Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
What if the troops at Ft. Donelson had been ordered to make the breakout - and had succeeded? The Army of Mississippi makes forced marches to Nashville and meets up with reeinforcements from Mid-Tenn and northern Mississippi.
In the week's time it takes Grant to move south - garrison troops at Nashville are in a frenzy to construct fortifications on the southern side of the Cumberland - much as the Feds later constructed them. Johnston without the loss of the troops at Donelson feels strongly enough that - even without long term preparation of defenses at that place - IT (Nashville) MUST BE DEFENDED!
Can a successful defense of Nashville be conducted at that point in February 1862?
Johnston had lost the fight to gain support from local plantation owners to utilize slave labor to construct fortifications in late '61 - even though financial reimbursement had been promised. (The slave owners of course fearing that their slaves would be more or less conscripted and they would lose the benefit of their free labor.)
In addition to garrison troops at the city - civilians are forced to participate in the hurried construction of works. Johnston also establishes several local batteries in temporary works as far as ten miles down stream on the Cumberland to impede the enemies river advance. The few passable gaps in the ridges north of Nashville are manned with small forces and sections of cannon to block these positions and about half of the Confederate force is left on the North side of the river in the event an attempt is made to assault and open a gap - troops can be rushed there to aid in defense.
The bridges are left in tact but plans made for demolition or destruction in the event such is needed.
Johnston feels confident that without the loss of his men at Donelson and sufficient reenforcement, and most importantly effective cavalry actions - he CAN hold Nashville!
What if the troops at Ft. Donelson had been ordered to make the breakout - and had succeeded? The Army of Mississippi makes forced marches to Nashville and meets up with reeinforcements from Mid-Tenn and northern Mississippi.
In the week's time it takes Grant to move south - garrison troops at Nashville are in a frenzy to construct fortifications on the southern side of the Cumberland - much as the Feds later constructed them. Johnston without the loss of the troops at Donelson feels strongly enough that - even without long term preparation of defenses at that place - IT (Nashville) MUST BE DEFENDED!
Can a successful defense of Nashville be conducted at that point in February 1862?
Johnston had lost the fight to gain support from local plantation owners to utilize slave labor to construct fortifications in late '61 - even though financial reimbursement had been promised. (The slave owners of course fearing that their slaves would be more or less conscripted and they would lose the benefit of their free labor.)
In addition to garrison troops at the city - civilians are forced to participate in the hurried construction of works. Johnston also establishes several local batteries in temporary works as far as ten miles down stream on the Cumberland to impede the enemies river advance. The few passable gaps in the ridges north of Nashville are manned with small forces and sections of cannon to block these positions and about half of the Confederate force is left on the North side of the river in the event an attempt is made to assault and open a gap - troops can be rushed there to aid in defense.
The bridges are left in tact but plans made for demolition or destruction in the event such is needed.
Johnston feels confident that without the loss of his men at Donelson and sufficient reenforcement, and most importantly effective cavalry actions - he CAN hold Nashville!
Can he?
The problem as I see it is that once Donelson-Henry fell the federals were in.
They had a highway into the state that allowed them to win at Shiloh, and strike at Memphis, Mississippi, Alabama, and Chattanooga from the west (which would cut off Nashville).
New Orleans, Vicksburg, Memphis, Mobile were as critical to the defense of Tennessee as Nashville and Donelson. Losses in those places pretty much doomed Tennessee.
Memphis was not a good place to strike at St. Louis from, but it could block the move south on Vicksburg. Nashville was good for striking north, but those killing mountains put a terrible strain on Confederate logistics from there.
The only hope would have been pressure on Cincinnati from Virginia - but that would put the ANV in danger by putting the AoP behind them.
A what if would be to block the passes as you suggest, send Jackson and the entire ANV at Charleston and Cincinnati - then send the Army of Tennessee up the Shenandoah to ambush the AoP in the flank as they went after Jackson.
It would be an enormous calculation, but with Cincinnati in Confederate hands Grant would have forgotten all about Tennessee until it was recovered.
With the Army of Tennessee holding Virginia, and Jackson holding Cincinnati with Grant to his front - St. Louis would be open to attack from Memphis. Grant would have to cover all of Kentucky, and be vulnerable to attack from the front, flank and rear.
Once Knoxville fell this would be impossible however.
Johnston feels confident that without the loss of his men at Donelson and sufficient reenforcement, and most importantly effective cavalry actions - he CAN hold Nashville!
Had the Donelson forces escaped capture, Nashville needn't be abandoned --- however. Johnston had in hand a pretty good design for turning Nashville into a really tough defensive position. As might be expected NIMBY ruled against Johnston whereas it didn't much deter the Union forces.
Nashville, perhaps more than Vicksburg, was THE key to Confederate weakness. Without it, subsequent Union gains would have been difficult, at best. Memphis would still have fallen, but with Nashville in Confederate hands and as a supply depot and concentration point, Vicksburg would have to wait until Nashville was in Union hands.
I'll agree with suwanee in that Confederate possession of Nashville would have diverted AoP and AotT resources to make sure Cincinnati was covered. A whole nother ball game. Floyd and Pillow did the Confederacy no favors that day. At least Forrest had the nads to get out and live to fight another day.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
The Confederacy lost much of Tennessee and Nashville, because they were inferior in logistic resources and steamboat capability. Nashville is on a river connected to the Mississippi. The U.S. had the dominance in steamboats for troops transit, supply transit, rams and ironclads.
The Confederacy had no hope of threatening or holding a Cincinnati. Cincinnati is on the Ohio River. The U.S. dominated the Ohio River, from the very beginning of the war, with its ironclads.
The Confederacy could make raids into Ohio and western Virginia, but because of steamboat transit, the Confederacy never had any chance of holding these areas for long, if at all.
The navigable rivers were the "interstate highways" for the fresh water U.S. Navy.
Of course, Whitworth, there was no real chance of taking Cincinnati, but politically, a remote possibility is a threat and must be countered. Cincinnati citizens would raise hob with the governor and he, in turn, would make demands on Washington to take the heat off himself. Ohio, being highly influential politically, gets pretty much what it wants.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I think that over emphasis was put on static defenses early in the war. A fort or fortress was immobile and required valuable time to construct and man - but later in the war - just below Nashville - one battery of guns showed what they could accomplish - as far as blockading a river goes - for over two weeks!
Had a more flexible defensive plan been established - it is feasible that even after the fall of Henry and Donelson - that a time consuming land campaign would have to take place along both banks of the Tenn. and Cumberland rivers - with of course very few crossing points along the way.
I don't think the C. S. could ever take or sieze Cincinnatti -but at least threaten politically valuable real estate in the union - causing redeployment of U. S. troops.
Probably what hurt the C. S. more than anything was the southern states' unwillingness to commit more troops early in the war and share more resources.
Jamie, something I've often wondered about is/was the attraction of a fortification as an object in the civil war. Take the breastworks at Franklin which were so brutally charged by the AOT. The best that could be expected from that effort was a bloody mess. Same was true to an extent at Gettysburg. With all that bulky defense mechanism in place in open territory, why not let the enemy sit there and stay prepared. At Franklin for instance, there was 25 miles of more or less open territory to the east through which Hood could have begun an approach to Nashville. Even if Schofield had shifted position, it would have taken a while and the resulting combat would have been in more open territory avoiding all that abattis. Seems like most any stationary force could have been avoided at least for a while. Having superior strength is one thing. Just wanting to tackle an entrenched foe otherwise is stupidity. I hope there are no Hood descendants reading this!
__________________ Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
Ancestors in CSA Army: 48th VA; 63rd VA, 5th NC Cav; 37th NC
Wife and Grandson's CSA: 15th AL, 51st GA, 41st TN; 36th TN; GA Mil 1197 Dist
At Franklin for instance, there was 25 miles of more or less open territory to the east through which Hood could have begun an approach to Nashville.
That makes good sense. But. Hood didn't have the luxury of time and broad maneuver -- and that's generously assuming he would have thought of it, facing as he was, a direct line-of-sight challenge to his army. I don't think Hood had it in him to avoid a fight by finessing his way around it.
I think we can all agree that if he fixed Schofield in Franklin and sent his forces on a long looping move on the right, he might have had a chance to trap Schofield in Franklin or force him to abandon the town and a rear-guard to Hood. But, that's speculation. Hood simply didn't have the time nor the resources (nor the temperment) to pull that off.
I read the situation as one of no choice at all when confronting the Federals at Franklin: go back to Alabama/Mississippi (no way) or take a flyer against all military learning (2 to 1 for the attacker) as the only viable alternative.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
At least two prominent Major Generals tried to convince Hood to live and fight another day, those being Patrick Cleburne and Nat Forrest. He was a stubborn man. Even Jim Longstreet would have passed on Franklin.
__________________ Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
Ancestors in CSA Army: 48th VA; 63rd VA, 5th NC Cav; 37th NC
Wife and Grandson's CSA: 15th AL, 51st GA, 41st TN; 36th TN; GA Mil 1197 Dist
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Nashville WAS defended? 
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