Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
During the Atlanta campaign, when Davis removed Johnston from command, what if he had put William Hardee in command of the Army of Tennessee instead of Hood? How would Hardee have done?
For one, there would have been a larger Army of Tennessee leaving Atlanta to Sherman. So far as I can see, Hardee would have been a good choice, at least a touch more capable than Hood, but Sherman had a bit more than twice the men facing him. You've got to get a bit closer than 2::1 to have much hope of holding against it.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Old Reliable would have fought as Johnston would have. That is, Hardee knew of Johnston's plan of attack at Peach Tree Creek. He would have carried it out and Johnston would either have been vindicated or discredited (because Johnston would have accepted responsibility to help Hardee).
With Hardee in charge I might suggest that Atlanta could possibly been held until after the November election. That could also have made a difference if Sherman had made some rash decisions in his approaches to envelope the city. Perhaps a poorly supported attack or the likes.
If Hardee decided to hunker down and defend the city, he'd be starved out ala Vicksburg. The Confederacy couldn't really raise a relief army. Hopefully Forrest would be caught so he could raid around Sherman while Sherman was trying to conduct a siege.
Does anyone have Hardee`s biography? In book 'Atlanta Will Fall' author has written that: 'Davis chose Hood on July 17 - a decision with which even a Hardee`s biographer agrees'. If someone does have Hardee`s bio, could I get a sentence from it which is about this matter? Thanks!
By the time Sherman started his drive into Georgia, the war was over, in a fairly real technical sense. The Union army would not lose; the Confederate army could not win.
Sherman's army totally outnumbered the Confederate army, was much better supplied, could lay and supply a siege of Atlanta, had superior artillery, and was too veteran an army to make the errors the earlier Union armies made.
Hood's attacks were motivated much by the realization that Sherman's army could effectively conduct a very effective siege of Atlanta. The Confederates knew well what the U.S. Army had done at Vicksburg. If attacking was desperate for the Confederates near Atlanta, it was mainly due to the knowledge the Confederates could not logistically defend Atlanta against a siege for long.
Hardee not only was a West Point graduate, he had been commandant of West Point. He was a long experienced officer in the old army, unlike Leonidas Polk, who left the service and became an Episcopal bishop.
Was it a case of not enough friends in high places, either at the beginning of the war or later. Accounts say he had a falling out, when under Bragg's command. And Bragg was a very good friend of Jefferson Davis.
By the time of Atlanta, Jefferson Davis didn't need a well grounded officer, like a Johnston and a Hardee. He needed a younger fool, who would go on a fool's errand and that was Hood. I have doubts whether a Hardee or a Johnston would have taken the Army of the Tennessee on a winter campaign into Tennessee, in late 1864.
I think little was ever said of Hardee historically, because few, if any, wanted to criticise the Confederates, after the war was actually lost, more than six months before Appomattox.
Except the ....."young fool".. description, the realization that conventional thinking and solid education was Not what was required to attempt a turn around of Confederate fortunes in the West in late 1864, was well founded.
The mission, decided on by higher commands, may have been 'foolish, and it's execution may have been inept and/or unlucky, but Hood was no fool, he knew the odds were long, but great odds require great daring. I would not condemn Hood, for trying to emulate Lee, as much as I would have, Hardee for trying to emulate Johnston.
As Davis and Hood both realized, a Lee was required not a Johnston.
As Davis and Hood both realized, a Lee was required not a Johnston.
We seem to be agreeing in a roundabout way that a Lincoln was required, not a Davis.
On the choice of Hood over Hardee in replacing Johnston: Hardee would certainly made Davis very happy in being more communicative, but Davis was under enormous pressure to chalk up another Chickamauga -- he and his government were losing face. Fast.
The Bragg-hater, Hardee, had lost the minute Davis sent Bragg out to interview both on their plans.
Given the resources of the other, it is quite likely that Sherman couldn't have stopped Johnston if their roles were reversed. Nor could Thomas, or Grant
Quote:
By the time Sherman started his drive into Georgia, the war was over, in a fairly real technical sense. The Union army would not lose; the Confederate army could not win.
Oh yes, we can see clearly now. The CSA may also have seen it, though not so clearly. But the CSA was not given to accepting defeat, however honorable, as long as there was a slim chance it had the grit to presage Lombardi's second effort. Sometimes the magic works; sometimes it doesn't.
Great posts, guys! Lots of good observations to think about.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln