Civil War History - "What if..." DiscussionsWhat if they had attacked instead of digging in...? What if he was in charge of the army instead...? Did you ever have a "What if..." question, and you weren't sure where to post it? Here's the place to ask these speculative questions!
I have to agree with Johann. The logistical support for capturing and securing safely to friendly lines all the supplies that could be gathered would require the dismantling of at leat a brigade of cavalry - which couldn't be afforded at that time.
Like he says, the Federal cavalry is mounted and in force, they not only oppose your attempts to frustate their lines, but have enough troopers to sever your lines of communication and supplies.
Shortly, if Hood meant to conduct a raid in passing and destroy as much as possible, it is likely he would be successful. But to consider occupation of his area of operation would be insanity with the man power issues at that time. Hanging on to terrain as you suggest sounds smart - your still in enemy territory and it becomes a motivational issue. But I might suggest withdrawing for the winter as far south as the Duck River line in the vicinity of Columbia. A full 50 miles would seperate you from the stronghold at Nashville and allow a much shorter line of communication and supplies.
This distance would allow plenty of time for manuever in the event the Federals came out to play.
I agree with much you say, but must argue the Cleburne appointment. This appointment to army command could be as tragic as Hood's appointment. Cleburne had only temporarily acted as corps commander and never as army commander. Just as Hood, Cleburne may have been the one to go down in history as the man that destroyed an army.
Forrest was great, but in the same sense, look at his performance after his appointment to departmental command. They all suffered and would have suffered from the same obstacles - lack of man power.
Personally, I don't think Lee himself could have done much more than sieze Murfressboro on this campaign, and perhaps sit around through the winter as an ominous threat.
Forrest would have had plenty of manpower if it had not been constantly taken from him. He was an excellent recruiter. Often soldiers who had deserted under Bragg or Hood would join him.
Falling back to Columbia actually has some merit. It would give me shorter supply lines and more time to anticipate and react. Or shifting over even further west. I like the idea of ambushing troops if they were coming down the Tennessee river. I think my main goal would not to expect to beat the Union in head up battle. Not unless I can get them coming at me uphill. They were too well armed, too much ammunition, too well fed and just plain too many. My goal would be to spend the time I could severing the river and the railroad. Capturing what I could before I stood and fought.
But I still like the lay of the land at the Harpeth. Knowing what I know and Grant’s insistence the battle take place soon, that’s where I’d wait. Also like the idea of attacking Clarksville in force. Plenty of stores there and strategic location. But neither are really viable if I’m not aware of the Unions eagerness to attack me asap. Maybe fall back to Mont Eagle.
I agree. I've spent alot of time lately going through Tennessee Veteran Questionaires and there is no question that Forrest definitley picked up alot of recruits on the Tennessee campaign.
I suppose though that at this point of the war you need a victory, and a pretty good one at that. Either surrender the initiative and await the certain Federal advance or strike when and where you are unexpected.
The only problem with No. 2 is you have to divide your army to be victorious, conducting fients, etc. That, of course, risks everything.
Gunny, I have to hand it to you... I hate "What If" questions they always seem like a waste of time to me. This one got me thinking. What were Hoods choices; he was out of his league and decided to do what had worked for him in the past on a tactical level... pure raw aggression, attack, attack, attack keep the enemy off balance; make him react to you.
THe problem some have w/ this question is a lack of realization that the Union Army under Thomas might just be operating against the CS Army in the fields of Tennessee, Union Cav were effective, experianced veterans, well armed and decently mounted. And the Infantry was a nice mix of hardened Veterans and fresh troops too Green to know they might do something increadibly stupid... and USCT men w/ something to prove. Thomas made good use of them all. Schofield... not bad, not bad at all.
I think Hood was boned the moment he crossed the Tennessee, any strategic target worth attacking was so well defended as to make his operations too costly to succeed. He couldn't continue to gobble up garrisons because Thomas was gathering them in to clobber him if he pushed a set piece battle. He didn't dare withdraw to a better position... that was the excuse he had used to get himself Johnstons command and he had already let Sherman advance too far into the interior of Georgia to get back to biting at their heels. He had to destroy something, and he had to have a victory for the CS, the more spectacular the better. He couldn't take Murfreesboro, Chatanooga had been tried and was too well fortified, if e tried to bypass Murfreesboro and head for Memphis he would have a strong enemy in his rear between him and his supplies. In short he was boned; and I wonder if he didn't know it.
Any chances he had he gave up when he fled Sherman; if he could have kept up his dance... but Alltoona showed him that gobbling up garrisons wasn't as easy as he thought. And I think Sherman had put a good scare on him around Atlanta. He'd been w/ Lee in the east; aggression and balls the size of Texas made a big contribution... he tried that w/ Sherman and discovered those Westerners wearing Blue were a whole different set of fighting men. At the battles around Atlanta, he had the initiative, position and at one point even suprise... but Shermans boys didn't panic; just like his Texans at Antietem they dove into the fight w/ a wee bit more enthusiasm than he expected.
He had to have some serious self doubt... was Joe Johnston right all along? He had to look into the faces of his men and know they hated his guts; he knew what they called him... and they didn't even bother to say it behind his back anymore.
The blame for Franklin and Nashville should be set squarly at the feet of three things. Hood himself for an ineptly run campaign. Davis for first giving Hood a command that was far out of his league and second for keeping him there when he had shown he wasn't up to the task. Thirdly and most importantly; he was facing a Union Army that didn't really know defeat, that was competantly commanded and well equipped... behind entrenchments to boot. I think the Union Army was the overriding factor in his defeat with all other things merely contributing factors.
__________________ Few take the trouble to understand or to view the American scene with perspective. And we Americans love to find ourselves guilty of something. However, it is never I who am guilty, but those other Americans, the past or present government or the other political party. Americans almost never find other countries guilty. It is always ourselves or our fancied influence in other countries. Louis L'amour
The only problem with No. 2 is you have to divide your army to be victorious, conducting fients, etc. That, of course, risks everything.
Oh yes, risky, but that is what I'd do. If it was Jan I'd try draw them into attacking my front along the Harpeth. Yes, it does risk everything. But I recall an old saying "You can't be careful on a skateboard, mister." But even taking risks I would not have succumbed to a götterdämmerung mentality that Hood apparently had.
Sizing up the situation, and knowing the importance of stopping the Federal army before they reach Nashville, I would issue the following orders:
Forrest, consolidate ALL of your cavalry on the east side of town and force a passage over the Harpeth at Hughes' Mill, secure the area and allow Stewart to cross half of his force, then proceed the most direct route to Wilson Pike and sieze the Nashville Pike in the vicinity of Brentwood, block Granny White Pike and roads west to Hillsborough and force the action at Brentwood.
Stewart, Cross in rear of Forrest and proceed under cover of darkness due north to the vicinity of Hollow Tree Gap and await Lee's arrival - orient west. Sieze the pike. I will travel with you.
Lee, arrive in rear of Lee and cross the Harpeth following in trace of Stewart. You will align on his left and orient west. You will not sieze the pike but command it by fire.
Cheatham, You will push the enemy's right flank, probe and fient to draw attention to the west. Do not commit to assault, but show entire force until after darkness. COntinue to probe with gunfire and test the enemy as long as he resists. It is essential you show force enough to draw the enemy's attention and maintain it. At dawn, you will cross at the nearest ford and march to the vicinity of Hollow Tree Gap.
It is my intent to secure the roads at Brentwood - at or near the head of their wagon train, Sieze the pike at Hollow Tree Gap after darkness, and force a battle at dawn Dec. 1.
Gen'l Cmding.
No better chance of success with this one than any other. I run the same risks that I did the night before.
Perhaps if Hood had realized the fact that by NOW there was no stopping the Feds from getting to Nashville at this point without great loss of life, and the arrival of Smith's corps in just a few hours - maybe Murfreesboro may not have been a bad idea?
Literally, there were about 8,000 garrison troops there. If you know the size of Fortress Rosecranz, you know that it would be actually impossible for 8,000 men to garrision all the works there. I have considered in the past and still think that if Hood had perhaps arrived at Franklin, and seen the futility of an attack there, he might have ordered a march down the Murfreesboro Pike to that place and envelope the garrision with his superior force. With his entire force, he could certainly conduct such a convincing fient, that he could overrun portions of the fortress with more ease than we could expect.
The Fortress was monsterous in size, and there is no way the Feds could truely defend such a large position with only 8,000 men.
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