Thomas and Sherman

[richard]

In the early summer of 1864, Sherman was getting ready to take on Johnston and drive his way to Atlanta. In order to do this, he needed to drive Johnston from Dalton. What if Sherman had followed the plan drawn up by Thomas? If followed and success fell on the side of the Union, would his march to the sea have been necessary?

Below is what Thomas proposed:Donn Piatt's Memories of the Men Who Saved the Union
General Sherman consulted General Thomas as to a plan of campaign, but unfortunately did not follow his advice. The hero of Chickamauga quietly traced upon the map a proposition that bade fair to annihilate the enemy. Johnston's army, between fifty and sixty thousand strong, lay in front of Dalton, Georgia, manning the almost inaccessible heights and passes of Rocky Face Ridge and Buzzard Roost, with a small force of about three thousand men stationed at the fortified town of Resaca to hold the communications secure. Thomas proposed to throw his Army of the Cumberland, sixty thousand strong, through Snake Creep Gap, which he knew to be unguarded, in the rear of Johnston on his line of communication, between Dalton and Resaca, while Sherman held him at Dalton with the remainder of his forces. In this way the Confederate commander would be forced to fight Thomas at a disadvantage or, abandoning Dalton and his communications, retreat eastward through a rough and broken country, where his army would have been cut to pieces or disorganized. General Thomas was confident that should the Confederates turn on him he could defeat them with the Army of the Cumberland alone, as he had done before. This plan Sherman refused to adopt, alleging as a reason that he desired to hold Thomas' army as a rallying-point for the other two armies, though what he wanted with such rallying-point, unless he expected his other two armies that numbered about as many men as Johnston had to run away, is hard to understand. We are forced to attribute Sherman's willfulness to the jealousy felt by a general who never won a victory toward one who never suffered a defeat.

[nbforrest]

As events proved Thomas was correct in his planning. This is one of the incidents that keeps me from rating Sherman very highly.

I've always seen Sherman's decision to use the Army of the Tennessee to force Snake Creek Gap rather than the Army of the Cumberland as another example of the rather unwarranted confidence Sherman (and Grant) placed in McPherson. He never really lived up to the position Grant and Sherman curried him for.

Respectfully

[samgrant]

Prolific military historian, Mark Grimsley, has an interesting 7 part series addressing and analyzing the Snake Creek Gap issue:

See 'Snake Bite' Part 1, here and follow the links:


http://warhistorian.org/blog1/index....y050822-182206

[r_moody]

I have read and reread most everything on Sherman, Thomas and Snake Creek Gap including most everything from the Civilwarwest group. I remain unconvinced that success was certain if Thomas's plan was followed to the letter. What no one seems to address is the danger and logistic possibility of moving such a large force through that very narrow gap. All of the artillery, ammunitions, rations and manpower marched through a single narrow pathway is risky beyond reason. Especially at the time of the year they were moving. A quick rain storm could have been the cause of a western mud march that would have trapped a third of the army.

Rick

[nbforrest]

The weather didn't prove to be a hindrance of any major sort to Sherman's campaign. Moving an army through a mountain pass isn't any easy thing. But considering the ease with which McPherson was able to proceed with, I don't see any major difficulties with a move through by Thomas. So he would have taken longer for his larger army to march through. So what? I just don't foresee massive problems. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that McPherson failed. Thus, Thomas pretty clearly would have been a better choice. Not just with numbers, but perhaps he would have seized the initiative (after all, he had already formulated plans for his proposed offensive move. He was pumped and ready to go.)

Respectfully

[samgrant]

North & South magazine did a feature a few years ago with a panel of CW historians on the "Top Ten Generals". In this contest, Sherman barely edged Thomas for #3 after Grant and Lee.

An interesting discussion, in which surprisingly to some, but not to me, they voted Montgomery Meigs as #6, after Sheridan, but ahead of Forrest!

Here's a link for where you can download that article and others including "The Worst Ten Generals" and the "Ten Greatest Blunders of the Civil War".


http://www.northandsouthmagazine.com...howpage&pid=35


While most of us can't put a lot of credence in 'top 10' anythings, heres just one more list I found of interest (tho it gives absolutely no explanation of how the generals were rated):

http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0785...3D#reader-page

In which Thomas is #3 ahead of Sherman at #4, but look at #2!, my fave Benjamin Grierson! Well I am a fan of Grierson, but to put him ahead of Sherman and Thomas (and Sheridan doesn't even make the list) is somewhat questionable, to say the least.

[elektratig]

Samgrant,

Thanks so much for the referral to "Snake Bit"! I've visited Mark Grimsely's blog, but somehow I missed that series of posts. It's great. Now, if only Prof. Grimsely would produce Part 8 . . ..

I, too, enjoy best and worst generals lists, although I tend to prefer lists that rank generals on each side separately. Otherwise, you immediately descend into the typical Grant vs. Lee debate. It also seems to me that the discussion becomes more interesting and productive when you recognize that different commanders had different strengths. I consider Grant and Sherman the best generals of the War, by far. But at the same time, I recognize that neither was a great tactician. Grant was taken by surprise by the aborted breakout at Fort Donelson; Grant and Sherman were taken by surprise at Shiloh; Sherman made a hash out of the north end of the field at Chattanooga (although, to paraphrase Pickett, maybe Cleburne had something to do with it); etc. But they had strategic and operational vision matched by no others.

Finally, I'd like to address one portion of the quote in Richard's opening post that I think is particularly unfair. After characterizing Sherman's decision as a "refusal to adopt" Thomas's plan, the quote concludes that ["w]e are forced to the attribute Sherman's willfulness to . . . jealousy". I haven't the slightest idea why we are forced to do so. First, from Sherman's standpoint, he didn't so much "refuse to adopt" Thomas's plan as he decided to adopt his own plan, which happened to be different. Second, to characterize Sherman's decision as "willful" really prejudges the issue, for the term strongly implies a petulant refusal to take advice that one knows is right. Third, I think that bad faith (of which jealousy in this case is a species) is typically the last inference one would make, after ruling out all others. As the "Snake Gap" series suggests, there are potentially many other explanations for Sherman's decision, starting with caution, which Sherman certainly displayed in abundance during the campaign.

[ewc]

I think too that a general perception, perhaps coming from Grant, of Thomas as a slow, plodding, deliberate mover may have been factored ahead of time into Sherman's planning of his conduct of this campaign. Old Pap had by far the largest army and was as steadfast as a mountain in a fight. So Sherman's grand design was to use Thomas as his anvil and the nimbler outfits of Schofield and McPherson were to be the legs and hammers. As Electratig points out, I agree that Sherman's using his own plan over Thomas at Snake Gap is more a case of being comfortable in his mind with his own design than of any lack of merit in Thomas's.

[nbforrest]

That's a pretty fair analysis. I think (fairly or not) Thomas had already been labeled as slow. Probably Sherman also did not fully confide in Thomas simply because Sherman had worked with McPherson much more extensively. The Army of the Cumberland was not Sherman's outfit, so he perhaps leaned most heavily upon his trusted old unit, not without reason (although I still can't help but think of McPherson was a bit of a dissapointment)

Respectfully

[ewc]

NB- True that Sherman had worked closely with McPherson, and he knew the mettle of the man and his military ability. He also knew McPherson's Army (the Army of the Tennessee) intimately as it was his old outfit and he knew and trusted its men and officers. All this is to take nothing away from Thomas and his superb Army of the Cumberland. Again I iterate the matter being one of the comfort level of the leader planning these operations. McPherson did disappoint Sherman in this campaign, missing out by hesitation a wonderful opportunity of licking Johnston at Resaca. One must remember that McPherson was new to army level command and its' responsibilities weighed heavily upon him as it did many competent commanders at the corps level new to the heightened level of decision and responsibility of higher command. Many failed in this initial moment of dread, but not all became poor commanders in consequence. I believe McPherson performed to Sherman's satisfaction after this initial mistake, though it was a biggie. I cannot believe Grant's and Sherman's trust in McPherson is not well grounded as the men who best knew the man.