Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
I think the most important aspect of this What If is how badly Lee beats Meade.
Agreed.
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Originally Posted by brigance
If Ewell takes the high ground on the first and it's won on the second by Meade attacking and failing to dislodge Lee, he has the opportunity to counter-attack after Union defeat and deny them salvage in the Pipe Creek line.
If Ewell takes the high ground late on July 1 (very hard to do), then the AoP immediately pulls back to Big Pipe Creek. Meade would never have tried a counterattack from such a disastrous position. IMHO.
The night retreat will be bad, but on the 2nd Lee can get his whole Army set up behind the creek; I don't think Lee can get his up to attack together. II, III, V, VI, and probably XII Corps are intact. What we have then is a bloody meeting engagement, won by the Confederates, with 5,000+ casualties on each side. Union I and XI Corps are fractions of themselves; some Confederate divisions and brigades are well-chopped up. IMHO
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Originally Posted by brigance
Result: The Army of the Potomac is essentially destroyed and rendered ineffective as a fighting force.
I think probably a bit optimistic for July 1. Beaten and blooded, yes, but still a dangerous force. IMHO
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Originally Posted by brigance
Lee might not have the ability to directly take Washington, though I think it would be, but he can take Baltimore.
Baltimore seemed to be moderately well defended by works. If a reasonably intact force gets into it, Lee won't be able to take the place (much like Early couldn't touch Washington in 1864 if there were real troops in the lines). He would obviously be able to do much damage in the surrounding areas. IMHO
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Originally Posted by brigance
European recognition is a rational possibility.
In 1863, it would probably take a very big win for Lee to offset what was going on in the West, where Vicksburg and Port Hudson had just fallen and Rosecrans was chasing a humiliated Bragg back from Tullahoma. The British had been here before; Fall 1862 was much better for the Confederacy. IMHO
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Originally Posted by brigance
If the line is flanked on the second day by Longstreet's corps, the victory will be less effective and not allow for a decisive destruction of the enemy. Lee wins the battle, but the war goes on.
If Longstreet can get across the ridge and advance North, the AoP can be squeezed. The troops in the pocket towards Cemetery Hill will have to retreat out the Baltimore Pike, which will inevitably come under Confederate fire as time passes. Disaster threatens more here than on the 1st because more Union troops are in a positon to be trapped, and more Confederates are in a position to do something about it. IMHO
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Originally Posted by brigance
Vicksburg is more than balanced out by the victory in Northern territory.
If it is a big victory that gives Lee a free hand, with Meade pulling back on Washington/Baltimore, that may be true. If it merely results in wasted bloodshed, with Lee still needing to be wary of an active Meade in the field, Lee will have to go back, although slower than in real-life. IMHO
This particular thread is fascinating and I have enjoyed reading the well reasoned specualtion on what could have been. As a matter of interest there was a novel published in the 1950s called " Bring the Jubilee" by Ward Moore. A little tedious in parts it does however give a broader picture of the US/CS relationship based on a win for the Confederates in the "War for Southron Independece" as it is called in the book. It actually comes under the realm of science fiction and without giving too much away it does have a reasonably "happy" ending.
Jeff Davies
Roughly how long would it take for the ANV to get to Harrisburg, wreck up the place, and get back to Virginia?
Ewell was getting ready to attack across the river at Harrisburg when he received Lee's orders to withdraw to concentrate the Army. IIRR, that was on the night of June 29-30. By the afternoon of July 1 his troops were in action at Gettysburg.
Probably 2 days to close to the river and prepare to cross. A day to force the crossing against the light opposition they'd face. A day of destruction would have a major impact. Three or four days probably for a really thorough destruction of facilities (such as Sherman in Atlanta).
Surely if the Rebs had won at Gettysburg, the ANV would remain in the short term to 'Panic' Northern public opinion?
Could Lincoln have survived at that point if an approach was made on Washington?
Well, again, it depends on how big a "victory" we are talking about.
If Meade is thoroughly thrashed and driven in defeat to Washington/Baltimore or (gulp) Philadelphia, Lee can roam the area doing what he will for weeks if not months. The Union will need to bring up reinforcements and rally the AoP before forcing him out.
If Meade is merely bloodied and forced back, but remains in the field with an intact army, Lee has major problems. He needs to keep his ANV concentrated to face Meade, but needs to disperse it to feed it for long. So if Meade can establish himself behind Big Pipe Creek after a July 1-2 defeat, not much changes from the June 30 situation except many thousands of casualties.
If Lee retreats in that situation, the Union can claim they have once again "driven the enemy from our soil", an Antietam-style victory. This is better than the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg that happened, but not much. Lee would still have a difficult time getting his army and 10-12,000 wounded back to Virginia. That will not improve with time, so he will have to go back unless he comes up with something brilliant to change the situation.
THE Essential ingredient for Lee is getting his corps commanders to follow his orders with promptness and confidence.
It has been claimed that after Gettysburg, or at least his staff, began to issue clearly worded orders with less reliance on interpretation by the receiving officer. If he did, was the corrective added by the 3d day of battle?
By the time Longstreet began his attack, Ewell's attack had already expired. So for the requisite 'crushing' victory, Ewell's attack needed to be coordinated with Longstreet, with Hill ready and willing to attack on a moments notice. With the Union's left crushed and fleeing and Ewell's attack successful enough to at least distract Union commanders attention to their flaniks, Hill should be able to break the center of the Union line, with the Left gone and the center pierced it is likely that the Right (if not already routed) would have to retreat.
Stuart with most of his cavalry must be present to harry the retreat into a rout. Otherwise men on foot can only run so far (pursuer or pursued), if cavalry is not present in force, it is unlikely that the survivors would go much past the Pipe Creek line.
It is well to remember this 'What If' at Gettysburg would probably Not affect the events at Vicksberg but would verly likely affect the contest in Tn. Would Bragg have been so aggressive if he knew that he would Not be reinforced any time soon (if ever, if Lee had his way)? With a crisis is Pa. how soon would it take the Mississippi River boats and northern RR's to transport Grant and his victorious army East?
PS Did Lee have a pontoon train with him to effect lodgements across major rivers? If So, were they any where near Harrisberg?
So, assuming a July 2 victory for the Rebs, what would have to go right for them to drive Meade back to Baltimore/DC?
Essentially, they have to crumple up the AoP badly enough that they cannot get off in good order, and they have to be in a position to pursue them, preventing them from rallying and establishing a good position.
An attack like 2nd Manassas, where Longstreet and Stuart nearly accomplished that, is what's needed. Even better, you need to win a victory early enough in the day to have daylight to pursue. The constant delays robbed them of that as well, even if they won.
As Lee pursues and Meade retreats, VI Corps will reinforce the AoP, while Lee will be strung out and disorganized by the pursuit if nothing else. That makes it likely the AoP can counterattack or hold a strong rear-guard position. Given the chance, Meade will set up behind Big Pipe Creek (which his engineers had already studied). If he manages that, Lee will have to stop and mount a co-ordinated operation. That isn't the sort of position you take on the run unless the enemy is surprised or thoroughly disorganized.
So what we are really talking about is either a total disaster on the field of Gettysburg late on the 2nd (the AoP losing whole brigades, divisions and/or corps), or a Confederate pursuit through the night ripping apart the routed Union. That last is as rare as any operation in warfare, and Lee is not set to do it: every force he has is already committed or out of range, except for Stuart's exhausted cavalry, grabbing what sleep they can on July 2.
THE Essential ingredient for Lee is getting his corps commanders to follow his orders with promptness and confidence.
Agreed. But that is hard to do in the aftermath of a major reorganization, and when the ANV is on the outside of the line, with long delays in co-ordinating units. Lee himself was not up to the task that day. His staff was much too small to handle the task properly (deliberately so, for a variety of reasons), Jackson was gone, and Stuart had been absent.
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Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
It has been claimed that after Gettysburg, or at least his staff, began to issue clearly worded orders with less reliance on interpretation by the receiving officer. If he did, was the corrective added by the 3d day of battle?
I'd say no. Lee's orders don't seem to bear this out on July 3. It is more apparent in 1864, particularly by the time of Cold Harbor when the laid-back Lee has become very hands-on to compensate for the missing Jackson-Longstreet-Stuart (dead or wounded) and the failures of their replacements (Ewell, A. P. Hill, Anderson, etc.)
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Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
By the time Longstreet began his attack, Ewell's attack had already expired. So for the requisite 'crushing' victory, Ewell's attack needed to be coordinated with Longstreet, with Hill ready and willing to attack on a moments notice. With the Union's left crushed and fleeing and Ewell's attack successful enough to at least distract Union commanders attention to their flaniks, Hill should be able to break the center of the Union line, with the Left gone and the center pierced it is likely that the Right (if not already routed) would have to retreat.
This was Lee's plan at the end (not at the start) of the day. To a certain extent, it was stopped by the failure of Hill's divisions to continue the en echelon attack when it came up to them. The last chance vanished with that. But this is all coming off too late in the day to allow for a successful pursuit, which is what Lee really needs. Also, Lee does not seem to have known how badly Heth's and Pender's divisions had been hurt (July 1) until sometime on July 3, so he probably had an unrealistic expectation for their participation on July 2.
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Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
Stuart with most of his cavalry must be present to harry the retreat into a rout. Otherwise men on foot can only run so far (pursuer or pursued), if cavalry is not present in force, it is unlikely that the survivors would go much past the Pipe Creek line.
Stuart's exhausted force arrived mid-day July 2, in no condition for this operation. Stuart leaves them and arrives at Lee's HQ before Longstreet starts for the right.
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Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
It is well to remember this 'What If' at Gettysburg would probably Not affect the events at Vicksberg but would verly likely affect the contest in Tn. Would Bragg have been so aggressive if he knew that he would Not be reinforced any time soon (if ever, if Lee had his way)?
Bragg was hightailing it back from Tullahoma in late June-early July of 1863, more than glad to get the flooded Tennessee River between him and Rosecrans' pursuit. Rosecrans then spent July-August preparing for his next move, the crossing below Chattanooga.
Grant and Pemberton were already negotiating surrender when Pickett was defeated on July 3. It would be unlikely that anything that happened at Gettysburg would affect the situation at Vicksburg, Port Hudson, or in Middle TN.
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Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
With a crisis is Pa. how soon would it take the Mississippi River boats and northern RR's to transport Grant and his victorious army East?
Burnside is the most likely source of reinforcements, from the general area of Cincinatti and eastern KY. His cavalry is in pursuit of Morgan's raiders across Indiana and Ohio in early July. If called on by July 4, Burnside might have 10-15,000 troops in central PA via Pittsburgh by mif-July (reversing the Hooker-Howard move the Union made after Chickamauga).
Of course, that does mean Burnside won't be moving on Knoxville in September, which changes the situation of Bragg-Rosecrans greatly.
I'd think Grant might easily have been called back himself, but the troops from his army would probably be going to TN-KY (which was where many of them had been robbed from, anyway).
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Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
PS Did Lee have a pontoon train with him to effect lodgements across major rivers? If So, were they any where near Harrisberg?
His pontoon train was down on the Potomac. The Union struck and destroyed it as Lee retreated, forcing Lee to improvise bridges across the flooded Potomac when he came to it.
The Susquehanna is a wide but shallow river. That's why they couldn't use it to connect to the west in 1820 or so (they tried).
Lee's men could have crossed the Susquehanana unless faced with veteran opposition. Ewell would have gotten it done June 30 or so (without a pontoon train) if he hadn't been recalled. Lots of soldiers showed the way on that in the Civil War (such as Forrest out in TN, several times).
Lee ordered Ewell to capture Harrisburg as an objective. Hill and Longstreet's Corps were initially to be used in an attack at Harrisburg. Lee layed up both corps in the Chambersburg area, waiting on developments and scouting by Ewell's Corps of the Susquehanna River. Unfortunately, few historians ever detail why Lee failed to even attack Harrisburg,which was on the eastern side of the Susquehanna River, or why Hill and Longstreet weren't marching towards the Susquehanna River, by June 28.
For the Confederates, Gettysburg was never an objective. It happened because Lee had Jubal Early's Division in the York-Wrightsville area, completely separated from the rest of Ewell's Corps, which was in the Carlisle-Harrisburg area. I've speculated that the only reason for Lee to cross over the South Mountain towards Gettysburg, was a fear that Early might get interdicted by AoP troops marching north. One must remember Lee would realize that telegraph traffic would locate, exactly where Lee had his corps and did. Gettysburg was never a second military objective for Lee.
The great advantage for smaller number of troops needed for protecting Harrisburg was the high water from the frequent rains and the fact that Lee's army didn't have the pontoon boats to cross without a bridge. And National Guard brigades were defending the few bridges that crossed the Susquehanna River near Harrisburg.
Few it seems, emphasize or know that it took less than three days for the Army of Northern Virginia to run out of artillery ammunition at Gettysburg. The ANV could not sustain many battles without capturing union artillery supplies in Pennsylvania. It never happened.
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