What if the Confederacy fought a true defensive war?

[samgrant]

What if the Confederates had not put their capital in Richmond, tantalizingly close enough to the North to naturally be a focus point of the objective to be pursued as the way to win the war?

Some say that the South were willing to sacrifice large areas in the West, in order to prolong the ultimate victory in Virginia, hence the best officers in the ANV vs. those in the west (don't ask for sources, I've lost those, tho I might find them if pressed).

This theory may be flawed in that at the beginning A. S. Johnston was considered the best of the lot of generals, more than Lee, at the time.

The fact was that all of these generals were products of the standard military strategy of the times and guerrilla (Rev. war) tactics were just not in their playbook. Nor would the CSA deem itself as a band of guerrillas, they must have been a 'credible' big army.

[larry_cockerham]

Bob Lee was a school teacher when the war broke out, his having been a very creditable civil engineer. He had some battlefield experience down in Mexico of some credit also. None of these gentlemen had been in a civil war driven by the strongest country on earth at the time. I don't think the capital location was the problem for the south. (Yes, the Richmond site did give old Abe a bit of a scare at times.) The war was over when it began from a supply and manpower standpoint. Farmers with muzzle loaders did not an army make. Nathan Bedford Forrest could have whipped (and often did) any yankee in Tennessee in a fair fight. Problem was, there were too many of 'em with too many guns.

[ole]

Some say that the South were willing to sacrifice large areas in the West, in order to prolong the ultimate victory in Virginia, hence the best officers in the ANV vs. those in the west (don't ask for sources, I've lost those, tho I might find them if pressed).

It wasn't only the south. Militarily, holding territory puts an enormous burden on an army -- a burden the south couldn't afford. Like you, I don't remember the source, but I read where McClellan, when he was finally prodded into the Peninsula Campaign, was in favor of giving up Washington so he could have the troops to take Richmond. And the trading territory for troop concentration was a central belief for J. E. Johnston.

Politically, giving up territory doesn't fly very well. As war is an extension of politics (Jomini, I think), the primary consideration is keeping the people behind the effort. It's a bit hard to convince your supporters that giving up a state or a port is the best strategy. Davis and Lincoln kept that in mind. In Davis's case, he might have been better off if he'd given Johnston a looser rein.

Bob Lee was a school teacher when the war broke out, his having been a very creditable civil engineer. He had some battlefield experience down in Mexico of some credit also. None of these gentlemen had been in a civil war driven by the strongest country on earth at the time.

This is news to me. I thought he was in Texas at a military post there -- especially as he resigned his commission to lead Virginia troops. Lee probably had one of the longest resumes with regard to military experience (with the possible exception of A.S. Johnston) of all commanders on both sides. The Union was fortunate that Scott was too infirm to take command. He was probably an excellent general and certainly had more experience than anybody alive in 1860, but his experience was based on a different kind of war. The WBTS showed that generals who didn't quickly adapt to the new kind of war were handicapped and generally performed poorly.

Ole

[richard]

It is fortunate that we have the means of looking back and finding the mistakes of the Generals of this war. For it is with this hindsite, that we can decide the correct direction of action that should have taken place.

Many errors of judgment took place on the part of both sides. The sad part of this is that many of the Generals would not or could not, for what ever the reason, admit to there mistakes. In doing so, they were condemed to repeat them. Lee and Jackson blamed their failure on devine providence, if they beleaved that they had failed at all. In fact these failures were caused by lack of sound planning, poor intellengence, and a very poor command system.

The south could not have engaged in a static war. They could not aford the war that they fought. This was proven to Lee when he went into Maryland. He thought that he could live off the land. He found out that he was not welcome there and could not find what he needed to feed his army.

Bragg and Smith found out that they could not live off the land in Kentucky, let alone bring back thousands of new fresh troops to fight the Union.

Many Generals, as one person stated, did not change there tatics. A good example of that would be Gen. John B. Gordan. He never left the classic style of fighting. On the other hand, General Barlow and General Thomas were always changing there tatics to meet the challange.

One could look back and say that if the South had had better leadership both in Goverment and on the battlefield, they might have well won the war in the first year. It was the fighting men and not the Generals who won there battles. And it was the fighting men who suffured because of there Generals.

[larry_cockerham]

Ole, history was never my strong subject. I kept going to sleep in class. Come to think of it, I may not have had a strong subject. As I recall Gen. Lee was for a time commandant at West Point. He much prior to that was responsible for flood control measures on the river at St. Louis. I agree also that Winfield Scott had the record, but he was getting up in years, as was Lee. Youth, alas, sacrifices experience. A brutal circle. We are very reluctant as a nation to start the freshmen. Perhaps for good reason.

[jkeith21]

Well my guess would be something along the lines of what transpired Johnston vs Sherman in the 100 Days War, 1864, Chattanooga thru Atlanta. Dig in, get flanked or fall back, fall back, dig in.........