Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
ewc: Thank you for your kind words; and, I enjoyed reading your post....very interesting (thanks for taking the time to write it). The Lincoln/McClellan relationship is troublesome, isn't it? To wit:
"....what proved to be utter inability to work with the administration- his 'bosses' as it were. He allowed politics, personal beliefs, and his disdain for the political and civil authorities to negatively color his judgment. Given, he had little from which to study to take his cue. But that said, he was only going to be successful working with the administration and not at odds with it. This is a bit of logic that escaped him,..." [ewc]
and,
"Unfortunately, he believed himself impaired and working despite the administration. Indeed, he was thrust immediately into the fire and did not have time to develop his abilites like the later successful commanders in the war were able to do. Grant in his memoirs states that he believes that McClellan, given a chance to learn the makings of this war a little at a time like he, Sherman, and others had, would have proved to be an excellent commander." [ewc]
McClellan's attitude toward the administration is unfortunate, to be sure. For a guy of his stature, the necessity of political expediency seems lost on him, doesn't it? I'm not sure what's going on there, but it sure doesn't lend itself to the successful execution of the war. Given the scope of the Civil War (or what it would become), I should imagine that everyone had a learning curve of sorts...including Lincoln.
That last part in the above quote....about Grant stating that "McClellan, given a chance to learn the makings of this war a little at a time...." is interesting and I was unaware of it. I hadn't thought about that angle of it (i.e., other commanders having the luxury of longer learning curves).
That said, however, I also think nbforrest's point...
"But those same factors affected the other generals of the time; inexperience, logistics, etc. And some of them overcame them." [nbforrest]
offers another insight into it as well and that would be the question of whether or not McClellan could learn it in the first place. So I think that's an interesting sort of contrast there as some of the other generals faced similar limitations and were able to learn as they went.
Lastly, both of you seemed to point out the weird paradox with:
"He was afraid of taking casualties. However, generals like that often end up taking more casualties than if they had offered a swift, decisive move rather than trying to avoid casualties." [nbforrest]
and...
"Succeeding so well in this sphere, arguably his most important, contrasts so greatly with his failures in others. To his great credit, and it translates to the Army of the Potomac, he loved these men and this army. Psychologically, he proved to be not strong enough (as looking at Lee for instance) to use it for its ultimate purpose." [ewc]
How ironic....in both cases. Our boy, Li'l Mac, makes for some good Shakespeare material; or, at best, he could have stepped right out of the pages of a Greek tragedy!
Thanks both of you for your thoughts; I'm going to go find some more stuff to throw out there, but it might take me some time ( sigh ~ so many Civil War generals, so little time!).
Mac would have been good behind a desk in DC; maybe he would have been ok in command of the Middle Department or something where he could guard his supply depots.
Respectfully
On this, nbforrest and I agree, Mac's love of his men would have made him better suited for C&C than Halleck. That would have utilized Mac's administrative talent and left combat command for someone who understood decisive action and quite possibly ended the war sooner.
On this, nbforrest and I agree, Mac's love of his men would have made him better suited for C&C than Halleck. That would have utilized Mac's administrative talent and left combat command for someone who understood decisive action and quite possibly ended the war sooner.
CC's post comes into play here. Mac earned Lincoln's disapproval early on, but Lincoln had no stable of proven generals from which to draw a replacement. Pope gained notice for island #10. When that choice didn't work out he virtually had no other choice than McClellan again.
Burnside's appointment turned out, as Burnside predicted, to be a disaster. What other choice did Lincoln have? Hooker was disruptive and no one else was as inoffensive as Burnside. Hooker ultimately got the nod but didn't meet expectations. So then we have Meade who managed to save his butt by turning in one of the most telling victories thus far.
Why not Grant instead of Pope? He had gained notice for Forts Henry and Donelson. On that, I'd have to speculate that Halleck, at the time, didn't much care for Grant and he had recently been made the top dog. Or maybe it was that Lincoln saw in Grant someone he'd rather leave in place to do what he was doing. Maybe Lincoln surmised that a winning army of westerners might well be kept that way -- given his interest in the western theater.
Meade was virtually the only choice Lincoln had in '63. Not a superior general, but capable and not bad.
Back to Mac. I'd have to disagree that Mac would have been a better C&C than Halleck. Not defending Halleck, but Mac's attitude would have tripped him up in that office as well. He was a superb soldier and administrator. He just wasn't cut from the cloth it takes to make a wartime leader.
Just an observation.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
"Back to Mac. I'd have to disagree that Mac would have been a better C&C than Halleck. Not defending Halleck, but Mac's attitude would have tripped him up in that office as well. He was a superb soldier and administrator. He just wasn't cut from the cloth it takes to make a wartime leader." [ole]
Okay....a hypothetical letter to Ellen (Mrs. Mac) vis-a-vis above:
Dear Ellen,
I have a few minutes to write to you, darling. You won't believe what the confounded twits in Washington want to do to me now! How they torture me with their idiocy. But, never mind that for now; you know I will serve as valiantly as I am able. But now, they want me to have a desk job and replace that ridiculous Halleck! This is the silliest thing I have heard since taking command here, but it doesn't surprise me. Washington is a veritable savannah of incompetence; an insufferable lot of fools. As you know, my darling, my expertise is in the field with my beloved Army; I could never be chained to a desk as though it were a horse!
I must be off now, thundering and raining terribly here!
George -
Okay, enough silliness ! I think a desk job for McClellan would be ideal in terms of capitalizing on what he's really capable of doing....but he'd never go for it. I don't think his persona would allow for a behind-the-scenes, non-limelight gig. Don't get me wrong, I think it's an excellent idea; I just don't think McClellan would accept it.
Last edited by CChartreux; 11-27-2005 at 01:01 AM.
Aside from his reputed egotistical nature and delusional mindset, Mac was also guilty (in my opinion) of one of the most egregious derelictions ever perpetrated.
I refer to his stubborn refusal to reinforce Pope's Army of Virginia in late August 1862.
(Not a refusal of orders in words, but in deeds.)
His failure to move his troops promptly from Harrison's Landing to Aquia Creek and Alexandria was not merely an example of his having "a case of the slows", but was a deliberate delaying action in order that another general not get the credit which he thought he was due himself.
In another one of those famous letters, he tells Mrs. Mac, "I take it for granted that my orders will be as disagreeable as it is possible to make them -- unless Pope is beaten, in which case they will want me to save Washington again. Nothing but their fears will induce them to give me any command of importance or treat me with otherwise than with discourtesy."
For an interesting study of McClellan, see T. Harry Williams' McClellan, Sherman and Grant.
__________________ -
"It was a very peculiar time." - Franklin D. Cossitt
Ancestors in USA Army: 6th IA Inf, 11th IL Cav, 1st AL Cav; 122nd NY Inf; 6th MI Cav; 35th MA Inf; 100th IL Inf; 1st CO Inf/Cav; 22nd IN Inf
Pope was capable of handling the initial threat of only jackson's corp on his own. Stonewall only had two divisions, those of Baldy Ewell and Charles Windwer totaling 12K men. In contrast, Pope had 50K plus Burny's Corp of 13k capable of reinforcing him or Lil Mac. Lee was stuck on the Peninsula east of Richmond Until august 3rd a full two weeks after jackson arrived at Gordonsville. Why didn't Pope use his 5 to 1 advantage in manpower and "bag" Jackson while Lee was pinned down east of Richmond? the political implications would have been enormous, the Eman. Proc. was ready by July 22nd. (R E Lee's Civil War, Bevin Alexander pp 42-45)
Respectfully,
Matt
Last edited by milhistbuff1; 11-27-2005 at 11:24 PM.
It wouldnt have had as great an effect, doing so before 2nd Manassas at Gordonsville that would have left the CSA without two of its better commanders and denied any hope of foreign recognition a year earlier and cut off the Shenendoah as a granary for the CSA army. Same citation as before
Respectfully,
Matt
Last edited by milhistbuff1; 11-28-2005 at 01:15 AM.
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sigh ~ so many Civil War generals, so little time!).
! I think a desk job for McClellan would be ideal in terms of capitalizing on what he's really capable of doing....but he'd never go for it. I don't think his persona would allow for a behind-the-scenes, non-limelight gig. Don't get me wrong, I think it's an excellent idea; I just don't think McClellan would accept it.
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