Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
The only serious talk of British involvement was during the Trent affair. After that, the UK had the good sense to stay out of it. A victory, although possible, would be temporary (the sleeping giant). Meanwhile, they will be bloodied badly, the flow of cotton will not be soon opened, and highly profitable trade will be interrupted. Makes good sense to sit it out.
Ole
THey were sitting on the fence making money hand over fist from both sides... I don't see the Brits making a moral stance on the side of an unrecognized nation founded upon slavery; an institution they had been fighting for years. While it was considerably less expensive in both money & blood to provide moral support... never a serious look at recognition of the CS in the halls of power.
__________________ Shane Christen
American Legion Post 352
SUVCW Camp Abernethy# 48
Lifetime NRA member
3rd MN VI
For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. Eccl 1:18
The French intervened decisively in the Revolution, and the Spanish rendered the Americans significant materials and funds. Neither did so because they sympathized with the revolutionaries, but as part of a long term rivalry with Great Britain.
The major change in 1860, was that this rivalry had been over for decades, and neither power felt the need to harass the other in the New World, using American proxies.
As far as British command incompetence, it existed, but I would put Benjamin Butler, Dan Sickles or Ambrose Burnside* up against any redcoated general.
As far as sitting on the fence and making money, that could very well describe the attitude of the United States during the early phases of both World Wars. Apparently, most folks in the US couldn't see much reason to get in a shooting war with Hitler until they absolutely had to.
The French intervened decisively in the Revolution, and the Spanish rendered the Americans significant materials and funds. Neither did so because they sympathized with the revolutionaries, but as part of a long term rivalry with Great Britain.
The major change in 1860, was that this rivalry had been over for decades, and neither power felt the need to harass the other in the New World, using American proxies.
As far as British command incompetence, it existed, but I would put Benjamin Butler, Dan Sickles or Ambrose Burnside* up against any redcoated general.
As far as sitting on the fence and making money, that could very well describe the attitude of the United States during the early phases of both World Wars. Apparently, most folks in the US couldn't see much reason to get in a shooting war with Hitler until they absolutely had to.
*or Bragg
Good Points and absolutely corrcet; though by mid 63 most of the incompetant commanders in the Union Army were gone.
__________________ Shane Christen
American Legion Post 352
SUVCW Camp Abernethy# 48
Lifetime NRA member
3rd MN VI
For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. Eccl 1:18
1. The Sepoy Army was equipped identically to the British until the mutiny. Sepoy units were reequipped with the P53 Enfield Rifle-Musket before some British units. After the Mutiny things changed a bit. The main change being the Artillery became an all European institution for the next 50 odd years. (The Indian Artillery was directly absorbed into the RA, taking the Brigade/ Battalion/ Regiment numbers of 16+)
2. As for blinding incompitance shown later:
The Zulu War, Lord Chelmsford (a Lt Col during the ACW) was recalled after Isandlwala, but had won the war before he was relieved:
3. The Russians lost every battle of the 1853-56 War (excepting the Siege of Kars)
4. The USN might have concentrated, yes. This is exactly that RAdm Milne hoped they'd do as it would make his job of destroying the USN much easier, his local squadron alone outgunned the USN.
The worst CoA from the RN PoV is that the USN might run for home and act as a fleet in being.
5. Your impression of the (defunct) purchase system draw on the mid-18th century. The 4 routes to commissioning where: Serving as a Gentleman Volunteer (essentially an OCdt on the Regiments strength who would be commissioned Ensign in the event of spaces opening), attending the Royal Military College or Academy (indeed, the main route in the Artillery and Engineer), commissioning from the ranks (surprisingly common) and by the Examination Board (where you would have to purchase if passed).
When promotions became available, they would typically be offered to the senior officer of the next rank, and down through the line, assuming they had sufficient service (2 years to Lt, 6 for Capt, 10 for Maj, 16 for Lt Col ISTR) and passed the exam for that rank (if applicable). Sometimes the rank would be purchased (selling your existing rank down) but generally it would be free. Ranks above Lt Col were by appointment only.
6. Moved on in life?
The typcial enlistment period was 22 years, lowered to 12+12 (i.e. 12 in regular service, extendable and 12 in the reserve) just before the Crimea.
1. The Sepoy Army was equipped identically to the British until the mutiny. Sepoy units were reequipped with the P53 Enfield Rifle-Musket before some British units. After the Mutiny things changed a bit. The main change being the Artillery became an all European institution for the next 50 odd years. (The Indian Artillery was directly absorbed into the RA, taking the Brigade/ Battalion/ Regiment numbers of 16+)
My understanding was that Indian Arsenals held only percussion smoothbores & flintlocks w/ the P39 being the most up to date arm in the Indian Army. If I am incorrect I stand corrected. And after the Mutiny the Indian Army arms were held back at least a generation from Brit Regulars.
2. As for blinding incompitance shown later:
The Zulu War, Lord Chelmsford (a Lt Col during the ACW) was recalled after Isandlwala, but had won the war before he was relieved: Rifles against spears... even a general like Bragg could have won that one. Isandhlwana came about through poor leadership and a prevelant belief that no native force could defeat them Even the Mutiny had failed to lift that particular veil. THe whole performance there was casual at best incompetant at worst. Proper orders given but not enforced or even checked on. http://www.britishbattles.com/zulu-war/ulundi.htm
Which Boer War are you referring too?
3. The Russians lost every battle of the 1853-56 War (excepting the Siege of Kars) Brit & French Leadership was less than stellar through the entire war and would have given credit to the worst of either the Union or CS; as I have often said wars are won by the least incompetant army and the Crimea is a clear proof. Did the Czars Army learn from their mistakes? Questionable if their experiance at Plevna years later is any example.
An example from the Crimea is Alma: Courage, resilience & endurance by the troops were hallmarks of the men on both sides during the battle. Raglan and his officers were uninspiring at best; Menshikov unintelligent at best. THe British won victory due to the bravery of the men in the ranks not stellar leadership or command and the Russians lost through incompetance. The later Charge of the Light Brigade is self evident.
4. The USN might have concentrated, yes. This is exactly that RAdm Milne hoped they'd do as it would make his job of destroying the USN much easier, his local squadron alone outgunned the USN.
The worst CoA from the RN PoV is that the USN might run for home and act as a fleet in being. That is all they had to do... (many were already there engaged in the blockade) and the effect of Commerce Raiders against the Brit Merchant Fleet would be felt at least as keenly as the US felt CS Commerce raiders. Sorry I just do not see the USN rolling over and dieing at a whim. They would have been closer to home & suppliles. The RN would have to heavily protect the convoys of transports to supply any troops in Canada or the CS. The length of suply lines alone would have been an issue.
5. Your impression of the (defunct) purchase system draw on the mid-18th century. The 4 routes to commissioning where: Serving as a Gentleman Volunteer (essentially an OCdt on the Regiments strength who would be commissioned Ensign in the event of spaces opening), attending the Royal Military College or Academy (indeed, the main route in the Artillery and Engineer), commissioning from the ranks (surprisingly common) and by the Examination Board (where you would have to purchase if passed).
When promotions became available, they would typically be offered to the senior officer of the next rank, and down through the line, assuming they had sufficient service (2 years to Lt, 6 for Capt, 10 for Maj, 16 for Lt Col ISTR) and passed the exam for that rank (if applicable). Sometimes the rank would be purchased (selling your existing rank down) but generally it would be free. Ranks above Lt Col were by appointment only. When did the purchasing sys end? It was still in full effect during the Crimea & as I understand it during the Zulu War.
6. Moved on in life?
The majority of men who had served in the Crimea were in the NCO corps by the 1860's as to the officer corps. Competance at that level was not a hallmark of the British Army.
The typcial enlistment period was 22 years, lowered to 12+12 (i.e. 12 in regular service, extendable and 12 in the reserve) just before the Crimea.
Again, I don't see any belief that the RN would be handily defeated by the much smaller USN; I also don't see any reason to believe they would roll over and sink at the site of the RN.
The Brits repeatedly got tarred and feathered in their initial engagements requiring time to ramp up to effectiveness. THe US Army had already gone through that phase by 63... were past it, some might say, until the next war anyway. The US RR sys alone would have been a deciding issue as well as the industrial base.
But as I've said it is a what if of enormous proportions and rather pointless to debate as the Brits opted not to try their hand at another American War. Perhaps their memory of New Orleans where the cream of the British Army was solidly whipped by slaves, pirates & volunteers was still branded on their mind.
__________________ Shane Christen
American Legion Post 352
SUVCW Camp Abernethy# 48
Lifetime NRA member
3rd MN VI
For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. Eccl 1:18
Aye, post-mutiny the Indian regiments dropped to bottom priority.
The Zulus had a lot of muskets and rifles and used them a lot. However, their primary tactic was to overwhelm their enemies with a double envelopment. Hence the British used squares thereafter. At one battle all British casualties were by small arms fire: http://www.britishbattles.com/zulu-war/gingindlovu.htm
The British Army in the Crimean was unfortunately politicised due to the profileration of agencies and the lack of a General Staff. Raglan was technically competent, if rather too reserved for example, although most of the brigade and division commanders turned out to be very good. Gentlemen such as:
British and French intervention could have been decisive in the CW. That intervention would not have been very easy however, and what would motivate the Europeans launch a major military operation in the New World is not clear. How long would the commitment last? What would define victory? What would the British and French gain from a victory?
Leaving aside its likelihood, I think its sometimes too easy to talk about sweeping offensives. How long would it take to build an large and effective Canadian force? A year? Without sufficient manufacturing, any forces weapons, equipment, munitions, uniforms, tentage etc. would have to be imported, and an ocean long supply line maintained.
What about a Union strike to capture Montreal before the Canadians and British built up a strong force?* Canada would become a hostage, not an asset in an Anglo-American war.
Tigers mentioned the Great Lakes. Could the US experience with freshwater fighting prove an advantage? Monitors on Lake Erie!
*now I'm talking through my hat about "sweeping offensives" Lee and Davis would have loved a Union attack on Canada.
The British Gov't was very conscious of the fact that the anti-slavery sentiment was strong among almost all classes of British Society, even the so-called upper class.
If Britain became bogged down in trying to conquer a continent, a not unlikely event, from their previous experiences, how deep was public support back home to prosecute a war that would seem to ensure not only the survival of slavery but also seemed to benefit the slave owners the most?
Whatever, the sentiments of the armed forces, such a war would necessarily have to be a quick one, before those at home had time think about where Britain's true interests lay.
*now I'm talking through my hat about "sweeping offensives" Lee and Davis would have loved a Union attack on Canada.
Agreed, Matthew. Lincoln would have had to have been powerful convinced of UK war intentions to authorize a preemptive strike.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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