Was McClellan largely responsible for the reverses the Union suffered up to sept 1862

[samgrant]

Never the less, McClellen was a "nut".

Why the powers that be didn't see thru him is a mystery to me.

I can only think that they did see something of that, but lacking someone better, and appreciating his organizational skills, they just hoped he might be up to the challenge of battle.

[Admiral_Porter]

I think Lincoln, Stanton, and others understood Mac pretty well.

But like Lincoln said they must use the tools they have. Who else could have reorganized the army so quickly after Second Manassas?

I think Mac's attitude negatively affected the AOTP during the entire war which is why they were sluggish and beat often. Most of those generals were McClellan disciples so the powers probably thought they would be getting the same thing even without McClellan.

[ole]

Interesting observation, Admiral -- McClellanitis affected the AotP throughout.

Or perhaps some of that was inherent in where the troops came from? There is much banter about the "western" boys being a better army.

Ole

[CChartreux]

You guys are so mean to George!

Ha ha!

"Or perhaps some of that was inherent in where the troops came from? There is much banter about the "western" boys being a better army." [Ole]

Personally, I think the AOP was fine (i.e., there's nothing wrong with that Army); I think it's a leadership problem and some other systemic problems, but not the troops themselves. The 'western' boys being better is probably because they actually had victories to increase their morale...makes a big difference. Of course, you can always put them all together (i.e., Chattanooga) and they'll compete against each other and then you'll really end up with a fired-up army!

[milhistbuff1]

Frankly, I find it hard to believe that the command structure of the AOP would be affected for so long by Lil Mac leaving. I believe the different personality types of his sucessors had more to do with the pallor that affected the AOP up to Grant taking over.
Respectfully,
Matt

[Admiral_Porter]

Or perhaps some of that was inherent in where the troops came from?

I don't think so. The men in that war fought hard regardless of their origin.

The 11th corps performed poorly in the east but after being transfered west they functioned very well during Chattanooga and Atlanta.

I have always found it odd that for the most part the best confederate generals were in the east while the best federal generals were in the west. But this may just be my perception.

There is much banter about the "western" boys being a better army.

If I had to make a choice I think the Army of the Cumberland was the best Federal army.

[Admiral_Porter]

I believe the different personality types of his sucessors had more to do with the pallor that affected the AOP up to Grant taking over.

Sedgwick, Hancock, and Warren were all McClellan supporters.

Two quotes I find interesting regarding the AOTP:

"You need the lever of Archimedes to move that army." -Henry Halleck

"Wilson, what is wrong with this army?" -Grant

[milhistbuff1]

Admiral Porter,

In reference to the Grant quote in yr last post.

Could it be that the AOP was too large to coordinate its efforts effectively? Would the North have been better served to having two smaller but easier to coordinate forces running around in the east, make it that much easier to do an army size hammer/anvil operation?
Take all the agressive commanders such as Hancock and Reynolds and make them into a multi corp striking force doing the maneuvering with the more cautious commanders like Meade and Sedgewick, providing an entrenched force to serve as an anvil.
Respectfully,
Matt

[CChartreux]

Originally Posted by milhistbuff1

Admiral Porter,

In reference to the Grant quote in yr last post.

Could it be that the AOP was too large to coordinate its efforts effectively? Would the North have been better served to having two smaller but easier to coordinate forces running around in the east, make it that much easier to do an army size hammer/anvil operation?
Take all the agressive commanders such as Hancock and Reynolds and make them into a multi corp striking force doing the maneuvering with the more cautious commanders like Meade and Sedgewick, providing an entrenched force to serve as an anvil.
Respectfully,
Matt

Matt - I recognize that your post was directed to Admiral Porter; however, in the meantime, if I may?

I think that's one of the obscure factors of the McClellan dilemma (i.e., the assumption that someone else will move that army). I'm not saying they will or they won't, but aggressive generals have a tendency to 'slow-down' when they get into that level of command because the pressure is about ten times greater...if they screw up at that level, then it really is all over the front page of the Washington Post (so to speak) [Grant, of course, is the exception to this]. Meade was aggressive; but I don't think he liked the heat of that job and he slowed down somewhat from his 'normal' pace. Hooker would have been the most aggressive and (in my opinion) would have probably ended up succeeding at something. It's regrettable that he went through all that work to turn the morale of AOP around (which is really hard to do and the failure at Chancellorsville has a tendency to completely overshadow all the work that Hooker did to turn that Army into happy campers again after Burnside - not an easy task!), only to take it out for a spin at Chancellorsville and have them beat so badly.

I think, also, that the AOP's proximity to Washington made things doubly worse for everyone involved. That's not to say that Grant didn't get sufficiently irritated by Halleck a thousand miles away, but Grant didn't have Washington constantly looking over his shoulder. I can't imagine that the proximity of Washington to the AOP did not have at least some kind of play in it.

[Admiral_Porter]

Could it be that the AOP was too large to coordinate its efforts effectively?

It's strange because after Gettysburg 7 corps, that's including the two sent to Chattanooga, were considered too many and then during the 1864 battles Grant came to the conclusion that 3 was too few. I believe it was Meade who reorganized the army.

I don't think size had that much to do with the army's problems; if anything was wrong it was that too many men were assigned to each corps. Sherman had 100,000 men in Georgia but he coordinated their movements well.

I think the primary problem was the way in which McClellan taught that army how to fight. Everything had to be absolutely perfect before engaging in battle and Grant just didn't fight that way and neither did Bob Lee.

I think it all comes down to too many generals worried about what's on the other side of the hill.

Would the North have been better served to having two smaller but easier to coordinate forces running around in the east, make it that much easier to do an army size hammer/anvil operation?

Probably not. The separation of federal forces is what allowed Jackson to win in the Valley and Lee at Second Manassas.