What if R. E. Lee had...

[Maj. Mapmaker]

Instead of concentrating the ANV during the 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania at Gettysburg. What if R. E. Lee had split the ANV into brigade or regimental sized units, and attacked the railroads and coal mines of western Pennsylvania? Do you think it would have done anything to help lift the blockade of southern ports (most of the ships were powered by coal)?

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by Maj. Mapmaker

Instead of concentrating the ANV during the 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania at Gettysburg. What if R. E. Lee had split the ANV into brigade or regimental sized units, and attacked the railroads and coal mines of western Pennsylvania? Do you think it would have done anything to help lift the blockade of southern ports (most of the ships were powered by coal)?

That is an unusual question, IMOP, but I would think that Lee wanted to do a BIG thing, not a bunch of little things by his 'invasion' of the North.

Lee's objectives (perhaps) were to demoralize Northerners resolve in the prosecution of the war, and/or to defeat the Union army decisively.

I would be very surprised if coal mines were something that Gen. Lee was actively concerned about.

[Maj. Mapmaker]

Shelby Foote claimed in "The Civil War A Narrative, Volume II" that Lee's intention was to create havoc in Pennsylvania in order to relieve pressure on Vicksburg, that being said, sometime "a bunch of little things" equal "a BIG thing". Admittedly it was already to late for Vicksburg, however Lee didn't nor could he have know this at the time, and what better way to get the attention of the folks up north then to use the highly effective tactics that Sherman would use in 1864 Georgia against the Federals war machine. We can, and do spend a lot of time analyzing the tactics and strategy of various Generals in the many land campaigns & battles of the war. But it was Winfield Scott that in my opinion did the most with his anaconda strategy of blockade to win the war. So back to my original question, do you think that guerrilla tactics in western Pennsylvania against the infrastructure that fueled the blockade would have had any effect?

[ole]

Major: He wouldn't have dared! Assuming all other factors are in place (especially Stuart's absence) he couldn't have fractionalized his army into pieces vulnerable to Pennsylvania state forces. Maybe, in the confusion, he could have gotten away with some raids and then reconsolidated his troops. What would that have accomplished? Railroads would have been repaired in days. Stockpiles of coal at the ports and rail depots all over the country would cover any temporary gap in supply. And, coal was mined in other places than southern Pennsylvania. Interesting premise, though. I believe his primary purpose was a desparate gambit to get Hooker and the AotP on ground of his choosing. If that had worked out, we'd likely have a national holiday on Lee's Birthday. :-) Ole

[CChartreux]

$0.02

Your question is an interesting one. I don’t think that guerilla tactics in western Pennsylvania could even be brought to bear because Lee, nor the Confederacy, have the resources required to sustain an aggressive offensive action. Without intending any disrespect, this is an Army and ‘war machine’ that cannot even provide shoes for its own soldiers, let alone materialize the resources to successfully execute this war. IMO, this is just a logistic and resource-based reality that, in the end, cannot be avoided. Regardless of whatever successes the Confederacy might have had initially, sustained effort is ultimately not possible for them (they never had the resources to execute this war, even from the beginning).

With regard to Vicksburg, I believe I understand what you’re suggesting (i.e., “Admittedly it was already too late for Vicksburg, however Lee didn't nor could he have know this at the time,...”); however, the significance of Vicksburg trumps every other and any other strategic contingency the South might have pursued. [As an aside, Lee might not have known, but Davis did.]

In short, Vicksburg’s long shadow will ultimately eclipse the South entirely and the South cannot survive with all its waterways cut off. The loss of Vicksburg in essence means the end of the war; everything after that is academic. To that end, it doesn’t matter what Lee does once Vicksburg is gone. That’s obviously my opinion and I recognize that it’s an ambitious assertion. Nevertheless, I think that Vicksburg is still not recognized for the strategic boon it really was (no doubt it takes something of a backseat to the Eastern theatre, which is probably understandable to some extent). To this end, I think that discounting Vicksburg or approaching alternative strategies while pretending Vicksburg could be set aside for a hypothetical ‘what if’ are essentially defunct. I’m not suggesting at all that you’re discounting Vicksburg (nor am I suggesting that your question is not worth pursuing); it’s just that Vicksburg is so instrumental (I believe) that its loss cannot be mitigated in any way. In the final analysis, the loss of Vicksburg amounts to the capture of the queen; checkmate is sure to follow (no matter what happens in the east).

[gary]

I'll agree with Ole. Lee wouldn't have split his army. First, it would open Virginia and the Confederate capital vulnerable to invasion. Second, like blockade runners that are generally trapped and brought to bay, his army would be defeated in detail. So, while he could enjoy a brief victory, he would pay a heavy price and the war in the East would have ended sooner (and probably for the better).

[FSPowers]

It would not have worked. Lee had no knowledge of the ground in order to be able to move his fragmented forces undetected. He could do that at Chancellorsville because he knew the area.

The AodNV would have been destroyed if Lee had split it.

[whitworth]

Pittsburgh was preparing for Lee to come that way. Some of the gaps were guarded by Union troops and miltia.
The great problem that Lee faced was his army was logistically unprepared to go into Pennsylvania. His army had enough ammunition for one good fight, as termed by E.P. Alexander. Lee lacked enough black powder to do much damage to coal mines and iron works. Remember the ANV ran out of artillery ammunition before Pickett's Charge.
I don't think Lee would have wanted to get blocked by the AoP west of Hagerstown and Hancock, Maryland, and then come into contact from the west by whatever troops the Union could bring up the Ohio River by steamboat and from Ohio by train.

[Jamieva]

I agree this is something Lee would have never considered to divide his army 20 or 30 different ways. Lee's biggest factor in how he traveled through PA was the ability to quickly concentrate the army at one spot if something happened, especially with lack of info from Stuart as to where the AOP was.

Having to track down 20 seperate units spread out over a vasy countryside would've been a disaster. The AOP would've picked them off one at a time.

[bgl1952]

If you like reading what ifs, there is a 3 book set by Newt Gingrich and William R. Forstchen. It is a what if Lee would have gone to the right after the first day of Gettysburg, like Longstreet wanted to.The titles to these books are Gettysburg, Grant comes east, Never call retreat. Altho I know that is fiction, I still enjoyed reading these books.