Thomas and Sherman

[nbforrest]

I agree with the bulk of that, though I'm still not quite as sympathetic towards McPherson as you are. Don't get me wrong, he was by no means incompetent. But I can't really rate him anything above average or middling. He turned in competent, if unremarkable, performances for the bulk of the campaign (and the bulk of his career).

Respectfully

[samgrant]

While it is widely assumed that Van Dorn's (perhaps his only worthwhile contribution to the CSA) assault on Holly Springs had caused a halt to Grant's advance into Mississippi, one might consider an appraisal of the situation, with suggestions, that McPherson sent to Grant on December 20, 1862 before he learned of the Holly Springs raid.

This was at the time that Grant was aiming to take Vicksburg from the East/Northeast (whatever), by land.

McPherson suggested that the forces down the Mississippi be strengthened, and certain railroad communications should be refigured and protected for a different approach. The implication was that the Mississippi route was better than the overland route.

Grant did follow McPherson's recommendations, and you know the rest of the story.

So you might see why Sherman, who was made aware of all that McPherson had done on the Vicksburg campaign, might have had more trust in that man, than with Thomas, with whom he was not so well acquainted.

These recommendations were

[richard]

So you might see why Sherman, who was made aware of all that McPherson had done on the Vicksburg campaign, might have had more trust in that man, than with Thomas, with whom he was not so well acquainted.

But must remember that Sherman had been at Chattanooga with Thomas on the assult on Missionary Ridge. I think he was well aware of Thomas's record and how he acted in battle, not to mention his prep work. He was also one of the few Generals that really used his engineers to his best advantage. Look at the maps that he gave Sherman.

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by richard

So you might see why Sherman, who was made aware of all that McPherson had done on the Vicksburg campaign, might have had more trust in that man, than with Thomas, with whom he was not so well acquainted.

But must remember that Sherman had been at Chattanooga with Thomas on the assult on Missionary Ridge. I think he was well aware of Thomas's record and how he acted in battle, not to mention his prep work. He was also one of the few Generals that really used his engineers to his best advantage. Look at the maps that he gave Sherman.

I hold nothing against Thomas, but I'd take exception a bit about Sherman being 'with Thomas' at Chattenooga. If I am not mistaken, Sherman arrived at that place at or about the same time as Grant, and didn't have much time to acquaint himself with Thomas, as Grant efffecively took charge of the show. So he would not neccessarily have any awareness of how he (Thomas) acted in battle.

A minor disagreement.

[richard]

You are correct. Sherman did arrive late. It is also true that Thomas had very good information about the area including detailed maps which he, unlike other Generals, Thomas used to great advantage.

[samgrant]

Let me add a 'sub what if' to this 'what if':

If, as it has been suggested elsewhere in these boards, Meade was not the right man to team with Grant for the Overland campaign, "not tenacious enough", etc.;

Which of these generals: Sherman, Thomas, McPherson, other(?) would you have chosen to replace Meade in that campaign?

[ole]

Interesting question, Sam. Meade was in command. He hadn't honked anyone off too badly. Why change? Grant may have had someone in mind -- Sheridan perhaps -- but I believe that he saw no advantage in changing commanders. Meade was as good as anyone he could have replaced him with. If it don't stink, don't stir it.
Ole

[samgrant]

I guess i'll agree Ole. I'm thinking (especially in light of the fact that Grant was felt out as early as July 1863, for command of the Aop), that Grant was wary of having a "Westerner" unfamiliar with the AoP, to take that position.

But, as this is a 'what if' , can you answer the question?

[oneplez]

Elektratig said:

. . . “Finally, I'd like to address one portion of the quote in Richard's opening post that I think is particularly unfair. . . . First, from Sherman's standpoint, he didn't so much "refuse to adopt" Thomas's plan as he decided to adopt his own plan, which happened to be different. Second, to characterize Sherman's decision as "willful" really prejudges the issue, for the term strongly implies a petulant refusal to take advice that one knows is right. Third, I think that bad faith (of which jealousy in this case is a species) is typically the last inference one would make, after ruling out all others. As the "Snake Gap" series suggests, there are potentially many other explanations for Sherman's decision, starting with caution, which Sherman certainly displayed in abundance during the campaign.”
_________________________________________________
Sherman did refuse to adopt Thomas plan!

Because of the loss of two of McPherson’s divisions to Bank’s “Red River” Campaign and because of the loss of much of McPherson’s and “Sooy” Smiths Cavalry to the abortive “*******n Campaign,” Sherman was forced to change the plans he had developed. In addition, because of Sherman’s and Grant’s desire to re-enlist volunteer’s for the duration of the war for which the reward was a thirty day (sometimes thirty-five) “Furlough” and travel time. He found himself short of manpower in the AOTT. Thomas refused to let his re-uped veterans leave. That Army originally had a manpower compliment of 44,000 men including a division of cavalry. He knew all this in advance of the SNG caper and did nothing except to change his original plan to send McPherson to Rome, Ga. to cut the Western and Atlantic RR, and Johnston’s lifeline to Atlanta. When he finally recognized the problem, his solution was to go to Thomas and ask him for a plan. Thomas gave him the plan and Sherman accepted the strategy and changed the tactics and lost the battle. McPherson may have been ‘timid’ or ‘cautious,’ depending on which of Sherman’s versions you like, but Mac did not deserve the lion’s share of credit for the loss. Sherman and Grant did.

Therefore, to claim that Sherman did not ‘willfully’ change Thomas’ plan is wrong. He accepted the entire plan except who was to execute it. This is the first time I saw the childish behavior Sherman exhibited in fighting a battle. He wanted (and I can think of no other reason) the AOTT to fight the battle because it had performed, under his command, so poorly at “Tunnel hill.” The same behavior appeared in the “Battle of Atlanta” where McPherson was killed. When Hood attacked the AOTT after Mac’s death and with Logan commanding, he (Sherman) claimed he let the AOTT fight the battle alone because they (AOTT) would be ‘jealous’ if anyone helped them! (He neglected to mention that had he put in support from Thomas he might have captured about half of Hood's force) On two other occasions he made statements that the AOTT were the best men on the face of the planet.

Now, this attitude is usually prevalent in teens and sub-teens, but in a forty-five year old man fighting a war?

One other reason I can give is that Sherman was conscious of the fact that he had failed in every battle he had fought except for a minor one in the East. Whereas Thomas had either won or was the deciding factor in preventing a Confederate victory or Union loss (see Missionary Ridge and Chickamauga or Tullahoma). With that superior performance and ability staring you in the face, he had to try to make his mark somehow. Using McPherson instead of the Army of the Cumberland and Thomas might be the opportunity.


Don