Nashville WAS defended?

[whitworth]

As I recall from Grant's Memoirs, Grant had Buell coming toward Nashville from Louisville. And he had troops arrive at Nashville on steamers on the Cumberland River.
In fact with the bridges out, Buell's army was ferried across the river to Nashville using the steamboats or steamers.

With Union naval superiority on the western waters, any Confederate defensive position near a navigable waterway, would eventually fall.

By the time Nashville fell, the Confederate army generals knew about as much about naval power, as they wanted.

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by gunny

What if the troops at Ft. Donelson had been ordered to make the breakout - and had succeeded? The Army of Mississippi makes forced marches to Nashville and meets up with reeinforcements from Mid-Tenn and northern Mississippi.

In the week's time it takes Grant to move south - garrison troops at Nashville are in a frenzy to construct fortifications on the southern side of the Cumberland - much as the Feds later constructed them. Johnston without the loss of the troops at Donelson feels strongly enough that - even without long term preparation of defenses at that place - IT (Nashville) MUST BE DEFENDED!

Can a successful defense of Nashville be conducted at that point in February 1862?

Johnston had lost the fight to gain support from local plantation owners to utilize slave labor to construct fortifications in late '61 - even though financial reimbursement had been promised. (The slave owners of course fearing that their slaves would be more or less conscripted and they would lose the benefit of their free labor.)

In addition to garrison troops at the city - civilians are forced to participate in the hurried construction of works. Johnston also establishes several local batteries in temporary works as far as ten miles down stream on the Cumberland to impede the enemies river advance. The few passable gaps in the ridges north of Nashville are manned with small forces and sections of cannon to block these positions and about half of the Confederate force is left on the North side of the river in the event an attempt is made to assault and open a gap - troops can be rushed there to aid in defense.

The bridges are left in tact but plans made for demolition or destruction in the event such is needed.

Johnston feels confident that without the loss of his men at Donelson and sufficient reenforcement, and most importantly effective cavalry actions - he CAN hold Nashville!

Can he?

As you'll notice here Jamie's original question didn't have much to do with Hood! Had Nashville actually been filled with troops and defended or untakeable in 1862, the army behind Grant and Buell, just as they did with respect to Shiloh, would have moved up the Tennessee River instead of the Cumberland. Thomas might have been commanding Florence or Clifton instead of Nashville or perhaps assembled his army at Pulaski. Same result, different roads.

[ole]

Had Nashville actually been filled with troops and defended or untakeable in 1862, the army behind Grant and Buell, just as they did with respect to Shiloh, would have moved up the Tennessee River instead of the Cumberland.

Question: "would have moved up the Tennessee." That is saying they couldn't have taken Nashville? It would seem to me to be quite foolish going after Corinth with an occupied, loyal Nashvile poised in the rear. They'd have had to take Nashville -- or, at least, invested the area to pin Johnston there long enough to take Florence and Chattanooga.

An April, 1862 battle there would have been interesting. Johnston would have had a good supply line to Chattanooga and points south. Grant/Buell would have had a good supply line to Louisville and Cairo. Seems the only problem there is Johnston being unable to get the cooperation of the secesh citizens around Nashville -- not my slaves; NIMBY.

Ole

[trice]

Originally Posted by ole

Question: "would have moved up the Tennessee." That is saying they couldn't have taken Nashville? It would seem to me to be quite foolish going after Corinth with an occupied, loyal Nashvile poised in the rear. They'd have had to take Nashville -- or, at least, invested the area to pin Johnston there long enough to take Florence and Chattanooga.

An April, 1862 battle there would have been interesting. Johnston would have had a good supply line to Chattanooga and points south. Grant/Buell would have had a good supply line to Louisville and Cairo. Seems the only problem there is Johnston being unable to get the cooperation of the secesh citizens around Nashville -- not my slaves; NIMBY.

Ole

Ole,

The problem is that with Grant and Buell combining forces at Nashville, A. S. Johnston is severely outnumbered. That's why Johnston had pushed up to Bowling Green in KY and downriver to Ft. Donelson to set up his defensive line. Trying to defend Nashville at Nashville allows the multiple Union forces to combine and attack together.

Regards,
Tim

[whitworth]

"I don't think the C. S. could ever take or seize Cincinnatti -but at least threaten politically valuable real estate in the union - causing redeployment of U. S. troops."

The Confederacy never had the steamboat fleet or logistics to ever threaten and capture --St. Louis.

Fort Donelson, Fort Henry, Nashville and Memphis were all lost, by the Confederates, because of Union logistical superiority. The Union army could ferry in the supplies and troops at the point of the attack, or nearby. The Confederates had no equal means of meeting this threat. The Union army under Grant brought troops from the Mississippi River, down the Cumberland River, directly to Nashville, by steamer.

The Union army truly "got there firstest, with the mostest."

[whitworth]

How does an army defend a city, when the enemy can bring its troops and supplies, directly from the Mississippi river, up the Cumberland River, and deploy its troops at the Nashville city limits.


"I knew General Buell was advancing on Nashville from the north, and I was advised by scouts that the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all the supplies they could. Nashville was, at that time, one of the best provisioned posts in the South. I had no use for reinforcements now, and thinking Buell would like to have his troops again, I ordered Nelson to proceed to Nashville without debarking at Fort Donelson. I sent a gunboat also as a convoy. The Cumberland River was very high at the time; the railroad bridge at Nashville had been burned, and all river craft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left. Nashville is on the west bank of the Cumberland, and Buell was approaching from the east. I thought the steamers carrying Nelson’s division would be useful in ferrying the balance of Buell’s forces across. I ordered Nelson to put himself in communication with Buell as soon as possible, and if he found him more than two days off from Nashville to return below the city and await orders. Buell, however, had already arrived in person at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, and Mitchell’s division of his command reached there the same day. Nelson immediately took possession of the city."

Ulysses S. Grant (1822–85). Personal Memoirs. 1885–86.
XXIII

[ole]

When Donelson fell, Johnston's command was divided. He didn't have much choice but to abandon Nashville to reunite it. As it looked like the federal goal was to be Corinth, he--with Beauregard's urging--went for Corinth as the point of concentration.

Johnston knew very well the value of the rivers, which doesn't at all explain his inattention to Forts Henry, Heiman, and Donelson.

ole

[larry_cockerham]

Hadn't A.S. Johnston's army been held up in northern Mississippi? I don't think Nashville by July 1863 was yet a player, though it would have already been under federal occupation by then? Only Forrest was there just prior to the 'evacuation' by Confederate forces.