he has the opportunity to counter-attack after Union defeat and deny them salvage in the Pipe Creek line.
Result: The Army of the Potomac is essentially destroyed and rendered ineffective as a fighting force. Lee might not have the ability to directly take Washington, though I think it would be, but he can take Baltimore. European recognition is a rational possibility.
If the line is flanked on the second day by Longstreet's corps, the victory will be less effective and not allow for a decisive destruction of the enemy. Lee wins the battle, but the war goes on. Vicksburg is more than balanced out by the victory in Northern territory.
__________________ Ancestors in the 28th, 38th, 46th, 59th and 22nd Btn. Virginia Infantry and 2nd Virginia Cavalry.
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Southern Victory at Gettysburg: Aftermath 
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