Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
At least two prominent Major Generals tried to convince Hood to live and fight another day, those being Patrick Cleburne and Nat Forrest. He was a stubborn man. Even Jim Longstreet would have passed on Franklin.
And then? What? There would have been a formidible AoT roaming about in the deep south while Grant choked the life out of Lee in Virginia. He'd have had to do something to take the pressure off Lee. Attack Vicksburg? Take Memphis back?
Thomas would have been in charge of bottling up Hood and the AoT and, with Sherman-like steps, would likely have done it. Meanwhile, the ANV is still toast.
No. It was all over when Atlanta fell. Unfortunately for the south, nobody made the call.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
And then? What? There would have been a formidible AoT roaming about in the deep south while Grant choked the life out of Lee in Virginia. He'd have had to do something to take the pressure off Lee. Attack Vicksburg? Take Memphis back?
Thomas would have been in charge of bottling up Hood and the AoT and, with Sherman-like steps, would likely have done it. Meanwhile, the ANV is still toast.
No. It was all over when Atlanta fell. Unfortunately for the south, nobody made the call.
Ole
Ole, this may be one of those times when you are both rational and correct. Instead of wasting his time and energy moving west across Alabama in November 1864 after the defeat at Jonesboro, Hood, in my opion, should have considered going after Sherman at the earliest opportunity. Georgia is considerably more forgiving to a traveler in the winter than is Tennessee. That would possibly have gotten Grant's attention and cut Lee some slack. Seems to me a bunch of lives might have been saved in the process. A good coin toss could have ended this mess? Grant, Lee, Sherman and Hood/Johnston could have met at the Darlington raceway and tossed the coin.
__________________ Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
Ancestors in CSA Army: 48th VA; 63rd VA, 5th NC Cav; 37th NC
Wife and Grandson's CSA: 15th AL, 51st GA, 41st TN; 36th TN; GA Mil 1197 Dist
Hood, in my opion, should have considered going after Sherman at the earliest opportunity.
Boith agree and disagree. Hood could have best served the cause by requiring Grant or Sherman to ship several divisions after him. His move against Nashville should have resulted in that action. He miscalculated the confidence given Thomas by his superiors.
Would heading west for Vicksburg, Memphis, or New Orleans have shaken Lincoln enough to order Grant to rush reenforcements to protect those points? Remember that Sherman could not be contacted at that point.
If he were to follow Sherman, what route would he take? Remember that according to the southern view, Sherman burned everything. Even if he did leave some provisions, it wouldn't sustain a pursuing army. So he'd have had to travel further south -- nearer the coast -- with multiple, rather large rivers to cross and questionable food supply.
Assuming he could have caught up with Sherman, his army would be worn to the nub, without ammo and other vital materiel. But this assumes Sherman continues piddling his way across the Carolinas. Sherman, hearing Hood was heading for him, could brush aside the forces opposing him and join Grant. The addition of 60,000 well-fed, well equipped, and thoroughly motivated veterans would take Richmond in days, take in the ANV and then turn on Hood.
Even if Hood, with the AoT intact, caught Sherman, we must factor in that the AotT under Sherman was hardly the equivalent of what Thomas had at Nashville.
Davis did Hood permanent historical damage by putting him in such a spot. I wonder if Lee himself could have done more.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Not as well versed as most of you folks on this, but from what I have read (this site mostly) have to agree with OLE. I sometimes wonder if HOOD wasn't just doing the best he could with the orders he had been given, and the troops he had to work with. Magnificant warriors as they may have been.
Boith agree and disagree. Hood could have best served the cause by requiring Grant or Sherman to ship several divisions after him. His move against Nashville should have resulted in that action. He miscalculated the confidence given Thomas by his superiors.
By the time Sherman is headed for the coast, it is too late to do anything about it. Hood is way too far to the West, and Sherman is already marching East. Here is a description of the situation from Beauregard's report:
On the 6th day of December, in answer to a telegram from the President, I addressed him, from Augusta, a communication, stating that all had been done practicable under existing conditions, with the limited means at command, to oppose the advance of Sherman toward the Atlantic coast, and that I had deemed it inexpedient to countermand the campaign of General Hood into Tennessee to attempt the pursuit of Sherman, for the following reasons, namely:
First. The roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa River across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been rendered impassable by the prevailing rains.
Second. Sherman, with an army better appointed and of superior numbers, had the start of about 275 miles on comparatively good roads.
Third. To pursue Sherman, the march of the Army of Tennessee would necessarily have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a desolated country, affording neither subsistence nor forage, while a retrograde movement of the army must have seriously depleted its ranks by desertions.
Fourth. Moreover, to have recalled the army to follow Sherman, would have opened to Thomas the richest portions of Alabama. Montgomery, Mobile, and Selma would have easily fallen, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.
Fifth. From the assurances of Governor Brown and Major-General Cobb, it was a reasonable supposition that about 17,000 men would be furnished in a great emergency by the State of Georgia, which force, added to thirteen brigades of cavalry, under Major-General Wheeler, and some 5,000 men, who, it was thought, might be drawn from the States of North and South Carolina, would have given us about 29,000 men to throw across Sherman's path. ...
Beauregard is engaged in a little CYA activity here, but then Davis-Hood had left Beauregard swinging in the wind as the campaign unfolded. Still, in mid-November when Beauregard and Hood find out from Wheeler that Sherman has destroyed Atlanta and headed out for the sea, the situation is pretty much as Beauregard describes it. The biggest difference is that Sherman has 60,000 men instead of the 44,000 Beauregard describes.
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Beauregard also outlines how he thinks this could have worked out better:
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And now, in conclusion, I deem it in place to give expression to my conviction that the campaign, instead of the unhappy day at Franklin and the disastrous culmination at Nashville, would have led to the signal defeat of Thomas, and such troops as might have been hurriedly brought up to his assistance, had the original plan been executed without undue delay and modifications and with vigor and skill; Sherman most probably would have been compelled to return to Middle Tennessee to repair and protect his line of communications before he could have collected sufficient supplies for the march from Atlanta to the sea-coast, or, in the event that he had been able to reach the coast of Georgia, he must have been forced to abandon it and hasten to the rescue of Kentucky, or perchance, the defense of Ohio, and thus have been prevented from attempting any operations looking to a junction on his part with Grant in Virginia, or any substantial diversion in favor of that commander; meantime, too,we would have been enabled to glean and send supplies from Middle and East Tennessee to Virginia, and re-establish our railway communications between our capital and those well-stored sections of the country. But instead of crossing the Tennessee River at Gunter's Landing, as General Hood intended at Gadsden, he suddenly changed his line of march, as mentioned hereinbefore, and repaired to Tuscumbia and Florence, where the want of supplies, due to the bad condition of the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston Railroads and prevailing rains, delayed his advance for nearly three weeks, whereby Sherman was given time to repair the damage done to the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad and to collect sufficient supplies for his march across Georgia. It is clear, also, to my mind that after the great loss and waste of life at Franklin, the army was in no condition to make a successful attack on Nashville--a strongly fortified city, defended by an army nearly as strong as our own, and which was being re-enforced constantly by river and railroads. From Franklin, General Hood should have marched, not on Nashville, but on Murfreesborough, which could doubtless have been captured, with its garrison of about 8,000 men; and after having destroyed the railroad bridges across Duck and Elk Rivers, which surely would have caused the evacuation of Bridgeport and Chattanooga, he might have returned, with the prestige of success, into winter quarters behind the Duck or Tennessee Rivers, as circumstances might have dictated, detaching then a force for the protection of South Carolina.
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The original plan referred to was for a crossing at Gunter's Landing. That is on the Tennessee, about 40 miles above Gadsden AL, and the original crossing date was to be about Oct. 21 or 22 -- more than three weeks before Sherman started for Savannah. But Hood abandoned that plan without informing Beauregard, as he would abandon other crossing plans.
Hood also seems to be one of those generals who expected logistics to somehow be taken care of by other people. The reason he sat so long at Tuscumbia was that he had wasted time getting there, and come to a place where there were no supplies and where there was no bridge. Everything Lee said of him turned out to be true.
And now, in conclusion, I deem it in place to give expression to my conviction that the campaign, instead of the unhappy day at Franklin and the disastrous culmination at Nashville, would have led to the signal defeat of Thomas,
Does this sound like, "We could have beaten him if he hadn't kicked the snot out of us first?"
Quote:
Please remind me what Lee said about Hood. thanks.
Pinckney: "All lion; no fox."
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Does this sound like, "We could have beaten him if he hadn't kicked the snot out of us first?"
Ole
Ole,
Well, just about.
This was happening right after Hood had struck the RR and Sherman had grown quite frustrated trying to catch him. Hood retreated West, hoping to get Sherman to follow him, and Sherman pulled back, split his force, convinced Grant to let him head for the coast, and set about preparing.
The crossing at Gunter's Landing (about where Guntersville in on the Tennessee River nowadays) might have been successful if Hood had actually crossed on about October 22 or so. From there, he can rip up the line between Chattanooga and Decatur easily, as well as heading north to cut the line between Chattanooga and Murfreesboro. That would cut all of Sherman's communication with the North and might have brought Sherman north after him.
That would have prevented the March to the Sea in 1864 if it happened. But we need to remember that what Hood would be doing is moving into Tennessee with some 30-35,000 men. Sherman will have 80-100,000 in Tennessee after leaving a force in Atlanta.
Hood can only succeed by moving fast, striking and retreating. His hope is to catch and smash isolated forces. If he ever ends up in a battle with a sizable portion of Sherman's host, he'll get crushed. Plus Sherman can use the preponderance of force to hem Hood in and track him down.
Long-term, Hood has little chance. Short-term, he might have accomplished a few things. So I agree Beauregard is gilding the lily a bit here.
But his observations on why it made no sense to send Hood after Sherman once they got the news Sherman was moving East make sense. Hood is 275 miles behind, over bad roads, with Sherman moving away from him. Hood could never have caught him.
Please remind me what Lee said about Hood. thanks.
Pinckney
Asked about making Hood a Corps commander in late 1863, Lee said that Hood was a good commander on the battlefield and careless off it (paraphrased). To me, that translates into a man who doesn't pay enough attention to logistics and normal routine. When you put someone like that in charge of an army, he needs a strong staff to make up for his weaknesses. Confederate staffs were rarely capable of that.
As good as the men were on his staff - as a whole, Hood's staff was definitely incompetent at perfroming the management a commanding general is responsible for. And that is what Hood required of them.
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