You are in command at Franklin.

[johan_steele]

GUnny, do you know if Hood knew the size of the garrison at Murfreesboro? I was under the impression, to be honest I have no idea where from that he greatly overestimated the size of the force there. Incidently I believe you're right

Though, to be honest Hood may have been well aware of the size of the garrison there and remembered the stiff defence of the garrison at Alltoona; pretty much wrecked French IIRC. Admittedly, those had been veterans; though Fortress Rosecrans had considerably more arty than Alltoona had and IIRC far superior defences.

I've never been able to really understand why he pressed the attack at Franklin

[scone]

niclley done Jamie, very impressive..

I was thinking the garrison at Fortress Rosecranz was larger than that.. Seems that that was better option with all the suplies there and the Size of the place..



Steven

[gunny]

Johan,

As Hood wrote in his autobiography, he was aware of the presence of 8,000 troops at Murfreesboro, but chose only to send Forrest with Jackson's Division, and Bate's infantry division with Sears' and Palmer's brigades to "watch the enemy" Hood implied that he wnted to prevent them from reinforcing Nashville.

The crazier thing is this. Taking his force to Nashville. For instance, doesn't it seem to make more sense to take your total force to a less fortified and outnumbered position and threaten the enemy than to go to the rings of entrechments and stone and earthen forts of Nashville occupied by a force of 50,000+?

I would assume that by moving on Murfreesboro with his entire force, he could literally surround Fortress Rosecranz. Probe the enemy and find the weakest point and sieze the fort. If not, it would have drawn the Feds out of Nashville to Murfreesboro's relief before they were prepared to do so and you would be fighting them on your terms.

Its all hindsight of course, but interesting none the less.

Jamie

[larry_cockerham]

The local "theory" is that aside from his dependancy on pain killers, Hood was apparently upset at his generals for missiing the opportunity of surrounding Schoffield on the move north at Spring Hill. The weather was also one miserable mess with much snow and sleet. Perhaps he just wanted to get it over. For 7,500 soldiers, that came to pass.

[ole]

Hood had to have been in the first stages of screaming lunacy -- whether or not laudanum induced. He single-handedly destroyed the Army of Tennessee. And for what? The temporary PR coup of taking back Eastern Tennessee? He'd have much better employed his forces by dogging Sherman across Georgia. Instead, he gives Sherman free reign and goes for a useless target.

I don't want to defecate on anyone's hero here, but his actions certainly deserve censure. Of all the bone-headed actions on both sides, Hood takes number one.

[scone]

I think hood did what he thought he had to.. Time was running short as was the daylight.. he couldnt afford to wait for the rest of lees corp or to take a few hrs to think about it or to properly scout out the area.. he had to strike whem he could..

Was he upset? i'm sure he was.. Was he punishing Cheatham corp? I think he used the hardest hitting corp he had to brake throught the middle of union line.

Its easy for us to look back knowing what we do about the area, the battle the location and strength of the troops but if we put our selfs in his shoes on that day knowing what he did would have done the same ?..

The failed actions at Spring hill was Hoods fault because he was the over all cpmmander.. But all the officers on the field had a share of the blame as well as the weather...

Jamies Book on Sping hill is wonderful and a real eye opener on the subject and tells it like was from the mouths of those that where there..


just a thought on the actions of the 29th and 30 of november.

Steven

[whitworth]

The movement of Hood's army into Tennesee was a disaster waiting to happen. Hood could neither capture Tennesee nor defend Georgia. It shortened the war by months.

Time was in favor of the Union army. Hard winter was soon approaching and logistically Hood was on the brink of total disaster.
The Union army gave one of the great defensive efforts of the war at Franklin, in its use of infantry and artillery and inflicted major casualties on the Confederates.
A whole group of Confederate leadership, starting with Jefferson Davis, including Lee, usefully could have been interred in an insane asylum for approving and/or not strenuously objecting to the plan.

[gunny]

whitworth,

I actually believe that it could be argued the movement itself was a good strategic move. To attempt to arrest Sherman's advance would only result in more turning movements, which Sherman could do all day because of his numerical superiority. His prize of Atlanta was already had. The only two viable options in the west were to tamper with Sherman's supply lines or conduct an offensive that would force the Federals to react. They chose both.

The biggest mistake was Jeff Davis announcing this strategy to the army and newspapers which in turn allowed Sherman to be knowledgeable of their future movements. From the time Sherman learned of this, he began to make preparations for the defense of middle Tennessee and his march on Savannah.

Hood's biggest mistake - in my opinion - is the lack of logistical planning and his three week delay in crossing the Tennessee River. This gave the Feds three weeks to gather more troops and material in mid-Tenn.

As it was, he came very close to cutting off or destroying at least a portion of the Fed. Army at Spring Hill. There he would have found himself between a disorganized and semi-rounted army and Nashville occupied by only about 8,000 garrison troops. If he had been a day or two earlier in this move, and actually executed at Spring Hill - it would have forced the evacuation of Murfreesboro to reinforce Nashville - as Hood would have a bee-line road to Nashville.

The planning in Tennessee was tactically sound until his failure to execute at Spring Hill. Thus, in my opinion - the fate of the Army of Tenn. was decided at SPring Hill and sealed at Franklin.

Jamie

[larry_cockerham]

The calendar had more to do with Hood's defeat than anything, that coupled with his lack of fresh troops and supplies. A mission doomed from the start. Even with the capture of Schofield at Spring Hill, mighty tough weather and a large army with many guns and warm bellies waited in Nashville.

[pvt gauss]

Larry, Compliments Sir,
You can`t leave this tragity alone, can ya.
If Forrest was allowed to take the number of troops he requested around the flank[before they got holed up], I believe "Franklin" would have been a tad different. Hood still wouldl`d have had Nashville , but "Franklin" would of been a lot less costly. How much morale an how many leaders{Cleburne, etc} were lost. And the real battle was yet to be. Go figure. Course then again I have use of all my arms an legs.Never been straped to a horse.
GAUSS.